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Abstract
This thesis explores the structure of international 
competition in the textile industry and the industry's 
development within the British context. The strategies of 
the three multinational corporations which dominate the 
British industry are analysed in detail. The method of 
investigation has involved an examination of both primary 
and secondary material on the industry. Two case studies of 
plant level restructuring were based on a series of 
interviews with management, trade union officials, and 
workplace union representatives at two of Courtaulds' 
textile plants.
The analysis of the industry raises several problems with 
the existing theoretical literature. These concern the lack 
of a developed, integrated perspective on international 
structural change and uneven development, and, in 
particular, the manner in which analytical categories are 
elaborated to mediate between these different levels of 
analysis. The thesis demonstrates that the complex dynamics 
of restructuring and sectoral decline can only be understood 
in terms of a matrix of international structural forces, and 
a national configuration of social and economic 
relationships.
The first chapter introduces a range of theoretical 
perspectives on international structural change and 
industrial decline. Section A analyses the international 
dimensions of change in the industry and the complex social 
and economic forces underlying the process of 
internationalisation. Section B outlines the performance of 
British textiles and clothing since the 1970s, and discusses 
a number of competing explanations of the industry's long 
term decline and current development. Section C investigates 
the international activities of three British textile 
multinational corporations, their domestic strategies and 
the changing balance between their national and 
international interests. An examination of restructuring at 
two of Courtaulds' textile plants involves an analysis of 
the implications of industrial change for social 
relationships at workplace level.
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Chapter O n e  Structural Chang« and Industrial Decline
1.1 Introduction
The analysis of the textile industry presented in this 
thesis initially stemmed fron an interest in the process of 
industrial restructuring» and in particular, the impact of 
technological change on work organisation and the 
formulation of union strategies to new technology. By 
investigating the implementation of new technology at two 
textile plants, the purpose was to analyse the dynamic 
recomposition of social relationships and the division of 
labour rather than to document in detail the implications of 
technological change for the structure of collective 
bargaining. These themes, however, were rapidly overtaken by 
a set of broader issues. As a result of research into the 
dynamics of change in the textile industry, it became clear 
that plant level restructuring was a concrete manifestation 
of more abstract economic and social forces. The objective 
of the following analysis is therefore to disentangle and 
reveal the complex economic imperatives shaping the 
strategies of the three leading producers in the British 
industry.
The integration of developing countries into the world 
economic system, as indigenous producers and as investment 
sites for multinationals, has had profound implications for 
the manufacturing industries of developed countries. Since 
the 1960s the British textile industry, like all other 
national textile industries, has been affected by an 
international restructuring of production and employment in
which the location of textile production has shifted 
systematically away from the developed to the developing 
countries. It is therefore no coincidence that the British 
textile industry has becoee progressively internationalised 
with the three leading manufacturers (Courtaulds, Tootal and 
Coats Viyella) having an extensive network of foreign 
subsidiaries as well as involvement in overseas 
subcontracting arrangements.
These observations, however, beg a series of much larger 
questions. Can an analysis of these international structural 
changes generate an adequate explanation of the precise 
development of the industry in the British context, the 
degree and character of its internationalisation or the 
specific responses of the leading producers in the present 
period of the industry's reorganisation? Do these 
international economic forces in themselves explain the 
evolution of British textiles as a low wage, low 
productivity industry or its relative decline in relation to 
other national textile industries?
The central argument of this thesis is that the complex 
nature of the industry's development and its particular 
location within the world textile industry cannot be simply 
deduced from an analysis of international structural change. 
Although international economic forces have impinged on the 
development of British textiles, the industry is also firmly 
embedded within a national terrain of economic and social 
institutions and structures which have interacted to shape 
the character of the industry and the responses of the
2
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leading producers in particular ways. Whilst the leading 
multinationals are an institutional Manifestation of the 
internationalisation process and are thus part of a more 
general concentration and centralisation of capital on a 
world scale, they also operate within a national context.
Multinational corporations adapt their competitive 
strategies (and the character and extent of their 
internationalisation) to particular national circumstances. 
The present predicament of the industry can therefore only 
be understood in relation to the complex interplay of 
international structural change and the peculiar 
configuration of national economic and social forces which 
have collectively shaped the industry's development and long 
term decline. The textile industry, then, is a concrete 
exemplar of two distinct processes, the progressive 
internationalisation of manufacturing industry and Britain's 
relative industrial decline.
The empirical analysis of the textile industry is thus an 
exploration of the dialectical relationship between 
international and national economic forces. As discussed 
below, these two dimensions of industrial change and 
development have often been analysed quite separately and 
have spawned two self contained strands of theoretical 
literature. The conventional partitioning of theoretical 
debate has centred around analyses of worldwide structural 
change and the internationalisation process on the one hand, 
and Britain's long term relative economic decline on the 
other. But this polarisation has produced conceptual
problems inherent in both sets of literature. The 
literatures in question are referred to below under the 
headings of 'New International Division of Labour', 
'Regulation Theory', and the 'National Disensión'. By 
engaging with these approaches the ais is to present a sore 
integrated view of the dynasics of industrial restructuring. 
How then do these literatures conceptualise the conplex 
relationship between international and national econonic 
forces?
1.2 Internationalisation and 'new divisions of labour*
The world econony has becose increasingly integrated over 
the post war period and this is intrinsically related to the 
expansion of transnational corporations. Pros 1945-60 there 
was an unprecedented growth in the activity of nanufacturing 
sultinationals, led by the USA, although since the 1960s, 
European and Japanese firms have been growing at a faster 
rate. MNCs are one particular institutional manifestation of 
the internationalisation of capital, or as Jenkins (1987:11) 
puts it:
'the process by which an increasingly integrated 
capitalist economy has developed and by which capital 
has become ever more global in its operations.'
This ensures that economic crises and periods of structural
dislocation assume a global character and that
manifestations of crisis are transmitted to all national
economies. Conversely, the economic and social
reorganisation of individual nation states occurs within an
international context and is closely determined by
structural changes operating at a global level.
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Two distinct, but interrelated perspectives, - termed neo- 
Ssithian and neo-Ricardian by Jenkins (1984) - conceptualise 
the structural transformation of the world economy as a new 
international division of labour. The first of these 
perspectives is exemplified by Frobel, Heinrichs and Kreye's 
research conducted in the 1970s. They draw upon 
Wallenstein's (1974) concept of the world economy as an 
integrated system and argue thus:
national economies are organic elements of one 
all-embracing system, namely a world economy which 
is in fact a single worldwide capitalist system —  the 
structural changes in individual national economies 
are interrelated within this single world economy.' 
(1980:8)
The major manifestations of structural disorder in the 
developed economies, such as de-industrialisation, 
unemployment, and stagnating domestic investment, are 
connected to the formation of a new international division 
of labour (Probel, Heinrichs and Kreye 1980:47). A new stage 
of imperialist development has superceded the classical 
international division of labour based on the integration of 
LDCs into the world economy as importers of manufactured 
products fror developed countries and as exporters of raw 
materials. LDCs are now being integrated into the world 
capitalist economy in a significantly new way, as centres of 
production, particularly for the export of manufactured 
products and as sources of 'cheap' labour power. Frobel, 
Heinrichs and Kreye (1980) emphasise changes in the world 
market, particularly the construction of a world market for 
labour and production sites, and industrial products as the 
determining factor in bringing about the new international 
division of labour. The internationalisation of production
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since the 1960s is s classic manifestation of fundamental 
structural changes characterising the world economy. It can 
be attributed to the tendency of multinationals to relocate 
production out of high wage economies into countries where 
there is a plentiful supply of cheap labour.
Manufacturing plants producing for the world economy can be 
profitably situated in developing countries for three main 
reasons. Firstly, the use of capital intensive methods of 
production in agriculture in the Third World and the 
displacement of rural labourers has generated a vast global 
reservoir of labour power which is cheap and available for 
any kind of waged work. Secondly, the intensive development 
of the division of labour and the fragmentation of 
production processes has made it possible for most sub­
processes to be performed by unskilled workers after brief 
training periods. Hence, the most deskilled, labour 
intensive parts of a production process can be relocated to 
areas of the world economy with abundant supplies of cheap 
labour. Thirdly, the development of transportation and 
communications technology has enabled capital to be mobile 
on a global basis. These phenomena have meshed with the 
profit orientated behaviour of capital which has led to 
industrial relocation to the cheap labour countries of the 
Third World.
Jenkins, following Brenner (1977) characterises this type of 
approach as 'neo-Smithian' (Jenkins 1984:29) because of the 
parallels with Adam Smith's arguments concerning the onset 
of industrialisation in Britain. In the context of the new
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international division of labour, the effects of the 
development of transport on the size of the market and the 
consequent division of labour, have constituted a world 
market for labour power and production sites, as well as for 
industrial products (Probel, Heinrichs and Kreye 1980:178).
The emphasis on the intensification of the division of 
labour and the fragmentation of the production process has 
led some theorists (eg. Bison 1986a) to argue that Probel, 
Heinrichs and Kreye (1980:41) conceptualise the new 
international division of labour as the application of the 
Babbage principle on a world scale. To Probel, Heinrichs and 
Kreye:
'Babbage's principle - a fundamental expression of 
the capitalist laws of notion - calls for the maximum 
replacement of skilled labour in order to attain a 
reduction in labour costs. It is implemented through 
the world-wide organised allocation ot the elements of 
the production process to the cheapest or most adapted 
labour force which can be found.' (1980:41)
The fragmentation of the labour process into its component 
parts, cheapens labour because the majority of tasks are 
rendered simple and repetitive and can be undertaken by 
workers with minimum levels of skill. It also enhances 
managerial control over labour because workers no longer 
have strategic knowledge of the entire production process 
and are easily replaceable and disposable. In fact. Probel, 
Heinrichs and Kreye (1980:45) explicitly use the term the 
new international division of labour to describe a tendency 
which not only undermines the classical international 
division of labour, but also:
'compels the increasing subdivision of manufacturing 
processes into a number of partial operations at
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different industrial sites throughout the world.'
The new international division of labour is therefore 
conceptualised as an 'institutional' innovation of capital, 
and is not the result of changes in the development policies 
of Third World states, or the strategies of transnational 
corporations (1980:46).
A second variant within this general framework, 
characterised as 'neo-Ricardian' by Jenkins (1984:30), views 
capital relocation and the new international division of 
labour not as a cause of crisis in the 'centre' but as a 
response to falling profitability which has bedeviled 
developed capitalist countries. This squeeze on profits is 
attributed to the secular rise in the strength of organised 
labour during the post war period which has made it 
difficult to maintain the profit rate through increasing the 
rate of exploitation. Working class strength has allegedly 
grown with the concentration of the «forking class and 
capital (Arrighi 1978) and as a result of the post war boon 
which seriously eroded the pool of unemployed «rorkers 
(Frobel 1982). The relocation of capital to the Third World 
is therefore a rational strategy, given the wage 
differential between the centre and the periphery and the 
relative political and industrial weakness of the working 
class in the Third World (Arrighi 1978).
Cowling (1986:24) has taken up this line of reasoning. 
Multinational capital is conceptualised as 'footloose' and 
'nomadic' driven by a desire to minimise costs whilst 
maintaining and enhancing market control. Relocation is a
rational response to rising labour costs, improvements in
communications and transportation, the development of
flexible production technology and the diffusion of the
multi-divisional organisational structure. The result is:
'an international transmission mechanism for 
production, investment, and jobs.... largely 
adopted for distributional reasons...Whenever 
workers act to raise wages, or control the 
intensity or duration of work, they will lose 
their jobs to other groups of less well organised 
and less militant workers in other countries.'
(1986:35)
These debates are directly relevant to any analysis of the 
textiles and clothing industry. Probel, Heinrichs and Kreye 
(1980), in particular, make clear connections between 
structural unemployment in the West German textile and 
clothing industries, the export oriented industrialisation 
strategies of LDCs, and the relocation of production by West 
German companies to lower waged countries. Thus, a central 
objective of this study is to explore how far the 
progressive internationalisation of the industry can be 
exclusively related to the search by multinational 
corporations for lower waged labour, and whether such an 
explanation provides us with an adequate understanding of 
the involvement of LDCs in the world textile industry.
1.3 The Regulation Approach
Regulationist theories focus primarily on the mechanisms of 
'regulation' of national economies and the establishment and 
eventual disintegration of hegemonic modes of accumulation 
which envelop a range of countries. The international 
capitalist economy is shaped by the relationships between 
these individual economies rather than by a 'supranational'
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world system which deteraines the development of national 
econoaies.
For regulationist analysis (Aglietta 1979, 1982), each 
historical period of capitalist developaent is characterised 
by a specific aode or fora of regulation denoting:
'the way in which a systea as a whole functions, the 
conjunction of econoaic aechanisas associated with 
a given set of social relationships, of institutional 
foras and structures' (Boyer 1979:100).
Such periods are characterised by an institutional stability
underpinned by relatively enduring aechanisas of regulation
in terns of wages, eaployaent, technology, labour process,
price formation and node of consumption.
A regime of accumulation refers to particular relationships 
between production and consumption in different historical 
conjunctures. For Lipietz (1987:14) it describes the 'long 
term stabilisation of the allocation of social production 
between consumption and accumulation' and is introduced by 
Aglietta (1979:68) as an intermediate concept to analyse - 
not rigidly periodise - the history of American capitalism.
A given regime of accumulation and certain forms of 
regulation stabilise at the sane time because they allow 
social relations to be temporarily reproduced despite the 
conflictual tendencies characteristic of capitalism.
A regime may be primarily extensive or intensive, depending 
on whether capital accumulation is a means to expand the 
scale of production or to further capitalist reorganisation 
of labour by increasing productivity through rapid advances 
in the mechanisation of production. An extensive regime of
11
accumulation characterises a historical period in which 
absolute surplus value extraction is the predominant mode of 
exploitation based on either the lengthening of the working 
day or the intensification of labour. An intensive regime of 
accumulation is characterised by the predominance of 
relative surplus value based on rising labour productivity 
which cheapens wage goods and makes possible a reduction of 
the necessary labour time devoted to the production of their 
equivalent. A regime of accumulation is associated with a 
schema of reproduction (cf. Lipietz 1987) which designates 
the allocation of labour and distribution of products 
between different departments of production (capital and 
consumption goods) over a certain period of time.
Crises break out because of a divergence between the 
existing mode of regulation and regime of accumulation. This 
may happen because the emergence of a new regime is held 
back by outdated forms of regulation (crisis of 1930) or the 
existing regime of accumulation has been exhausted given the 
prevailing node of regulation (the present crisis) (Lipietz 
1987:34). Regulationists therefore do not prioritise any one 
single cause of crisis but emphasise multiple factors, 
including fluctuations in the profit rate; underconsumption; 
overaccunulation, sectoral imbalances etc. (cf. Mazier 
1982). Crises are however viewed as historical turning 
points or creative ruptures in the continuity of the 
reproduction of economic and social relationships which lead 
to their restructuring in new forms.
Regulationists argue that the current structural 
transformation of the world economy is related to the demise 
of Fordism. A regime of intensive accumulation - Fordism - 
denotes a system of mass commodity production which 
facilitated the 'continual adjustment of mass consumption to 
rises in productivity' (Lipietz 1987:35). It triggered off a 
period of continuous economic growth from 1945 to the mid 
1960s. This stable environment for capital accumulation was 
based on the diffusion of Taylorist work organisation and 
assembly line production methods. The mechanisation of the 
labour process facilitated sustained rises in productivity 
matched by increases in the purchasing power of wage 
earners. The establishment of a Fordist regime of 
accumulation was underpinned by a new regulatory system. 
'Monopolistic' regulation - as Lipietz (1987) terms it - was 
associated with the extension of the welfare state, the 
regulation of wage relations through collective bargaining, 
corporatist arrangements between the representatives of the 
state, industry and labour, and economic intervention by 
governments through Keynesian demand management policies.
Fordism was diffused at an international level through the 
medium of American economic and political supremacy which 
culminated in the Marshall and MacArthur Plans, the Bretton 
Woods Agreements, and the establishment of institutions such 
as GATT, IMF, the World Bank and the OECD. Third World 
countries - or the 'periphery' - were integrated into the 
world economy as exporters of raw materials. Lipietz 
(1984:99) points out that in the mid 1960s, at the height of 
the Fordist regime of accumulation, the importance of the
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periphery in world trade for manufactured goods was 
negligible.
The disintegration of Fordism began in the late 1960s and 
was manifested by a general slowdown in the growth of 
manufacturing output, rising unemployment and the emergence 
of inflation. Many Régulâtionists argue (Aglietta 1979, 
Lipietz 1987:44, Mazier 1982) that the primary factor 
underlying the crisis was the technical limits of the 
Fordist labour process. Aglietta (1979:119) stresses that 
assembly line production eventually limits the rise in the 
rate of relative surplus value. The greater the extent of 
task fragmentation and automation of the labour process, the 
costlier is any subsequent intensification of output due to 
escalating capital costs. The increasing complexity and 
large scale specialisation of machines designed for scale 
economies induced imbalances and slowed down productivity 
growth, with a rising coefficient of per capita fixed 
capital. The 'technical rigidity of the machine system', 
(Aglietta 1979:119) therefore shattered the hitherto dynamic 
equilibrium of the two departments, and produced profound 
disharmony between the spheres of production, exchange and 
distribution.
The crisis of Fordism was associated with profound changes 
in the international economy, notably the growing 
internationalisation of production, pressing external 
constrainta on national economies which produced chronic 
balance of payments problems, breakdown of the international 
monetary system and changes in the nature of integration of
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the Third World into the world econoiy. Lipietz (1987:99) 
situates the new international division of labour in the 
context of the emergence of the crisis of Fordism in the 
'centre'. In response to falling rates of profit, the 
national boundaries of Fordist accumulation had to be 
transcended so that new sources of surplus value could be 
located, notably, in the newly industrialising countries 
(WICs).
Two significant logics underpinned the expansion of 
Fordism's geographical base and have informed the 
accumulation strategies of the NICs. The first of these 
logics is termed 'primitive Taylorisation' by Lipietz 
(1987:74), which involves the transfer of deskilled labour 
processes to Third World states characterised by high rates 
of exploitation. Productivity increases are generated by 
increases in the extraction of absolute surplus value, 
mainly through the lengthening of the working day. The South 
East Asian NICs (Hong Kong, Singapore) initially pursued a 
'primitive Taylorisation' strategy in a number of 
industries, notably, textiles and electronics (Lipietz 
1984:100).
The second logic - 'peripheral Fordism' - characterises the 
attempt by a number of NICs to improve the technical level 
of their exports. This is associated with demands for rising 
wages, mechanisation of the labour process and an expanding 
market for consumer durables. The diffusion of Fordism to 
Third World economies is peripheral because the jobs and 
production processes which involve skilled manufacturing and
15
engineering are still mainly located in the developed 
economies.
But «rhat about a possible resolution of the crisis? Is there 
an emerging new regime of accumulation or mode of 
regulation? Although many regulationists are cautious about 
producing definite prognoses concerning the future shape of 
a post Pordist regime of accumnalation certain economic 
trends have been identified which may constitute the basis 
of a new mode of production and consumption sufficient to 
initiate an expansionary wave of capital accumulation. For 
example, Murray (1985, 1987) has argued that we are 
witnessing the emergence of neo/post Fordism characterised 
by the production of specialised goods for segmented 
markets. It is based on an integrated production system 
which radically reduces the optimum scale of production by 
systematically connecting design, manufacturing, stock 
control, marketing and retailing through the extensive 
deployment of information technologies and the diffusion of 
organisational innovations such as just-in-time production 
systems (1985:29). Other writers (Aglietta 1979, Jessop 
1988) argue that neo-Fordism is associated with a 
restructuring of the institutional forms of the state, 
involving the breakdown of corporatist relationships between 
the state, industry and organised labour, and the 
commercialisation and privatisation of a wide range of 
collective services previously organised by the Fordist 
welfare state.
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Post-Fordism has not, however, initiated one single 
hegenonic growth aodel, with Japanese, Aaerican and European 
aodels in competition. Structural dislocation at the 
international level has generated a 'tripolar global 
configuration' (Lipietz 1987) with one aajor pole importing 
products and monopolising credit (America), the second pole 
exporting (Japan) and the third pole stagnating (Europe). In 
the context of the Third Nor Id, a replication of the 
international division of labour is occurring. Higher wages 
in the first wave of MICs and protectionism in the developed 
economies have rendered 'bloody Taylorisation' strategies of 
accumulation less viable. The South East Asian NICs - in 
conjunction with MNCs - are therefore subcontracting labour 
intensive production processes to second tier LDCs, notably, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand. According to 
Lipietz (1984:103):
'..the Third World is today like a constellation of 
special cases. They are characterised by vague 
regularities, fragments of an accumulation logic 
which fit more or less well together and flows which
come and g o --without having established a stable
mode of regulation at a global level.'
Clearly, this account of the dynamics of capitalist 
development is situated at a relatively abstract level of 
analysis. But attempts have been made (eg. Murray 1985,
1987) to harness the conceptual categories of Fordism, neo- 
Ford ism or flexible accumulation strategies to capture 
particular features of the reorganisation of individual 
industries and companies. Thus, Benetton - the Italian 
clothing transnational - has been drawn upon as a prime 
exemplar of current forms of industrial restructuring. The 
company's strategy has been based on the application of
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information technology in marketing and distribution, the 
utilisation of a putting out system of production, and the 
implementation of just-in-time methods to integrate 
manufacturing and retailing.
An investigation of the broad processes of change in the 
textile industry points up some of the problems involved in 
applying conceptual categories like neo/post-Fordism to 
describe the complex nature of industrial change and the 
behaviour of firms in the industry. An important theme of 
the thesis is the extent to which new technologies have led 
to substantive changes in the nature of competition in the 
industry and whether, in fact, an emphasis on marketing and 
retailing, and mechanisms to integrate production and 
distribution are intrinsically novel developments.
1.4 The National Dimension
Analyses which focus primarily on the issue of industrial 
decline emphasise the role of internal forces and economic 
and social institutions operating within a national context. 
In the British context, the degree of emphasis placed on 
these internal forces differs but reference is made to the 
character of industrial relations and the militancy of trade 
unions, the legacy of Britain's imperial rule, the 
separation of industrial and finance capital, or the 
inconsistent record of successive governments in the 
formulation of industrial policies.
Two particular perspectives on the relative decline of the 
British economy conceptualise this process in remarkably
18
similar ways, primarily from an institutionalist viewpoint. 
Thus, Elba urn and Laxonick (1985) consider the root of 
Britain's relative decline as located in a particular 
configuration of institutional relationships which emerged 
in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. The main 
emphasis is on how the structure of industrial relations and 
industrial organisation inherited from the era of Britain's 
international economic dominance impeded the structural 
transformation of British manufacturing industry.
A body of literature, referred to as 'Flexible 
Specialisation' (henceforth flex-spec), echoes the 
descriptive features of regulationist analysis although the 
conceptual categories used are institutionalist. 
Regulationists view the historical development of capitalism 
as being punctuated by 'structural breaks' or 'organic 
crises' which are the product of multiple contradictions 
within production, and between production, exchange and 
distribution. The explanatory categories used - capital, 
value etc. - are intended to reveal the dynamics and social 
character of the capitalist mode of production. In contrast, 
a flex-spec perspective focuses on the process of 
institutional rigidity and adaptation, and the interplay 
between changes in the level and composition of demand, 
product markets, technology and the labour process.
Flex-spec theorists draw on the work of Piore and Sabel 
(1984), who argue that structural change within the 
developed economies is related to a transition from Fordist 
methods of production, involving the mass production of
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basic standardised products for a homogeneous market to an 
emerging stage of flexible specialisation, characterised by 
small or medium batch production of specialised, high 
quality goods. Shifts in consumer demand, notably the 
saturation of the demand for mass produced consumer durables 
underpin the current period of restructuring. The economic 
viability of flexible specialisation has been enhanced by 
computer technologies which permit a reduction of unit costs 
within non-repetitive manufacturing, thereby permitting 
firms to respond to the changing composition of demand. The 
implication is that the transition to flexible 
specialisation and its meshing with new technologies has 
reduced the optimum scale of production thus conferring 
competitive advantages onto small firms, rather than large, 
vertically integrated corporations which were formerly 
geared to maximising scale economies from high throughput 
production.
The development of flexible specialisation production 
methods allegedly requires a multi-skilled and polyvalent 
workforce, thus reversing the deskilling tendencies of 
Taylorist forms of work organisation. The implications for 
the structure of the international economy are not analysed 
in any great detail, but a likely outcome of present 
restructuring would be the concentration of flexibly 
specialised, high technology industries in the developed 
economies and the relocation of Pordist mass production 
industry to the LDCs. At a conceptual level, the analysis 
focuses exclusively on exchange relations, notably shifts in 
demand, which shape the nature of product markets, and the
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organisation of production. In contrast, regulationists 
consider the fragmentation of demand and the disintegration 
of iass production/consuaption as a manifestation not the 
underlying cause of crisis.
The central focus of flex-spec theory is on the changing 
nature of competition within the developed economies, and 
the factors which either facilitate or impede the diffusion 
of flexible specialisation production methods in particular 
national contexts. Thus, the slow diffusion of flex-spec 
production methods in the UK is explained by reference to 
the poor guality of managerial decisionmaking in UK 
manufacturing (Milliams et al. 1989:6); the mistaken belief 
of British governments and managers in the competitive 
advantages of large sized firms and the efficiency gains of 
scale economies (Hirst and Zeitlin 1989b) or the rigid 
commitment of private sector trade unions to free collective 
bargaining and high wage increases. Strategic 
miscalculation, managerial inefficiencies and institutional 
rigidities are therefore presented as the main reasons for 
the continuing poor performance of British firms in the 
1980s.
Thus, Elbaurn and Lazonick (1985) and flex-spec writers, like 
Hirst and Zeitlin (1989a/b) analyse Britain's competitive 
failure as a reflection of entrenched or rigid institutional 
structures. The main difference is that the former view 
economic decline as a continuous process beginning in the 
late nineteenth century, whereas the latter point to a 
historical 'turning point' in British economic development
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in the late 1960a, coinciding with the demise of u s s  
production. Both approaches have contributed to debates on 
the development of British textiles and clothing.
1.4.1 The decline of British textiles: a long term problem? 
Lazonick's (1985) analysis of the decline of British 
textiles focuses on a set of institutional relationships 
which originated in the late nineteenth century and 
allegedly conditioned the development of the industry up 
until the 1960s. In the context of the cotton industry - 
which has undergone the most protracted decline of all the 
textile sub-sectors - he emphasises that the constraints of 
industrial relations and industrial organisation inherited 
from the era of Britain's international economic dominance 
impeded the structural transformation of the industry and 
perpetuated its technological backwardness. This thesis, 
however, takes issue with Lazonick's historical account for 
two reasons. Firstly, an exclusive emphasis on nationally 
based 'internal' constraints ignores the analytical 
significance of international economic developments; the 
integration of the British industry within a global system 
of production and the significance of multinationals in the 
industry. Secondly, the focus on nineteenth century 
institutional relationships downplays the potential for the 
change and transformation of the British industry during the 
twentieth century and the significance of government 
intervention and shifts in state policy towards this sector.
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1.4.2 Reatructurlnq; a cae« of flex-spec?
A number of writers (Zeitlin 1985, Zeitlin and Totterdill 
1989, Hitter 1986) have drawn upon the 'flexible' potential 
of automation technologies and their convergence with a 
shift to the production of higher quality, fashion 
orientated products in smaller batches to argue that 
industries like textiles and clothing are moving from a 
Pordist mass production paradigm to flexible specialisation 
production methods. Por the UK, the general implication is 
that a perceptible shift to small batch production - at 
least in the early 1980s - provided a favourable context for 
the regeneration of these industries. Yet, the analysis of 
developments in textiles and clothing points out that both 
industries are the site of a complex recomposition of 
competitive relationships which tend not to be amenable to 
superimposed ideal typical categories, like Pordism or flex- 
spec. The simplistic application of these analytical 
categories to specific national contexts and particular 
industries is questioned.
1.5 An Alternative Approach
The central argument of this thesis is that the fracturing 
of theoretical analysis around two separate axes of 
international structural change and national industrial 
performance has resulted in the absence of a synthetic 
treatment. Analyses of structural change in the world 
economy tend to neglect the differentiated nature of 
national economies and the particular configurations of 
social and economic relationships which have shaped the 
character of national industrial development. An emphasis on
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internal forces in shaping the development of individual 
economies often downplays the significance of changes in the 
structure of international capitalism and the international 
integration of national economies through the activities of 
transnational corporations and banks. A more convincing 
account of industrial decline would seek to analyse the 
interactions between the key social agencies (labour, 
multinational and national industrial capital, finance 
capital and the state) which have been crucial to the 
emergence of the UK as a low wage, low productivity economy 
in comparison to other developed countries.
The main contentions of the thesis are:
a) New international division of labour theories, 
particularly the world-systems variant, blur the complex 
relationship between international and national economic 
forces because of their exclusive focus on a supranational 
international economic system. The emphasis on the Babbage 
Principle underplays the significance of technological 
developments in raising productivity and reducing unit 
production costs, whilst the notion of multinationals as 
'footloose' in search of cheap labour ignores the multi­
faceted nature of corporate strategies.
b) The focus of regulation theory on the development of 
the USA and the diffusion of the Pordist regime of 
accumulation to other developed economies obscures both 
national specificities and an account of the complex 
processes which have informed the present development of the 
international economy.
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c) Regulation1st theories tend to harness the UK's 
relative industrial decline to conceptual categories which 
were not originally formulated for the analysis of the 
differentiated nature of individual economies. Thus, partial 
empirical trends are abstracted from complex empirical 
circumstances which are then subsumed under a set of 
stylised categories (eg. Fordism, neo-Pordism;.
d) Analyses which focus primarily on the issue of 
Britain's industrial decline, however, overplay the role of 
internal forces peculiar to the nation state because of 
their exclusive emphasis on institutional rigidities. They 
therefore downplay the importance of multinationals to 
British manufacturing and changes in the form of Britain's 
integration in the international economy during the 
twentieth century.
e) Relatedly, a flex-spec perspective underestimates 
the continuing significance of scale economies and large 
scale production, particularly in consumer durables.
Evidence indicates, moreover, that the implementation of 
computerised technologies, and an emphasis on high value 
added production does not necessarily mesh with the 
emergence of polyvalent, skilled workers or a cooperative 
model of industrial relations.
1.6 The Method of Analysis
The objective of this study of textiles and clothing is not 
to subject the hypotheses from any one particular 
perspective to empirical falsification but to reveal the 
complex interplay of international and national economic 
forces in shaping the present predicament of British
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textiles and the strategies of the sost influential and 
highly internationalised firms in the sector.
The substantive focus of the thesis progresses in distinct 
analytical stages from an account of the relatively abstract 
forces structuring competition at an international level, to 
the configuration of economic and social relationships 
operating within the specific context of the British 
industry. A major part of the thesis is devoted to an 
analysis of the three textile multinationals which dominate 
the British industry. The restructuring of production at two 
of Courtaulds' textile plants is the object of detailed 
discussion.
The analysis of corporate strategies is not intended to 
elucidate the process of managerial decision making within 
the modem corporation but illustrates the complex manner in 
which multinationals recompose the structure of production 
and employment on an international and national basis. An 
exclusively plant level case study based approach to 
industrial change was therefore eschewed because this does 
not allow any detailed elaboration of the broader economic 
and social forces impinging on national industries or 
particular companies. Nevertheless, the adaptation of the 
three British textile multinationals to competitive 
pressures has led to radical changes in the structure of 
production at particular plants. This, in turn, has profound 
implications for the process of industrial relations, and 
the social division of labour. The reshaping of the 
production process at two of Courtaulds' textile plants
therefore serves as an analytical sedius through which the 
dynamics of industrial change can be revealed at a concrete 
level.
An integrated analysis of relatively abstract econosic and 
social forces and their concrete sanifestations ensures that 
the complexities of industrial change can be better 
understood. The analysis of the British textile industry 
therefore tries to transcend the conceptual polarity between 
international structural change and national industrial 
decline which has so often been reinforced in other accounts 
of industrial restructuring.
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SECTION A: STRUCTURAL CHANGE III THE TEXTILE INDUSTRY 
The textile industry has undergone iuense structural change 
over the last three decades, both within the developed 
countries and internationally. A major restructuring of 
production and esployeent has occurred on an international 
basis, in which the location of production has moved 
systematically away from higher waged to lower waged 
countries. Moreover, since the 1960s, industrialised 
countries have shifted from being net exporters of textiles 
and clothing to net importers. In short, the industry has 
become progressively internationalised over the post war 
period.
The aim of this section is to analyse the broad dimensions 
of change in the industry, and the reasons underlying shifts 
in production, employment and trade flows. One particularly 
influential analysis attributes these locational shifts to 
the activities of multinational corporations who have sought 
to relocate production to LDCs in response to lower wage 
costs. Although a considerable gap exists in average labour 
costs between developed and developing countries in the 
industry, the pattern of foreign direct investment (fdi) 
tends not to support the thesis that the locational 
strategies of NNCs are driven exclusively by differences in 
relative labour costs. Access to markets appears to be more 
important. Moreover, the bulk of fdi made by OECD textile 
firms tends to be located in other developed countries 
rather than the LDCs. International subcontracting, which 
more closely approximates a strategy designed to reduce 
labour costs, tends to have been unevenly adopted by firms
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in the developed econoaies, and evidence indicates that it 
has resulted in problems for multinationals because of the 
arms length nature of the transactions involved. Moreover, 
competitive strategies bailed on 'cheap labour' have 
contradictory effects. Investment in lower waged LDCs has 
often generated demands for rising wages, expansion of 
unionisation and industrial conflict. Firms in the industry 
have also embraced other forms of internationalisation such 
as cross-national licensing agreements, which do not involve 
investment in overseas markets or the relocation of 
production. The internationalisation of production in the 
industry has therefore assumed a number of forms and is 
driven by a multiplicity of factors, not merely the search 
for low waged labour.
A unique concern with labour costs underplays the 
significance of labour productivity and specifically, 
technological developments in raising productivity and 
reducing unit production costs. Although Third World wages 
may be lower it does not necessarily follow unit production 
costs are lower as this depends on productivity rates. There 
has been a long run trend of the textile industry towards 
more capital intensive production methods. The main stimulus 
to technological development has been the need for firms to 
economise on unit production costs to compete with lower 
waged economies.
A major issue in what follows is the extent to which new 
technologies have enhanced the competitiveness of firms in 
the developed economies. Have they initiated the relocation
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of labour intensive production processes back to the 
developed economies? And is this synonymous with a process 
of 'deinternationalisation'?
The central thesis is that capitalist competition is not, 
and has never been, characterised by stability or stasis. 
Both national and multinational firms continuously search 
for methods to enhance and revitalise profitability but 
competitive strategies can only ever mediate the 
contradictions of capital accumulation in an imperfect 
manner and with partial success. They are thus continually 
being reshaped in response to new competitive imperatives 
and the emergence of impediments or obstacles to continued 
capital accumulation. In this context, multinational firms 
are not omniscient economic units - they too experience 
capitalist competition as an external force which coerces 
then to recompose the structure of production and employment 
on an international basis.
The ambiguous character of state intervention in the 
industry in developed economies has heightened the tensions 
and contradictions integral to the process of capital 
accumulation. National governments have provided financial 
subsidies to facilitate the restructuring and modernisation 
of the industry. But measures have also been implemented to 
maintain textile and clothing employment which tend to delay 
the structural adaptation of the industry to the imperatives 
of international competition. Although mutually 
inconsistent, both policies - together with the regulation 
of trade flows through protectionist agreements - are
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designed to stea the decentralisation of production on an 
international basis. But they coexist siaultaneously with 
favourable trade and custoas provisions which facilitate the 
aobility of aultinational capital, and the relocation of 
production to lower waged econoaies. Thus, the following 
analysis highlights the contradictory ways in which 
governarnts and firan in the developed econoaies have 
responded to locational shifts in production and eaployaent, 
and the aanner in which these forces have shaped the 
integration of developing countries into the world industry.
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Cha p f  r Two: Dimensions ?f Structural Chang»
2 . 1  Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to describe the broad shifts in 
production, employment and trade flows which have 
characterised the process of structural change in the 
industry since the 1960s. The following analysis recognises, 
however, that textiles is one part of a complex 'processing 
and marketing chain' (Clairmonte and Cavanagh 1981) linking 
the multiple stages of fibre production, yarn preparation, 
fabric formation, garment manufacturing and retailing. In 
particular, the reconfiguration of the clothing industry is 
relevant to any discussion of changes in the textile 
industry as both industries have a close, almost symbiotic 
relationship. Clothing accounts for roughly 50% of total 
final fibre consumption in OECD countries thereby 
constituting the major determinant of demand for textile 
products. But the transmission of demand for clothing into 
that for textile products (fabric and yarn) is not 
straightforward and relatively small changes in sales at 
retail level can generate stock movements that will be 
amplified at the various discrete and relatively independent 
stages of textile production. Changes in one sector, 
particularly retailing or garment manufacture, tend 
therefore to have repercussions on the stages further down 
the production chain (1) and therefore specific features of 
change in both industries are analysed in connection with 
developments in the textile industry.
2.2 Shift« in production, •■ploy— nt and trade flow 
In the period between 1963-80, the share of OECD countries 
in world production of textiles and clothing fell 
substantially, fros 58% to 48% in textiles and fro» 70% to 
51% in clothing, (OECD 1983:12) with developing countries 
(LDCs) and centrally planned economies (CPEs) accounting for 
a greater share of world output (cf. tables 1 and 2). The 
decline in the OECD's share of world production over 1963-80 
has fallen »ainly to the benefit of the centrally planned 
econoaies, with LDCs increasing their share of world output 
only »arginally since 1963 and performing substantially 
«maker in textiles than in clothing (OECD Observer 1983:24). 
Trends in the growth of textile and clothing industry output 
for the period 1980-86 indicate, however, that LDCs achieved 
the fastest growth rates overtaking the CPEs. Moreover, 
there was a noticeable slowing of gro«rth in textile and 
clothing production in all regions except Asia (cf. table 
3). In 1986-87, this trend has continued with the developing 
countries achieving average growth rates of 2.4% in textiles 
and 4.1% in clothing compared to 1.9% and 1.4% respectively 
for the developed economies. The location of production 
seems to have moved systematically away from higher to lower 
waged countries (Cable and Baker 1983, ILO 1984, Anson and 
Simpson 1988).
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Tabl« 1 s Production in the t u t l U , clothing iâ 1 «nd 
■anufacturing industrfjiä 
(annual rates of change)
Textile Clothing Total
Industry Industry lanofactarinq
IadostriM
Developed
■arket
1941-71 1971-10 1941-71 1971-00 1941-71 1971-00
•coaoiiti (b) 4.4 -0.2 1.1 0.0 4.2 1.0
OICD Europe 2.1 1.1 2.2 -0.4 9.4 1.4
EEC 2.) •0.4 1.4 -1.4 9.1 1.1
lorth Aierica 5.S -0.2 1.4 0.9 9.9 1.7
Japan
Centrally
planned
7.1 -0.9 4.9 -1.1 12.1 1.0
econoaiei (c) 
Developing
4.« 4.2 0.7 S.2 9.1 4.4
countries 4.7 2.4 S.O 1.9 7.4 4.7
lain 1.7 1.2 4.0 1.9 4.9 4.1
•orId (d) 4.9 1.4 4.0 2.2 7.2 1.1
Source: OECD 1983:12
c îS in l iU  lraâuTt:rl««°r l d  <d> p r o d u c t lo n  o t  th *  .n d
(percentages)
Textile Clothing
Industry Industry
1963 1980 1963 1980
Developed narket 
economies (b) 57.5
OECD Europe 27.9
EEC 23.4
North Aserica 21.7
Japan 6.4
Centrally planned 
econonies (c) 28.6
Developing
countries 13.9
Asia 5.4
48.2 70.2 52.3
20.5 24.7 17.9
15.7 22.1 14.4
20.2 42.6 31.8
6.7 2.1 2.6
37.5 24.7 41.0
14.3 5.1 6.7
5 4 2.1 2.8
Source: OECD 1983:12
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Table 3: Trend« in the growth of taxtil* and clothing 
Industry output. 1963-16
(% of value added at constant price«)
Centrally Planned econoales
Textiles
Clothing
All Manufacturing 
Developed countries 
Textiles 
Clothing
All Manufacturing 
Developing countries 
Textiles 
Clothing
All Manufacturing 
North AMerica 
Textiles 
Clothing
All Manufacturing 
BC
Textiles
Clothing
All Manufacturing 
Asia (b)
Textiles
Clothing
All Manufacturing
Japan
Textiles
Clothing
All Manufacturing
World
Textiles
Clothing
All Manufacturing
1963-73 1973-80 1980-86
6.0 4.0 1.1
6.7 5.2 2.4
9.1 6.6 3.9
4.4 -0.4 0.2
2.1 -0.2 -1.0
6.2 1.8 1.8
4.7 2.5 2.8
5.8 4.2 3.7
7.4 5.7 5.3
5.5 -0.1 1.4
1.6 0.7 -1.0
5.5 1.8 2.5
2.3 -0.7 0.0
1.6 -1.2 -1.0
5.1 0.8 0.8
3.7 3.5 3.5
4.8 5.6 7.6
6.5 6.4 10.1
7.1 1.2 -0.4c
6.9 1.1 -C
12.3 4.9 4.1c
4.9 1.4 1.0
4.0 2.2 0.8
7.2 3.3 2.7
Note: (a) including China; (b) excluding Japan; (c)1980-85
Source: Anson and Siepson 1988:49
For the period 1972-86, More disaggregated figures indicate 
that the European CoMMunity experienced the severest decline 
aeong developed econoaies. Output levels were considerably 
lower in 1984 than 1973 although there has been sone 
recovery since then. Japan also suffered to a sinilar degree 
with production declining on average by 11% coepared with a 
13% drop for the EC. In contrast, the USA sustained broadly 
siailar levels of textiles and clothing output.
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Over the period 1972-86, the developing countries showed a 
sustained rise in output of both textiles and clothing, 
despite a lull in 1981-82. Clothing output growth, however, 
has tended to outstrip that for textiles since 1973. Again, 
the nost narked growth has been in Asia, South Korea being a 
notable case asong the South East Asian NICs. Over the 
1975-85 period South Korea's output of textiles rose by 148% 
and apparel by 196%. Rapid growth in textiles and clothing 
production is observable in other Asian countries, notably 
Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines with alnost all the 
growth occurring in clothing. In the large developing 
countries which tend to cater nainly for the dosestic 
aarket, notably India, Brazil, Egypt, and Pakistan, 
production has lagged well behind Manufacturing as a whole. 
Production in Eastern bloc countries has steadily expanded, 
but struggled to keep up with Manufacturing industry levels.
Mithin the general shift of textiles to developing and 
centrally planned econonies, the decline of the cotton 
textile industry in Most Western countries is particularly 
striking. Developing countries have generally increased 
their textile capacity by prodigious «Mounts, while European 
and North American capacity has contracted (cf. table 4).
Western European cotton spinning capacity declined froa 
alnost 30 an. spindles in 1960 to 12 an. in 1980, whereas 
Asian capacity rose fron 42 nn. to 76 an. Most of the growth 
occurred in India and China, by about 52% and 166% 
respectively, catering nainly for the doaestic aarket.
Nevertheless, capacity in Taiwan increased by seven til
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in South Korea by six tines and in Thailand by over nine 
tines over this period but was heavily geared to export 
denand. A najor expansion of capacity has also occurred in 
Southern Europe (particularly Turkey, and Greece) (2).
r o o *  M t t * n ' t y p « 1» p l n a i ^ t t 0 n  TY P * ’  3 p ln n tn q  c « P « c l t y  ( « )
ttun in Cipacltr
1974 1910 19(5 1974/(0
(t)
1910/74
(•)
1915/10
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Alii 0,004 (1,1(1 79,309 49.7 21.7 14.0
Clill 11,000 17,000 22,(25 17.5 42.1 11.1
Iadii 11,157 21,5(( 24,742 14.0 11.0 14.7
11,141 10,412 9,5(1 -10.4 •14.4 -0.1
lorn 1,540 3,1(7 1,101 224.2 144.9 4.2
Tiinn 2,527 3,459 3,937 511.1 11.0 11.1
Thailand 1,309 1,1(4 1,(01 1121.1 -11.1 55.1
Europe 47,922 47,240 42,219 • - 0.1 -10.7
Prince 3,352 2,2(4 1,147 -44.2 -30.9 -40.2
■ Gernny 3,154 2,510 1,921 -14.1 -11.1 -21.4
Greece 701 1,442 1,510 71.0 95.7 4.1
Italy 1,143 1.114 2,122 -14.5 -12.4 -29.9
lether1ands 440 1(4 (1 -56.9 -52.9 -54.0
Turkey 1,951 1,1(4 1,225 119.5 51.5 1.1
01 2,(71 1,771 (14 -72.4 -10.2 -50.1
(a) Figures are estimates, and in the case of none countries 
(in. China) rough approxinations.
(b) short staple spindles and open end rotors only.
Source: Cable and Baker 1983;47/Anson and Sinpson 1988;54
Employment too in the developed countries has been falling 
since 1963 in textiles and since 1973 in clothing while 
there has been continued employment growth in developing 
countries and centrally planned economies (tables 5 and 6). 
From 10.4 million in 1963, employment fell by 2.0 million to
8.4 million in 1979. Over the period 1963-70, employment in 
textiles and clothing in the OECD area fell at an annual
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rate of 0.5%, which doubled to 1% a year from 1970-73 and 
from 1973-79 the rate of decline rose to 2.6% a year. The 
share of textiles and clothing in manufacturing employment 
also fell from 16.9% to 12.8% in 1979.
Table 5; Employment in the textile and clothing (a) 
industries (annual rates of change)
Textile
Industry
Developed
1963-73 1973-78
market economies (b) 
Centrally planned
-1.0 -3.1
economies (c) 1.5 0.6
Developing countries 1.9 2.9
World (d) 1.4 0.7
Clothing 
Industry 
1963-73 1973-78
1. 1  - 1. 2
2.9 0.8
4.4 8.4
2.9 3.1
T«bl. 6; sh.r. in « r i d  (d) . ^loynnt 
clothing industries (percentages)
in the textile and
Textile
Industry
1963-73 1973-78
Developed
market economies (b) 46.5 33.1
Centrally planned
economies (c) 2 6 . 0  2 8 . 8
Developing countries 27.5 38.1
Clothing 
Industry 
1963-73 1973-78
50.8 40.7
37.7 39.5
11.5 19.8
(a) clothing in table 5 includes the footwear and leather 
industry.
(b) OECD countries plus South Africa and Israel
(c) Soviet Union and six European members of CMEA
(d) excluding China and other CPEs in Asia.
Source : OECD 1983:13
Shepherd (1981:6-7) points out that in terms of the EC, the 
textile industry was among the largest shedders of labour in 
a period when manufacturing employment was falling and the 
overall unemployment rate was rapidly rising. Thus, from 
1973-80, 512,000 jobs were lost in textiles (28% of the 
total) and 333,000 jobs in clothing (26% of the total). 
Employment fell at an unprecedented rate in 1980-81 - by 14%
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over two years in textiles and clothing combined and around
330,000 jobs were lost in the EC (Cable and Baker 1983:107). 
By 1987, EC (12) textile employment was sore than a quarter 
down on its 1980 level (Anson and Sinpson 1988:179). The 
biggest job losses, of the order of a quarter to a third of 
the workforce, have been in the Irish Republic, Spain, the 
Netherlands, Italy, the UK and Nest Germany. In Denmark and 
Greece, in contrast, the numbers have actually increased.
In terms of trade patterns, one of the most significant 
changes since the early 1960s has been the shift in 
industrialised countries from being net exporters of 
textiles and clothing to net importers, with all of the 
trade deficit accounted for by clothing (Anson and Simpson 
1988:86-90). The ILO (1984:5-6) study concluded that while 
the newly industrialising countries have had considerable 
success in penetrating the markets of the industrialised 
countries in clothing they have been very small suppliers of 
textiles. The share of developing countries in the textile 
imports of the industrialised countries rose between 1968 
and 1978 from 1.12 to 2.79 per cent, whilst the rates for 
clothing imports were 1.94% (1968) and 11.64% (1978). 
Industrialised countries still enjoy a surplus in textiles 
trade although this has declined since 1981 after rising 
steadily in the 1960s, 1970s and early 1980s. By 1985 the 
textiles trade surplus of the industrialised countries was 
down to $1.3 bn. from its peak of more than $5 bn. in 1981. 
In clothing, industrialised countries have been net 
importers since the early 1960s. In 1985, 90% of the 
developed economies clothing trade deficit of $18.5 bn.
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could be accounted for by LDCs which had a net surplus of 
$1 6 . 6 bn. in clothing trade with the developed economies.
Regional trade flow illustrate similar trends. In 1970 
developed countries accounted for 74% of world textiles and 
clothing exports whereas by 1985 the figure was only 55%. In 
textiles, developed countries still account for the bulk of 
world exports (in 1985 the share was 65% and LDCs 25%) and 
in clothing the share was 44% and 43% respectively. Nearly 
three quarters of textile exports from developed countries 
go to other developed countries whereas 43% of LDC textile 
exports go to developed countries. In clothing, again, most 
exports by developed economies (87%) are intra regional 
whereas the bulk of LDC clothing exports (88%) go to 
industrialised countries (Anson and Simpson 1988).
The main contributor to the decline in the developed 
economies' surplus in textiles and to the increase in the 
clothing deficit is the USA. US trade in textiles and 
clothing was in deficit in 1980 by $4.6 bn.; by 1986 this 
had deteriorated to $2 1 . 1  bn. - more than 20 times that of 
the EC as a «»hole ($1.0 bn.). In textiles, the US trade 
deficit reached $3.3 bn. in 1986, followed by the UK with 
the second largest trade deficit at $2.2 bn. The developed 
countries which still enjoy substantial surpluses in 
textiles include Japan, Italy, West Germany and 
Belgium/Luxembourg. In clothing the main contributor to the 
deficit of the industrialised countries is again the USA; 
the US imbalance in clothing more than trebled over the 
period 1980-86 to $17.8 bn. followed by West Germany with
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the second largest clothing trade deficit of $6.2 bn. In 
contrast, Italy has overtaken Hong Kong as the world's 
largest net exporter of clothing and is the only developed 
econosy which showed a substantial trade surplus in 1986. In 
fact, Italy's combined surplus of $9.0 bn. in 1986 made it 
the world's largest net exporter of textiles and clothing 
ahead of South Korea, Taiwan, China and Hong Kong.
Although there has been a clear shift in comparative 
advantage to the developing countries, they do not 
constitute a homogeneous unit and three clearly discernible 
groups can now be identified. Firstly, there are the textile 
exporters which still mainly export y a m s  and fabrics but 
are also acquiring clothing capacity (India, Pakistan, 
Brazil, Egypt, Turkey and China). China, in particular, has 
grown rapidly in the 1980s, initially as an exporter of 
textiles but recently clothing exports have substantially 
increased. Turkey's clothing exports have shown a similarly 
rapid growth. The second group exports mostly clothing and 
imports substantial amounts of textile y a m s  and fabrics 
(Hong Kong and Singapore and increasingly Malaysia, 
Phillipines, Thailand and Yugoslavia). South Korea and 
Taiwan are net exporters of both textiles and clothing but 
the bulk of foreign exchange earnings are from clothing. The 
third group consists of the poorer, less industrialised LDCs 
which are still net importers of textiles and clothing.
A number of factors influence patterns of world textile 
trade, but an increasingly important factor is the volatile 
nature of exchange rates. The level of the US dollar has a
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particularly important influence on world textile and 
clothing trade flows since the currencies of sost of the 
sajor Far Eastern textile and clothing producers are linked 
to it. The depreciation of the dollar since 1985 - the 
value of the dollar in European Currency Unit (the Ecu) 
terns stood in March 1988 at just 58% of the March 1985 
level - has increased the conpetitiveness of inports into 
Western Europe, not only fron the USA but also the Far East. 
Thus, in the second half of 1988, nost Western textile 
producers experienced depressed trading conditions, 
characterised by falling output levels, and high stocks 
conpared with the sane period in 1987. The only countries to 
secure an increase in yarn production were South Korea and 
Pakistan and in cloth output. South Korea, Japan and Taiwan 
(FT 4.1.89/12.4.89).
It is highly likely that conpetition between the developed 
and the developing countries will increase and intensify in 
the long tern as the trend for world fibre denand is one of 
slower growth. This pattern, though, is largely a 
continuation of historical trends. Clothing has been the 
najor deteminant of fibre and textile denand but consuner 
expenditure on clothing has lagged behind total consuner 
expenditure for a wide range of OECD countries and 
consequently, the proportion spent on clothing has declined 
over the period 1970-86 (3). Table 3 indicates that over the 
period 1963-86 both textile and clothing output failed to 
natch the growth in nanufacturing as a whole for any of the 
three periods. As a result the share of nanufacturing value 
added accounted for by both textiles and clothing has
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declined since the early 1960s. Moreover, world deaand for 
fibres is forecast to grow by 2.3% per annua to 1995 
cospared with the aore buoyant levels of 3.8% in the 1950s, 
4.3% in the 1960s and 2.5% in the 1970s (Coker 1988:21). 
Growth in denand is jwer than current increases in 
productivity which will generate serious overcapacity. All 
of the extra deaand in the Western developed econonies is 
expected to be aet fron textile and clothing products aade 
in LDCs, notably China and East/South East Asia. Growth in 
denand is expected to be slowest in the USA and the EC which 
are the world's biggest iaporters of textiles and clothing. 
One industry specialist has argued that:
'Unless there is a revival of deaand in open narkets, 
the prospects for any sustained and significant 
increase in world textile trade are discouraging and 
it seeas probable that the existing tensions and 
conflicts of interest will persist and perhaps even 
intensify.' (Coker 1987:31)
It is apparent froa this descriptive account of the broad 
diaensions of change in the industry that textile production 
has been progressively internationalised. Chapters three and 
four explore the reasons underlying these locational shifts 
in production, eaployaent and trade flows in greater depth. 
Are they, for exaaple, siaply attributable to the activities 
of First World aultinationals in search of 'cheap labour'?
To what extent are new technologies initiating a relocation 
of labour intensive production processes back to the 
developed econonies? How have (national) states in the 
developed econoaies intervened in the industry, and have 
they atteapted to facilitate or impede the decentralisation 
of production on an international basis?
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^«•nationalisation:
ip i h o m t t
C h a p t e r
multlnai
T h r e e :  T h e  p r o c e s s  o f  i n 
lnationala in search of~cheaM
3.1 Introduction
According to Probe 1, Heinrichs and Kreye (1980), the 
internationalisation of production is largely attributable 
to the activities of eultinationals who have sought to 
relocate production to developing countries in response to 
lower wage costs (4). Structural unemployment in the West 
German textile and clothing industries, the export oriented 
industrialisation strategies of LDCs and the relocation of 
production by West German companies to lower waged countries 
are interrelated phenomena, characteristic of a new 
international division of labour. The mechanism underpinning 
the new international division of labour is the Babbage 
principle, which:
'calls for the maximum replacement of skilled labour 
in order to attain a reduction in labour costs. It 
is implemented through the world-wide organised 
allocation of the elements of the production process 
to the cheapest or most adapted labour force which 
can be found.' (1980:41)
The objective of this chapter is to explore how far the 
progressive internationalisation of the industry can be 
exclusively related to the search by multinationals for 
lower waged labour, and whether such an explanation provides 
us with an adequate understanding of the involvement of LDCs 
in the world textile industry. It is argued that the 
expansion of multinationals within the textile and clothing 
industry has been uneven. Patterns of foreign direct 
investment tend to be driven by a number of factors, 
particularly the need to gain access to foreign markets, and
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the decentralisation of the production process on an 
international basis has generated its own problees and 
contradictions for Multinationals because of the aras length 
nature of the transactions involved. This echoes the 
insights of debates on the historical evolution of different 
foras of work organisation. As Marglin (1976) aakes clear, 
subcontracting arrangeaents and process specialisation 
typical of the early 'putting-out' systea can haaper 
aanagerial control of the production process, and Nilliaason 
(1980) has stressed the econoaic costs that Manufacturers 
incurred, such as heavier transportation expenses, larger 
inventories and other interface leakages (such as theft and 
embezzlement of raw Materials). Thus, econoaic costs can be 
accentuated when process specialisation and the 
fragmentation of production occurs on an international 
basis.
A unique focus on the Babbage Principle and the 
fragaentation of the production process underplays the 
significance of technological developments in raising 
productivity and reducing unit production costs. An 
iaportant thene in what follows is the extent to which new 
technologies and non-price foras of coapetition are 
initiating a relocation of production back to the developed 
econoaies. One particular company, Benetton, has been 
central to debates on industrial restructuring as it is 
allegedly typical of a generalised shift to flexible 
specialisation, or neo-Pordism (Hurray 1985). The 
application of information technology to the areas of 
marketing and distribution; the utilisation of a 'putting-
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out' system of production, and the implementation of just- 
in-tiae aethods to integrate aanufacturing and retailing has 
enabled Benetton to oxpand without relocation of production 
to LOCs.
The central arguaent of this chapter is that international 
coapetition in the industry tends not to be characterised by 
clear cut shifts in coaparative advantage or stable, 
dichotoaous relationships between the developed and 
developing countries. The integration of LDCs into the world 
econoay and the developaent of particular industries like 
textiles and clothing has not been exclusively dependent on 
the strategies of firas in the developed econoaies. In the 
developed econoaies, there has been a trend towards the 
production of high value added, high quality products, the 
adoption of non-price foras of coapetition and the 
utilisation of integrated, inforaation technologies. But the 
evidence is not consistent with the view that a stable, 
dichotoaous polarity in the structure of international 
coapetition is eaerging, with Third NorId firas being 
relegated to the production of aass produced, low cost 
textile and clothing products. Coapetitive relationships are 
experiencing a dynaaic process of recoaposition in the face 
of an intensification of capitalist rivalries. This 
indicates that the process of internationalisation is 
subject to a number of competing pressures and 
contradictions which both facilitate and impede its 
development.
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3.2 Multinational« and foreign direct investment 
Although concentration levels have generally increased in 
both the textile and clothing industries over the post war 
period, eultinationals have penetrated this sector less than 
more capital intensive industries (eg. cars). Of the largest 
500 Multinationals analysed by Stopford and Dunning (1983) 
only fourteen were in textiles, clothing and leather and 
eleven were involved in synthetic fibres. In general, the 
production of synthetic fibres tends to be dominated by a 
saall nuaber of sultinational companies but large fires with 
an international network of subsidiaries are also a feature 
of particular parts of the textile and clothing industry. 
They can generally be divided into those that specialise in 
clothing, such as Bideraann (French), Triumph International 
(German) and the American jeans producers (Levi Strauss, 
Vanity Fair, Blue Bell), and those that are involved in a 
wider range of textile processes, including, Courtaulds, 
Coats Viyella (British), Burlington (America), Agache 
Willot, Prouvost, DoIfus Mi eg (French) and Freudenberg 
(German). Courtaulds, Coats Viyella, Burlington, Levi 
Strauss and Blue Bell were amongst the 500 largest 
multinationals classified by Stopford and Dunning (1983).
The evidence concerning the location and direction of 
foreign direct investment (fdi) in the industry is complex 
and does not unanimously support the concept of 
multinational firms as 'footloose' capital in search of the 
cheapest possible labour. Host textile and clothing firms of 
the developed economies have made only relatively limited 
use of fdi over the last ten to fifteen years (OECD 1983:57)
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and such investment has been related to a number of factors 
particularly the need to gain access to foreign markets 
sheltered from import competition. The bulk of fdi made by 
OECD textile firms tends to be located in other 
industrialised countries rather than LDCs.
The major exception to this pattern is Japan. Pdi by 
Japanese textile companies began to increase during the 
1960s, and by the early 1980s, the industry accounted for 
approximately 12 per cent of all Japanese manufacturing fdi, 
the fourth most important sector after metals, chemicals and 
electrical machinery (Young and Hamill 1985:5). Two thirds 
of Japanese textile fdi has been skewed towards the South 
East Asian LDCs. The other important area is Central and 
South America which represents around one fifth of the total 
stock of textile fdi. Investments also occurred in the 1970s 
in European and South American countries, and in the USA and 
Canada. In terms of composition, overseas investments have 
been heavily concentrated in the synthetic fibre sector, 
which according to Young and Hamill (1985) accounts for 
approximately one half of all textile fdi, with cotton 
spinning and weaving accounting for 33%. Pdi in synthetic 
fibres, and textiles has been motivated by a number of 
factors, particularly, the need to secure and retain 
markets, whereas fdi in clothing, knitting etc. has been 
related to the search for lower cost production locations. 
Local marketing or production subsidiaries are currently 
being set up in developed economies to evade trade 
restrictions on Japanese exports, especially from the USA. 
One recent development has been an increase in investment in
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the USA by Japanese textile companies, (eg. the spinning 
fin, K an eb o ) but the opening up of China to foreign 
investment may stimulate the establishment of Japanese joint 
ventures in textiles and clothing.
The UK textile industry is one of the most highly 
internationalised of all the OECD countries and second only 
to Japan. Direct investment in wholly or partly owned 
foreign subsidiaries has been a dominant form of 
internationalisation in textiles and has been motivated by 
the need to circumvent tariff barriers and gain access to 
markets and to make use of lower cost labour. In synthetic 
fibres, fdi by firms such as ICI and Courtaulds, has tended 
to be geographically concentrated in Western Europe. Pdi by 
UK clothing firms has been sore limited due to their smaller 
average size. Overseas investments have recently increased 
but mostly in the direction of the USA or Western Europe.
The branded knitwear company, Dawson International has 
manufacturing or sales/marketing subsidiaries in six foreign 
countries (mostly developed economies) and S R Gent has 
recently established production facilities in Canada to 
supply Narks and Spencer's extensive operations there 
(Hamill 1987:15).
Pdi by American and West German textile companies 
demonstrates that patterns vary considerably between and 
across nations. In synthetic fibres, US fdi has encompassed 
both developed and developing countries. US textile fdi 
(yams/fabrics) has been motivated by an attempt to gain 
access to overseas markets as well as reducing production
49
costs. But in contrast to Japan, the extent of fdi by US 
textile coapanies has been liaited. For exaaple, for 
Burlingtons and United Merchants - two of the largest US 
textile producers - over 90 per cent of total sales are 
accounted for by US plants (Haaill and Young 1987:10). The 
branded clothing aanufacturers such as Levi Strauss and Blue 
Bell Inc (Mrangler) have extensive international operations 
with overseas subsidiaries aainly but not exclusively in 
Mestern Europe. Marketing/licensing arrangeaents and new 
technology rather than cheap labour appear to be their key 
concerns (Elson 1988a). The liaited involvement of most 
textile and clothing firas with fdi Bay be related to the 
relocation of production by firas to lower labour cost 
locations within the USA (eg. the non-unionised southern 
states).
West German synthetic fibre companies have made extensive 
use of fdi to gain access to markets, especially the US but 
few textile and clothing firas have made significant 
overseas investments, and these have tended to have been in 
the USA and Europe rather than LDCs. According to the 
International Textile, Garment and Leather Workers' 
Federation (ITGLMF) (1984:75), only 14« of the net foreign 
investment made by German textile and clothing companies in 
1982 was directed to developing countries. The major 
exception to this pattern is Triumph International, a 
manufacturer of ladies' garments, which has a controlling 
interest in production facilities in over twenty countries. 
The company has expanded its overseas operations, 
particularly in Japan, Hong Kong, Thailand, the Philippines
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and Brazil, whilst rationalising its Meet German operations. 
The company has also engaged in co-production agreements in 
Eastern Europe, especially in Hungary. It is estimated that 
by the mid-1970s approximately half the items in Triumph's 
total product range were made in Hungary (Taggart and Hamill 
1987:10).
3.3 Licensing
Cross-national licensing agreements - the payment of 
royalties in exchange for the use of technology or brand 
names - are a fora of internationalisation which does not 
involve any relocation of production. Licensing is most 
common in synthetic fibres and branded clothing. It allows a 
company to operate internationally without extensive 
distribution networks or engaging in risky foreign ventures 
(ITGLWF 1984). Por example, Toray Industries, a Japanese 
fibre company, has emerged as an outward licensor to 
producers in America, Italy, Germany, Eastern Europe and 
Central America (Young and Hamill 1985). There have also 
been cross-national licensing agreements between US and West 
European fibre producers (eg. Celanese (USA) and Hoechst 
(Germany)). In branded clothing, the US jeans manufacturers, 
Levi Strauss and Blue Bell, have made extensive use of 
licensing in countries where foreign direct investment is 
restricted, such as those in Eastern Europe (Hamill and 
Young 1987). Blue Bell has licensing agreements with 
independently owned firms in over 50 countries. Gruppo GFT, 
one of the three largest Italian clothing manufacturers 
along with Karzotto and Benetton, has also made use of 
licensing agreements with fashion designers. It is difficult
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to gauge accurately the extent of cross-national licensing 
agreements in the textile and clothing industries but the 
ITGLWF (1984) argues it is probably guite extensive.
3.4 Offshore Processing
The internationalisation of production has taken another 
fora - offshore processing (5). This fora of 
internationalisation aost closely resembles the 
fragmentation of the production process which Frobel, 
Heinrichs and Kreye (1980) argue underpins the latest phase 
of the internationalisation of production. Typically, this 
refers to the process whereby fabrics are manufactured and 
cut in developed economies and then sent to an independently 
owned or partly owned firm in a lower waged country, which 
undertakes the labour intensive process of garment assembly. 
The finished garments are then shipped back for reimport 
into the source country, often taking advantage of 
favourable customs duty arrangements. It tends to be heavily 
concentrated in garments and knitwear rather than y ams and 
fabric.
The relative importance of offshore processing varies 
considerably across countries. The West German industry, 
stimulated by government trade policy, has rads more 
extensive use of such arrangements than any sther EC 
country. It has been estimated that indigenous West German 
clothing manufacturers, by virtue of their foreign assembly, 
subcontracting and direct investment activities, are 
responsible for no less than 40% of all West German clothing 
imports (Taggart and Hamill 1987:11).
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Under special arrangements import duties are applied only to 
the foreign value added component of imported textile goods. 
Hence, many Most German clothing firms have relocated large 
parts of their manufacture to lower cost countries, thus 
securing a market for the products of the more capital 
intensive textile industry. Consequently, imports of 
textiles and clothing subject to value added duties have 
risen from 3.2% of the total in 1961 to 8.8% in 1973 and 
6.0% in 1978. The expansion of clothing imports under value 
added duties has been faster but relative to total imports 
of clothing they peaked in 1965 at 17% and fell to 12.5% in 
1978 (OECD 1983:59). Hence, in the 1970s, about 12-15% of 
clothing imports had been assembled offshore and imported 
under special tariff provisions, accounting for about 5% of 
sales of clothing in West Germany (Taggart and Hamill 1987). 
While the major advantage of outward processing is a 
reduction in labour costs it inevitably involves additional 
transport costs: for West Germany, therefore, outward 
processing activities are concentrated in Eastern Europe, 
Yugoslavia and to a lesser extent the countries bordering 
the Mediterranean (Tunisia and Morocco).
American clothing manufacturers have substantially increased 
their involvement in offshore processing over the last ten 
years to reduce production costs in response to a growth of 
low cost imports. It has also been stimulated by the 
sourcing polic'es of the major retailers who have 
substantially increased their purchases of clothing in the 
Far East and elsewhere. The most common locations have been 
the Caribbean and Mexico. As in West Germany, government
policies have positively assisted this development. Under 
the *807' provisions, US companies that contract with 
overseas manufacturers (ie. Mexican and Caribbean suppliers) 
to assemble US made components pay duty only on the value 
added offshore when they reimport the finished product. In 
the 1970s between 7t and 10% of all clothing imported into 
the USA had been assembled offshore and imported under 
special tariff provisions but by 1980, these imports 
accounted for slightly less than 1% of total sales of 
clothing in the USA and their absolute level in 1978 was 
only about one half of German levels (Hamill and Young 1987) 
(6). In America, the bulk of offshore processing tends to be 
carried out by subsidiaries of US corporations or by 
companies controlled by them. Thus, whereas in the case of 
Germany subcontracting has been largely an alternative to 
direct investment abroad, in the US it has been 
complementary to it (OECD 1983:59-61, Hamill and Young 
1987).
Por Prance, recent evidence suggests that offshore 
processing is expanding (7) (Anson and Simpson 1988) 
although it is not yet as extensive as in Germany where 
about 6 0 subcontracting agreements exist in low cost 
countries as opposed to only 17 in Prance. As in the US, 
offshore processing is partly carried out by subsidiaries of 
Prench firms and is linked to direct investment. Fragmentary 
information in other countries suggests a relative expansion 
of offshore processing by Swiss and Dutch companies but the 
relative absence of any involvement by UK, Italian and 
Japanese companies.
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Unlike the US and Meat Germany, the UK has no special 
arrangements for exemption from duty on the added value of 
imported garments which have been assembled abroad from 
domestically produced fabrics. In the UK and Japan, clothing 
retailers and trading houses have been involved in 
international subcontracting agreements and purchasing in 
LDCs rather than manufacturers (Young and Hamill 1985:11). A 
few UK companies have established operations in 
'traditional' offshore processing locations but these 
normally involve an equity share in the operation (fdi) 
rather than the 'arms length' relationship normally 
associated with offshore processing. For example, Lee 
Cooper, the jeans manufacturer, obtains almost all of its 
output from a Tunisian operation, but this is 60% owned by 
the company. William Baird, the textile and clothing group, 
has clothing operations in both Hong Kong and the 
Philippines but these take the form of subsidiary companies 
rather than non-equity offshore processing. In textiles, 
however, there has recently been a growth in international 
subcontracting by manufacturers, involving the direct buying 
of fabric from foreign producers, especially those in Asia 
(Hamill 1987:16).
Another explanation of the relatively low involvement in 
international subcontracting by UK, Italian and Japanese 
companies is their utilisation of domestic subcontracting, 
particularly in the clothing industry. In the UK, a number 
of clothing retailers and manufacturers have subcontracted 
production to small, inner city firms and homeworkers, 
thereby making use of skilled but low paid, immigrant
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'female' labour (Phizacklaa 1987, Hitter 1986) (8). The new 
style Italian clothing Multinationals, like Benetton (9) and 
Stefanel, subcontract a high proportion of their 
Manufacturing operations to 'satellite' clothing firas in 
Northern Italy, aany of which are saall enouqh to be able to 
avoid paying social charges. In the context of the Italian 
industry, Anson and Siapson (1988:232) argue thus:
'b e n e f i t s  h ave  b e e n  d e r iv e d  f r o a  a p a r t i a l  r e t u r n  
t o  c o tta g e  i n d u s t r y  p r o d u c t io n  M ethods u s in g  
o u tw o rk e rs  o r  d e c e n t r a l i s e d  p r o d u c t io n  s i t e s .  U s in g  
th e s e  a e th o d s , l a b o u r  c o s ts  a r e  o f t e n  v e r y  lo w  
(a  f i g u r e  o f  a q u a r t e r  o f  th e  h ig h  r a t e s  p a id  i n  th e  
la r g e s t  f a c t o r i e s  h a s  been q u o t e d ) .  A ls o  f i r e s  have 
a a x ib u m  f l e x i b i l i t y  o f  b e in g  a b le  t o  " t u r n  t h e  t a p  on 
o r  o f f "  a s  r e q u i r e d  b y  M a rk e t d e n a n d , w i t h o u t  c a r r y i n g  
th e  b u rd e n  o f  e x p e n s iv e  and u n n e c e s s a ry  o v e r h e a d s . '
Similarly, Most Japanese clothing fires do not own 
production capacity but instead subcontract work out to 
snail scale factories for assenbly (Anson and Sinpson 
1988:171). The large spinning conpanies and trading houses 
tend also to subcontract production, particularly of cloth 
froa spun yarn.
3.5 International Subcontracting: Units and contradictions 
As a corporate strategy, offshore processing or 
subcontracting creates its own probleas and contradictions. 
Toyne et al. (1984:142) in a series of interviews with one 
Prench and two Nest German textile fires noted sone 
disenchantment with offshore processing because it lessens 
the control nanagenent has over the production process.
Close control required the physical proxinity of Management 
and plant which would generate greater flexibility and 
higher rates of productivity thereby offsetting the
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advantage of lower wage rates.
Major difficulties have also arisen for US manufacturers, 
involving problems of low productivity, high labour 
turnover, delivery delays and poor quality. Haaill and Young 
(1987) cite the case of Casualwear Inc., a aanufacturer of 
woaen's clothing, which invested in a joint venture in Haiti 
in the aid 1960s. Low wage rates were insufficient to 
coapensate for low productivity, poor quality and high 
labour turnover. Consequently, the coapany transferred 
production to a twin plant operation straddling the 
Mexican-US border. But even in Mexico, high labour turnover 
constituted a aajor problea averaging 14% a aonth. other 
negative aspects of offshore processing included lack of 
trained personnel, and longer lead tiaes.
Recent research into the iapact of aicroelectronics on the 
international clothing industry also highlight soae 
significant shifts in the general approach to offshore 
processing aaong multinational clothing producers in 
developed countries (cf. Hoffaan 1985:379 and Hoffnan and 
Rush 1984). Although the involveaent of Multinational firas 
in LDCs was still increasing, aany of the coapanies 
interviewed cited probleas, including higher unit transport 
costs, probleas of control over production and long lead 
tiaes. They argued that these factors would lead thea to 
favourably consider investment in automation as an 
alternative to offshore production if the right equipment 
became available. In a few cases new facilities had been 
created in offshore locations closer to their domestic
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market rather than in the lower labour cost locations of 
Asia. It was felt that cost savings resulting fros 
pre-assesbly microelectronic technology enabled the 
companies to operate closer to developed economies. Although 
labour costs were higher, lead times were shorter and it was 
easier to exert effective control. Similar developments were 
occurring among the large clothing manufacturers in Japan.
Some recent evidence appears to suggest that the growth of 
offshore processing may be subsiding in Western Europe. 
According to Anson and Simpson (1988:252), fabric suppliers 
in high cost countries like West Germany are in an 
increasingly vulnerable position. With highly productive 
capital intensive machinery they rely on high capacity 
utilisation to minimise unit capital costs. But the recent 
fall in the dollar has made offshore processing using German 
manufactured fabrics less attractive compared to direct 
imports from the Par Bast and the Mediterranean countries by 
retailers and clothing producers.
Thus, although the volume of offshore processing imports has 
risen, as a percentage of total imports it has declined from 
14.5% in 1975 to 10.4« in 1986 (Morris and Sowter 1987:11). 
In the wake of the falling dollar, cheaper imports from Par 
Eastern suppliers led, in the period January-July 1987, to 
large increases in imports from Asian countries - China by 
55% and Thailand by 68%. Between 1981 and 1986 West Germany 
enjoyed a growing surplus in its trade in yarns and fabrics, 
but there was a downturn in 1987 as the textile surplus 
fell, although it was still double the level of 1983. The
fall in 1987 in overall exports - of 1.1% - was the first 
since 1975 (10) with isports rising by 7.0%. The resulting 
trade deficit was nearly a third higher than in 1986, with 
nearly all of the deterioration in finished goods (including 
clothing). Isports fron the Par East have hit West Germany's 
trade with Cosecon countries and has led to reduced interest 
in offshore processing in particular. Textile exports to 
Conecon countries were static in 1985 and fell by 5% in 
1986. Excluding East Germany, where exports rose by 12%, the 
fall was 10% (Taggart and Hasill 1987:11). A parallel 
development was an increase in direct imports from 
Yugoslavia and Eastern Europe. In 1975, offshore processing 
accounted for 91% of clothing imports from Yugoslavia and 
76% fron Eastern Europe but by 1986 these percentages had 
fallen to 69% and 70% respectively.
3.6 LDCs: a satellite of First World Multinationals?
A 1978 ILO Textile Committee Report (ILO 1984:7) argues that 
the role of multinationals in textiles nay be becoming more 
important and refers to the growth in the numbers, size, and 
foreign location of multinationals (11). It is often pointed 
out that in the free trade zones of LDCs in which textiles, 
clothing and electronics predominate, foreign multinationals 
do account for the bulk of employment. In Asia where free 
trade zones account for more than half a million workers, it 
is estimated that employment in textile multinationals is in 
the order of 200,000 (40% of the total of zone employment) 
(ILO 1984). The new international division of labour.
Probe1, Heinrichs and Kreye argue, forces LDCs to function 
as extended workbenches which nay or may not be used by
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First World multinationals (1980:87). To what extent have 
Third World countries becose locked into a purely dependent 
role within this particular industry?
A one-diaensional focus on (First World) aultinationals and 
their search for cheap labour tends towards an overly 
functionalist account of Third World industrialisation. The 
integration of LDCs into the world econosy and the 
development of particular industries like textiles and 
clothing has not been exclusively dependent on the 
strategies of firms in the developed economies. There are, 
for example, considerable variations between Third World 
countries in the degree of foreign ownership and control of 
industry (cf. Jenkins 1984). Evidence indicates that the 
NICs in particular, have a strong indigenous textile and 
clothing industry. Local firms accounted for 42% of the 
clothing and footwear exports of the 318 largest enterprises 
in Brazil in 1973, 88% of the textile/clothing exports of 
South Korea in 1978 and 75% of Mexico's total exports of 
clothing and footwear in 1979 (Thrift 1986:48), although 
these figures do not take into account the subcontracting of 
production by multinationals to independent, locally owned 
firms in developing countries. LDCs, therefore, tend to 
constitute a heterogeneous grouping with different forms of 
involvement in the industry. Some countries tend to 
specialise in textiles (India, Pakistan, Brazil), or 
clothing (Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, Phillipines), 
whereas others are net exporters of both (South Korea and 
Taiwan). Another group consists of the poorer, less 
industrialised LDCs which are still net importers of
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textiles and clothing.
Third World fins, particularly those based in the NICs like 
Brazil, Taiwan, South Korea and Hong Kong, have also sought 
to circunvent harriers to their expansion, often through 
investsent in overseas aarkets, thus reinforcing the process 
of internationalisation. Governaents, too, have actively 
intervened to facilitate the restructuring of these 
industries. Evidence indicates, for exaaple, that 
aultinationals are now a phenoaenon of both developed and 
developing countries (ITGLWF 1984; Hood and Young 1985). 
Protectionist agreeaents have aotivated coapanies based in 
the NICs to set up subsidiaries in locations where such 
restrictions do not apply (other LDCs) or in the export 
aarkets of developed countries. The Units to growth in the 
industry and the wove by developed countries to sore 
restrictive protectionist trade policies will give an added 
iapetus to nultinational fdi froa the NICs to other LDCs, 
such as Malaysia and Sri Lanka, as well as to developed 
countries.
As early as the aid 1960s, Hong Kong clothing aanufacturers 
aade considerable investaents in South East Asian countries 
(Singapore, Taiwan, Macau, Malaysia, Philippines, Sri Lanka, 
Indonesia), and Mauritius, often in newly established export 
processing zones to reduce costs, evade US and UK quota 
controls, and in the 1970s to gain access to the EC. In the 
1980s, clothing coapanies have invested in China, 
particularly in 'special econoaic zones' to take advantage 
of lower labour costa. A nuaber of coapanies are also
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investing in developed countries, in the fora of production 
and marketing/selling subsidiaries (Hood and Young 1985:9). 
Yangtzekiang Garment Manufacturing, a Hong Kong company 
which has plants in Singapore, Macau, Taiwan and Malaysia, 
opened a plant on Merseyside in 1987 which will supply
400,000 garments a year to the British retailer,
Littlewoods, as well as exporting to the EC and the USA 
(Hamill 1987:16).
There are positive moves by South Korean companies, 
encouraged by the Government, to invest in production 
facilities abroad in an attempt to overcome the problems of 
protectionism in its export markets. In 1986, 20 South 
Korean textile companies invested in operations in other 
countries, more than the total for the previous four years 
(Textile Outlook International November 1987:45-46). By 
1987, the number of companies investing abroad was expected 
to rise to 30. A large textile plant is planned in the US as 
a joint venture between the US industry and South Korean 
companies. Rapidly rising wage costs in the South Korean 
textile industry (wages have risen 127% since 1980 compared 
with an increase of 66% for Taiwan and 1% for Hong Kong) may 
also have contributed to the increase in fdi (12).
Far Eastern clothing companies have also invested in the 
Caribbean as a base to export to the USA. Freight and 
transport costs are lower due to the proximity of the US 
market but in many cases, labour costs are lower in 
Caribbean countries than in the Asian NICs ($0.81 an hour in 
Haiti compared with over $2 in Hong Kong). Since early 1986,
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South Korea has provided investment worth £3.7 an. in 15 
Caribbean clothing plants. This may, however, encourage the 
US to restrict imports of clothing from the Caribbean made 
from fabrics sourced outside the USA (FT 8.11.88).
Taiwanese companies have begun to invest in the UK (Hamill 
1987) to gain access to European markets, and to export 
guota free to the US market. UK production locations make it 
easier for a Far Eastern company to supply Marks and 
Spencer, which is an i«portant consideration given the 
latter's dominance in the clothing retail market and its 
hitherto strong domestic sourcing policy. Taiyun Textiles, 
one of Taiwan's largest fabric manufacturers plans to invest 
$50 million in a spinning and weaving plant in the USA. 
According to the company's president:
'Even though labour is cheaper here (ie. in Taiwan) 
electricity and raw materials are cheaper in the 
US.' (FT 9.10.87)
Firms like Samsung of South Korea and Far Eastern Textile of 
Taiwan, in addition to three Brazilian firms currently 
figure amongst the world's 50 largest textile companies 
(Anson and Simpson 1988:43).
A number of Third World countries which previously based the 
expansion of their textile and clothing industries on 
offshore processing and EPZs are reconsidering such 
strategies. LDCs have become aware of the disadvantages of 
the US Government's '807' arrangements. Supplier companies 
are restricted to assembly and sewing whereas the important 
value added and often automated operations of design, 
pattern marking, cutting and marketing are all monopolised
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by US contractors. Although such provisions benefit 
employment, value added ia kept to a si ni bu s and the 
contribution to the developing econosy is United. Smaller 
producing companies can become reliant on one customer with 
no guarantee that contracts will be renewed on their 
termination. Profit margins for suppliers tend to be very 
low. In Jamaica, for example, the value added by the local 
producer averages 10% to 20% of the total value of the 
exported product (Anson and Simpson 1988:145). In the light 
of such considerations, the Mexican Government instituted an 
export promotion programme in 1985 to improve backward 
linkages with textiles and have placed restrictions on the 
expansion of export processing zones. They are now 
authorised only for products in which Mexico has unfilled 
MFA quotas (Anson and Simpson 1988:308-9).
The role of MNC subsidiaries in LDC textile and clothing 
production should therefore not be exaggerated. Moreover, 
the expansion of multinationals within the textiles and 
clothing industry has been extremely uneven. Foreign direct 
investment tends to be located in other industrialised 
countries rather than LDCs, and is driven by a number of 
factors, particularly the need to gain access to foreign 
markets. A recent phenomenon has been the international 
expansion of firms based in the NICs who have also sought to 
circumvent barriers to their expansion through the 
establishment of overseas subsidiaries.
The spread of international subcontracting arrangements, 
which more closely approximates a 'cheap labour' strategy.
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has also been unevenly distributed. Proportionately, 
offshore assembly has been sore important for West German 
and American manufacturers and has been positively assisted 
by special tariff previsions. But firms adopting 
decentralised production strategies may incur an additional 
set of problems and contradictions, such as poor product 
quality, low productivity, long lead times and high labour 
turnover. Corporate strategies based on 'cheap labour' can 
only ever be successful in a limited, temporary sense. The 
expansion of investment in LDCs is often associated with 
demands for better wages, union organisation and industrial 
conflict. Por example, the general expansion of investment 
in South Korea has generated demands for wage rises, union 
organisation and an escalation of industrial disputes.
Gordon (1988:51) points out that the ratio of average Korean 
manufacturing wages to the OS rose more than five fold over 
1966-79 and these relative increases could potentially price 
producers out of labour intensive industries or provide an 
imperative for relocation to lover waged LDCs. in short, 
'cheap labour' does not pose a long term solution to the 
problems of capital accumulation.
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3.7 Technology and the Relocation of Production 
A considerable gap exists in average labour costs between 
developed countries and the LDCs in the textiles and 
clothing industries. UNIDO estimated in 1978 that average 
hourly gross wages in textiles in developed countries were 
8.5 times higher than LDCs (UNIDO 1983:236) and the ratio 
for clothing was even higher. Recent figures on earnings 
ratios for 1987 (cf. table 7) indicate that the comparative 
wage differential between America and one of the lowest 
waged textile producers, Indonesia, is a factor of 46, 
whilst the wage differential in favour of Indonesia compared 
to Meat Germany is 65. It is, of course, easy to exaggerate 
the gap between developed and developing countries by 
comparing the highest and lowest paying countries, like 
Indonesia and China. In contrast, the wage differential 
between one of the Asian NICs, Hong Kong, and America is
only a factor of 5 (13).
Table 7: Earnings ratios in textiles 1987
Gross Index of
Earnings Hourly Earnings
$/hr (USA-100)
Netherlands 13.75 148.81
West Germany 12.98 140.48
Italy 12.67 137.12
Japan 11.99 129.76
France 9.99 108.12
USA 9.24 100.00
UK 7.09 76.73
Spain 4.78 51.73
Hong Kong 1.93 20.89
Portugal 1.83 19.81
Turkey 1.28 13.85
India 0.65 7.03
Phillipines 0.57 6.17
Sri Lanka 0.31 3.35
Indonesia 0.20 2.16
Source: Anson and Simpson 1988:61/62
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Other components of total labour coat, such as social 
charges also tend to be lower in the developing countries 
(with s o m  exceptions such as Uruguay, Mexico, Brasil) and 
the «forking week is typically longer outside developed 
countries by, on average, six to eight hours. But although 
Third World wages and social charges say be lower it does 
not necessarily follow that unit costs of production are 
lower, for the latter also depend on productivity rates.
3.7.1 The Textile Industry
In textiles, productivity rates do tend to narrow the cost 
differential between developed and developing countries. 
Table 8 indicates that in 1980 US productivity was almost 
eight times higher than in Pakistan - the lowest waged 
textile producer. When combined with low wages the labour 
cost differential in favour of Pakistan in relation to the 
US is reduced from a factor of 17 to one of 2.
Table 8; Productivity Ratios in textiles, 1980 (US-100)
Productivity Hourly Earnings Labour Cost 
Per Unit of 
Production
UK 56 96.6 141Belgium 87 173.8 196
Prance 74 95.3 157West Germany 87 168.1 193
Holland 86 170.0 215
Italy 76 124.8 151
USA 100 100.0 100
Japan 74 82.2 101
Egypt 14 6.2 43
Pakistan 13 5.7 46
Turkey 41 18.0 48
Source: Cable and Baker 1983: 56
Moreover, a GATT study reported that productivity in 
textiles in the developed countries rose by 3% to 4% a year 
in the 1970s «rhile it remained relatively flat for the
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developing countries (GATT 1984).
Other cost factors in addition to wages are important. The 
OECD (1983:88) found that the landed price of cotton y a m  
and fabric imported from South Korea was higher than Germany 
and the US due to higher transport and capital costs. On the 
basis of 1987 data, Anson and Simpson (1988:63) compare all 
manufacturing costs, with some consideration of proximity to 
markets embodied in transport costs. In spinning, wage rates 
in India were only 13% of those in Hest Germany and South 
Korea had a similar wage cost advantage. But wage costs 
accounted for only 40% of manufacturing costs in spinning 
and 39% in weaving. Once productivity differences were taken 
into account, the gap in total manufacturing costs narrow. 
Indian manufacturing costs become 67% of those for West 
Germany while South Korea's are 53% - if the final elements 
of freight and insurance are added West Germany needed a 
tariff of 22% on South Korean yarn to compete on the basis 
of price alone. In the case of India, a tariff of 21% is 
needed. Cable and Baker's 1983 comparison based on 1978 data 
showed that West Germany needed a 3% duty on y a m  from South 
Korea and 12% on cloth, whilst the US needed no protection 
at all. Their conclusion (1983:57) was that 'in 
textiles... .low labour cost countries are unlikely to have a 
strong trading advantage.' Productivity differentials tend 
to narrow the comparative advantage of even the lowest waged 
LDCs.
Theoretical analysis indicates that a narrow focus on labour 
costs seriously underplays the significance of technological
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developments in raising productivity and reducing unit costs 
of production. In fact, it has been argued that the most 
important aspect of new technologies is their potential to 
initiate the relocation of labour intensive production 
processes back to the developed economies (Jenkins 1984, 
Kyoung Cho 1985, Lipietz 1987). To what extent are new 
technologies reshaping the international structure of 
textile production?
A long run trend of the textile industry has been towards 
more capital intensive production methods. In textiles, 
capital intensity (capital stock per worker) has risen in a 
large range of developed countries at a rate in excess of 
that for manufacturing as a whole. The level of investment 
per head in textiles in the EC rose to Ecu2.394 in 1984, an 
increase of 125% on its 1977 value. So, despite the fact 
that labour costs form a relatively high proportion of total 
costs in textiles and clothing (eg. in 1986, 28% of total 
costs in textiles, and 34% in clothing), in state of the art 
European and American textile mills labour costs can be 
limited to between 8% and 20% of the value of sales (Textile 
Horizons Nay 1986:12) (14). The main stimulus to 
technological development, and investment in labour 
displacing technologies such as rotor spinning and 
shuttleless weaving, has been the need for firms to cut unit 
production costs to compete more effectively with lower 
waged economies (OECD 1983:18). In addition. West European 
countries have engaged in scrapping redundant machinery - 
42% of 1973 weaving capacity and 23% of ring spindle 
capacity was scrapped over the period 1973-78.
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Are new technologies initiating a relocation of production 
back to developed countries? Recent data on textile 
Machinery shipments tend to support the idea of a technology 
induced comparative advantage. Over the period 1977-86, 
European countries accounted for 79% of total shipments of 
the higher productivity open end rotor spinning systems, 
whilst Asia took only 9%. In weaving, similar trends were 
noticeable. Investment in the less productive shuttle 
technology occurred predominantly in Asia (three quarters of 
the total). The major individual investor was South Korea 
with 30% of all shipments of shuttle looms. During 1976-85, 
Asia accounted for one third of shipments of shuttleless 
looms but it was Europe which held the major share in the 
newer technology wivh 4,4% of the total. Although a number of 
the Asian NICs are investing heavily in shuttleless 
technology (in 1985, Asia was the dominant purchaser with 
40% of the demand for shuttleless looms) textile machinery 
shipments to Asia slumped in 1985. Compared to 1984, there 
has been a decline of 7% for shuttleless looms and 31% for 
shuttle looms. One estimate puts the value of textile 
machinery imports by Asia in 1984 at one third less in real 
terns than 1980 (Textile Outlook International November 
1986b:26). This has been attributed to the critical balance 
of payments position of many LDCs and the negative impact of 
import restrictions on investment plans.
The predicament of the South Korean textile industry 
illustrates the problems facing LDCs. In the 1970s, textile 
exports rose by 31% per year but this figure fell to 7% in 
the first half of the 1980s and to 3% in 1987. The industry
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has also experienced difficulties moving upmarket. Outmoded 
technology accounts for 50% of the capital stock in textiles 
(Textile Outlook International November 1987). The 
Phillippines textile industry has also suffered from poor 
quality, outdated machinery. It is estimated that 50% to 60% 
of textile machinery needs to be replaced. Indonesia too 
needs to scrap around 18% of its existing spinning machinery 
and 34% of weaving capacity (Textile Horizons January 
1988:64). Although the best practice Mexican spinning mills 
achieve productivity levels common in Western Europe, a 
significant proportion achieve only one half or a third of 
this level (Lindquist and Sanchez 1988:15). Turkey's low 
labour cost advantage has also been negated by low 
productivity rates. Barchard (1986:21) argues that:
'Turkish textile firms have grown up in a 
management culture where labour is cheap and 
the solution to most problems is to throw some 
bodies at it'.
The result is that 60 per cent of looms are over twenty five 
years old (Barchard 1986).
In contrast, recent years have seen a burst of investment in 
developed economies. In the US, investment in textiles rose 
6% in 1983, and 24% in 1984. For the EC, surveys suggest 
that between 1982-84 investment in textiles and clothing 
rose 40% in Italy, 32% in France, 25% in West Germany, and 
24% in the UK (15).
Thus, a major trend in the textile industry has been the 
utilisation of more capital intensive production methods.
This enables firms to raise productivity levels and thereby 
reduce unit production costs. This has not led to a massive
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or inedlate shift in comparative advantage against LDCs, 
but it is liksly that investment in highly productive 
textile machinery and its more rapid diffusion to developed 
economies has maintained, at an aggregate level, their net 
surplus in textile trade.
3.7.2 Clothing Industry
Hitherto, international comparative advantage in clothing 
has been largely determined by differences in labour costs. 
The gap in wage rates between developed economies and LDCs 
has been considerable even though this has been partially 
offset by higher productivity in developed economies (cf. 
Hoffman 1985:373). Table 9 gives cost data for shirt 
manufacture in a number of different countries. Both Hong 
Kong and South Korea are able to produce a cotton shirt at 
two thirds of the price of the sane garment in West Germany 
and Portugal is clearly the cheapest producer within the EC.
Table 9; Costs of clothing production - cotton shirts, 1985 
(DM per piece)
DI B u t  C t n u i  Portugal Sont! lor«« long long
Labour coat 1.21 4.3« 1.41 1.0S 0.00
Total
aanofactarinq
coat ll.ff 11.17 11.14 9.40 9. SI
Coat index
(Boat Gerainy
■ 10») 12.11 ISO.00 74.00 42.40 41.20
Source: Anson a Simpson 1988:65
The materials handling process which accounts for about 80% 
of the total time required to manufacture a garment, has 
been technically difficult to mechanise, and the production
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process has generally resained highly labour intensive. In 
fact, the underlying product and process technology has 
changed little in sore than fifty years. At the national 
level, the low capital and technological reguiresents for 
production have facilitated the easy entry of small firms. 
Typically in OECD countries, firms with less than 50 
operators account for 75% of enterprises in the sector but 
only 25% of total employment (Hoffman 1985). It is therefore 
unsurprising that the clothing sector was one of the first 
sectors where LDCs achieved rapid growth of manufactured 
exports to developed economies.
There are, however, signs of fairly rapid technological 
change in the industry. Sophisticated CAD and CAM 
installations in the pre-assembly phase and numerical 
control and microcomputer based sewing machine robotic 
handling devices and automatic transfer systems have become 
more commonplace. However, the rate of diffusion of 
microelectronic technology in developed economies has been 
much slower in clothing than textiles. The prevalence of 
small firms has been identified as a fundamental obstacle to 
the technological transformation of the industry, in the 
sense that such firms have neither the financial resources, 
scale of output nor the managerial skills to support 
investment in expensive automated equipment. Rush and Soete 
(1984:183) argue that this type of capital investment makes 
economic sense for large multi-plant firms only, with 
turnovers starting at $20 million. So far it is principally 
larger firms with sales above $50 million that have 
purchased computer aided design and computer controlled
cutting systems. Currently the diffusion of eicroelectronics 
in the assembly phase of production is even more limited and 
the one machine/one operator link has not been broken. On 
average, only 5% of the sewing machines used by large firms 
in Hoffman's (1985) sample had microelectronic controls. 
Because of the capital cost of such systems, technology 
induced, scale related entry barriers may be introduced into 
the industry for the first time (Hoffman 1985).
Technological gradualism can also be linked to labour supply 
factors, notably the fact that clothing manufacturers in a 
number of developed economies have had access to a large and 
plentiful supply of low paid, often ethnic female labour 
(Phizacklea 1987). Two factors may change this situation, 
notably a discernible trend towards a higher degree of 
concentration in the European and American clothing 
industries and a variety of public and private sector 
research and development initiatives in the developed 
economies, notably the EEC, Sweden, Japan and the US 
directed towards increasing the automation of garment 
manufacturing.
Por example, the Japanese Government through its Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry (MITI) has ploughed more 
than $53 million into a research and development project 
concerned with flexible manufacturing systems, which, it is 
hoped, will achieve a 50« reduction in unit production costs 
in the industry. Individual companies are also involved in 
joint ventures in similar areas, notably, the 
Courtaulds/GEC/Pfaff research into robotic technology.
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Evidence on the impact of ■icroelectronic technology in the 
clothing industry tends to be asbiguous. Hof f u n  and Rush 
(1984) give a nuaber of exasples where the use of 
aicroelectronics was important in maintaining a firm or 
sector's competitiveness. This had occurred in hosiery, 
jeans manufacturing, knitted garments, children's clothes 
and men's shirts. In hosiery, the use of electronics in toe 
closing machinery and knitting equipment had raised 
productivity rates and enabled some US firms to close 
offshore plants whilst maintaining their market share. 
Microelectronics, particularly computer aided design and 
computer controlled cutting machinery, had enhanced the 
ability of large firms to compete in certain product 
categories such as men's shirts and jeans manufacture. 
Several US jeans manufacturers had responded to higher 
productivity rates in their US locations by closing plants 
in Western Europe and reducing their subcontracting from 
Asian firms.
A recent survey of a small sample of US firms (Mody and 
Wheeler 1987) indicates that in 1985, US clothing firms were 
planning to locate future capacity either within the US or 
the Caribbean. This represents a shift away from Par Eastern 
countries which have traditionally dominated LDC clothing 
exports. Mody and Wheeler (1987) point out that the more 
time sensitive the product market, the more attractive 
become US or US-Caribbean production locations. For 
integrated, automated clothing production based in the US, 
total time in process and transit is only ten days. This 
increases to over a month for US-Caribbean production
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locations; to over two eonths for Korean and Chinese 
production using less advanced technologies and to nearly 
three Months for US-Asian joint production. They argue that 
in the future the tendency to locate outside the US 
continent will be weaker than in the past. More generally, 
over the next decade, it is predicted that the Asian MICs 
will lose ground to China and US/Caribbean joint operations. 
These Middle incoMe developing countries, - terned the 
'vanishing Middle' by Mody and Wheeler (1987) - face dual 
coapetitive pressure froa Western and Japanese firas 
adopting new technology and froa lower waged developing 
countries, such as China, the Philippines, Indonesia, the 
Caribbean, and Mexico.
But Mody and Wheeler's (1987:1271) research also indicated 
that, as yet, autoaation does not constitute an instant 
coapetitive panacea for the developed countries. Based on a 
saaple of six 'price-sensitive' products, US producers using 
fully autoaated plants (ie. robotic technology) were lower 
cost than Korean producers in only two garaent categories 
and case close in a third. Their research suggests that 
autoaating the reaaining three garaents (sen's slacks, sen's 
and woaen's knitted shirts) would cost so auch that US 
producers would still not be reaotely cost coapetitive. When 
using the best of currently available technology 
(seal-autoaated), US producers in all six product categories 
were not price coapetitive with their Korean counterparts.
In fully integrated garaent production, China was the 
least-cost in all garaent categories with both Korean and US 
producers at a clear cost disadvantage. Thus, the anbiguous
76
nature of the evidence appears to indicate that new 
technology has not led to an immediate and massive shift in 
cosparative advantage against the Third World. Moreover, 
there has, as yet, been no quantifiable ispact on 
international trade patterns with the developed econonies 
Maintaining at an aggregate levol a net deficit in clothing 
trade.
Are LDCs passive victins of a technology induced shift in 
comparative advantage? It is certainly the case that the 
rate of diffusion of microelectronic clothing technology 
appears to be very much slower in LDCs than in developed 
countries. Less than 7% of CAD systems have been sold to 
LDCs and these went primarily to the Asian NICs (Hoffman 
1985:377). But the competitive situation in an industry as 
internationalised as textiles and clothing is dynamic and 
within the LDCs, both governments and employers are actively 
attempting to restructure the industry. In July 1987, the 
South Korean Government set up a three year rationalisation 
and modernisation programme in which low interest long term 
loans were allocated to textile companies for the 
replacement of outdated machinery. The cotton spinning, 
synthetic fibre and weaving industries are engaged in 
technological development and many textile firms are now 
focusing on specialty products with increasing emphasis 
being placed on marketing techniques and the quality 
requirements of the West European market. Due to rising 
labour costs. Cable and Baker (1983:136) argued:
'One inevitable result is that Korea will have to 
accept that it cannot compete in the way it has 
before in the more labour intensive garment 
operations'.
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Pirms are now beginning to change their competitive 
strategies by selling higher value products to MPA quota 
areas (ie. the developed economies) whilst expanding lower 
cost exports to non quota areas in Africa, Asia, Latin 
America and the Middle East.
The Malaysian Government too has instituted a restructuring 
plan to facilitate the introduction of more modern textile 
technology and marketing techniques (Textile Outlook 
International March 1988). In Hong Kong, and Taiwan, textile 
and clothing firms are attempting to move upmarket to higher 
value added products with an emphasis on improved quality, 
service and design. In 1981, the current Taiwanese ten year 
plan set out certain objectives for the industry, including 
automation, modernisation of finishing, and upgrading of 
design skills as well as diversification into other export 
markets. The Turkish Government also recommends a shift to 
high value added products, accompanied by better quality and 
productivity, as well as the development of garment 
manufacture rather than cotton spinning. Perhaps, though, of 
most threat to the industrialised countries are the Southern 
European textile and clothing industries, particularly 
Portugal and Spain who are not only part of the EEC but also 
have a crucial competitive advantage over the Par Eastern 
NICs because of their proximity to the markets of Western 
Europe and their lower labour costs.
In short, a major trend in the textile industry has been the 
utilisation of more capital intensive methods of production. 
This enables firms to raise productivity levels and thereby
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reduce unit production costs. This has not led to a aassive 
or immediate shift in conparative advantage against LDCs, 
but it is likely that investment in highly productive 
textile Machinery and its sore rapid diffusion in developed 
economies has maintained, at an aggregate level, their net 
surplus in textile trade. Garment manufacturing, though, is 
still a predominantly labour intensive production process. 
Pre-assembly microelectronic technology appears to have had 
some impact on the competitiveness of a number of firms, 
particularly large firms, and their investment decisions. 
But as yet, there has been no quantifiable impact on 
international trade flows. Moreover, firms in the LDCs, 
particularly the Asian NICs, have also sought to modernise 
and upgrade their capital stock which has been facilitated 
in a number of cases by government action.
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3.8 Textiles and clothing; the »it» of »new* competitive
■tratigieB?
So far, the impact of price factors on international 
competition in the industry has been considered, but non­
price factors - such as speed and reliability of delivery, 
product quality and design - although intrinsically 
difficult to measure, are also important features of current 
competitive relationships.
In the context of slow growth in the industry, textile and 
clothing manufacturers in the developed economies have 
sought to maintain their market share by segmenting the 
market into heterogeneous niches. Firms have differentiated 
their products from those of their low cost competitors by 
shifting to the production of high value added, high quality 
goods. It has also involved engaging in other forms of non­
price competition, such as the use of brand names to 
differentiate products both from unbranded imports and from 
retailer's brand names. Branding enables a company to 
command a price premium but it requires considerable 
financial and marketing resources. It is only recently that 
clothing firms have had the financial and marketing leverage 
to realise its potential. Such techniques have been most 
visibly used by multinational jeans manufacturers who 
produce long runs of products in a relatively standardised 
form. As the Blue Bell (Wrangler) Vice President said:
'We are after clothes of a standard design that the 
masses buy and that can be produced in volume through 
mechanised assembly and marketed with the Wrangler brand. 
We have spent $75 million on the Wrangler name, and we 
are cashing in on that now'. (Clairmonte and 
Cavanagh 1981:209)
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The use of brand names and substantial advertising 
expenditure has enabled s o m  (large) clothing eanufacturers 
to escape froa 'the strait jacket iaposed on it by the 
retailer' which foraerly leant that control of the aarket 
was in the retailers' hands' (Textile Horizons January 
1988:24). In the case of Benetton, the Italian clothing 
Multinational, advertising accounts for a higher proportion 
of the value of sales (2.8%) than research and developaent 
expenditure (0.5%) and it is becoaing increasingly 
iaportant.
Such strategies illustrate that coapetition purely on the 
basis of price is not the only way for fi ras to Maintain or 
increase Market share. But it has been argued that these 
trends denote new foras of corporate behaviour. Bison 
(1988a), for exasple, has argued that Multinationals in the 
textile and clothing industry have shifted away froa the 
'supply of Manufactures' to the supply of Manufacturing 
'services'. Thus :
'THCs are defining their function not in terns of 
production, but in terns of the co-ordination of 
decentralised production, with such greater eaphasis 
on Marketing, finance, and licensing.' (1988a:35)
Benetton, in particular, has been drawn upon as an exanple
of current industrial restructuring, notably, the
application of integrated information technologies to the
areas of Marketing and distribution (Murray 1985).
But is the eaphasis on Marketing, and methods to coordinate 
production and distribution a particularly novel 
developaent? Chandler's (1977) historical analysis of the 
evolution of large-scale American enterprises indicates that
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an e a p h a s is  o n  t h e  c o o r d in a t io n  o f  p r o d u c t io n  and s a l e s ,  and 
tike M a rk e tin g  o f  p r o d u c t s , has been a r e l a t i v e l y  e n d u r in g  
f e a t u r e  o f  th e  s t r a t e g i e s  and p r e o c c u p a t io n s  o f  M odern 
c o r p o r a t io n s  t h r o u g h o u t  th e  t w e n t ie t h  c e n t u r y .  Th e  
in t e g r a t i o n  o f  u s s  p r o d u c t io n  w i t h  Mass d i s t r i b u t i o n  
i n i t i a l l y  to o k  t h e  f o r e  o f  M e rg e r s , v e r t i c a l i s a t i o n  and  th e  
e s t a b l is h a e n t  b y  M a n u fa c tu re rs  o f  n a t io n a l  and  g lo b a l  
M a rk e tin g  n e t w o rk s / p u rc h a s in g  o r g a n i s a t i o n s .  Th e  
i n t e r n a l i z a t i o n  o f  t h e  p ro c e s s e s  o f  p r o d u c t i o n .  M a r k e t in g , 
and p u r c h a s in g :
'..reduced transaction and inforaation costs. More 
iaportant, a firs was able to coordinate supply More 
closely with deaand, to use its working force and 
capital equipment More intensively, and thus to lower 
its unit costa..'. (Chandler 1977:286)
Moreover, as Williaason (1980) points out, the degree of
i n t e r n a l i z a t i o n ,  a n d  t h e  k in d s  o f  c o n t r a c t u a l  r e l a t i o n s  t h a t
c h a r a c t e r is e  f i r m s ,  a re  n o t  in a u t a b le  phenomena b u t  h a ve
changed o v e r  t i m e .  P ir n s  a re  e s s e n t i a l l y  p r o a c t i v e  a g e n t s .
They actively seek to strengthen their Market control by
t r a n s f o r a in g  t h e  o b s t a c le s  and c o n s t r a i n t s  c o n f r o n t i n g  th e n
in their competitive environnent. So, although the fora of
in t e g r a t i o n  o f  p r o d u c t io n  and d i s t r i b u t i o n  may h ave
changed -  a lo n g  w i t h  th e  e v o lu t io n  o f  'n e w ' t e c h n o lo g ie s  o f
c o o r d in a t io n  -  t h e  e a p h a s is  b y  f i r m s  o n  t h e  m a rk e tin g  o f
p ro d u c ts  and t h e  m a tc h in g  o f  s u p p ly  w i t h  d e a a nd  do e s n o t
c o n s t i t u t e  a new  s t a g e  o f  i n d u s t r i a l  d e v e lo p m e n t o r  an
intrinsically novel feature of corporate behaviour. It
Merely represents the continuous preoccupation of firms w it h
Methods t o  r e a l i s e  p r o f i t s  th r o u g h  th e  e s t a b l is h n e n t  o f
nechani sms t o  e n s u r e  t h a t  p r o d u c ts  a re  n o t  j u s t  M a n u fa c tu re d
b u t  a ls o  d i s t r i b u t e d  and s o l d .
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Textile and clothing eanufacturers are currently attempting 
to coordinate the production and distribution of their 
products in a number of ways. One strategy has been the 
adoption of Japanese style 'Just-in-Time' production methods 
to minimise stockholding costs and reduce delivery and lead 
times. It is estimated that total delivery time from the 
arrival of raw materials (fibre) to sales of garments is 13 
months (Gilmartin 1987), with only 24 out of 56 weeks in the 
total cycle spent in manufacturing. In primary textiles, 
only 24% of total time was used in manufacturing. But in 
making up, the situation was even worse with only 1% of 
production time spent in manufacturing. The British Knitting 
Economic Development Council (KEDC 1987) found considerable 
evidence of unnecessarily long lead times in the UK knitting 
industry. The longest recorded time was 52 weeks for a 
la-jxas fully fashioned sweater - knitting and dyeing took 
one to two days whilst the fibre was sitting in stores or 
factories waiting to be processed or sold for the other 363 
days. The KEDC (1987:13) report proposed that lead tines 
could be halved:
'the main rewards of increased responsiveness for UK 
knitters are likely to take the form of competitive 
advantages over at least the distant foreign suppliers 
to the home market - at best it could lead to the 
supreme protective device of inducing retailers to 
adopt procurement practices into which distant 
suppliers cannot fit'. (16)
Benetton's utilisation of a just-in-time approach to 
production and distribution has underpinned its transition 
from a small Italian family business in 1965 to one of 
Europe's largest clothing firms. But this has also been 
combined with a 'putting-out' system of manufacturing.
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Benetton's direct labour force nusbers 1,600 whilst an 
additional 15,000 to 20,000 are esployed in approximately 
300 small subcontracting firms. Production occurs in 
Benetton owned factories only in the crucial initial phases 
of design, and cutting and those stages at the end of the 
production cycle, such as dyeing, quality control, 
packaging, labelling, warehousing and delivery. 
Subcontractors located at or near Benetton in the Treviso 
district of Italy, are involved in the labour intensive 
phases of the production process such as garment assembly, 
ironing, finishing. They perform around 40t of the company's 
knitting, 60% of garment assembly and 80% of finishing. 
Subcontractors can be divided into four categories - those 
under the financial control of the Benetton family through 
various financial companies; affiliate firms which belong 
either to former employees or actual Benetton managers or 
clerks (here Benetton guarantees orders in the start up 
phase); independent firms and homeworkers (cf. Belussi 
1987).
Subcontractors generally agree to work exclusively for 
Benetton and in return are offered stability of demand and 
the guarantee of a 10% profit margin on their sales. The 
system of subcontracting utilises external management 
resources and reduces labour costs (in terns of unit labour 
costs the saving is about 40%). Labour productivity in 
subcontracting firms is estimated to be 10% higher than 
Benetton owned firms attributed by Belussi (1987) to 
management having greater control over the workforce and the 
ability to enforce a faster working pace.
Benetton has combined the domestic subcontracting of 
production with forward integration into distribution 
through franchised retail outlets. Benetton was the first 
firm in Italy and possibly in the world to introduce a 
system of franchising in textiles and clothing. Retailers 
which sell Benetton's products do not pay any royalties but 
cannot sell any other make of clothing. In 1985, it had 
2,000 shops abroad but eventually it is estimated Benetton 
will have 4,000 outlets in 57 countries (17). Benetton 
imposes the price of each item on retailers but generally it 
receives a higher share of the final price than European or 
American competitors (61% compared to 55%-56%) and at the 
same time retailers get higher net profit margins (Belussi 
1987:34—35).
Other important agents which gravitate around the Benetton 
system but are not directly owned by the company (although 
controlled by then) are material suppliers with whoa 
Benetton has a nonopsonistir relationship. Benetton 
purchases wool from just one firm, the (formerly) publically 
owned company of Lanerossi which means Benetton represents 
70% of Lanerossi's sales. In cotton fabric, one supplier 
covers 50% of Benetton's demand which is controlled by 
Benetton through a 30% shareholding.
Information technology is the 'glue' that integrates the 
spheres of production and distribution and is the key to the 
managerial control and coordination of all Benetton 
operations, particularly during its overseas expansion in 
the 1980s. New technology has been vital to Benetton in
aarketing, distribution, design, pattern Marking and cutting 
rather than assembly operations. More importantly, Benetton 
has used new technology to improve the speed of information 
flow throughout the whole system. The franchised shops are 
in close contact with head office and report weekly takings/ 
detailed sales trends. In 1985, all information about each 
product was recorded on automatic cash registers in each of 
about 200 shops located in four strategic markets. Every day 
this information is recorded on a main computer at Benetton 
head office which enables real time projections on market 
trends.
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The important feature of this system is that Benetton 
manufactures garments in response to direct orders from the 
retail outlets as the pattern of sales and extent of 
re-orders is regularly fed back from the shops to Benetton. 
Planning of production based on the shops' orders reduces 
seasonal peaks, inventories and the average length of tine 
that garments spend in the warehouse. This centralised 
information system enables Benetton's products to reach its 
franchised retail outlets very quickly and facilitates a 
rapid response (ben days) to re-orders by both domestic and 
foreign shops (Belussi 1987). Pranchised retailing (a case 
of forward integration based on 'control' rather than direct 
ownership) constitutes a particularly effective method of 
extending the company's access to foreign markets. It 
guarantees outlets for Benetton's products, enables easier 
planning and coordination of the production process and 
provides a vehicle for advertising and marketing.
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Although Benetton's products have been concentrated in the 
areas of the fastest growth of desand the systes is not 
iamine to problems. The coapany has been likened to:
'an elephant balanced on a tub.... One year of
poor sales for pullovers or jeans, a slip of 
image or an off key collection would have the 
elephant for all its fanous flexibility with 
its legs in the air.' (Finnerty 1987:75).
Saturation point has been reached in Italy and the UK where
the momentum of growth has faltered. Further growth nay cone
from diversification into other products, such as home
furnishings, real estate, and in-store credit cards. The
company articulated in its 1985 Annual Report a new strategy
of diversification into financial services. It aims to reach
the sane strength in financial services as in clothing
(LlOOObn) but Finnerty (1987) argues that diversification
into finance and banking nay mean it is spreading its
resources too thinly. Competition has intensified with
Benetton clones like Stefanel increasingly operating on an
international basis through franchised retail outlets.
Hence, Benetton nay face saturation in its main markets not
only as a result of its own growth but also as its
competitors attack the sane market segments.
In one sense, Benetton is not really a manufacturing 
multinational but more a marketing and distribution MNC (cf. 
Elson 1988a:34). Despite the extensive internationalisation 
of its retailing functions (controlled but not owned by 
Benetton through franchising) it has made few overseas 
investments in production. Hor, contrary to Murray (1985), 
is Benetton typical of a flexible specialisation production 
model or the resurgence of the small firm. Benetton's single
87
coloured classic knitwear is a standardised Pordist product. 
It is Manufactured in grey (undyed) fora and then dyed at 
the end of the production cycle when product differentiation 
occurs.
The novel feature of Benetton's expansion is that it 
occurred through the development of a network of 
'controlled' f i n s  rather than the extension of direct 
ownership but this does not imply a trend to smaller firm 
size. Benetton has, in effect, a quasi-vertically integrated 
structure. The company controls its satellite firms in 
production and distribution without owning then because of 
its centralised possession of the information flows vital 
for production and retailing and the structured 
nonopsonistic dependency of suppliers, subcontractors and 
retailers on Benetton itself, all of which are tied into the 
system by a variety of means. The proximity of 
subcontractors to the Benetton operation itself avoids the 
loss of managerial control and economic costs associated 
with international subcontracting. The firm is responsible 
for the strategic functions of control and coordination of 
production and distribution (ie. planning, marketing and 
those manufacturing phases requiring the most complex 
technological knowhow) whilst most labour intensive 
manufacturing functions are subcontracted to firms which 
concentrate entirely on production tasks. Benetton's 
strategy is to maintain complete control over these firms - 
each subcontractor is responsible for only a particular 
phase in the production process and never the production of 
a complete item. Benetton advises on machinery layout and
the BOBt efficient production methods (cf. Belussi 1987:74). 
Such an iaage of an essentially 'fragmented' production 
process determined and controlled by an external firm is 
hardly reminiscent of the autonomous artisan craft workshops 
so celebrated by flexible specialisation writers.
It has been argued that the shift to high value added 
products, and the utilisation of integrated information 
technologies and just in time production methods, typical of 
Benetton, constitutes the emergence of a new polarity in the 
structure of international competition in the industry 
(Seitlin 1985). firms in the developed economies have 
shifted to strategies of flexible specialisation underpinned 
by 'new' automation technologies, whilst LDCs are left to 
concentrate on the production of basic fabrics and mass 
merchandise clothing in line with their comparative labour 
cost advantage. These factors are leading to:
'a visible shift in the relocation of production 
in the clothing industry from the Third World in 
favour of Western European countries since the 
beginning of the 1980s'. (Hitter 1986:46)
But international competition in the industry tends not to 
be characterised by clear cut shifts in comparative 
advantage or dichotomous relationships between the developed 
and developing countries. For example, although just-in-time 
production methods enable high labour cost countries to 
reduce emphasis on price and transfer it to delivery and 
service, it is more plausible to argue that comparative 
advantage would shift to Southern European countries like 
Turkey and Portugal which have lower labour costs and 
proximity to European markets rather than North European
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■anufacturers (cf. Grahl 1983). A West European buyer can 
receive goods within a week fros Portugal, and Turkey is 
only two days away fros the sajor West European trading 
countries.
More isportantly. Third World firas, particularly in the 
NICs, are attempting to overcose this type of competitive 
obstacle. Far Eastern exporters are also introducing just- 
in-time production methods. The KEDC (1987) report gives an 
example of one Far Eastern knitwear manufacturer who has 
invested in new technology to reduce lead times from three 
to two weeks whereas the best practice in the UK for a 
similar product is four to six weeks. In fact, not only has 
protectionism facilitated the establishment of Third World 
multinational corporations and foreign direct investment to 
developed countries and lower cost developing countries, but 
it has also encouraged LDCs to move upmarket, to increase 
the value of their exports because bilateral quotas limit 
export volume. This, in turn, will intensify the competitive 
pressures on firms in the developed countries which have 
also shifted production upmarket.
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Chapter Four; State Intervention: The Dewloptd Econo»!««
The discussion, so far, has centred on the strategies of 
firss, and especially the role of eultinational corporations 
in the process of the industry's internationalisation. But 
competition froe LDCs has, in turn, encouraged the state in 
the developed economies to actively intervene in the 
industry. The objective of this chapter, then, is to focus 
on the character and nature of state policies towards the 
industry.
The central arguaent is that state intervention has often 
been characterised by mutually inconsistent objectives and 
has generated contradictory outcomes. A major thrust of 
sectoral policy has been to facilitate the restructuring of 
firms to the imperatives of international competition. But 
the provision of financial subsidies to rationalise and 
modernise the industry's productive base has coexisted in a 
number of countries with measures which potentially delay 
the structural adaptation of firms to international 
competition. For example, employment maintenance subsidies 
tend to cheapen the cost of labour to firms and therefore 
renders the adoption of labour displacing technologies a 
less attractive option. Trade restraints seriously limit the 
access of Third World firms to markets in the developed 
economies and contradict the intention of other state 
agencies (GATT, IMF, World Bank) to liberalise international 
trade and to encourage LDCs in the direction of strategies 
of export led growth, and the dismantling of tariff 
barriers. Moreover, the defence of markets against 
competition from LDCs coexists simultaneously with
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favourable trade and custoas provisions which facilitate the 
mobility of multinational firms, and the relocation of 
production to lower waged economies through offshore 
processing arrangeaents.
The emphasis on the character of state intervention is 
counterposed to comparative analyses which tend to attribute 
the differential performance of the industry within the 
developed economies to the extent of state intervention or 
entrepreneurial self reliance. Such analyses tend to focus 
on one or two successful industries (ie. Germany and Italy) 
which are then used to judge and evaluate the performance of 
industries in other countries. But the differential 
performance of the industry within these countries ought not 
to be simplistically attributed to the degree of state 
intervention. A more satisfactory approach recognises that 
industrial development is related to a complex of economic 
and political forces which take specific shapes in 
particular countries. The following discussion therefore 
attempts to draw out general issues regarding the 
relationship between the state and the industry, and the 
ambiguous nature of intervention in this sector.
4.1 Structural change and state policies; an overview 
Protectionist agreements were initially intended to be 
temporary measures to allow the textile industries of the 
developed countries to structurally adjust to competition 
from low cost LDCs by investing in capital intensive 
machinery, shifting into non competing products and 
scrapping antiquated and outdated plant. One outcome has
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been a dramatic transformation in the structure of the 
industry in most developed countries.
Formerly, the industry was characterised by a large number 
of small and medium sized, mostly family enterprises and 
concentration levels tended to be «rell below the 
manufacturing average. The strong movement to concentration 
in textiles is attributable to a number of factors, notably, 
the attempt by synthetic fibre firms to increase their share 
of textile output and in some countries (UK and Japan) 
direct acquisition of a large amount of textile capacity by 
vertical integration and the diffusion of mass production 
technologies, especially in the cotton industry which tended 
to the integration of spinning and weaving processes.
The governments of the developed countries have been active 
in facilitating various forms of structural adjustment which 
have favoured the rationalisation and modernisation of the 
industry and in many European countries, as «rail as Japan, 
governments have positively supported mergers and takeovers 
(except the US). Even where scale economies were not of 
consequence, as in clothing, it was believed that other 
benefits of size arose from the greater marketing, 
management, and financial resources of large companies (OECD 
1983:25-27, Anson and Simpson 1988:46). Thus, concentration 
in clothing has tended to increase over the postwar period, 
particularly in those countries with a relatively 
concentrated clothing retailing business (ie. UK and 
Finland). However, concentration levels are generally higher 
in textiles than clothing (OECD 1983:27). According to the
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OECD (1983:27) textiles and clothing are Moving to divergent 
corporate structures:
'In both industries, flexibility in responding to 
output changes resains critical but this appears 
to be aore compatible with a high level of 
concentration in basic textiles than in the rest of 
the industry.'
The overall trend to increasing size and concentration in 
textiles has proceeded at different rates in the developed 
countries (cf. table 10).
Table 10: Concentration characteristics of textile 
industries in selected countries. 1985
lest
Cortear Italy OSA 1 Japan France
Knployaent
Largest 3 firm 0,72) 14,004 117,200 11),500 22,375 42,007
Largest 5 firm 15.200 10,220 140,500 1)0,01) 32,014 50,225
Largest 10 fins 10, >04 21,435 210,0)0 150,000 50,027 73,404
loaber of fins 
with turnover over 
Dll bn 2 10 5 10 4
Sbire of tales ia 
largest firas to 
sales of eorld's top 
250 fins (I)
Largest 5 2.1 2.0 15.2 7.2 1.2 5.4
Largest 10 ).S ) .0 21.0 0.5 11.1 7.1
Largest 20 5.1 4.7 20.5 0.4 15.0 0.4
Coaolatm share of eaployaent 
in largest 10 fins to total 
textile eaployaent (t)
1045 11 20 20 12 14
1070 15 14 25 57 11 2)
1075 14 16 26 70 10 21
1080 14 10 24 67 8 30
Source: Anson and Sinpson 1988:42
The US industry, for exasple, is dominated by large fires 
although there has been no government backing of aaergers. 
Currently, US firms constitute five of the world's top ten
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textile firms and twenty two of the top fifty. The average 
employment levels of the largest ten are a staggering 21,000 
higher than in West Germany, Italy, the UK, Japan and 
Prance. The concentration of the US industry has recently 
increased with a number of important mergers involving the 
largest companies. By 1990 it is estimated that the fifteen 
largest corporations will have increased their share of 
output from 25% to 40%. This has been accompanied by 
diversification into other activities particularly in 
consumer goods manufacturing so conglomerates have become 
more common. American textile mills tend to be concerned 
with manufacturing long runs of a small number of products 
for a large, and well protected domestic market. Although 
Bur 1 ingtons, and J P Stevens are amongst the largest textile 
firms in the world, and are involved to some extent with 
foreign investment, they rely heavily on the US market (18).
The UK has probably the most concentrated textile industrial 
structure amongst the developed countries. State backing for 
fibre producers' attempts to restructure the industry led to 
high levels of concentration in most branches. The share of 
establishments with more than 1 ,0 0 0  employees in net output 
rose from less than 13% in 1948 to 22% in 1970 in textiles 
and from 5% to 13% in clothing (OECD 1983:25). By 1980, five 
firms accounted for half of all employment in the UK textile 
and clothing industry. There has been renewed merger 
activity in the 1980s with the formation of the Coats 
Viyella group (now the UK's largest textile company) from 
four previously independent firms and the emergence through 
aeguisition of the John Crowther group. UK governments have
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directly intervened in the industry through a number of 
specific sectoral progranes. The present Government, in 
contrast to other European governments, is no longer running 
special sectoral schemes to help either industry. An attempt 
to introduce a relatively modest scheme in the mid 1980s 
involving f20 mn. of assistance to upgrade the technology of 
small firms in the clothing, footwear, and knitting 
industries was turned down by the EC in 1985 on the grounds 
it would merely transfer remaining structural problems and 
employment from one member state to another.
As in the UK, the impetus for concentration in the Prench 
textile industry came from the leading synthetic fibre 
manufacturer - Rhone Poulenc, again with the positive 
assistance of the state, mainly through tax incentives.
There have been strong linkages between Rhone Poulenc and 
textiles through common shareholdings in a leading textile 
group: Dollfus Nieg, as a result of which the top three 
producers have over a third of loons and spindles (Cable and 
Baker 1983:39). The favourable attitude of successive Prench 
governments towards concentration in textiles tended to cool 
in the late 1970s as several very large firms collapsed. Aid 
was given specifically to textiles in the form of grants to 
rescue ailing firms from bankruptcy, such as Boussac.
Prench textiles differs to the UK in the extent to which 
small or medium sized firms have remained in existence.
Small and medium size companies (less than 200 eaployees) 
make up one third of sales and account for 40t of the 
workforce. In clothing, two thirds of all enterprises employ
fever than ten employees but account for 12% of the total 
number of employees. In fact, the largest companies (500 +) 
aake up only 0.1% of the number of firms and employ fever 
than 3% of the total clothing vorkforce.
But in contrast to the UK, Prench governments have been 
particularly proactive in their attempts to restructure the 
industry in response to severe import competition. In the 
1980s the Government semi-nationalised and became deeply 
involved in the reorganisation of Boussac Saint Preres and 
Rhone Poulenc's loss making textile activities when the 
chemical giant vas taken into public ovnership. The Prench 
state also gave loans to help other textile firms in 
difficulties, particular Bidermann and Prouvost in 1981.
Early in 1982, the Prench Government approved a plan to aid 
Prance's ailing textile industry. Under the tvo year 
programme the Government agreed to subsidise social security 
contributions by textile firms in return for commitments on 
employment and nev investment, vith a viev to modernising 
the industry and making it more competitive (19). One 
estimate has put the cost at nearly 3.5 times the level of 
subsidies granted in 1980. But the Plan appears to have 
succeeded in its objectives. Betveen 1981-83, the rate of 
investment doubled; the annual rate of reduction in the 
vorkforce dropped from 7% to 2% and total investment 
increased by 38%. Participating firms increased their 
investment by 47% in real terms over the period - 23% in 
textiles, 75% in knitvear and 125% in clothing.
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Japanese industry is at a similar stage to Prance in its 
level of concentration but this say be misleading given the 
influence of the giant conglomerates (Zaibatsu) which 
exercise an influence through interlocking directorates and 
joint ventures as well as shareholdings in subsidiaries. The 
large trading companies are linked with textiles through 
various shareholdings and joint ventures (eg. Mitsui with 
Toray/Itoh with Teijin). The major distinguishing 
characteristic of the Japanese textile industry has been its 
involvement in foreign direct investment, which was 
accompanied by diversification into non textile products 
( 2 0 ) .
Japanese textile and clothing fins have been supported in 
their efforts to rationalise and modernise plant by the 
state, and the Ministry of International Trade and Industry 
(MITI) has been particularly influential in shaping the 
textile industry over the years. Government related 
financial agencies have provided loans, for small and medium 
sized firms in particular, to close down excess capacity. It 
is estimated that, since 1973, 20% of textile facilities 
have been disposed of in this way (Anson and Simpson 
1988:142). Firms seeking to convert to other sectors were 
given special monetary and financial support under a 
government sponsored business conversion programme. For 
firms remaining within the industry but seeking to adapt 
their products or technology, funds have been available from 
MITI. In recent years government assistance has concentrated 
upon helping firms give greater emphasis to research and 
development, and high quality products, especially in
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clothing.
Two countries stand as exceptions to the general trend to 
increasing size and concentration in textiles - West Germany 
and Italy (21). West Germany has no firms with a turnover of 
more than DM 1 bn. and its largest firm, Freudenberg, just 
makes it into the world's largest fifty. During the 1960s, 
many leading firms adopted the strategy of vertical and 
horizontal concentration to exploit the scale economies 
derived from manufacturing long runs of standardised 
clothing. Other firms opted for specialisation in fashion 
goods and household or industrial textiles. During the early 
1970s, the growth of low cost textile and clothing imports 
and rapidly rising real wage costs made a mass market 
strategy relatively uncompetitive. Consequently, many firms 
collapsed or were converted to specialisation. The number of 
textile firms shrank from 4,500 in 1960 to 1,800 during the 
late 1970s. The West German industry's strength is built on 
these medium sized firms (employing 200 to 3,000 with none 
more than 6 ,0 0 0 ) which remained after the shakeout of the 
1970s and concentrated on using advanced textile machinery 
to produce high quality textiles.
The West German Federal Government favoured liberalisation 
with no significant sectoral policy for textiles. 
Nevertheless, the regional governments frequently stepped in 
to rescue ailing firms and operated their own industry wide 
assistance programmes providing subsidies for investment and 
loan guarantees. Contrary to Shepherd's argument (1983) 
concerning the link between the success of the West German
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textile industry and the absence of government intervention, 
it appears that the extent of assistance to textile and 
clothing companies at regional level has been quite 
extensive. One estimate has put the figure at an average of 
DM 200 million per year directed towards the textile 
industry between the period 1980-82 (Hartmann 1985:7).
In the 1970s, Italy emerged as the world's largest net 
exporter of textiles and clothing, steadily increasing its 
market share. In the adjustment pattern followed during the 
1970s, the decline of the large vertically integrated firms 
has been most marked. Since the 1950s, a déconcentration and 
devertical isation process has left Italy with relatively few 
large firms and a dominant role for small firms of 1 0 0  
employees or less specialised by products or production 
phases. According to the OECD (1983:138), the large groups 
have not necessarily disappeared but, when surviving, they 
now have a more flexible organisation and a number of small 
independent firms are connected with the parent company only 
through financial and sometimes marketing linkages. This 
change in industry structure did not affect all the 
different branches to the same extent, but was most narked 
in woollen fabrics, knitting and clothing, and many small 
firms operating in a single production phase took advantage 
of the high geographical concentration of the textile 
industry in areas (Biella and Prato for the wool industry, 
Como for the silk industry and so on) where the costs of 
transportation, information etc. among firms are very low 
and external economies quite high.
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In the clothing and knitting industries, restructuring was 
accompanied by a growing recourse to hoaeworkers. This 
reorganisation was primarily an attempt to reduce labour 
costs and to evade state legislation and trade union 
organisation in the pursuit of greater labour mobility. 
Nevertheless, the counterpart of this restructuring process 
has been the weakness of research and development 
activities, notably in synthetic fibres and in the highly 
capital intensive parts of the textile industry.
The Italian Government has operated extensive schemes for 
the textile and clothing industries, with subsidies for 
restructuring and industrial investment. Since 1976, many 
firms in southern Italy have benefited from investment 
grants and interest relief on loans for the establishment of 
new firms or the reopening and extension of existing firms. 
Both textile and clothing firms also benefited from general 
aids to industry such as schemes to reduce the levels of 
unemployment insurance of small firms and low interest loans 
available since 1972 for reorganisation and restructuring. 
The state has also paid a proportion of national health 
insurance contributions, and textiles and clothing have been 
the major sectoral beneficiaries of government support to 
workers on short time.
According to Cable and Baker (1983) much old equipment was 
scrapped in the modernisation programmes, although large 
scale state aids have led to an increase in unused capacity 
of up to 40% in some plants. It is estimated that state 
subsidies approximate $356 per worker per year. Many private
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firms have been taken over by public holdings which now 
control about 5% of the total employment in textiles and 
■ore than 10% in clothing. In textiles, government aid has 
been poured into large, high technology production.
Clearly, the nature of public intervention is no siaple 
explanation of the differential perforaance of the 
industries in these countries. Shepherd (1983) eaphasises 
strong entrepreneurial self reliance which he argues was 
encouraged by the West German Governaent's liberalisation 
policy and abstinence from structural policy. But state 
intervention occurred in Nest Germany at the regional level 
and the Federal Government's encouragement of offshore 
processing ensured to some extent the survival of a capital 
intensive textile industry. Italy has had strong 
protectionist governments and an interventionist structural 
policy, whilst remaining extremely coapetitive in textiles 
and clothing. Moreover, there are signs that firas in the 
Italian industry are beginning to increase in size in an 
attempt to reap scale economies. Anson and Simpson 
(1988:238) argue that Italian firas in addition to Benetton 
are recognising the limitations which their small scale of 
operation and fragmentation imposes - market barriers 
(especially when it comes to exporting), a lack of 
bargaining power with suppliers and customers, and their 
inability to capitalise on ether scale economies. They cite 
the recent handing over to the private sector of Lanerossi, 
which has become part of Marzotto, creating Italy's largest 
textile company with annual sales of LI,300 bn. (larger than 
Benetton) and the takeover by Marzotto of Bassetti, involved
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in household textiles.
It has been argued that the deterioration in the 
competitiveness of French and UK textiles is due to the 
weakening of the entrepreneurial base by long term decline 
in the case of the UK (a tautologoua argument) and by 
protectionism in Prance, a less flexible labour market and a 
more equivocal government position towards trade 
liberalisation and structural policy than in Germany which 
favoured the emergence of large groups (Shepherd 1983). But 
the evidence indicates that in France and the UK, state 
intervention did have a rationalising effect as did the 
concentration strategies of the synthetic fibre firms.
French state aid to the industry has increased investment 
and reduced employment decline.
Nevertheless, (national) state policies towards the industry 
have often had contradictory effects (cf. chapter 6). For 
example, the aim of industrial polices has been both to 
provide immediate financial assistance to firms in 
difficulty and to modernise and rationalise the industry.
The latter objective has often been counterposed to 
employment subsidies and employment-maintenance schemes 
operated in most developed countries (is. UK, Belgium,
Sweden, Ireland, Norway, Japan). The OECD (1983:127) study 
points out that the impact of employment policies on 
capital/labour ratios is uncertain but by reducing the cost 
of labour to firms, they have to some extent contradicted 
the impact of investment incentives which are designed to 
accelerate the process of capital/labour substitution.
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Moreover, both trade restraints and employment Maintenance 
Measures aay have actually delayed the restructuring of the 
industry and the adaptation of firms in the developed 
economies to the imperatives of international competition, 
which has often been the stated objective of industrial 
policies.
The degree and nature of (national) state intervention in 
the European textile industry has in the 1980s conflicted 
with European Community policy. In recent years, the EC has 
taken a tougher stance against sectoral assistance and a 
number of member states have had their aid schemes 
challenged either by the EC or by one or more other member 
state for being in restraint of trade or otherwise 
infringing EC regulations.
The recent spate of rejections by the EC of proposals for 
selective textile industry assistance have a historical 
precedent which goes back to the late 1970s and the 
conjunction of the recession and the intensification of 
competitive pressures. In December 1979, the EC opened 
procedures in respect of unlawful state aids regarding a 
major project in the French textile industry. The French 
Government also fell foul of the EC Commission in 1987, when 
the EC asked the Government to withdraw by recovery 49% of 
its alleged aid to Boussac Saint Freres. This followed the 
discontinuation of the original Textile Plan following 
complaints that it distorted competition. In its place the 
French Government introduced a new five year scheme designed 
so aid was less overtly directed at subsidising production.
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But in 1986, this was rejected by the EC Conission on the 
grounds that the scheee was so vaguely worded that the aid 
could still be used to give selective assistance to 
individual f i n s  or to subsidise French exports to other EC 
■embers. At the beginning of 1989, the West German textile 
industry association (Gesamttextil) was attempting to block 
French regional textile subsidies which it argued were not 
in accord with EC competition rules and would contradict the 
goal of a unified European market (FT 6.1.89). Selective 
assistance schemes drawn up by the Dutch, Belgian and UK 
governments have also been rejected by the EC.
Paradoxically, despite its tougher stance against sectoral 
assistance in recent years, the EC has played a more active 
role in the restructuring of the industry. EC textile and 
clothing firms have in the past received aid from the 
Community itself, in addition to aid from national 
governments. The Regional Fund channels aid to safeguard 
jobs in regions where the textile and clothing industry 
provides more than 10% of total industrial employment and 
the Social Fund attempts to retrain workers either within 
the industry or to find jobs in another industry. A number 
of special, non sector schemes are also available to support 
industry research and development, from which the textile 
and clothing industries benefit (22). The largest scheme and 
one where there has been direct investment in research into 
new clothing technology is the EC's 'Basic Research in 
Industrial Technologies for Europe' (BRITE) Programme (23).
A special allocation is available for 'flexible materials' 
aimed at the clothing industry while textiles has been
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singled out by the EC as a target for allocation of the 
1987-91 budget.
Contradictions have thus emerged between national European 
governments and the character of their intervention in the 
industry and the 'liberal' non-interventionist policies of 
the EC as a regional economic bloc. Fundamental tensions 
exist between the desire of national governments to 
stimulate the restructuring of the industry to cope with 
changing conditions of international competition and/or to 
cushion the impact of unemployment exacerbated by the 
regional concentration of textile and clothing employment, 
and the EEC's 'liberal' competition policy. The forces which 
led to heavy concentration of the industry in the 1960s and 
1970s appear to have abated in the 1980s. Both the state and 
fibre companies have drawn back from further concentration 
in textiles and the impetus they provided in the earlier 
years has not been replaced. Fibre companies appear to be 
less interested in vertical integration than in 
diversification into other industries. Nevertheless, large 
firms have not declined in importance and the most recent 
experience of the US and UK indicates that the trend to 
larger size has not been halted.
4.2 Protectionism
A number of governments and employers in the developed 
economies have embraced protectionism as a defence against 
rising competition from LDCs. It has long been felt by 
various firms, trade unions and governments in the developed 
countries that low cost imports were largely responsible for
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the job losses in the industry (24). The fear has been that, 
unless strictly controlled by protectionist measures, the 
rapidly growing tide of inports of textiles and clothing 
fron the Third Morld would overrun donestic markets. The 
relationship between increasing inport penetration and 
declining enploynent in textiles and clothing in developed 
countries has therefore been one of the nost controversial 
issues in international trade relations over the post war 
period.
The evidence concerning the relationship between inport 
penetration and declining enploynent levels in the developed 
countries in, however, extrenely difficult to interpret. For 
exanple, a nunber of studies have sought to quantify the 
enploynent inpacts of inport growth over particular periods 
(cf. Cable 1977:41; De La Torre and Bachetta (1979); Soete 
(1984)). But studies which have used the sane data often 
generate different conclusions. In relation to the UK, Cable 
(1977) concluded that if one takes the performance of 
clothing, cotton textiles, yarns and footwear together, over 
the 1970-75 period, productivity growth was twice as 
important as a determinant of job losses as trade related 
factors. In a more recent study (Rush and Soete 1984) which 
looked at the 1970-79 period only for the clothing industry, 
net job displacement fron Third Morld clothing imports was 
nearly 50% (44,580) of the total job losses in the sector 
over that period (99,400). Moreover, genuine economic 
causality is often difficult to identify. Rises in 
productivity could be induced by an increase in import 
penetration or its threat, particularly in textiles (OECD
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1983:80-81). It can therefore be misleading to assess the 
effects of LDC Imports on employment in the industry in 
isolation from other factors.
Despite the ambivalence of the evidence, protectionist 
sentiments have been stimulated by the fact that the 
textiles and clothing industries in many developed countries 
are geographically concentrated in areas with high 
unemployment levels. Consequently, tariff and non tariff 
barriers directed at excluding textiles and clothing 
products from the Third World have continually risen in 
level and scope since the 1960s although national and local 
restrictions on textile trade date back in some cases to the 
1930s. In short, textile products are the most 
comprehensively regulated and the longest protected of 
industrial goods.
The best known and most controversial system of regulation 
is the Multi Fibre Agreement (MFA) renewed for the third 
time in August 1987 (25). The MFA had its origins in the 
five year Long Term Arrangement on Cotton Textiles (LTA) in 
1962, which was an attempt to bring the growing number of 
bilateral agreements under the surveillance of GATT and to 
allow the industries of the importing (industrialised) 
countries a temporary period to adjust to increased cotton 
textile imports from low-wage countries, which, until the 
mid 1970s included Japan. The LTA was twice renewed before 
it was replaced in 1974 by an agreement that embraced all 
the major textile fibres.
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The UFA, which case into force in 1974, arose fro* a GATT 
initiative to identify the problems of international trade 
in textiles and to seek eultilateral solutions. The final 
agreement was reached by 50 countries in 1973. The UFA 
allows for an exporting country and an importing country to 
reach a separate bilateral agreement to restrain the flow of 
textiles and clothing from the exporting country into the 
importing country. Quotas are agreed which establish limits 
on the guantity of goods to be exported, and are 
administered and applied by the exporting country. The MFA's 
stated objectives are the expansion and progressive 
liberalisation of trade in textiles whilst avoiding the 
disruption of individual markets and production in both 
importing and exporting countries (26). Although the UFA is 
mostly applied to the exports of LDCs, it seeks ostensibly 
to secure for LDCs an increase in their export earnings and 
a greater share of the world's trade in textile products. 
Annual increases of 6% are allowed in LDC exports of 
restrained goods to the markets of developed countries.
The first UFA (1974-77) was relatively liberal but covered a 
more extensive range of products than the LTA. Although 
import growth was held at 6%, employment sharply declined in 
the developed countries because of the 1973 recession which 
seriously reduced demand for textiles and led to zero growth 
in clothing. Conseguently, UFA 2 (1978-81) was much more 
restrictive. The new bilateral agreements covered a larger 
number of products and the annual growth rates of imports 
were reduced to below 6%. UFA 3 returned in some ways to the 
original aims of UFA 1 but it was still restrictive and
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severely curtailed growth in imports from LDCs.
Negotiations for MFA 4 (1986-1991) were deeply effected by 
the predicament of the USA, which had experienced an 
unprecedented surge in textile and clothing imports from 
both high and low cost countries. Protectionist sentiment 
culminated in the Jenkins-Thurmond Bill which sought to roll 
back imports to the levels that would have been attained had 
import growth been kept to the levels established under UFA 
3 (27). It was estimated that it would have led to cutbacks 
in imports from LDCs of the order of 30%. Although the bill 
passed successfully through the House and Senate, it failed 
to command the necessary two thirds majority to avoid the 
presidential veto but a veto override attempt was scheduled 
for six days after MFA 3 was due to expire.
The major NIC exporters have generally worked with and 
administered quotas. Even though their exports were 
restricted, a certain amount of market access has been 
guaranteed and quotas were allocated on the basis of past 
performance. Other LDCs, however, have found that export 
growth (although from a very low level) has involved then 
becoming subject to quotas, even though those exports nay 
account for a very small proportion of the total imports of 
a developed country. MFA 4 therefore makes a distinction 
between the poorer LDCs and the NICs. The least developed 
countries along with small suppliers and new entrants would 
in principle be excluded from import controls. When they 
were imposed, treatment would be 'significantly more 
favourable'. Despite these concessions, the MFA 4 is in some
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respects sore restrictive than UFA 3. The eost significant 
change involved an extension of the fibres covered by the 
agreement.
4.2.1 The Effect of the UFA on Developing Countries 
reports into developed countries froe LDCs have grown but 
evidence suggests growth rates have slowed significantly, 
especially during UFA 2. During 1963-76, under the LTA and 
early part of MFA 1, textile inports from LDCs to developed 
countries grew in real teres by an average of 7% a year and 
clothing imports by 21t. In the latter half of the period 
covered by MFA 1 and the first year of MFA 2 (1976-78) 
annual growth declined to 4.6% and 4.8% respectively (28). 
Over the period of the agreements, the LDCs (including the 
Eastern trading area) share of textile and clothing imports 
into developed countries (OECD) rose from under 30% in 1973 
(last year of LTA) to nearly 40% in 1981 (last year of MFA 
2). In the five years of MFA 3 progress was slower and by 
1986 the share of LDCs had climbed only 3.4% to 43.4%. Most 
of the growth in recent years has been in clothing; LDCs 
share of developed countries' textile imports grew only 0.4% 
in the five years to 1986.
Chinese and South Korean exports have shown rapid growth. In 
1973, their share of textile and clothing imports into the 
OECD countries were 1.7% and 3.6% but by 1986, South Korea's 
share had almost doubled to 6.7% while China's share had 
more than trebled to 5.3%. If China and Taiwan are excluded 
(China joined in 1986 and Taiwan never joined) the share of 
the remaining LDCs was less than 33% in 1986 having climbed
by only 1.1% in five years. In clothing, progress was even 
slower during HFA 3 with a rise of only 0.5% if the two sain 
non—UFA countries are excluded. However, it is likely that 
the surge in isports into developed countries in 1987, 
attributable to the fall in the value of the dollar, has 
restored sose of the loss in the LDCs share (Anson and 
Sispson 1988:128-9).
The evidence appears to indicate that isport controls have a 
trade diversionary rather than an isport restraining effect. 
Anson and Sispson (1988) analysed three years of isport 
restraints (1973, 1981 and 1986). As regards the US there 
was a relative shift in the source of isports in clothing 
and to a lesser extent textiles, away fros LDCs towards the 
Eastern trading area (alsost entirely due to China) and to 
other developed countries (sainly Western Europe). In the 
EC, there has been a sinor shift away fros LDCs in favour of 
the Eastern trading area and other developed countries since 
the early 1980s. Hence, it appears that the growth in the 
share of LDCs in developed country isports has been slowed 
if not halted by the UFA. The sajor beneficiaries have been 
the southern European countries (especially Turkey), non-UFA 
LDCs and the Eastern trading area countries, particularly 
China (29).
The EC has special arrangesents with the forser colonies of 
EC sesber states in African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) 
countries and with its associate sesbers in the 
Mediterranean ris. Prior to 1978 preferential suppliers had 
unrestrained access to EC Markets but the need for sore
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formal arrangements arose as imports from the Mediterranean 
suppliers grew rapidly to fill the vacuum created by 
restraints on UFA suppliers. In fact, according to GATT 
estimates, the UFA regulates only about a quarter of world 
textile trade. The other three quarters of world trade is 
accounted for by export flows between industrialised 
countries (including about a fifth which is intra-EC trade)» 
export flow« between MFA and non-MFA signatories; trade 
covered by other arrangements and products not subject to 
MFA bilaterals.
Although the MFA was designed to be only a temporary 
arrangement there has been no date fixed for the MFA's 
eventual abolition. The IMF estimated that complete 
liberalisation of trade (tariffs and quotas) would lead to 
an increase in textile imports into the main OECD countries 
by 82% and clothing by 93%. UNCTAD estimated rises of 78% 
for textiles and 135% for clothing (cf. Anson and Simpson 
1988).
The effects on LDCs of abolition is difficult to predict. 
Textiles and clothing play a major role in the economic 
development of the poorest and most indebted LDCs. The OECD 
secretariat in a 1985 study on the costs and benefits of 
protection argued that:
'a continued healthy expansion of manufactured exports 
is becoming increasingly vital to the LDCs. It constitutes 
an important link in the chain of maintaining their own 
demand for imports (notably for investment goods and other 
manufactures), servicing their external debt and 
sustaining investment' (International Textiles and 
Clothing Bureau 1986).
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But unless indebted LDCs are allowed to run trade surpluses, 
they cannot Maintain interest payments in the absence of 
additional capital flows (Cable 1985). The World Bank and 
the IMF are also pressing LDCs towards market oriented 
policies with explicit priority given to more rapid export 
growth but there is an obvious tension here between such 
practices and MFA restraints. The LDCs have consistently 
argued that the MFA constitutes a derogation froa GATT's 
objectives of the liberalisation of world trade and that 
import controls have had a trade diversionary rather than an 
import restraining effect. Moreover, contrary to the aegis 
of GATT, the MFA sanctions discriminatory restraints on LDC 
imports into developed countries.
The context for future trade negotiations are not 
auspicious, particularly in the context of an overall 
slowdown in the growth of demand for textile and clothing 
products in the world's major markets (US and EC). One 
particularly important development is rising protectionist 
sentiment in the USA. In 1988, a new Textile and Apparel 
Trade Bill cane before the US Senate. The Bill seeks to 
apply global quotas on all US imports, including those froa 
Western Europe and Canada. The EC has threatened retaliation 
as have other developed and developing countries who are 
concerned not only about potential limitations on their 
exports to the USA but also that MFA exports destined for 
the US market may be diverted to other developed countries. 
The Bill therefore may not succeed given that it would 
initiate a series of potentially destabilising retaliatory 
actions by developed and developing countries.
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The regulation of textile and clothing trade ia a major 
arena in which international capitalist rivalries between 
regional econoaic blocs are expressed. The MFA, by closing 
off markets to a number of low cost producers, reflects the 
economic power of one particular bloc, the developed 
countries over a heterogeneous grouping of less developed 
countries. In this context, the MPA starkly symbolises the 
unequal distribution of econoaic and political power within 
the world economy and the tensions and conflicting econoaic 
interests of the developed and developing countries.
To «rhat extent is the MPA the coherent expression of 
homogeneous national interests? Protectionism within the 
developed countries has been formerly promoted by an 
alliance between textile and clothing employers, trade 
unions and national governments, but this fragile expression 
of 'unity' masks a more complex set of divisions within and 
between the developed countries over the necessity of trade 
restrictions. Protectionism accentuates inter-industry 
divisions, cleavages between multinational and national 
firms and policy differences amongst national governments. 
There are, for example, real differences in the degree to 
which national governments embrace the apparently semi­
permanent status of the multi-fibre agreement. Overall, the 
US appears to have emerged as the most consistently 
protectionist of developed countries in both tariff and 
quota policy (Shepherd 1983:36), with the UK and Prance also 
heavily committed to trade restrictions. In both countries, 
well organised industrial groups have campaigned for tougher 
action by national governments and the EC in controlling
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isports. In contrast, Germany has been the most liberal 
importer although since 1979, the UK has adopted a much more 
ambivalent stance towards the MPA as it runs counter to the 
Conservative Government's ideological commitment to the 
liberalisation of international trade. Policy differences 
towards trade restrictions will be exacerbated by the 
formation of a single European market, in which the present 
system of MPA quotas negotiated on a country by country 
basis will be replaced by a Community wide system. A number 
of national trade associations (eg. the British Textile 
Confederation) have already argued that such a system would 
make it easier for textiles from other countries to 
penetrate the European market, with some markets clearly 
more vulnerable than others (eg. Netherlands and the UK) (PT 
20.2.89).
Protectionist agreements, like the MPA, are in effect an 
obstacle or block to any further locational shifts in 
production, trade and employment to the LDCs. But this 
strategy runs counter to the positive assistance provided by 
a number of governments, especially Mest Germany and the 
USA, in facilitating the relocation of labour intensive 
production processes to lower waged countries through 
offshore processing trade provisions. A further 
contradiction which subverts protectionist interests 
articulated within a national context, is the mobility of 
multinational capital in the industry, and the participation 
by retailers in international subcontracting or purchasing 
agreements. Even nationally based retailers and clothing 
manufacturers in the developed countries have a vested
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material interest in a more liberal regime concerning 
textile imports. Unrestricted access to global sources of 
fabric supply denied to clothing manufacturers by the MPA 
agreement would clearly enhance their competitiveness and 
profitability. Retailers tend to be in favour of the 
liberalisation of trade because they are major buyers from 
both foreign exporters and domestic clothing firms (Hoffman 
and Rush 1984). Protectionist strategies - intended to 
restore the profitability of domestically based 
manufacturing capital - may become increasingly irrelevant 
in the context of inter-industry divisions and the global 
strategies of multinational capital. In any case, the MPA 
represents only a partial and incomplete solution to the 
problem of low cost producers. Spain and Portugal now have 
complete access to EC markets, and there is the possibility 
that Turkey will become a future entrant to the EC.
One of the paradoxes of protectionism is that it has 
directly enhanced the internationalisation of the industry, 
as Third World companies have sought to evade quota 
agreements through investment in both developed and 
developing economies (Anson 1985). It has also helped to 
accelerate the shift of production in LDCs from low to high 
value added textiles and clothing products because quotas 
are measured in volume rather than value. Hence LDCs have 
sought to maximise the value added content of their exports 
and the unit value of quantities sold. This has seriously 
enhanced competitive pressures in the developed countries 
which have also tended to shift their production to high 
value added products (OECD 1983:121). Protectionism has
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therefore had contradictory aaterial effects which have 
intensified rather than stabilised international rivalries 
in the industry.
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Section A; Sumary
The central argument of this section is that the 
internationalisation of production in the industry has 
assuaed a nuaber of forms and is driven by a multiplicity of 
factors. Multinational corporations have and continue to 
play a pivotal role in the industry's development but their 
expansion cannot be exclusively related to an inexorable 
search for lower waged labour underpinned by the 
fragmentation and relocation of production. Such 
explanations underplay the contradictory nature of capital 
accumulation, and the imperfect and partial nature of 
competitive strategies.
A unique emphasis on the Babbage Principle and the 
fragmentation/relocation of production designed to reduce 
labour costs ignores the significance of technological 
developments in raising productivity and reducing unit 
production costs. There has been a long run trend in the 
textile industry towards more capital intensive methods of 
production. Two issues arise from these developments. First, 
is it the case that new technologies have initiated a 
relocation of production back to the developed economies? Is 
this synonymous with a process of 'deinternationalisation'?
At an aggregate level, the more rapid diffusion of highly 
productive textile machinery in the developed countries has 
contributed to developed economies maintaining their overall 
net surplus in international textile trade. But it is 
difficult to substantiate the claim that technological 
developments have initiated a 'relocation' of production
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back to developed economies. It is wire plausible to argue 
that it has helped saintain particular branches of textile 
production in the developed countries but this is not 
synonymous with a ussive shift in comparative advantage 
against LDCs. Moreover, the trend to capital intensive 
production methods and the diffusion of labour displacing 
technology has certainly not stemmed employment loss in this 
sector. The clothing industry is a different natter, 
however, with the rate of diffusion of microelectronic 
technology in developed economies being very much slower, 
and the high capital outlays involved in such capital 
investment being beyond the financial scope of the majority 
of (small) firms in the sector. Although there have been 
cases where microelectronic technology has been important in 
maintaining a firm's or a sector's competitiveness, there 
has as yet been no guantifiable impact on international 
trade patterns with the developed economies maintaining at 
an aggregate level a net deficit in clothing trade.
International competition in the industry tends not to be 
characterised by clear cut shifts in comparative advantage 
or stable, dichotomous relationships between the developed 
and developing countries. In fact, competitive relationships 
in the textile and clothing industry are experiencing a 
dynamic process of recomposition in the face of an 
intensification of capitalist rivalries. This implies that 
the process of internationalisation is subject to a number 
of competing pressures and contradictions which both 
facilitate and impede its development.
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A set of counter tendencies and structural forces act as 
powerful i epodi senta to the global decentralisation of 
production. Textile and clothing products are the sost 
coeprehensive 1 y regulated and the longest protected of 
industrial goods. Protectionist agreements, like the Multi 
Pibre Agreement have sought to close off or restrict the 
access of low cost producers to the markets of developed 
economies. Thus, the regulation of textile and clothing 
trade is a major arena in which international capitalist 
rivalries between regional economic blocs are expressed. 
Furthermore, protectionist strategies - intended to restore 
the profitability of domestically based manufacturing 
capital - have contradictory material effects which have 
intensified rather than stabilised international rivalries 
in the industry. International competition in the industry, 
then, is not driven by monocausa 1 imperatives but a complex 
matrix of conflicting and heterogeneous material interests 
mediated in various ways by national firms, governments, 
trade unions and transnational capital.
To what extent have these forces shaped the integration of 
developing countries into the world textile industry? It is 
doubtful whether the development of Third World textile and 
clothing industries has ever been dependent on or completely 
reducible to the strategies cf firms in the developed 
economies. Evidence indicates that many developing countries 
have a strong indigenous textile and clothing industry 
although local firms may be involved with foreign 
enterprises - both retailers and manufacturers - through 
licensing and subcontracting arrangements.
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More importantly. Third World firms, particularly in the 
Asian NICs, are proactive. They have sought to transcend and 
overcome constraints and obstacles operating in their 
competitive environment. Not only has protectionism 
facilitated the establishment of Third World multinational 
corporations and foreign direct investment to developed 
countries and lower cost developing countries, but it has 
also encouraged LDCs to move upmarket, to increase the value 
of their exports because bilateral guotas limit export 
volume. First World firms, therefore, cannot merely depend 
on maximising their geographical proximity to centres of 
demand or introducing time economies into the production and 
distribution of products. Far Eastern exporters are also 
implementing just-in-time production methods in an attempt 
to reduce delivery and lead times. This, in turn, will 
intensify the competitive pressures on firms in the 
developed economies who have shifted production upmarket and 
attempted to improve the overall coordination of production 
and sales through the application of information 
technologies.
There may be time lags involved in technological 
development, leading to the uneven diffusion and deployment 
of new technologies in LDCs, but governments and firms, 
particularly in the NICs, are actively involved in the 
restructuring of their industries. Third World governments 
have introduced rationalisation and modernisation programmes 
to upgrade the capital stock in textiles and clothing (eg. 
South Korea, Malaysia, Hong Kong and Taiwan) and a number of 
LDCs which previously based the expansion of textile and
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clothing industries on export processing zones are 
critically re-evaluating such strategies. The MNCs involved 
in export processing zones are currently just as such likely 
to be Third World fires as First World (cf. Elson 1988b).
Hence the trend to the production of high value added, high 
guality products, the adoption of non-price fores of 
competition and the utilisation of integrated, information 
technologies are not competitive panaceas for firms in the 
developed economies. Moreover, they will not facilitate some 
sort of stable, dichotomous polarity in the structure of 
international competition, with Third World firms being 
relegated to the production of mass produced, low cost 
textile and clothing products.
Internationalisation in the textile and clothing industry 
has, in short, assumed different forms and has been driven 
by a multiplicity of factors, but, more importantly, the 
process itself has developed unevenly. Its pace has been 
both facilitated and impeded by the cumulative actions of 
supranational and national economic and political agencies. 
It seems unlikely that information technologies and their 
application to textile and clothing production in the 
developed economies or strategies of product differentiation 
and non-price competition will stem or reverse the process 
of internationalisation. The evidence points to an increased 
interlinking and symmetry between companies in the developed 
economies and the NICs, motivated by the need to transcend 
obstacles to their expansion by gaining access to markets 
denied to them by protectionist agreements or tariff
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barriers. The relationship between Third World textile and 
clothing producers and the developed countries can therefore 
no longer be conceptualised in t e n s  of their structured 
'dependency' and subordination to First World 
■ultinationals. Developed and developing countries in the 
world textile industry have becose interdependent, with the 
fors of integration of individual economies changing over 
time. This interdependence is not necessarily harmonious but 
is punctuated by capitalist rivalries, and conflict between 
regional economic blocs.
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SECTION B: STRUCTURAL CHANGE AND INDUSTRIAL DECLINE; BRITISH 
TEXTILES AND CLOTHING
The structural transformation of textiles and clothing on an 
international basis has clearly affected the condition of 
all national textile and clothing industries. But although 
international economic forces have had a profound ispact on 
the developaent of British textiles and clothing, these 
factors in thesselves do not account for the present 
predicament of these industries or their specific location 
within the world economy. The British textile and clothing 
industry has also been firaly embedded within a national 
terrain of economic and social institutions and structures 
which have interacted to shape the character of the industry 
and the responses of the leading producers in particular 
ways. It is therefore the specific nature of the industry's 
developaent within the British context, and its relative 
perforaance in relation to other national textile and 
clothing industries that constitutes the these of the 
following discussion. Some commentators have argued that the 
perforaance of the textile industry in the 1980s 
demonstrates that the process of long term decline has been 
arrested. The following discussion therefore focuses on the 
recent development of textiles and clothing in the UK. This 
involves an analysis of a number of competing perspectives 
on the decline and current perforaance of the sector.
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Chapter Five; British Textiles and Clothing? Decline or 
Regeneration?
In this chapter the performance of British textiles and 
clothing since the 1970s is outlined. The recessionary 
conditions of the eid 1970s and early 1980s have had a 
profound iepact on output and eeployeent levels in both 
industries. This has served to accelerate the long term 
decline of the textile industry in particular. Nevertheless, 
some commentators have drawn upon the post-recession 
performance of the industry as an alleged example of a much 
broader trend, namely, the transformation and rejuvenation 
of British manufacturing. The evidence on production, 
employment levels and trade f l o w  indicates, however, that 
the textiles and clothing industries have experienced a 
modest recovery from the depths of the early 1980s recession 
rather than a regeneration.
5.1 1973-82; the impact of recession
The British textile industry has suffered a process of long 
tern decline in both output and employment. At the beginning 
of the twentieth century it employed 1,200,000 people out of 
a total of 5,000,000 in manufacturing. Now, employment has 
fallen to less than 250,000. The decline in employment 
occurred long before overall manufacturing employment 
started to fall in the mid-1960s. Employment decline has 
been steady since the 1950s but it accelerated in the 1970s, 
with a severe contraction over the period 1979-1982.
In terns of output growth, the industry's performance, with 
the exception of synthetic fibres, has been well below the 
manufacturing average. Since 1973, output (in real prices)
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has been falling with a severe contraction over the 1978-82 
period (although there was soee ieproveeent over the 1983-87 
period). In 1972, all textiles, including synthetic fibre 
production, accounted for 5.9* of the net output of British 
manufacturing industry and 7.6* of the manufacturing labour 
force. This reflected a large decline in the industry's 
relative importance since 1951, when textiles accounted for 
12.2* of manufacturing net output and 12.9* of manufacturing 
labour. Moreover, as Miles (1976:185) points out, the 
decline in the importance of the cotton and man-made fibre 
processing sector has been even more dramatic. In 1951, it 
was by far the most important sector, accounting for 38.5* 
of net output and 40.5* of employment, but by 1972 it 
accounted for only 17.4* of total 'textile' net output and 
19.8* of employment. In short, the long term historical 
trend in the industry has been one of output decline and 
even more rapid contraction of employment. In 1987, the 
industry (excluding man made fibres) accounted for only 3* 
of the value added in the entire manufacturing sector and 5* 
of the employed labour force (Cambridge Econometrics 1987).
UK textile production was particularly depressed over 1973- 
82. There was a dramatic switch from an average annual 
output growth rate of 0.74* during 1954-73 to a decline in 
the annual average rate of more than 6* over the 1973-82 
period (Soete 1984:144). Table 11 demonstrates the severe 
impact of the recession in the late 1970s on both the 
textiles and clothing industry. In 1982, textile production 
was 40* below the 1970 level and 50* below the peak year of 
1973. The fall between 1978 and 1983 was particularly steep.
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being approximately a third. Clothing output was leas 
severely affected, but between 1978 and 1983 the fall was 
between 15% and 20%. Manufacturing industry output as a 
whole fell by 13% between 1978 and 1983, less steeply than 
in clothing and much less steeply than in textiles.
Despite the heterogeneous nature of the industry, output 
fell in most of the industry's sub-sectors (cf. table 15). 
Synthetic fibre production has declined precipitately since 
1973, with production more than halving over 1979-82. Cotton 
and allied mill production of y a m  and cloth has also been 
severely depressed, with output levels in 1982 well under 
half the 1973 level. Even the woollen and worsted sector, 
which is usually regarded as a relatively strong part of the 
industry, experienced accelerated output decline over the
1979-83 period.
Table 11: Changes in UK Textiles and Clothing 1978-82 
Textiles % Change 1978-82
Fibre consumption (mn kg)
Production Index (1975=100) 
Employment ('000s, excl. N. Ireland)
32.7
33.7 
37.6
Clothing
Consumers' expenditure 
(constant price index, 1975 - 100) 
Production index (1975 = 100) 
Employment ('000s, excl. N. Ireland)
26.1
17.4
30.0
Source; Cable and Baker 1983; 116
In contrast to textiles, output in the clothing industry 
increased in the post-war years until 1979. Even during the 
recession of 1973-79, average output growth of 1.2% a year 
was well above the manufacturing average. It was only during
128
the early 1980s that output declined dramatically, at more 
than 9* a year. Nevertheless, the clothing industry has 
suffered widespread job loss over the post-war period. 
Employment in clothing in 1983 was only 58% of the 1972 
level (Silberston 1984:18).
The dramatic fall in levels of output in both industries 
over the 1978-82 period has been mirrored by steep declines 
in textile and clothing employment. Employment in synthetic 
fibres and cotton spinning more than halved during 1978-83. 
In mid 1978, 74,000 people were employed in the cotton 
sector in Britain as against 155,000 in 1971. By mid 1982, 
this number had fallen to 43,000. In clothing, employment 
dropped by 10.4% a year between 1980 and 1982 compared with 
steady employment decline of 1.9% a year over the 1954-79 
period (Soete 1984). In aggregate, textile employment fell 
by 165,000 or 37.6% over the years 1978-82 and clothing 
employment by 30%.
Palls in employment have been proportionately greater than 
output, with the result that productivity (output per head) 
has risen. For textiles, as a whole, including knitting, 
productivity rose particularly steeply during the years when 
employment fell rapidly, by 5% per annum over 1974-76 and
1980-82. The trend rate of productivity growth over 1973-83 
was 2% per year (Silberston 1984:18).
The rate of productivity growth in clothing between 1975 and 
1983 was about 4% per annum. During the early 1980s, 
productivity growth slowed down to 1 .1% per year, which
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suggests either that the clothing industry had not yet fully 
re-organised itself or it was 'hoarding' labour to take full 
advantage of a possible upturn (Rush and Soete 1984).
Labour productivity growth in textiles has cose about partly 
because of increasing capital intensity (Soete 1984). In the 
case of the UK, capital stock per enployee in textiles was 
57% higher in 1977 than in 1970 cospared to 41% for 
manufacturing industry as a whole. There was, however, a 
slowdown in the rate of investment growth during the 1970s 
(excluding synthetic fibres) and a dramatic fall after the 
peak level in 1974. The clothing industry is characterised 
by very low capital intensity, growing at a rate «»ell below 
the manufacturing average. Investment grew steadily until 
1974 after «»hich time it fell dramatically. In 1982 it hit 
an all time low. The slowdown in investment after the peak 
of 1974, however, did not lead to a significant decline in 
productivity gro«»th in clothing, «»hich almost certainly 
reflects shedding of labour, «fork intensification and 
scrapping of older plant (cf. Rush and Soete 1984) (30).
Table 12 charts the massive fall in fixed capital 
expenditure in textiles, leather and clothing over the 
period 1974-82. Capital investment in 1978 was just over a 
half of the level (in real terms) of 1974 and by 1981, had 
halved again. Moreover, capital expenditure in textiles, 
clothing and leather fell at a much faster rate than in 
manufacturing.
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Table 12: Fixed Capital Expenditure. Textile». Clothing and
Leather and Manufacturing 1974-82
(All prices revalued at 1975 prices; 1974-100)
Source: CSO Monthly Digest of Statistics, February 1981 and 
1982. June 1983.
This picture of decline is mirrored by a steadily 
deteriorating trade balance in both textiles and clothing 
over this period. There has been a trade deficit in clothing 
since the early 1970s which has grown steadily. Trade in 
1977 was almost completely balanced with a surplus on 
textiles compensating for a deficit in clothing (as in 
1973). But since 1977 the situation has deteriorated. The 
growing clothing deficit has not been balanced by a surplus 
in textiles because textiles itself has slumped into a large 
deficit (see table 13).
The deteriorating trade balance is not wholly attributable 
to an influx of imports from developing countries. Although 
the volume of UK textile and clothing imports increased by 
35% over the 1976-79 period, imports from LDCs grew by only 
19%. Imports from developed countries rose by 58%. Among the 
LDCs, those outside the MFA increased their exports to the 
UK most rapidly. Table 14 shows how in both periods of the 
MPA but especially the second, imports from LDCs rose less
Fixed Capital Exp. 
Textiles, etc.
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
100
70
51
48
55
59
43
28
29
100
93
8 8
92
99
105
95
78
71
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rapidly than iaporta from OECD countries. The US increased 
its exports to the UK by 20% over 1979 and by 111% over 1978 
to 81,000 tons, mainly of fibres, yarns and carpets. The 
major part of the increase in imports from the EC was in 
fibres and carpets (31).
Table 13: The Balance of UK Trade In Textiles and Clothing 
1971-88
C an. Textiles (1) Clothing Combined
1971 143.0 - 48.7 94.3
1972 122.8 - 74.5 48.3
1973 149.6 - 153.9 4.3
1974 140.5 - 172.4 - 32.0
1975 96.1 - 239.7 - 143.6
1976 135.8 - 271.7 - 135.9
1977 164.4 - 168.4 4.0
1978 - 124.6 - 250.7 - 375.4
1979 - 248.2 - 443.4 - 691.6
1980 - 59.6 - 423.6 - 483.2
1981 - 461.8 - 592.3 -1060.4
1982 - 644.7 - 660.4 -1305.1
1983 - 921.4 - 736.1 -1657.4
1984 -1100.7 -1016.8 -2117.4
1985 -1237.7 - 922.8 -2160.5
1986 -1404.5 -1158.4 -2562.9
1987 -1626.9 -1349.5 -2976.5
1988 -1629.0 -1683.0 -3343.0
1 - excluding synthetic fibres
Source: Textile Statistics_Bureau, Quarterly Statistics 
1971-87, British Textile Confederation, March 1989.
Table 14: Growth Rate of UK Imports (a) by value (current 
prices) annual percentage average
UFA 1 1974-77 UFA 2 1978-82
EC (b) 29 15
EC applic. (c) 8 17
Efta (d) 9 7
Other OECD (e) 21 15
All OECD (e) 22 14
Hong Kong 14 9
Other I.DCs 30 11
All LDCs 21 10
CPE (f) 32 8
Total 22 13
a - SITC division 65/84 b = including Greece
c = Spain and Portugal d = excluding Portugal
e - including Israel f - centrally planned econ
Source: Cable and Baker 1983 : 121
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5.2. The 1980»; recovery or rwurqtnM?
'Whenever Governaent Ministers have cast about for 
examples of resurgence within manufacturing industry, 
textiles has emerged as a popular choice. The textile 
industry, or so these Ministers are fond of saying, 
has hauled itself out of the doldrums of the early 
1980s. Moreover, they say, the combination of a new 
Managerial spirit and sustained investment in new 
technology has transformed it from a relic of the past 
into an industry of the future.' (FT 4.1.88 'Days of 
Decline are Over')
The textile industry has become a popular exaaple of the 
much vaunted 'resurgence' of British manufacturing industry. 
But a more cautious consideration of the performance of the 
textiles sector over the 1980s does not support the notion 
of a dramatic regeneration of the industry (see table 15). 
Moreover, any analysis of the industry's post-recession 
performance needs to be contextualised in terns of the long 
run depression of production since 1975 and the collapse of 
output and employment over the 1978-82 period.
Since the output of the textile industry plummeted to its 
lowest level in 1982, it has risen every year to 1987 (ie. 
in total by 13%). But even in 1987, output was still 18% 
below its 1979 pre-recession level. Synthetic fibre 
production has shown no signs of recovery and in 1987 was 
less than half the 1979 level. The only textile sub-sector 
which demonstrates a degree of buoyancy is household 
textiles. Production in 1987 was 13% above the 1979 level. 
Clothing has also shown signs of modest recovery. Although 
output fell to its lowest level in 1981, production has 
since risen every year to 1986 (by nearly 20% but fell by 
roughly 2% over 1986-87) and had reached its pre-recession 
level. One forecast suggests that output in textiles will 
only reach the 1979 level by the year 1999 (Cambridge
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Econometrics April 1987).
Table 16: index of production for textile sub-sectors 1979-
(1980 - 100) 1979 1980 1987 Change
Manufacturing 109.4 100 107.3 - 2.1
Synthetic Pibres 137.0 100 62.8 -74.2Textiles 121.0 100 102.7 -18.3Wool and Worsted 115.6 100 101.5 -14.1Spinning on Cotton 133.6 100 81.3 -52.3Weaving 135.1 100 75.5 -59.6Hosiery t Knitting 108.3 100 102.4 -5.9Textile Finishing 124.5 100 107.1 -17.4Carpets 127.5 100 115.7 -11.8
Clothing 110.7 100 110.6 -0.1Household Textiles 107.1 100 120.2 ♦13.1
Source: Textile Statistics Bureau, Quarterly Statistics1979-87
Table 17: Esployaent 1978-87 (1981 - 100)
Year Textiles Clothing
1978 144.3 135.01980 121.5
1981 100.0 100.01982 92.7 101.2
1983 86.9 97.81984 85.1 100.3
1985 85.4 101.71986 85.9 101.51987 82.1 99.2
Source: Textile Statistics Bureau, Quarterly Statistics1978-87,
Table 18: Eaployeent 1972-1987 ('000s)
1972 1978 1980 1983 1985 1987
0! Fibres 44.5 37.7 26.8 16.3 15.1 7.4
Textiles 510.4 411.3 344.9 256.2 233.2 222.4
Clothing 361.1 307.0 272.9 214.2 212.2 209.7
Household Textiles 41.3 37.6 38.5 27.5 26.8 29.1
Source: Textile Statistics Bureau. Quarterly Statistica 
1 9 7 2 - 8 7 ------- ------------
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Table 19; Output, •■ploy— nt. productivity trends 1979-87 
for the textile, clothing and leather Industry (1980 - 100)
Output
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
Employment
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
Output per 
person ■■ployed
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
Manufactur1nq
109.5
1 0 0 . 0
94.0
94.2
96.9
100.9
103.8
104.0
109.6
105.3
1 0 0 . 0
91.0
85.5
81.0
79.8
79.5
77.9 
76.8
104.1
1 0 0 . 0
103.5
110.4
119.8
126.5
130.6
133.6
142.8
Textiles, Clothing, 
Leather
117.9
1 0 0 . 0
92.7 
91.3
94.7
98.7
101.9 
103.6 
105.1
1 1 1 . 8
1 0 0 . 0
87.2
81.5
78.1
78.6
79.5
79.2
77.6
105.5
1 0 0 . 0
106.5
112.1
121.3 
124.9
128.3 
131.1
135.6
Source: Department of Baployaent Gazette September 1988
The argument that the rejuvenation of the industry is 
illustrated by rising productivity levels (ie. output per 
head) can be aisleading. Productivity changes are the 
product of differential eoveeents in output and esploysent. 
Over the period 1979-86, the total output of textiles fell 
by 20% whilst employment fell by 46%. In clothing, total 
output fell by 2% whilst employment fell by 25%. Employment 
in textiles stabilised in 1984-86 but fell again in 1987
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whereas employment in clothing stabilised over the period 
1984-87 (see table 17). Table 19 illustrates the disparity 
between falls in output and employment in textiles, clothing 
and leather over the period 1979-87. As the fall in 
employment was disproportionately greater than the fall in 
output the inpact statistically was an increase in output 
per head.
The rise in productivity levels nay of course be partly 
related to changes in production technologies and an 
increase in investnent expenditure. Nevertheless, although 
fixed capital expenditure in textiles, clothing and leather 
has increased since the low point of 1981, it only just 
exceeded its pre-recession level in 1987.
Table 20: Fixed capital expenditure 1978-87 in textiles, 
leather and clothing, (at 1980 prices £ mn.l
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
343
344
235
166
205
208
256
254
326
364
Source: CSO Monthly Digest of Statistics. April 1988
The available evidence suggests that the productivity 
performance of UK textiles is poor compared with its 
international competitors. Estimates for 1980 suggest that 
productivity in textiles in the UK was only 56% of the US 
level and 74% of the level in Prance and Japan (Cable and 
Baker 1983:56). Eurostat data for 1982 indicates that UK
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textiles and clothing had lower labour costs and 
productivity than its main European competitors (ie. Prance, 
West Germany and Italy) (table 21). Moreover, recent 
evidence concerning growth rates in value added and value 
added per employee for the period 1961-85 demonstrates that 
in textiles the UK has not performed as well as its major 
European competitors (table 22).
Table 21; Gross Value Added Per Person Employed (Factor 
Cost) and Labour Comtm Per Person Employed 1982, for the UK. 
West Germany. Italy and Prance (1,000 Ecu)
A. Gross Value Added Per Person Employed
Textiles Clothinq
EC 14,4 11,8
West Germany 17,7 13,3
Prance 17,4 13,9
Italy 16,6 13,2
UK 13,1 10,3
B. Labour Costs Per Person Employed
Textiles Clothing
EC 11,3 9,4
West Germany 14,7 11,4
Prance 13,5 11,3
Italy 11,9 10,2
UK 9,8 7,8
Source; Eurostat Industry Statistical Yearbook. 1986
Table 22: Growth rates (value added and value added per 
employee), in textiles for the UK, West Germany. Prance and 
Italy. 1961-85 (%)T
1961-85 Value Added
West Germany 0
Prance 1.20
Italy 3.84
UK - 0.05
Value Added Per 
Employee
3.68
4.03
4.25
3.60
Source: Dunne and Hughes (1989)
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Although the potential for rapid productivity growth is 
quite significant in many textile sectors, the rate at which 
new technologies are adopted in the UK appears to be 
relatively slow. Anson and Siapson (1988:183/252) have 
compared machinery capacities and re-equipaent ratios in a 
number of European countries. On a straight count of 
spindles and rotors in spinning and looms in weaving, Italy 
had by far the biggest capacity followed by west Germany, 
Prance and the UK. When shipments are divided by capacity to 
give an indicator of re-equipment rates, the UK compares 
very poorly with its main competitors in both spinning and 
weaving (table 23). UK spinning and weaving capacity and 
receipts of machinery now compare more closely with the 
smaller Belgian industry than with the other three EC 
textile majors.
Table 23: Spinning and waving and re-equipment ratios, 
selected EC countries (TT
(1) Data on shipments relate to 1977-86 and capacity to 
1985.
Spinning
W.Germany UK
Shipments as « of 
capacity
Short staple s * "  s 15.3
6.3
80.5
19.6
26.1
107.0
42.1 8.6
18.0 4.0
152.1 44.4
bong staple spu 
Open end rotors
Weaving
Shipments as % of
capacity
Cotton system 1« 
Shuttle 
Shuttleless 
Total
6.9
114.9
69.8
7.6
132.0
70.5
7.0 8.4 
229.9 92.0 
113.4 37.8
Source: Anson and Simpson 1988:183
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A report: by the International Textile Manufacturers 
Federation provides evidence that the UK had the weakest 
record of the sain European industrial nations on investment 
in new textile eachinery. UK textile companies invested much 
less in spinning and weaving equipment than many 
competitors, particularly Italy and West Germany. Around 90% 
of UK ring spinning machines in 1985 were 10 years old or 
more compared to 50% in Italy. Only 21% of yarn produced in 
the UK in 1985 was manufactured on machinery not more than 
10 years old, compared to 71% in Italy. The age profile of 
weavinq machinery was similar. West Germany led the field 
with 46% of its looms of the modern, shuttleless type not 
older than 10 years. Italy came next with 44%, followed by 
Belgium, Prance, US, and Spain with the UK at 25% (FT 
24.11.87).
Although by domestic standards, the British textile 
industry, particularly the large multinationals, nay be 
investing heavily in new technology, existing data indicates 
that by international standards much of its equipment is 
outdated. In short, British textiles has emerged as a low 
wage, low productivity industry.
This picture of relative decline is further illustrated by 
comparing the fate of the British textile industry with 
other European nations. In the 1970s, the UK was second only 
to West Germany in terns of output of synthetic fibres. By 
the early 1980s, Italy had overtaken the UK as the former's 
capacity had expanded while the latter's production had 
declined. Spain nas also been expanding capacity and its
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production is now little short of UK levels. Poraerly the 
world's biggest cotton spinner and weaver, the UK now ranks 
only fifth in the EC behind West Germany, Italy, Prance and 
Spain in the production of cotton type yarns and fabrics. In 
contrast Italy is continuing to expand its capacity and West 
Germany has maintained its position. In knitting, the 
turnover of UK firms is exceeded by Italy, West Germany and 
Prance. Out of all the textile sub-sectors, the UK appears 
to be relatively strong in only the wool industry where it 
is a net exporter. In wool spinning, the UK has the second 
largest capacity amongst EC countries (Anson and Simpson 
1988).
The trade position of the UK textile industry has also 
deteriorated. Although exports have risen, by over 50% in 
value terms since 1980, with clothing showing the biggest 
growth - 77% against only 37% in textiles - imports have 
grown much faster and from a larger base. Imports of 
textiles rose by 126% in 1980-87 as did clothing. As a 
result the trade deficit in textiles has worsened 
dramatically from £198 an. in 1980 to £1.6 bn. in 1987. The 
deterioration in the clothing trade deficit has been less 
serious - from £424 an. in 1980 to £1.3 bn. in 1987. The 
import penetration index, (imports as a ratio of domestic 
demand) has increased over the 1980s for both textiles, and 
footwear and clothing. This has not been counterbalanced by 
proportionate increases in the export/sales ratios for 
either industry.
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sssa sk a s *s?c*?mS>/**1** r,tt'
h a l t *  aonths ending (Dm .)
A. Iaporti/Deund (1)
1111 1112 111! 1114 m s 1111 1!I7(
T u t  i 1m 11 11 41 44 44 45 47
Footvur ind Clothing 
1 . I ip o r t ./ S .lu  (1)
11 11 11 14 IS 14 11
T u t  i l u 10 21 21 10 11 10 12
fo o tv u r ind Clothing 20 11 11 11 11 11 21
1. Figures for 1987 are provisional.
Source: CSO Monthly Digest of Statistics. February 1989
isport penetration in 1987 was particularly high in upstrean 
textile sectors, such as man made staple fibres and filasent 
(78.1% and 91.3%), cotton y a m  56.2%, cotton cloth 84%, and 
san sade fibre cloth 78%. In knitting, isport penetration 
was lower (34.4%) and lower still in household textiles 
(19.5%). Disaggregated figures for clothing indicate that 
isport penetration by value in 1987 was 32.5% cospared to 
30.9% in 1985. In 1987, nearly two thirds (64%) of textile 
isports originated fros EC countries cospared to 40.2% of 
clothing isports. Hong Kong was the largest source of UK 
clothing isports in 1987 with a 20% share (British Business 
3.3.89).
Table 25 desonstrates the UK's international cospetitive 
weakness in textiles in 1986. It had the second largest 
deficit aeongst six sajor conpetitors in the industrialised 
countries. The clothing deficit was however overshadowed by 
the West Gersan, Aserican and Japanese deficits.
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Table 25: Balance of trade of the UK's main competitors
(1986)
(ibn.) Textiles Clothing Combined Balance
Italy 2.59 6.41 9.00
West Germany 1.47 -6.23 -4.76
Prance -1.05 -1.60 -2.65
UK -2.16 -1.69 -3.85
Japan 3.28 -2.12 1.16
USA -3.27 -17.82 -21.09
Source s Aneon and Si.pson 1988:88
The UK clothing industry has been preserved partly by the 
local sourcing policies of major retailers, particularly 
Marks and Spencer. Garment manufacturers have maintained 
their competitiveness by buying low cost imported raw 
materials (yams and fabrics) mainly from Asia at the 
expense of UK textile producers. Higher value, dyed or 
finished fabrics tend to be sourced from Continental Europe. 
This has been the reverse of trends in West Germany and 
Prance where many clothing firms relocated large parts of 
their manufacture to low cost countries in the fora of 
offshore processing arrangements. This has secured a market 
for the products of the parent country's more capital 
intensive textile industry (especially fabric), which then 
reappear as clothing imports.
The proportionately greater recovery in the clothing and 
household textiles sector is also partly attributable to 
growth in consumer spending on these items (table 26). In 
contrast to the overall EC picture, the UK experienced a 15% 
rise in real per caput consumption of clothing over the 
period 1980-84 which was more rapid than growth in overall 
consumer spending. In contrast, in real terms. West German 
clothing consumption has been falling since 1980 (largest EC
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narket in absolute terns) (by 4.7%) as has the EC (10) as a 
whole (by 3.8%) (Anson and Sinpson 1988:187). Consuaer 
spending on clothing has been sufficiently buoyant in the UK 
to both absorb the supply of products fron the donestic 
industry and to acconodate an increase in inports fron 
dollar based countries in North Anerica and LDCs.
Table 26: Consuner expenditure for clothing 1978-87
(at constant prices) 
Clothing Household Textiles All itens
1978 93.7 109.3 96.1
1980 100.0 100.0 100.01981 100.0 100.2 99.7
1982 102.7 100.6 101.01983 110.4 103.7 105.1
1984 117.1 102.6 107.41985 125.9 103.5 111.5
1986 136.2 105.8 118.21987 142.6 112.7 122.9
Source: Textile Statistics Bureau, quarterly statistics
1980-88; British Business, February 1988
In the short tern, output of textiles and clothing is very 
sensitive to exchange rate fluctuations which seriously
affects the price conpetitiveness of these products. In 
textiles, the rapid depreciation of sterling fron its peak 
level in 1980, led to a rapid increase in exports and 
relative recovery in output over the 1983-85 period. Exports 
and output grew by an annual average of 6.1% and 3.6% 
respectively over the 1983-85 period bringing about a short 
tern reversal in the historical trends of the industry 
(Canbridge Econonetrics 1987).
The adverse novenents of the exchange rate fron early 1985 
ended this period of relative recovery and 1986 witnessed a
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rapid increase in import penetration. The rapid depreciation 
of the US dollar from early 1985 gave dollar based countries 
in North America and the Far East a substantial cost 
advantage over British producers. Despite rapid growth of 
consumer desand in the hose market in 1986 (5.4%) output 
remained stagnant and exports performed poorly. Sales to 
the US, a leading export market for British textiles fell by 
11% in 1986 whereas imports from the US and the Far Eastern 
NICs rose sharply. In 1987, imports of textiles grew by 11% 
(12% in volume) while clothing imports rose by 16% (17% in 
volume). Moreover, imports from low cost countries rose by a 
third, despite MFA quotas. Imports from the US rose by 29% 
while those from the EC were static (Anson and Simpson 
1988:256) .
Table 27 demonstrates that over the period 1985-88, low cost 
imports (by volume) rose by 70% compared to 9% for developed 
countries as a whole. Imports from the USA have doubled 
whilst those from the EC rose by only a small percentage 
(7%). Low cost imports as a proportion of total imports have 
therefore risen from 26% in 1985 to 35% in 1988. There was, 
however, a slow down in the growth of low cost imports 
during 1988 with a registered rise of only 7%. Overall, in 
1988 textile and clothing imports increased by 7% (in value) 
to £6.9 bn, while exports increased by just 2% (in value) to 
£3.6 bn. The balance of trade deficit has therefore risen 
from £2.9 bn. in 1987 to £3.3 bn. in 1988. Currently, 
textiles and clothing represent 23 per cent of the overall 
UK current-account trade deficit (BTC 1989).
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product- *
I chanqt
1915 1906 1907 1900 1900/05 1900/06 1900/07
Defcloped
countries 679 671 605 742 9 9 0
BC12 »77 570 571 620 7 9 9
Other DCs 102 100 114 122 20 13 7
OSA 22 26 33 44 100 72 14
Lov Coat 2)1 204 179 404 70 42 7
lon-P referentiil 205 240 M 147 69 40 5
lediterreaean 25 20 17 45 00 62 22
ACT (a) 1 8 10 11 37 19 9
Total 916 902 1064 1145 25 19 0
DCa 1 7« 70 64 65
Lo* Coat t 26 30 16 IS
a: African, Caribbean and Pacific preferential countries 
Source; British Textile Confederation 1988b/1989
The rise in the value of sterling in 1988 combined with the 
weakness of the US dollar and related south-east Asian 
currencies has clearly affected the price competitiveness of 
British textiles and clothing. Job losses have been recorded 
in acrylic and cotton yarn spinning, knitwear and 
childrenswear, all of which are import sensitive products. 
The level of employment in textiles and clothing fell by 
15,000 to 477,000 during 1988 (BTC 1989). One estimate of 
potential job losses in 1989 is 25,000 out of a combined 
textile and clothing workforce (Guardian 30.12.88).
Table 28 demonstrates that in 1988 production levels 
contracted in all sectors of textiles and clothing, with the 
exception of carpets. As employment in textiles, clothing 
and leather rose whilst production levels contracted, the 
result was a fall in output per person employed (table 29). 
The deterioration in the trading environment has also
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affected fixed capital expenditure in the industry. Over 
1987-88 fixed capital expenditure fell by 17% in real ten 
froa a total of £516 an. in 1987 to £430 an. (revalued at 
1985 prices).
Table 28: index of production for textile sub-sectors 1987-
(1985 - 100) 1985 1987 1988 Change 88/87
Synthetic Pibres 100 110 108.0 - 2.0
Textiles 100 104.5 102.5 _ 2.0
Wool and Worsted 100 109.3 105.8 - 3.5
Spinning on Cotton 100 100.8 93.2 — 7.6
Weaving 100 102.2 98.4 - 3.8Hosiery t Knitting lOO 101.0 95.6 — 5.4
Textile Finishing 100 113.5 108.3 - 5.2
Carpets 100 107.3 114.3 + 7.0
Clothing 100 99.8 99.5 - 0.3
Source: CSO Monthly Digest of Statistics, March 1989
Table 29: Indices of output, eaployaent and output per 
person eaploved for textiles, clothing and leather. 1987 and
m  - 1 0 0)
Output Manufacturing Textiles etc.
1987 106.6 103.3
1988 114.0 102.4
Raployaent
1987 97.2 98.2
1988 98.7 98.5
Output per Person
1987 109.7 105.2
1988 115.5 104.0
Source : Departaent of Eaployaent Gazette, May 1989
Any talk of a regeneration of the industry appears in the 
face of this evidence to be preaature and aisplaced. The 
aost recent data on production, eaployaent levels and trade
147
flow indicate that the modest recovery of Britieh textiles 
and clothing has run aground in the late 1980s. The poor 
international competitiveness of these industries and the 
long t e n  decline of textiles in particular has not been 
substantially reversed in the 1980s. Nevertheless, the 
contraction and decline of industries is not an inevitable 
process. The next chapter discusses a number of competing 
explanations of the industry's present predicament and 
focuses on the role of the British state.
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Chapter Six: Th* Decline of British taxtllw; conwtlnq 
explanation«.
The British textile industry has suffered a long tern 
decline in both output and enployaent levels. A nunber of 
ccapeting explanations have been put forward to account for 
the industry's deteriorating competitiveness, which 
eaphasise particular features of the sector's development. 
One influential analysis (cf. Lazonick 1985) focuses on a 
set of institutional relationships which originated in the 
late nineteenth century and allegedly conditioned the 
development of the industry up until the 1960s. An 
alternative perspective (cf. Shepherd 1983, Blackburn 1981) 
highlights the 'flawed' strategies of the large vertically 
integrated corporations which currently dominate the 
industry.
This chapter argues that the industry's decline reflects the 
combined weaknesses of a set of key economic and social 
agencies: employers, trade unions and the state. The actions 
and interventions of these agencies, separately and 
collectively, have failed to generate the pressure to bring 
about the industry's transformation into a high wage, high 
productivity sector.
6.1 The nineteenth century revisited?
British textiles has experienced a long tern process of 
decline but the cotton industry has undergone the most 
protracted decline of all the textile sub-sectors. According 
to Lazonick (1985), the structure of industrial relations 
and industrial organisation inherited from the era of 
Britain's international economic dominance impeded the
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structural transformation of the industry and perpetuated 
its technological backwardness. The horizontally specialised 
and vertically disintegrated structure of the cotton 
industry impeded the pursuit of a cost cutting strategy 
based on the adoption of modern, high-throughput 
technologies (eg. the ring frame and the automatic loom). 
Spinning and weaving firms tended to produce yarn and cloth 
almost exclusively to order. To reap the benefits of long 
runs, each firm sought to attract orders for, and to 
specialise in, narrow ranges of yarn counts or types of 
cloth. This type of horizontal specialisation was 
accompanied by a high degree of vertical disintegration. In 
1884, 60% of spindles in Lancashire were in firms that only 
spun and 43% of loons in firms that only wove. By 1911 the 
figures were 77% and 65% (Lazonick 1985:23).
The industrial relations structure also allegedly impeded 
the technological transformation of the industry. The 
persistence of an internal subcontract system enabled 
employers to intensify labour on existing technology rather 
than invest in new technologies. This node of labour 
management, which lasted until the demise of mule spinning 
in the 1960s, involved chief spinning operatives or minders 
directly employing and paying their own assistants or 
piecers. Wage lists, which emerged during the late 
nineteenth century in various spinning districts of 
Lancashire, institutionalised the minder-piecer system.
These gave minders standard weekly earnings on mules of 
different lengths, out of which the big and little piecers 
were paid specified amounts. The wages of piecers did not
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vary with actual production, but were fixed by the list 
whereas the minders were paid by the piece. If the minder 
produced more than normal production he reaped all the 
benefits to the exclusion of the piecers who had to work 
longer and harder for the same pay. In general minders did 
not oppose the intensification of labour on existing 
technology because wage lists protected then against 
arbitrary reductions in piece rates thus ensuring then a 
share in productivity gains. Minders could transfer much of 
the extra work onto piecers, who received no additional 
remuneration. Hence, minders' 'were willing to trade off 
more work (for the ninder-piecer unit as a whole) for more 
earnings (for themselves)' (Lazonick 1979:253).
The ninder-piecer system held out against alternative 
divisions of labour in the Lancashire spinning industry, 
primarily because, employers, fragmented and divided by 
competition and confronted by a strong craft union still 
found the internal subcontract system an effective node of 
labour management. Since ring spindles were operated by 
poorly paid females, the prospect of the substitution of 
male minders by cheaper female labour also encouraged 
minders to cooperate with management in raising productivity 
on mules. Short term gains in productivity were therefore 
achieved at the cost of the industry's long tern dynamic 
efficiency. Moreover, Lancashire spinners tended to shift 
their mule spinning production to finer yarn counts and away 
from coarse counts which were most threatened by foreign 
competitors using ring spinning. Consequently, by 1907, ring 
spindles accounted for about 8 0 « of the cotton spinning
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spindles in America but less than 15% in England.
The decline of the industry stened fros a particular 
configuration of institutional relationships which evolved 
in the late nineteenth century. Institutional rigidity or 
ossification allegedly prevented the British cotton industry 
from adapting its organisational structures to the new 
imperatives of international competition.
This account of industrial decline has major implications.
By focusing on nineteenth century institutional 
relationships the analysis tends towards a unilinear and 
deterministic view of historical development. It downplays 
the potential for the change and transformation of British 
industry during the twentieth century. This is reflected in 
the neglect of the state. One of the most influential 
agencies that could have spearheaded or hindered the 
reorganisation of the British cotton textile industry is, of 
course, the state and yet, there is little consideration by 
Lazonick (1985) of the significance of state policy towards 
the industry or the changing character of government 
intervention. Moreover, the fact that the British industry 
has become increasingly internationalised over the post war 
period is ignored.
Lazonick (1985) emphasises a set of 'internal' constraints 
which evolved within a purely national context. But the 
cotton textile industry was not held in an ossified 
condition throughout the twentieth century because of 
institutional rigidities that were cast in the nineteenth
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century. Both the interwar and post war period provided 
'historic' opportunities for the emulative transformation 
of the industry and were narked by phases of intense 
structural change.
6 . 2  Large Pirns; ossified dinosaurs?
Lazonick's account of the decline of the cotton sector 
emphasises the relatively enduring problens posed by the 
vertical disintegration and horizontal specialisation of the 
industry. The izg>lication is that a concentrated and 
vertically integrated industrial structure - like the one 
exhibited by the Aamrican industry - would have facilitated 
the adoption of high throughput technologies, and eradicated 
the sector's technological backwardness. Other explanations 
for the industry's decline tend, as indicated below, to 
invert these argunents by highlighting the nisguided and 
flawed strategies adopted by the large vertically integrated 
groups which cane to dominate the industry during the 1960s 
and 1970s. Shepherd (1983:44-45), for exanple, argues that 
the large textile groups of the 1970s pursued a sinilar set 
of strategies centred around producing goods for a nass 
narket. This was encouraged by the nature of the 
relationship that had developed between the large UK 
nultiple retailers and textile producers. The forner played 
a dominant role in product choice, design and quality 
control and thereby encouraged a production emphasis on long 
runs of standard, basic fabrics to the neglect of marketing 
and innovation. According to Shepherd (1983:36):
'It is telling.... that the ranking of the four
countries by their capacity for survival in the 
1970s.. .corresponds more or less with the ranking of 
"unconcentratedness": that is, Italy as the least 
concentrated and the best survivor, followed in
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order by Germany, Prance and the U K . '
The poor international performance of the French and the UK 
industries is held to reflect the protection seeking 
strategies of a large number of marginal firms and the mass 
market orientation of a small number of very large firms.
The basic conclusion of his thesis is that the large textile 
corporations stifled entrepreneurial initiative. Blackburn 
(1981:52) is explicit about this connection:
'...the industry's structure...has militated against 
its ability to keep up with the pace of the market, 
and . . . the formation of very large groups in an 
industry like textiles has stifled enterprise and 
initiative. '
In the context of the UK, these factors have been allied to 
the character of industrial relations in the sector.
Although it is conceded that textile workers are not 
particularly militant. Shepherd (1983:45) has argued that:
'their organisation along craft lines, combined 
with a certain traditionalism among many workers 
and managers, makes incremental technical and 
organisational change, particularly difficult 
and helps explain the relatively low productivity 
of UK textiles.'
The association between high concentration levels, the 
prominence of large textile corporations (often 
multinational in scope) and 'inflexibility' has informed 
analyses of the industry in recent debates on local economic 
strategy.
The record of one particular corporation, Courtaulds, has 
been singled out for trenchant criticism, notably for 
'draining the industry of investment', 'causing the 
destruction of thousands of jobs', all of which is 
indicative of a 'marked lack of commitment to the UK textile
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industry', and a 'frantic pursuit of profits', (Gilhspsy 
1986:209) .
The purpose of the following discussion is not to engage 
with these argusents at the level of proposing an 
alternative or sore preferable development path for the 
British textile industry. Cosparisons will therefore not be 
sade between the UK textile industry and ideal typical 
'capitalist' success stories, like Italy or West Germany. 
Analyses which operationalise this type of comparison 
(Shepherd 1983) tend to sake superficial connections between 
concentration levels, state intervention and economic 
performance and therefore become variants on a 'small is 
beautiful' theme.
In this context, it must be noted that other studies have 
not blamed the large vertically integrated firms for the 
sector's problems. In fact, in an analysis of an earlier 
period 1963-74, Fishwick and Cornu (1975:21-23) note that 
there was a rapid rise in labour productivity in the 
industry, and over the three sub-sectors, the greatest 
increases were in cotton spinning and weaving. The increased 
productivity had been achieved through capital expenditure, 
much of it financed by the largest enterprises. In 1968, the 
19 largest employers in waving accounted for 44% of 
employment and 66% of capital expenditure. In spinning, the 
corresponding proportions for the 15 largest employers were 
59% and 71% (rishwick and Cornu 1975:21-23). In a more 
recent analysis of the industry, Anson and Simpson 
(1988:251) emphasise the positive features of vertical
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structures, namely, that they:
'give companies better control over the many stages
in the textile chain. This--enables thee to offer
quick response but also gives thee control over 
quality - essential if fires are to eove to higher 
added value products...The result is greater flexibility 
in an industry which is largely design led...'.
These contrasting assesseents of the iepact of large fires
on coepetitive perforeance point against explanations which
centre on size alone. What is needed is an analysis of the
econoeic, social and technical forces which cueulatively
shape a sector's coepetitive perforeance, notably, the
changing nature of state intervention in the industry and
the prevailing relationship between eeployers, trade unions
and the state.
6.3 The State and the Industry: an historical overview 
The state has intervened in the textile industry, especially 
the cotton textile sector, at various periods during the 
twentieth century to spearhead reorganisation and large 
scale production economies. Why, though, has the state been 
forced to intervene in the industry on successive occasions?
Attenpts by the state to rationalise capacity during the 
interwar period were a response to the failure of the 
industry to adapt itself to the changing imperatives of 
international conpetition. The British cotton industry had 
geared much of its production for export to mass markets in 
the LDCs, particularly India, China, Turkey and Egypt and to 
the colonies of Canada, South Africa and Australia. As early 
as 1913, the industry began to face acute problems posed by 
import substitution strategies in the LDCs and the emergence 
of competition from new exporters (Japan) (32).
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Subsequently, by 1922, the voluse of British piece goods 
exports was only 61% of the 1913 level and in 1929 only 53% 
(Lazonick 1985:19).
A consequence of the decline in export Markets was the 
emergence of substantial excess capacity due to the 
existence of a large nusber of relatively saall, 
horizontally specialised fires which had evolved to cater 
for large foreign sarkets. But despite the decline in desand 
for British cotton goods in the 1920s, spinning and weaving 
capacity failed to contract (Lazonick 1985:19). In 1929 
there were 3% sore spindles and only 6% fewer loons in 
operation than in 1913. As existing firms continued to 
compete for shrinking markets, there was little incentive 
for new investment in modern machinery. Miles (1976:185) 
estisuites that in 1930 only 58% of spinning capacity and 54% 
of weaving capacity was in use. Surplus productive capacity, 
in turn, discouraged investment in new equipment and raised 
costs of production.
By the late 1920s, the Bank of England, acting through the 
Bankers' Industrial Development Company, sought to effect a 
large scale amalgamation of spinning capacity. This resulted 
in the formation of the Lancashire Cotton Corporation (LCC) 
which intended to merge as many as 200 mills and 20 million 
spindles in the spinning industry. The company was disliked 
by many cotton mill managers but was forced on a reluctant 
industry by creditors and bankers who threatened the 
directors of many spinning firms with termination of credit. 
By 1930, the LCC had acquired 96 companies making it the
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largest aerger (in teres of the nueber of fires 
disappearing) between the wars and the largest on record in 
the UK at any tine (Hannah 1983:75). But there were probleas 
in integrating eany sea 11 and fornerly independent cotton 
Bills within one organisation and the LCC was unable to 
develop an effective aanagenent structure (cf. Lazonick 1985 
and Hannah 1983). The LCC, though, did eradicate a large 
anount of surplus capacity and by 1939 it had scrapped about 
4.5 nn spindles.
By 1934, under the inpact of the world depression of the 
early 1930s, British yarn production had declined fron its 
1912 levels, by 40% and cloth production by 55%, while the 
nunber of spindles in the industry contracted by only 20% 
and the nueber of loons by 25% (Lazonick 1985:33).
According to an official governeent report, the generally 
high level of uneeployeent that prevailed, coupled with a 
declining donestic and export denand for cotton goods, eeant 
that short-tine «forking, uneeployeent and wage reductions 
were coneon. The industry:
'...was relying on having at its disposal a cheap, 
highly skilled labour force which it could turn on, 
off or put on to short tine at any eonent' (Board of 
Trade Working Party Report 1946:8).
Widespread price cutting had reduced profit nargins to a
level which inpeded large scale re-eguipeent. Moreover,
cotton eanufacturers were generally reluctant to invest in
new eachinery because they had evolved a strategy of
operating antiguated nachinery in tines of buoyant denand
and closing down plant when trade was depressed.
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An early fora of state intervention in the industry was the 
Cotton Spinning Industry Act of 1936 which was enacted to 
eliminate redundant spinning machinery. A total of 6.2 an. 
spindles was scrapped which amounted to only 13% of 1935 
installed capacity (Lazonick 1985:33/Briscoe 1971:128). The 
Act was relatively unsuccessful in attaining large scale 
rationalisation for a number of reasons. The Act was aimed 
purely at the spinning sector, thus neglecting the problems 
of excess capacity in weaving and finishing. More 
importantly, it proved impossible to get the numerous small 
spinning firms in the industry fully participating in the 
scheme. Hence, attempts to fix prices, regulate supplies by 
quotas, and carve up markets during the interwar period 
tended not to be successful (Miles 1968:33).
Two government enquiries into the industry - Report of the 
Cotton Textile Mission to the USA (London: HMSO 1944) and 
Board of Trade Working Party Report:Cotton (London: HMSO 
1946) - were carried out during and immediately after the 
Second World War. Both reports highlighted the need for 
large-scale investment and structural change if the problems 
of high production cost, low productivity and technological 
backwardness were to be overcome. The Report of the Cotton 
Textile Mission to the USA (the Platt Report) made several 
recommendations, notably that the British industry needed to 
become increasingly standardised for high throughput 
production which in turn necessitated changes in 
distribution and production methods, involving large scale 
re-equipment of the industry.
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The key points of the report were reinforced by the Board of 
Trade Working Party in 1946 which proposed that the industry 
needed to adapt itself to the situation of post war labour 
shortages by offering higher wages. The Report pointed out 
that high wages would encourage firss to invest in new 
machinery to raise productivity and reduce unit production 
costs and that such a strategy would necessitate the 
introduction of shift working.
It was also argued that the transforaation of the industry 
into a high wage, high productivity sector could not be left 
to private sector initiative but required joint action 
involving both employers and the state. This last 
proposition led to a lengthy Meeorandus of Dissent froa the 
aanufacturing aeabers of the working party. They took a 
short-tera view of the nature of the industry's probleas and 
in particular, opposed both large scale re-equipment and 
enforced rationalisation. According to Miles (1968:37):
'(this was) partly because of their attachment to 
free-enterprise principles, partly because of the 
need bo avoid disruption of production, and partly 
because, they argued, traditional Lancashire 
equipment had certain technical advantages.'
The comprehensive proposals for structural change made in 
both reports were ignored by the industry. The 1948 Cotton 
Spinning Industry (Re-equipment Subsidy) Act attempted to 
implement part of the recommendations. According to the Act, 
firms with at least three mills and a minimum number of 
spindles were eligible for a 25% re-equipment subsidy for 
modernisation and the eradication of excess capacity. But 
the Act had a negligible impact on re-equipment or the
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■crapping of excess capacity. Employers, instead, chose to 
maximise export earnings and short term profits from the 
post war boom, which reflected a temporary world shortage of 
cotton goods (33). Obsolescent plant was brought back into 
production, immigrant workers were recruited to operate the 
machinery, and employers failed to make any major changes in 
organisation or working methods. But by 1952, the post war 
boom was over and output, employment and export levels began 
to fall. Between 1951 and 1952 output fell by 28%, and from 
1954 onwards, imports began to increase rapidly while 
exports continued to decline. According to Miles (1976:187):
'Imports, and especially imports from low-income 
Asian countries, were regarded as the cause of 
all the difficulties, and pressures for protection 
began to mount.'
At this point, the British industry was completely 
unprotected from the Commonwealth Asian producers of cotton 
textiles, which included Hong Kong, India and Pakistan. 
Imports from Japan, China and the Soviet bloc countries were 
controlled by guota under bilateral trade agreements, but 
otherwise there were no quantitative restrictions.
Surplus capacity, thus, re-emerged as a feature of the 
industry during the late 1950s. During 1957-59 under 70% of 
installed spindles were operational and 78% in weaving. The 
Conservative Government responded by introducing an 
ambitious piece of sectoral intervention - the 1959 Cotton 
Industry Act, which was intended to assist the industry in 
adapting to import competition. A set of 'voluntary 
limitations' on exports was agreed between the British 
cotton industry and the industries of Hong Kong, India and 
Pakistan to provide a two year 'breathing space' for
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structural adaptation. The Act proposed that a half of the 
industry's plant be scrapped in spinning and 40t in 
weaving/finishing. Firms were compensated for their losses 
by the provision of grants to those ceasing to trade in 
textiles and subsidies for the purchase of new equipment. On 
this occasion a consensus operated between government and 
industry, including management and unions, over the need for 
joint action. Both parties realised that the problem of 
excess capacity could not be tackled by the industry alone 
without incurring large scale unemployment and widespread 
disruption.
A total of £17 an. was paid in compensation to firms, of 
which £11.3 an. was contributed by the state. The 
rationalisation target was almost reached with 48% of 
spinning spindles, 27% of all doubling spindles and 38% of 
all loons in the industry being scrapped. 203 firms left the 
industry (one fifth of the total), of which only 2 0 were 
vertically integrated, (ie. carrying out two or more 
processes). Of the remaining 183, 123 specialised 
exclusively in weaving. By 1963, 30 integrated 
spinning/weaving firms accounted for 70% of spinning 
capacity and 40% of «reaving capacity. But it was larger 
firms, particularly multi-process firms, trhich took 
advantage of the re-equipment provisions of the Act. Firms 
staying outside the scheme were small with a mean size of 74 
employees, whereas the mean size for those in the scheme was 
250 for single process firms and 2,360 for multi-process
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Only relatively worthless, antiquated eachinery was scrapped 
and re-equipeent too fell short of Governsent expenditure 
estimates (Textile Council 1969). These had been based on 
the industry's own calculations of probable costs of 
re-equipeent of between £80 an. and £95 en., whereas total 
eligible re-equipeent expenditures aeounted to £53.5 en. But 
the 1959 Act did result in the eodernisation of soee of 
Lancashire's stock of eachinery. By October 1965, 13% of 
spindles and 9% of the loons had been purchased with 
re-equipeent grants and there were substantial productivity 
ieproveaents in both spinning and weaving. Output per ring 
equivalent spindle increased by 30% between the beginning of 
1959 and the Biddle of 1966, conpared to only 2% during 
1951-59. In the weaving sector, output per loon hour 
increased by 10% over 1951-59 and 14% between 1959 and 
Bid-1965 (Niles 1968:87-88).
Nevertheless, conteeporary governeent assesseents deeeed
this type of sectoral intervention a failure because it did
not address the frageented structure of the industry. During
the period 1961-62, the Estieates Coeeittee of the House of
Coeeons reviewed the operation of the Act and argued that:
'failing a speedy and satisfactory solution to the 
related problens of i«ports, earketing and the 
fuller use of plant and nachinery, euch of the 
expenditure incurred will have been to no purpose'
(HMSO 1962: p.x. para.26).
But the assueption that the renoval of surplus capacity and 
the provision of subsidies for new investeent would restore 
the industry's coepetitiveness, ignored the features of eany 
fires in the sector. A typical seall, privately owned, 
unprofitable textile coepany was:
'able to disrupt prices, under-cutting fires with
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relatively high fixed costs when demand was rising 
and withdrawing again when trade was slack'. (Niles
1976:204).
Moreover, in the 1950s, the cotton unions cooperated with 
such a strategy by accepting lags in wage rates below 
national industrial wages, and short-tine working when trade 
was depressed. The compliance of the unions in short term 
cost cutting strategies impeded the modernisation of the 
industry. As Turner points out, the unions were in effect 
offering 'a virtual subsidy to the technologically backward 
employer' (1962:339). The industry, through its trade 
associations, argued that money spent on new plant would be 
wasted without stricter import controls but Niles'
(1976:209) more recent assessment of the Act emphasises 
other f actors:
'An important lesson of the British textile experience 
is that the ailing small companies which are at 
the core of the problem are simply not able to take 
advantage of financial incentives, or are not 
interested in doing so. They lack a capital base, 
they lack cash flow, and they lack the necessary 
management skills.'
Despite state intervention in the industry, the Textile 
Council report (1969) indicates that by 1967 cotton textiles 
was predominantly a low wage, low productivity industry by 
international standards. The spinning sector had lower wage 
costs than other Mestem textile industries (excluding 
Portugal). In Holland and Nest Germany wages were 55 per 
cent above the UK and in the USA 160 per cent higher. On 
average, UK labour productivity compared unfavourably not 
only with Mestern countries but also with Hong Kong and 
Japan. Labour productivity was 45% greater in Prance and 80% 
greater in Germany. In weaving, average output per person 
hour in the UK was typically around 10% lower than in other
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advanced European countries. The Report attributes (1969:42) 
these productivity differences to the tendency of UK textile 
employers to operate a higher proportion of outdated 
equipment than their sajor Western competitors. But it was 
also noted that productivity rates were lower than those 
prevailing in other Western textile industries, even when 
similar materials and equipment were compared. The Report 
cites managerial inefficiency as the main reason underlying 
the poor competitiveness of these firms, and argues for:
'better training and the more widespread and intensive 
use of work study and other specialist management 
techniques'. (1969:43)
In contrast, the Report was positive about the attitude of 
textile trade unions to the need for industrial change and 
adaptation :
'The industry is fortunate in having trade unions which, 
in collaboration with the employers' organisations, 
have achieved a standard of industrial relations which 
is the envy of many other industries. There has been 
no major strike in the industry for over 35 years 
....the unions generally have accepted work study, 
multi-shift working and new methods. .Rapid adaptation 
to the completely new requirements of the modern textile 
industry is now the main concern of trade union 
leadership.' (1969:89)
Nevertheless, the weakness of textile trade unions and their 
willingness to accept wage cuts and short tine working 
rendered them unable to 'shock' the majority of textile 
employers into best practice production methods and 
investment in new technologies.
Thus, in 1936, 1948 and 1959, the state actively took 
measures, albeit on a sporadic and temporary basis, to halt 
the industry's decline by facilitating the structural 
adaptation of the sector. This involved the provision of 
financial assistance and subsidies to spearhead the
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rationalisation of capacity, new investaent and the 
Modernisation of the sector. The state, though, did not 
anticipate the responses of the majority of cotton textile 
fi ras towards financial subsidies and their ability to 
transfora the industry into a high wage, high productivity 
sector. Measures designed to accelerate the modernisation of 
the sector were rarely connected to any coherent vision of 
the industry's future development or even an appropriate 
fora of industrial structure. The Platt Mission in 1944 was 
in favour of a vertically integrated structure for the 
cotton textile industry, whilst the Board of Trade Working 
Party in 1946 favoured both greater horizontal concentration 
and a more vertical structure. More importantly, the highly 
interventionist 1959 programme was entirely neutral on the 
question of an 'appropriate' industrial structure for cotton 
textiles. The measures therefore constituted an unsustained 
and inadequate attempt to halt the sector's decline.
6.3.1 Corporate Intervention
In recognition of the failure of the 1959 measures to 
adequately deal with the industry's problems, the state 
withdrew from direct sectoral intervention. Private sector 
initiatives, notably mergers to generate capital 
concentration and vertical integration, were actively 
encouraged. The most sustained impact on the structure of 
the textile industry came from the acquisitions pursued by 
the two leading synthetic fibre producers, Courtaulds and 
ICI. Both companies needed a secure customer base for their 
products and fear for the future viability of their domestic 
markets motivated both companies to intervene in the textile
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industry. Structural reorganisation of the industry was also 
facilitated by the increasing concentration of the retail 
sector. The role of large sultiple retailers in importing, 
in forcing down prices and in generating sharp changes in 
demand created pressure for larger firm size and vertical 
integration to counterpose the selling power of the 
retailers and to facilitate greater control over supplies 
and outlets and the development of branded textile products 
(Fishwick and Cornu 1975:5) (34).
Courtaulds' planned strategy was to acquire the five largest 
spinning firms, the Lancashire Cotton Corporation, Fine 
Spinners and Doublers, English Sewing Cotton, the Calico 
Printers' Association and Combined English Mills. Between 
1963-69, Courtaulds spent nearly £150 mn. on acquisitions 
leaving it with 30% of all Lancashire spinning production, 
including the purchase of the Lancashire Cotton Corporation 
and Fine Spinners and Doublers, 22% of filament weaving, 35% 
of warp knitting and 35% of ladies' hosiery. The firm also 
invested £5 mn. in English Sewing Cotton and as a result 
held 8% of the equity of English Calico which was the result 
of a merger in 1968 between English Sewing Cotton and Calico 
Printers' Association. The company spent £57 mn. between 
1962 and 1969 on re-equipment and expanding fibre using 
operations. The intention was to develop a series of capital 
intensive textile plants (particularly weaving) with high 
value added per worker. Courtaulds rationalised existing and 
acquired capacity, re-equipped some plants to raise 
productivity and built entirely new units on greenfield 
sites usually in Assisted Areas. Eventually, Courtaulds
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acquired a substantial share of the British textile industry 
and becaae active in a wide range of textile processes 
ranging froa spinning to clothing manufacture.
In contrast to Courtaulds' strategy of direct acquisitions, 
ICI pursued a policy of long tens lending and purchasing 
Halted aeounts of share capital. The coapany, like 
Courtaulds, invested aoney in English Sewing Cotton Ltd. 
leaving it with 8% of the equity of English Calico and over 
the period 1963-70 invested over £20 an. in Viyella 
International and Carrington and Dewhirst Ltd. In 1970, ICI 
arranged a Merger between these two companies and with 
further investaent into the new coapany (Carrington-Viyella 
Ltd.) eventually possessed 64t of the equity. In wool 
textiles, during the 1960s, ICI acquired a 20% holding in 
Lister and Co. Ltd.
According to Sir Arthur Knight (Chairaan of Courtaulds froa
1975-79):
'The initiative in approaching the fibre producers 
case froa the governaent side. It was aade clear 
that the governaent could not be expected to do 
■ore to help the industry, financially or by seeking 
agreeaent with exporting countries, unless the 
industry were seen to be doing aore to help itself. 
Courtaulds felt encouraged by Board of Trade officials 
to take an initiative. The objective was to fora 
a strong group which could effectively aanage the 
troubled Lancashire section of the industry'.
(1974:52)
Thenceforth, Courtaulds was to play a pivotal role in the 
industry and helped shape future state policy towards the 
textile sector. The coapany was an influential exponent of 
the argument that modernisation of the industry and the
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implementation of capital intensive methods of production 
necessitated a period of special protection from low cost 
imports. The industry eventually got the protection it 
sought, in a new comprehensive quota system for cotton 
textiles introduced in 1966 covering all newly and 
semi-industrialised countries excluding the Sino-Soviet 
bloc. During the early 1970s, this was subsequently replaced 
by a system which allocated specific quotas to individual 
countries and during 1972, tariffs were introduced. In 
addition, Britain became a signatory to international 
protectionist agreements.
Textile companies also benefited from non-sectoral state 
financial assistance, particularly from loans and grants 
towards training and machinery expenditure in development 
areas, sanctioned by the Industrial Development Act 1966. 
Such provisions encouraged Courtaulds to build weaving mills 
and a spinning unit in development areas. According to 
Knight (1974:175,182):
'without the financial incentives these large 
projects may not have gone ahead and certainly 
would not have been located in these areas.9
It is estimated that about 25% of Courtaulds' investment in
the five years to March 1970 came from Government grants.
Up to 1964, the Conservative Government displayed few public 
doubts about the extent and effect of acquisitions by the 
synthetic fibre producers but the Labour Government adopted 
a more ambivalent stance. Despite the positive attitude to 
mergers adopted by the Industrial Reorganisation 
Corporation, Courtaulds' monopoly of the supply of
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cellulosic fibres was referred to the Monopolies Commission 
for investigation in 1965. While the Conission was sitting 
the company continued to acguire fires but the clearance for 
such acquisitions was being delayed by the Board of Trade. 
According to Knight (1974:153)x
'This led to som irritation because Courtaulds 
were (sic) being encouraged to get on with integration, 
by both the Prise Minister in private conversation and 
the President of the Board of Trade (Douglas Jay), 
and the punctiliousness of the Board's officials 
contrasted oddly with this pressure.'
Moreover, in 1967 the Commission concluded that Courtaulds'
acquisition of firms in the textile industry was much
greater than required:
'to develop and promote the use of its 
(the company's) fibres and keep it in touch 
with users' problems.' (1967:85).
It also announced that the company should not make any 
further acquisitions in any sector of the textile and 
clothing industries, if its share of capacity (or of sales) 
exceeded 25t. Following Courtaulds' takeover bid for English 
Calico in 1969, the Labour Government announced a 
prohibition on further mergers between any of the five 
largest companies in the textile industry - (such firms, 
however, could continue to acquire smaller firms in the 
industry). This moratorium was breached when ici made a 
takeover bid for Viyella International, to effect a merger 
with Carrington and Dewhurst, although ICI had to reduce its 
eventual shareholding in Carrington Viyella to not more than 
35%. In addition, during 1973-74, Courtaulds acquired a 29% 
holding in Highams Ltd, a vertically integrated manufacturer 
of cotton type textiles, but in 1975, Courtaulds agreed with 
the Office of Fair Trading to reduce its holding in Highams
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to 25% and not to use it to influence company policy.
Meanwhile, the state re-orientated its attention to smaller 
and medium sized textile firms to act as a counter weight to 
the influence of the larger corporate groupings. In 1970, 
the Industrial Reorganisation Corporation administered a 
special loan fund for medium sized and smaller textile 
companies to finance re-equipment and expansion schemes and 
up to £10 million was earmarked for textiles.
The impact of this merger activity on the structure of the 
textile industry was profound although uneven. In 1963-68, 
concentration increased in both the cotton and hosiery 
sul>-sectors, which was mainly because of the intervention of 
the two fibre producers (35). Over the period 1968-73, 
concentration levels rose more in the wool sub-sector than 
in cotton or knitting (36) but despite such variation, the 
degree of concentration in the combination of the three 
sul>-sectors was high: five firms controlled 57% of all 
turnover in 1968 and 59% in 1973. These were Courtaulds, 
Carrington Viyella, Tootal (previously English Calico),
Coats Paton and Illingworth Morris.
If hitherto the state had misjudged the response of firms in 
the industry to the provision of financial subsidies, the 
notable feature of state policy during this period was its 
lack of consistency. During the early 1960s, the state 
actively encouraged the formation of large, vertically 
integrated groups and high levels of concentration in the 
industry. But by the late 1960s and early 1970s, state
policy was clearly being influenced by eore atomistic 
notions of competition, and an inherent suspicion of the 
power of monopolies. Consequently, the merger policy for the 
industry was put into reverse and schemes were introduced to 
assist small and medium sized companies to counter the 
influence of the large producers. This meant that the large 
firms in the industry never achieved full vertical 
integration. Courtaulds' share of production diminishes at 
successive stages closer to the final market whereas 
Tootal' s structure was the inverse, with a heavy presence in 
finishing and aerchanting. Furthermore, the bargaining power 
of the large retailers was enhanced by the relative 
fragmentation of the knitting and garment manufacturing 
sectors, which made the textile industry especially 
vulnerable to low cost imports.
6.3.2 The mid-1970s onwards
In the 1960s an intense period of structural change in the 
industry coincided with the rapid oscillation of governments 
between contradictory and confused sectoral objectives. A 
sectoral approach to the industry's problems re-emerged in 
the mid 1970s. State financial assistance was directed to 
sectors other than cotton textiles, namely, the clothing 
industry and wool textiles sector and was intended to 
promote re-equipment, rationalisation and greater 
concentration. Assistance was provided in two stages under 
the Wool Textile Industry Schemes introduced in 1973 and 
1976. Structural adjustment assistance loans were intended 
to help write off outdated equipment and to encourage firms 
to install modern machinery. Projects assisted under the
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schemes involved investment of almost £100 in. of private 
capital and f24 an. was made available by the Government. An 
official study concluded that the funds made available had 
an important leverage on investment activity and that:
'the scheme had--brought about a most encouraging
improvement in the performance of the industry in 
all major respects' (OECD 1983:111).
Rationalisation occurred with reductions in both production
capacity and employment.
The Clothing Industry Scheme, introduced in 1975, had the 
objective of encouraging the reorganisation and 
rationalisation of firms, and also the concentration of 
industrial activity without increasing capacity. The 
financial commitment under the scheme which closed for 
applications at the end of 1977 totalled around £20 million. 
The vast majority of government assistance was spent on 
investment in equipment and buildings. Three quarters of the 
investment projects were assessed as successful in the sense 
that the company's investment had been recouped within three 
years and at least 40% of these companies recovered their 
investment faster than the two to three years payback that 
was normally expected on plant and machinery (Totterdill and 
Pearce 1986). An OECD (1983:112) report argued, however, 
that the impact of both schemes was weakened because they 
were not linked to any overall marketing, managerial, or 
product strategies to ensure the viability of assisted 
investment. Moreover, sectoral support was abandoned after 
an initial period of two years, which reflected a switch 
away by the Labour Government from overt sectoral 
intervention.
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Whilst, the state in the nid 1970s was concerned to 
facilitate the rationalisation and re-equipaent of clothing 
and wool textiles, the industry was also a aajor recipient 
of the Tesporary Bsploysent Subsidy, designed to stes job 
losses and rising unesploysent. The state paid a subsidy at 
the rate of £20 per week for each worker threatened with 
redundancy. At its height, in late 1977, the schese covered 
200,000 workers with about one half esployed in textiles and 
clothing, equivalent to over 1 0% of the total labour force 
in these sectors. The schese was eventually Modified to 
restrict the extent to which it could benefit fires in 
textiles, clothing and footwear and to require potential 
recipients to show how they planned to sake jobs viable 
within a year of starting to receive the subsidy.
Most of the large textile fires eade extensive use of the 
schese. It has been estieated that in 1977 the subsidy 
accounted for 20% of Carrington Viyella's pre tax profits,
3% of Coats Patons'; 10% of Tootal's; 7% of Allied 
Textiles'; 6% of Illingworth Morris's and 11% of Courtaulds' 
pre-tax profits (FT 27.7.78/29.7.78). There were real 
contradictions in state policy between the rationalising 
thrust of sectoral support and the esploysent subsidies 
offered by this schese. Interestingly, a retrospective 
assesssent of the scheae by a chairman of Too ta 1 argued that 
eaployaent subsidies had delayed the such needed 
rationalisation of the sector and referred to:
'the way in which the last Government prevented 
industry - and particularly the textiles 
industry - from reorganisation. Most of Tootal's 
plants which received TES have closed down'.
(Tiaes 14.7.80)
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Since the deeise of the sectoral scheees of the 1970s, very 
little substantial financial assistance has been Bade 
available to the industry. The present governaent has been 
aabivalent as to how or whether the structural adaptation of 
textiles and clothing should be facilitated and sectoral 
provision has generally been downgraded in preference to 
private sector initiatives. An extremely modest scheme of 
financial assistance was announced in March 1984. The 
Department of Trade and Industry announced a €20 million 
scheme aimed specifically at small and medium sized firms in 
the clothing, footwear and textile industries. The scheme 
was intended to provide an inventory of technologically 
advanced eguipment, for which eligible firms would be able 
to apply for an investment grant of up to 20t. The TUC 
Textiles committee argued that:
'the amount set aside for the approved scheme for 
assistance - £5 an. in each of the four years - is 
inadequate to meet the industry's needs.'
This view was endorsed by the clothing industry employers'
association - the BCIA. Other criticisms of the scheme was
its exclusive focus on new technology, which did not address
the industry's problems of low investment, low productivity,
poor marketing, financial weakness and inadequate
management. The scheme was eventually rejected by the EC in
February 1985 because it was judged incompatible with EC
Competition policy. Totterdill and Pearce (1986:22) argued
thus:
'there has been serious cause to doubt the DTI's 
willingness to pursue the scheme vigorously in 
Brussels, and indeed to doubt its commitment to the 
future of textile and clothing production in the 
UK. . .officials tend to draw a sweeping distinction 
between the so-called "sunset" and "sunrise" 
industries in allocating priorities for expenditure.'
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Two fora* of sectoral assistance are currently directed 
towards the industry. The Textile and Clothing Education 
Equipment Scheme, launched in June 1986, provides 
discretionary assistance to educational institutions for the 
purchase of advanced textile and clothing equipment and the 
EC's 'Basic Research in Industrial Technologies for Europe' 
programme (BRITE) provides financial support for basic 
research in established industries such as textiles and 
includes a specific budget for research on the handling of 
flexible materials.
But such schemes hardly constitute a fora of coherent, 
targeted assistance towards the industry. This paucity of 
state provision has been characterised in a recent analysis 
as a:
'blanket refusal to give government assistance for 
industrial restructuring, although many other EEC 
countries have received large amounts of Government 
aid and have maintained production and employment with 
more success than the UK.' (Chisholm et al. 1986:61)
Mon-sectoral financial assistance is provided under sections 
seven and eight of the 1982 Industry Act (eg. regional aid 
and national selective assistance). The Department of Trade 
and Industry has estimated that approximately £50 million in 
Government aid is paid to the textiles and clothing sector 
each year, of which around two thirds goes to textiles and 
one third to clothing. But there is little co-ordination of 
the many schemes which have often been approved under 
section eight and no sectoral appraisal of the schemes.
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It appears, Moreover, that very few textile and clothing 
firms take advantage of government assistance for which they 
are eligible (Totterdill and Pearce 1986:120). In 1981/82 
the total assistance paid to textiles in regional 
development grants was just over £15 million - under 2.5% of 
the £616 million (approximately) paid to all industry. By 
1983/84 this had dropped in both absolute and percentage 
terms to £7.3 million - 1.7% of the £438.9 million 
available. Assistance to clothing and footwear has also 
fallen from less than 1% of the total money made available 
to industry in 1981/82 to 0.9% in 1983/84. This is clearly 
related to the fact that many of the specific schemes aimed 
at supporting innovation and providing technical advice to 
firms are restricted to companies with at least sixty 
employees or require large minimum investments which tend to 
exclude small firms in the industry.
Changes in state provision since 1984, particularly under 
the recent Regional Industrial Policy Act, have further 
reduced the aid available to industry. Under section eight, 
selective assistance is now only available in exceptional 
cases. It has been estimated that by 1988 £300 million a 
year will have been removed from an annual regional aid 
budget of £590 million. Special Development Areas have 
disappeared and many areas have been downgraded from 
development area to intermediate area status which are not 
eligible for automatic regional development grants. This 
means that many areas in which the industry is concentrated 
are now excluded from assistance, including the East 
Midlands and large parts of West Yorkshire (37).
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The role of the National Economic Development Corporation, 
which was originally envisaged as a strategic planning 
agency, has also been effectively downgraded. The sectoral 
EDCs have spawned a range of initiatives directed towards 
particular themes (ie. marketing, design) but these have not 
been linked to an overall strategy for industry in general 
or textiles and clothing in particular. The textile EDCs 
have on occasion delivered muted protests about the lack of 
government aid for the industry. The Cotton EDC argued:
'The industry does not seek special treatment, but it 
would welcome similar assistance to that which its 
European competitors have received so that it can 
compete on an equal and fair basis' (1983:13)
Union representatives on the NEDO committees have argued
that the council should consider the way in which macro-
economic policy inhibits the improvement of industry
performance at the sectoral level. Textile unions, notably
the National Union of Hosiery and Knitwear Workers, also
felt that NEDO and the industry committees have been biased
towards corporate priorities:
'NEDO was too conscious of management sensitivities and 
failed to raise difficult issues on EDCs likm outward 
investment and the activities of multinational 
corporations.' (NUHKtf 1986:228-229)
The most visible form of state assistance to the industry in 
the 1980s was the renegotiation of the Multi Fibre 
Agreement, which is now less of a 'breathing space' for the 
industry's reorganisation and more a permanent feature. The 
UK Government's participation in the renewal of the MFA in 
1986 occurred only after intensive and prolonged lobbying by 
both the textile and clothing industry associations and the 
trade unions through the TUC Textiles, Clothing and Footwear
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Industrias Cossittee (TUC 1985) and daspits faars that tha 
qovernnant would ba reluctant to pursue a policy which ran 
counter to its ideological preference for the liberalisation 
of international trade. According to the industry lobby, the 
Textile Industry Support Caspaign, it was 'an open secret 
that the UK representatives at Brussels (were) taking a such 
sore liberal line than the governnent (was) willing to 
admit' and UK representatives initially joined Nest Germany 
and the Netherlands in supporting greater liberalisation of 
textile and clothing trade (FT 27.11.85).
The current government's ambivalence towards planned 
'interference' in international trade, and its reliance on 
private sector initiatives to reshape the industry meshes 
uneasily with the policy objectives of industry and union 
representatives (38). The British Textile Confederation 
(BTC) - an industry pressure group consisting of both 
employer and union representatives - expresses in a concrete 
way the degree of consensus that exists between trade unions 
and employers on the underlying reason for the industry's 
decline and strategies for renewal. This consensus has 
traditionally coalesced around the adoption of protectionist 
measures to stem the rising levels of imports, particularly 
of low cost textile and clothing products, and to thereby 
protect jobs. The British Textile Confederation has often 
acknowledged the coalition of interests that has evolved 
between unions and employers in the industry. In its annual 
report of 1984, it pointed out that:
'The Confederation is an equal partnership between the 
industry's trade unions and employer organisations... 
in the practical and policy issues with which the 
Confederation deals, the level of co-operation between 
the two parties is outstanding. The resolute and positive
179
way in which our trade union aeibers pronote policies to 
strengthen the industry on which their »sabers' 
livelihood depends has been extreaely effective.'
(BTC Annual Report 1984:9)
The concern of unions and eaployers with the problea of 
iaports is not a recent phenoaenon but has its roots in the 
early part of the post war period. In the late 1950s there 
was a spate of resignations froa the Conservative Party by 
'angry cotton aanufacturers' until governaent policy was 
adjusted to 'aeet the needs of Lancashire ... to guarantee a 
brighter future for the industry' (Singleton 1986:105) and 
union officials expressed siailar disenchantaent with the 
Labour Party's policy on the cotton textile industry and the 
threat of iaports in the 1960s. At the 1967 TUC Conference, 
a delegate froa the Aaalgaaated Weavers coaplained that 
Labour Party proaises regarding isport protection had not 
been adeguately fulfilled and that the govemaent was 
pursuing a 'laissez fairs' policy which would lead to the 
'undisciplined rout' of the industry. The arguaent, 
articulated by both unions and eaployers during this period, 
was that iaports were the aost important iaaediate threat to 
jobs and that successive post war governaents had betrayed 
the Lancashire cotton textile industry by failing to 
introduce adeguate protectionist aeasures. The response of 
both eaployers and unions in the industry has been 
attributed 'to the fact that iaports were the only element 
that Lancashire felt able to affect through political 
lobbying'. (Singleton 1986:106)
This coalition of interests between eaployers and unions has 
continued to peraeate industrial relations in the industry
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up until the present. During the period of sill closures in 
the aid 1970s, unions and employers united once again to 
call for stricter import controls. Mr Fred Hague, the joint 
general secretary of the Amalgamated Textile Workers Union, 
argued that Courtaulds had been forced into plant closures 
because of the deteriorating state of trade and the high 
level of low cost imports (FT 8.3.75). Members of the 
Hosiery and Knitwear Union had adopted a strategy during 
this period of picketing shops which sold imported knitwear 
and urging customers to buy UK goods.
The most recent and formal articulation of trade union 
policy on the problems of the UK textile industry is 
contained in a TUC document, 'A Fair Balance in Textile and 
Clothing Trade: a TUC Statement on MFA 4' published in 1985. 
The central message of this document is of support for 
import controls and in particular, the renewal of the Multi 
Fibre Agreement. It is argued that the MFA should be renewed 
partly to help safeguard jobs in the UK textile industry but 
also to give continued opportunities to the least developed 
countries. Some modifications are proposed, notably that the 
least developed countries should receive more favourable 
treatment than other suppliers, such as the NICs and that a 
social clause be introduced to facilitate social 
improvements in all MFA countries. It is suggested that 
action should be taken against countries which persistently 
infringe ILO Conventions on minimum labour standards but 
this would occur only after a lengthy procedure is completed 
and after every other solution is explored.
181
The TUC attributes such of the employment decline in the 
industry to the recessionary conditions of the early 1980s, 
and the economic policies of the British qovernaent (eg. the 
high value of the pound, high interest rates and low 
domestic desand) but it also argues that a sajor factor 
underlying job losses over the past ten years has been the 
constant pressure of low and high cost inports which 
weakened the industry's ability to fight off the damaging 
effects of the recession. According to Neil Kearney - Head 
of Research at the National Union of Tailors and Garment 
Workers - the MPA:
has given a degree of stability...... ;
companies are feeling more secure and making the 
investments; they are more competitive, and are 
thus holding on to jobs.'
(International Labour Reports March-April 1986:9).
The TUC policy on the UFA reflects an alliance of interests 
between (national) employers and textile trade unions which 
centres around the necessity of protectionist measures, the 
restoration of the profitability of the UK industry and (it 
is hoped) the preservation of jobs. Textile trade unions 
have been irrevocably weakened and strategically out paced 
by the rapid and traumatic decline of the industry, and have 
in the main responded by supporting any corporate and 
government measure which will preserve jobs even on an 
insecure and temporary basis.
A typical view held by trade unions and many employers in 
textiles, and the related industries of clothing and 
retailing is that successive governments have been content 
to let the industry continue on its downward path, and have
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thus dons littls to stem its decline. A director of Narks 
and Spencer criticised the paucity of state provision for 
the industry in the following way:
'Rarely understanding the importance of the clothing 
industry to the economy, most Governments have been 
guilty of double standards, only showing concern when 
unemployment threatened their political base and 
future. In contrast to the practices of key competitor 
countries, especially Prance and Italy, UK Government 
assistance for the clothing, knitwear and textile 
industries over the past thirty years has been 
derisory....'. J. Salisse, (Knitting Sector Working 
Party 1983:13)
But the foregoing analysis indicates that the central 
problem with the relationship between the industry and the 
state is not the limited extent of the state's intervention, 
but the character of sectoral policy itself. The state has 
chosen to intervene in the industry on a sporadic and 
unsustained basis - often when the industry's problems have 
been at their most acute. Wore importantly, sectoral 
policies have had mutually inconsistent objectives. Measures 
designed to accelerate the modernisation of the sector were 
rarely connected to any coherent vision of the industry's 
future development or even an appropriate form of industrial 
structure and governments have often made unrealistic 
assumptions regarding the responses of firms towards 
financial subsidies and their ability to transform the 
industry into a high wage, high productivity sector. These 
contradictions were at their height during the 1960s when 
the state actively encouraged the formation of large, 
vertically integrated groups and high levels of 
concentration in the industry which were then overturned by 
more atomistic notions of competition, and an inherent 
suspicion of the power of monopolies. Consequently, the
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merger policy for the industry was put into reverse and 
scheies were introduced to assist ssall and nedius sized 
companies to counter the influence of the large producers.
Protectionism has ceased being a 'temporary breathing space' 
for the industry's reorganisation and has become a permanent 
measure despite the current government's more ambivalent 
stance towards the regulation of international textile 
trade. But the relatively permanent protection of industries 
from low cost competition delays the adaptation of companies 
to competitive pressures and therefore runs counter to 
attempts by the state to facilitate and accelerate the 
modernisation of the industry through financial subsidies 
for scrapping and re-equipment. In further contradiction to 
the modernising thrust of sectoral policy, the industry has 
also been a beneficiary of employment subsidies designed to 
encourage firms to 'hoard' labour in times of rising 
unemployment and recession. But the cheapening of labour by 
the state through financial subsidies potentially impedes 
the rationalisation of productive capacity, the adoption of 
labour displacing technologies and the process of industrial 
restructuring.
In the present period of the industry's reorganisation, the 
state has downgraded sectoral support, in preference to 
private sector initiatives. The industry has been left to 
reshape its own productive base to the imperatives of 
international competition. The structural adaptation of the 
sector in the 1980s has been at great social cost for 
textile workers who have been massively displaced from the
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industry but as yet, such seasures have failed to 
irrevocably stes the industry's decline. The government's 
negative stance on the Multi Fibre Agreement and its non­
interventionist approach towards the industry's problems 
have therefore produced significant tensions between the 
state and the relevant employer's associations and textile 
and clothing trade unions who are united in their concern 
about the impact of exchange rates on the industry's 
competitiveness, the absence of any substantial targeted 
sectoral assistance, and the government's commitment to the 
liberalisation of trade.
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Chapter gfSBQl Pwcline or Raqanwatlon? a move to flexible 
specialisation?
The overall picture of two industries beset by continuing 
decline and competitive weakness is not universally 
accepted, particularly in relation to the clothing industry. 
It has been argued that substantial changes are occurring in 
the character of inter-industry competition consonant with 
the emergence of a 'new pattern of production and 
distribution' (Zeitlin 1985, Zeitlin and Totterdill 1989,
GLC 1986, Nitter 1986). These writers have drawn upon the 
'flexible' potential of automation technologies and their 
convergence with a shift to the production of higher 
guality, fashion orientated products to assert that this has 
led to a:
'visible shift in the relocation of production in 
the industry from the Third World to Western European 
countries since the beginning of the 1980s'
(Nitter 1986:46).
Allegedly, this new pattern of competition not only 
indicates that industries like clothing and textiles are 
moving from a Pordist mass production paradigm to flexible 
specialisation production methods, but the effect has been 
to reduce the importance of Third World clothing imports 
into the UK. The implication, then, is that the changing 
character of inter-industry competition has provided a 
favourable context for the regeneration of these industries.
Textile and clothing production has previously been 
'Pordist', it is argued, because of the nature of the 
relationship between British retailers and manufacturers. 
Clothing retailing has been dominated by a few large groups 
who have exercised enormous buying power in the wholesale
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market for garments and fabrics. According to NEDO (1982:19) 
a stable contractual relationship was built up between the 
major textile groups and multiple retailers. Retailers 
emphasised basic garments with little fashion content and 
Marks and Spencer, in particular, set very detailed 
specifications for fabrics, making up and final garment 
quality.
Manufacturers, like Courtaulds and Carrington Viyella, 
geared their production to large volumes of basic fabrics 
for a few major customers and gradually withdrew from small 
orders and more design sensitive products. The role of 
garments and fabrics branded by manufacturers diminished.
The dominant retailers increasingly set the pace and 
direction of fashion changes and pressed their suppliers to 
capture available production economies of scale by adopting 
garment engineering techniques developed in the USA. 
Competition among retail chains revolved around the price 
and the quality of garments.
Various forces are identified which have brought about the 
transition to flexible specialisation, but the ones that are 
most commonly cited are shifts in the composition of demand, 
the volatile nature of consumer demand for clothing, 
demographic changes, and product differentiation which have 
cumulatively fragmented the mass market for clothing and 
eroded the advantages of long run manufacture (Zeitlin 
1985).
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In the UK context, retail competition has intensified as 
overall growth in consumer demand for clothing has slowed. 
The market share of the multiple retailers (Littlewoods,
BHS, Narks and Spencer) has been affected by the smaller 
chains of 'image' shops (Benetton, Next) and grocery 
supermarkets (Asda, Tesco) have gained market share in many 
imported basic garments. The big retailers have responded by 
shifting away from merchandise which competes with low cost 
imports and have introduced more fashion elements into their 
garments. Retailers have also responded by increasing the 
speed with which they introduce fashion and style changes. 
This, in turn, forces their suppliers to manufacture shorter 
runs of garments with higher design and fashion content 
leading to an increase in the number of different garment 
styles being sold and discontinued from season to season. 
This situation inherently favours manufacturers in developed 
economies because of their geographical proximity to 
retailers. According to Hitter (1986:52):
'It is difficult for the large scale garment 
manufacturers in the Far Bast to be responsive, 
either in design or colour terms, or in speed of 
delivery, to the fashion requirements of a remote 
market.'
Hence, there has been a shift in retail competition away 
from an emphasis on garment price to non price factors, such 
as design, quality, speed of delivery. These changes, it is 
argued, have created a more balanced relationship between 
retailers and suppliers creating a new pattern of production 
and distribution. Manufacturers have broadened their order 
books and have become less vulnerable to monopeonistic 
pressure on their profit margins. Retailers are more
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dependent on suppliers capable of productive flexibility and 
able to generate saleable designs. Clothing suppliers no 
longer turn out long runs of individual garaents at the 
lowest unit cost but design and manufacture the widest 
possible style range at the lowest cueulative cost.
According to Zeitlin (1985:12):
'flexibility has become the key to competitive 
performance and the means for its realisation has 
been found in new computer based technologies.'
Such developments, it is argued, have led to sharp drops in 
overseas imports from retailers. Nitter (1986) has asserted 
that major department stores reduced imported clothing by 
36% over 1981-83 and Hoffman and Rush (1984) stated, on the 
basis of interview evidence, that UK retailers, noted for a 
past preference for sourcing in the Par East, indicated that 
higher prices for imported products, improved domestic 
efficiency and changing buying patterns had all stimulated 
domestic sourcing. Zeitlin (1985:10-11) cites clothing trade 
and production trends over the 1980-83 period, which 
allegedly demonstrate that the share of LDC imports to 
Britain has fallen, with the value of clothing imports as a 
whole levelling off between 1982-83.
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7.1. Intar-industry competition 
7.1.1 A shift to do— tic sourcing?
A straightforward connection does not exist between the 
alleged fragaentation of consumer deaand for clothing, the 
strategies of UK retailers and a shift to flexible 
specialisation. In particular, the purchasing patterns and 
sourcing strategies of retailers are both varied and 
complex.
As chapter three indicates, the UK clothing industry, unlike 
West German and Prench clothing manufacturers, has not in 
the main relocated production 'offshore'. This has been 
partly due to the volume purchases of major retailers, and 
in particular the domestic sourcing policy of Marks and 
Spencer. The dependency relationship between Marks and 
Spencer and clothing manufacturers has tended to preserve 
the latter, but over-reliance on a limited number of retail 
customers has meant closure or severely reduced margins in 
times of recession as in the late 1970s and early 1980s 
(Gibbs 1987:2). As Rainnie (1984) points out, Marks and 
Spencer has a large number of dependent suppliers and de 
facto control of the production process in these companies. 
This has given it the flexibility to respond rapidly to 
changes in demand for particular items whilst not bearing 
the risks of ownership of production facilities. Production, 
though, has been organised within specified factories and 
not subcontracted out to other clothing firms or 
homeworkers.
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Other retailers in the UK have adopted a slightly different 
strategy (eg. C 4 A) in that they have relied on designs 
from wholesalers or Manufacturers and engaged in widespread 
subcontracting often eediated through so-called 'eiddleeen'. 
Production has been subcontracted to small, inner city fires 
and hone workers thereby naking use of skilled but very low 
paid, inaigrant female labour (cf. Hitter 1986, Phizacklea 
1987).
This situation has had profound implications for textile 
manufacturers. Competition among retailers in the past for 
increased market share has affected garment manufacturers by 
placing pressure on their production costs and profitability 
which in turn encouraged firms to source low cost imported 
raw materials (yarns and fabrics) from overseas at the 
expense of UK textile producers (NEDO 1982:29). Higher 
value, dyed and finished fabrics have tended to be purchased 
from European textile manufacturers. It is estimated that 
half the fabric in Harks and Spencer's clothing (Silberston 
1984:46) and over 70% by volume of all fabrics for the UK 
clothing industry are imported (Knitting International Nay 
1985). The chairman of Harks and Spencer argued that fabric 
is imported for guality reasons:
'Me and our suppliers are compelled to buy a substantial 
guantity of woven fabrics from high wage, technically 
advanced producers, mainly in Western Europe, North 
America and Israel. Nuch of this could, and should, 
be within the capacity of British firms to produce, 
but they do not.' (Annual Report 1978)
Narks and Spencer has had until recently an explicit 
domestic sourcing policy for clothing goods, but the scale 
of operation of some UK retailers (British Home Stores,
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Littlewoods) has enabled thee to take an active role in 
overseas sourcing with extensive involvement in 
international subcontracting and purchasing agreements with 
low cost LDCs. The actual volume of imports under such 
agreements is difficult to measure but it is believed to 
form a large part of the UK's overall trade deficit in 
clothing products. Hamill (1987) points out that Littlewoods 
directly imports approximately seven million manufactured 
garments per year from Hong Kong alone. In Prance and Italy, 
however, the fragmented nature of the retail system has made 
it more difficult for low cost imports to penetrate the 
clothing market. For example, independent specialist stores 
have a share of only 19% of UK retail clothing sales 
compared with over 60« in Prance, almost 70« in West 
Germany, and about 80« in Italy. In the UK, the large 
clothing multiples and variety chain stores have about 44« 
of retail clothing sales, with department stores a further 
9« and mail order stores about 10« (Anson and Simpson 
1988:251) .
It has been argued, though, that this situation has 
significantly changed and that individual UK retailers 
sought in the early 1980s to reduce their dependence on 
imported items (Zeitlin 1985, Hitter 1986). But to what 
extent has there been a shift in retail purchasing patterns 
away from overseas sourcing? Moreover, do short term changes 
in trade trends constitute evidence in support of long term 
shifts in competitive relationships?
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Developments, other than a shift to flexible specialisation, 
are more responsible for the slowing down in import 
penetration of the British market from low cost sources 
during the early 1980s. Among these are a more restrictive 
MPA, the rising labour costs of the Asian NICs, an increase 
in transport and insurance costs and currency movements. 
Furthermore, by the mid-1980s these favourable trends had 
been reversed. In 1987, imports of textiles and clothing 
into the UK from low cost countries rose by a third despite 
MPA quotas, which was largely due to exchange rate 
movements, particularly the devaluation of the dollar since 
1986 which enhanced the competitiveness of both America and 
the Par Eastern NICs. Over the longer period 1986-88, low 
cost imports of textiles and clothing rose by 42t. In short, 
short term trends in trade flows appear to be conditioned by 
currency movements and the impact of protectionist 
agreements rather than a prolonged shift in comparative 
advantage to the UK clothing industry.
The argument that retailers have sought to reduce their 
dependence on imports also tends to be an extrapolation from 
temporary, short tern adjustments in retail purchasing 
patterns. There have been, for example, recent reports of an 
increase in overseas sourcing by the major High Street 
retailers, and more importantly, Marks and Spencer has begun 
to source some of its clothing from the Par East. A 
spokesman for the company argued thus:
'Many comments have been made about our imports from 
the Far East...we should all recognise that the image
of the Par East is changing rapidly--There are centres
of excellence emerging even in countries known in the 
past only for cheap production...Marks and Spencer will 
buy abroad when we cannot get at home the guality or 
innovation customers seek.' (Knitting International,
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April 1986:64-65)
Although Marks and Spencer purchased 20% of the UK's entire 
output of clothing in 1987, a recent Economist report 
(15.10.88) noted that the company plans to source a larger 
proportion of its goods overseas to get the lowest possible 
price. UK suppliers have reportedly been told that they can 
continue to supply Marks ami Spencer only if they are 
willing to source raw materials (yarn, fabric) and finished 
garments on an international busis. It is therefore 
unsurprising that tfillias Baird, the third largest clothing 
■anufacturer in the UK and supplier of contract clothing to 
■ultiple retailers like Marks and Spencer, C 6 A, and 
Storehouse, has increased its sourcing from contract 
manufacturers in the Far East to around one third of its 
clothing reguirements. The company is currently building a 
new warehouse in Manchester to handle its imports of 
clothing for Marks and Spencer (FT 26.4.88). In 1988, most 
of the large Marks and Spencer suppliers set up or purchased 
sourcing houses in the Far East in response to the rise of 
the pound (above the critical level of $1.60) and the 
depreciation of the US dollar, although it appears that some 
have incurred problems with these arrangements, including 
late deliveries and poor product quality (FT 31.1.89) (39).
Evidence therefore suggests that the 'new' retail 
competition does not intrinsically favour British textile 
and clothing manufacturers. Although non-price factors nay 
have become more salient during the 1980s, - and this is a 
phenomenon which is intrinsically difficult to measure - the
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price competitiveness of textile and clothing goods 
continues to condition the purchasing policies of the large 
retailers. It has been argued that retailers will purchase 
garsents fron domestic sanufacturers as long as the price 
differential between their goods and conparable imports is 
no higher than 20% (FT 26.4.88). According to Anson 
(1988:25):
'In today's global markets, price, coupled with 
availability, is clearly a major factor in sourcing 
decisions taken by retailers and other importers.'
The recent spate of mergers and acquisitions by large
retailers to maintain their market share in a slowly growing
market has exacerbated the ease with which imports can
penetrate the British market (40). More importantly, Marks
and Spencer is in the process of becoming a multinational
retailer. In 1988, the company acquired a large American
menswear retailer. Brooks Bros, which will spearhead its
expansion in North America and the Far East (FT 9.3.88).
Currently, Marks and Spencer has 21 stores in Japan and
intends to expand in Europe through acquisitions of existing
retail stores. The attempt by Marks and Spencer to extend
its international presence has profound implications for UK
clothing and textile manufacturers and may indeed underpin
its shift to a more overt overseas sourcing policy.
Moreover, any competitive advantage accruing to UK 
manufacturers because of their geographical proximity to 
retailers may be seriously dissipated by the emergence of 
the single European market in 1992. A recent report from the 
Boston Consulting Group estimates that the cost of 
transporting goods within the EC should fall by 10% to 20%
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mttmr 1992 (FT 20.2.89). In addition, the Coniasion ia 
expected to replace MPA quotas negotiated presently on a 
country by country basis with a Conunity wide systea which 
it is feared would sake the European market nore accessible 
to textiles froa outside the Coaaunity. One of the most 
vulnerable aarkets is of course the UK which has the highest 
concentration of retail buying power and is thus the easiest 
for inports to penetrate.
7.1.2 Patterns of change in aanufacturlng
Is there evidence to support the contention that a long tern 
shift to a pattern of production typically associated with 
flexible specialisation has occurred in the 1980s?
It is hard to identify with any degree of analytical 
precision, which sectors or firas of the textile and 
clothing industry are Baking the alleged transition froa 
Fordisa to flexible specialisation. As Zeitlin and 
Totterdill (1989) concede in their nore recent analysis, it 
is probably dubious to assuae that clothing firas were ever 
stereotypically Pordist in the first place. An OECD study 
(1983) pointed out that in the clothing industry, typically 
Fordist technology, such as high perforaance special purpose 
nachines has been justified only for very large production 
runs, which are possible for a ninority of products, such as 
jeans and sen's shirts. However, in the priaary textile 
industry, covering spinning and weaving, products have 
tended to be standardised and nanufactured in large volune, 
but there does not seen to be any real aove here to short 
run, batch production. Again, firas can display a typical
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flex-spec emphasis on design, fashion and marketing, but 
still produce an essentially standardised product, such as 
Benetton, whose knitwear only becomes differentiated at the 
dyeing stage.
Furthermore, the degree of productive flexibility required 
by manufacturers is often over-emphasised. It has been 
argued that a large part of the design differentiation 
demanded by retailers consists of marginal changes to 
existing designs. S R Gent - one of the largest of Narks and 
Spencer's clothing suppliers - handle a wide range of styles 
but make small rather than substantial design alterations to 
their garments (GLC 1985).
The debate on changing production methods in the textile and 
clothing industry has generated contradictory assertions 
regarding the restructuring of the retail-manufacturer 
relationship. Zeitlin's (1985) study suggests that retailers 
now favour long term relationships with a smaller number of 
suppliers to ensure high standards of quality, speed of 
turnaround, and greater design input by the manufacturers. 
But Hitter (1986) asserts that the trend to non-price 
competition in the retail sector and shorter production runs 
necessitates access to multiple suppliers and has led to 
extensive subcontracting by retailers and manufacturers, 
often involving homeworking.
The clothing industry is the site of a number of complex 
retail-manufacturer relationships. For example, cut, make 
and trim production units (CUT), out-workers and homeworkers
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tend to produce lower quality, cheap faahion garments for 
aale by mail order fires, soee large stores (C I A) and 
street traders. Sweatshops, in particular, coepete on the 
basis of low labour costs, utilise antiquated machinery and 
remain dependent on orders from retailers and 
wholesaler/manufacturers or 'middlemen'. It is difficult to 
quantify the extent of sweatshops in the industry, but the 
British Clothing Industry Association estimates that 
sweatshops provided one tenth of the industry's value of 
sales in 1987. The number of clothing companies in Bast 
London has risen from 10,000 to 30,000 since 1980, and the 
West Midlands clothing industry has multiplied from 5,000 
firms to 25,000 (FT 19.11.88). The more advanced sector of 
the clothing industry covers the well-equipped larger 
producers (S R Gent, I J Dewhirst, Courtaulds, Coats Viyella 
etc.), who are encouraged by Marks and Spencer and other 
retailers (Next, Principles) to introduce the latest 
automatic production methods and develop their own design 
facilities (Chisholm et al. 1986).
There is, however, little evidence of a significant shift in 
the relationship between retailers and manufacturers towards 
a more 'balanced' partnership. Despite the fact that the 
supposed transition to flexible specialisation favours small 
firms, there is scarcely any evidence to suggest that more 
'upmarket' retailers have switched sourcing away from large 
firms in the UK industry to small firms. In fact, retailers 
which sell high quality, fashion products, such as Marks and 
Spencer and Next/Principles, have always had an ambivalent 
relationship with small firms. Zeitlin's (1985) study of the
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London clothing industry indicates that these retailers have 
traditionally avoided sourcing from small firms, because of 
their technological backwardness, and the widespread use of 
outwork which has meant that their products are typically of 
low quality.
Gibbs' study (1987:8) of clothing suppliers in the North 
West, indicates that retailers are setting tighter 
deadlines, and seeking faster turnaround tines and reorders 
at shorter notice (41). But the pressure from retailers to 
reduce production costs had not abated and one particular 
manufacturer suggested that any revival of the industry 
depended on manufacturers continuing to reduce costs. There 
was no evidence of higher quality and shorter runs being 
rewarded by higher making up prices for garments (42). 
Advances in retail automation, such as electronic point of 
sale systems, have meant that manufacturers are increasingly 
carrying the risks of higher stocks. The stock levels of 
some Narks and Spencer suppliers, notably I.J. Dewhirst, 
have risen due to the introduction of new automated 
distribution systems (FT 31.1.89).
Contrary to Zeitlin's (1985:10) optimistic scenario of 
manufacturers becoming less subject to monopsonistic 
pressure on their profit margins as they broaden their range 
of customers, it appears that current competitive conditions 
involve clothing firms carrying the risks of design, 
innovation and stock holding. Moreover the downturn in UK 
retail trading conditions in the latter half of 1988 in the 
UK means that retail clothing has once again become the site
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of intense competition and price cutting. Marks and Spencer 
announced a 1% fall in clothing prices in its interim 
results for April to end of September 1988. According to the 
British Textile Confederation (1989:3), increased interest 
rates have had a negative impact on the market for clothing 
and household textiles. The fall in the rate of growth of 
consumer expenditure has influenced ordering patterns at all 
levels of the retail and distribution chain, with companies 
heading off placing orders for as long as possible. It seems 
probable that in 1989, clothing suppliers will be squeezed 
by both an increase in imports and retail pressure on 
prices.
Whilst the continuing decline of both the textiles and 
clothing industry may not be inevitable, there is little 
evidence to justify the claim that we are witnessing a 
'regeneration' of either industry in the UK context. In 
contrast to textiles, the clothing industry has experienced 
a modest recovery in output after the collapse of production 
and employment in the early 1980s. These trends, and the 
temporary slow down in import penetration in the early 
1980s, represent the complex interplay of a number of 
factors, including the domestic sourcing policies of Marks 
and Spencer, an increase in consumer expenditure on clothing 
and temporary adjustments in retail purchasing patterns due 
to the depreciation of sterling in the early 1980s.
But, as the foregoing analysis indicates, none of these 
factors confirm a transition away from Fordism to strategies 
of flexible specialisation or long term changes in the
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nature of inter-industry competition. Moreover, they had all 
either been modified or reversed by the late 1980s. Marks 
and Spencer appears to be shifting to a more overt overseas 
sourcing policy and retail trading conditions were generally 
less buoyant in 1988 because of the rise in UK interest 
rates. Adverse movements in the exchange rate, notably the 
depreciation of the US dollar from early 1985 gave dollar 
based countries in North America and the Par East a 
substantial cost advantage over British producers, which was 
exacerbated in 1988 by the appreciation of sterling against 
other European currencies. Consequently, imports of clothing 
products rose by 33% over 1986-88, compared to an increase 
in exports of 13% with the import penetration index (ratio 
of imports to home demand) having risen throughout the 
1980s. More recently, output of clothing has been 
depressed - production levels were 2% lower in the third 
quarter of 1988 compared to 1987, and overall output in 1988 
had fallen slightly from the 1987 level.
Claims, therefore, of a shift in comparative advantage 
towards UK producers based on strategies of flexible 
specialisation tend to be hasty extrapolations from short 
term trade trends. Evidence indicates that inter-industry 
competitive relationships are not changing in ways that 
intrinsically favour domestically based UK manufacturers. 
Mhilst non-price product differentiation strategies may have 
become more salient in the 1980s, the price competitiveness 
of textile and clothing products still appears to be an 
important determinant of retail purchasing patterns and 
sourcing policies. This could explain the reported increase
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in hoMworkinq and small production units which utilisa 
issiqrant feule labour on vary low ratas of pay. Low cost 
gansants fros the informal sector of the industry are 
intended to be price competitive with thoee obtainable from 
subcontractors based in UKu. There is little evidence, 
therefore, to connect such developments with a shift by 
retailers/manufacturers to design orientated, high value 
added, high quality production, characteristic of flex-spec 
strategies.
2 0 2
SECTION C: MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND BRITISH TEXTILES: 
COMPANY STRATEGIES AND PLANT LEVEL INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
The foregoing analysis indicates that Multinational
corporations have actively reshaped the textile industry
over the post war period. The significance of large textile
firas and in particular, those with an extensive
international presence, varies between different nation
states.
The UK textiles industry is currently dominated by three 
large and influential producers - Coats Viyella, Courtaulds 
and Tootal. It has already been demonstrated that these 
firas were pivotal in reshaping the industry's structure by 
spearheading a process of concentration through 
aaalgaaations and takeovers. But these three firas are also 
large producers within an international context. In 1986, 
Coats Viyella was the world's second largest textile coapany 
in teras of the value of sales, with Courtaulds the eighth 
largest. These two coapanies are currently the two largest 
European textile coapanies. The UK textile industry is one 
of the aost internationalised of textile industries in the 
OECD, with only Japan having a acre substantial 
international presence (Haaill 1987:10). The three largest 
UK textile firas have extensive overseas interests with 
foreign subsidiaries in both developed and developing 
countries. Moreover, Coats Paton - before its aerger with 
Vantona Viyella - and Courtaulds, had established foreign 
subsidiaries prior to the First Morld Mar. Not only have 
these firas been iaportant 'national' actors - Mediating the 
fate of the industry within the context of the UK - but they 
have also been significant agents at the level of the world
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industry. This has occurred through their participation in 
the industry's internationalisation and the general shift of 
production and esployaent to LDCs.
The objective of the following discussion is to investigate 
in detail the international activities of these firss, their 
domestic strategies, and the changing balance between their 
national and international interests. Courtaulds, in 
particular, was encouraged by the British state in the 1960s 
to intervene and arrest the decline of the industry at the 
national level. But in what ways have these firss Mediated 
the decline of the industry at the national level? And has 
their 'sultinationality', and international aobility 
actually exacerbated this process?
Corporate strategies reflect the interaction of national and 
international econosic forces. They are also sediated by 
social agents operating at the level of individual 
workplaces. Firms respond to competitive pressures by 
changing the structure of production, industrial relations, 
and the social division of labour. The recomposition of 
production relations tends to occur in a particularly acute 
form at the level of the plant. The reshaping of the 
production process at two of Courtaulds' textile plants 
therefore serves as an analytical medium through which the 
process and dynamics of industrial change can be revealed.
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Chapter Eight; Corporate Strategies In tha 1980»
The corporate strategies, both national and international, 
of the three eajor British textile eultinationals are the 
subject of this chapter. The analysis points up important 
differences between Multinational corporations in the 
textile industry, and the eephasis placed by individual 
corporations on the balance between their UK and overseas 
activities, and particular fores of internationalisation.
8.1 Coats Viyella
Coats Viyella is the world's largest thread producer, but 
also has extensive interests in clothing, y a m s  and fabrics, 
household furnishings and retailing. In its present fore, it 
has existed only since January 1986, when it was formed by a 
merger between Coats Paton (already an important 
multinational) and Vantona Viyella, a purely British based 
clothing and furnishing company with almost no exports. This 
company in turn was the result of several mergers and 
takeovers that occurred in the 1980s, namely, the 
acquisitions by Vantona of Carrington Viyella in 1982, and 
two Narks and Spencer suppliers, P. Miller in 1984 and 
Nottingham Manufacturing in 1985.
The company is now the most internationally oriented of the 
major UK producers with subsidiary or affiliate companies in 
more than thirty countries, both LDCs and developed 
countries. Prior to the merger with Vantona Viyella, less 
than one third of the company's assets and employment were 
in the UK with foreign operations accounting for 
approximately 90% of the company's profits.
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Tabl< 30; Coat« Paton; global distribution of employment 
1974, 1978 and 1983 and poat merger distribution. 1986. 
1 9 8 7 .
Employment 1974 1978 1983 Coats
v T v e T T a
1986 1987
Worldwide 74,000 66,000 43,500 70,723 68,485
UK 32,600 23,800 15,200 43,120 41,544
Foreign 41,000 42,200 28,300 27,603 26,941
Source: Coats Paton/Coats Viyella Annual Report:»
Aleost all of the major foreign operations were thread and 
yarn companies with the vertically integrated activities in 
fabrics and garment production based mainly in the UK. Host 
foreign operations, especially in LDCs, were joint ventures 
arising from government regulations in the host country 
which limit the extent of foreign equity participation.
Two broad themes can be identified in Coats Paton's strategy 
prior to its merger with Vantona, namely, the continued 
expansion of its non-European activities especially in South 
America and other LDCs and a strategy of product 
diversification in developed countries, with the 
establishment of its Precision Engineering Division 
(surgical needles, die-castings, mouldings etc.). The 
company was, however, highly dependent on its thread 
business and on its locations in developing countries. It 
was also notorious for its global wage and production cost 
calculations. In its comparative labour cost statistics, 
calculated on a monthly basis, the company formulated an 
index that incorporated such factors as exchange rates and 
social wages for different intensities of production.
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The impressive growth record of Vantona Viyella, 
demonstrated in table 31, was based on a number of factors, 
namely, a strong brand name presence in household textiles 
(with a 25-30% market share) and shirts. The company was 
also a leading supplier of uniforms, woven fabrics (after 
Courtaulds), and carpets. Moreover, along with Courtaulds, 
it was one of the largest textile and clothing suppliers to 
Marks and Spencer.
Table 31: Sales. Trading and Pre-Tax Profits of Vantona
Vlyella 1981 to 1985, Coats Vlyella 1985-87
(f mn.) Sales Trading Profit Pre-Tax Profits
1981 104 7.0 5.8
1982 356 13.7 0.8
1983 365 17.3 2.7
1984 607 41.5 42.41985 1710 165.0 151.0
1986 1750 188.0 182.01987 1795 214.0 213.0
Source: Buck 1986:33
The merger combined in one company Coats Patons' extensive 
overseas operations and distribution network and Vantona 
Viyella's diverse UK manufacturing base (cf. table 32). 
Vantona sold 85% of its products in the UK and manufactured 
most of them domestically whereas Coats made a narrow range 
of products but had an international distribution network. 
The group now has a presence in almost every area of 
textiles and clothing in the UK, complemented by very 
specialised textile activities overseas.
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Table 32: The Merger of Vantona Vlvella and Coat» Paton: 
product and geographical distribution of aalea, 1985.1>1! a (C an.) UK Overseas
Household Textiles 154 _
Clothing 183 -
Yarns/fabrics 101 13
Carpets 94 —
Hosiery/Knitting 122 -
Retai1 — »
Hand Knitting - -
Sewing Thread - —
Diecasting/aisc. “ “
Total 622 13
Coats Viyella UK Europe North South Australia Rest
(f an.) Aaerica Aaerica of
World
Household Tex. 154 _ _
Clothing 192 65 -
Yarns/fabrics 173 9 13Carpets 94 - -
Hosiery etc. 142 — —
Retail 137 - -
Hand Knitting 54 141 74 10 20 12
Sewing Thread 34 96 70 60 17 15
Diecasting etc . 42 14 67 5 “ “
Total 1022 251 211 75 Ill 40
Source: Buck 1986:33
Since the aerger in 1986, restructuring of the coapany has 
involved the decentralisation of aanagerial control; the re- 
equipaent of plants operating in growth sectors of the 
textile market; a shift to high value added products; an 
extension of the coapany's international activities and, in 
response to the recent intensification of coapetition in the 
industry, rationalisation of the coapany's UK and overseas 
workforce.
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8.1.1 The Decentralisation of Managerial Control 
Since the aerqer of the two companies, a three tier 
structure of Management has been adopted. Each of the 250 
subsidiaries is run by a Managing director who reports 
directly to the head of the relevant division. The 
divisional board sits on the sain board. Soee of the foraer 
Coats subsidiaries have been broken up into smaller units to 
make thes more easily Manageable and every coapany has 
becone an individual profit centre. For exaaple, Jaeger is 
now divided into two retailing businesses and Coats and 
Clark, the US thread subsidiary, has been broken up into 
four profit centres. Nanageaent control is facilitated by 
the Monitoring of the developaent of each subsidiary through 
weekly sales reports and Monthly profit figures by a central 
management tean.
8.1.2 Investeent in Hew Technology
In 1987, Coats Viyella announced a £35 Million capital 
investaent programme at its two UK hose furnishing 
divisions, Doraa and Vantona. Over the period 1987-88 £24 
Million has been spent re-equipping spinning, weaving and 
warehousing plants involved in the production and 
distribution of Doraa branded products. It is estimated that 
'Dona' accounts for 21% of the branded part of the £725 an. 
household textile sector and a 25% share of retail sales of 
household textiles. Despite limited growth in the bedwear 
Market, Dorma has increased its sales turnover from £1.5 
million in 1970 to an estimated £100 million in 1987. At the 
Vantona division, £11 to £12 million has been spent on the 
reorganisation and expansion of a beaming and printing
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plant. Although import penetration is quite low in household 
and other u d e  up textiles - the ratio of imports to home 
desand in 1987 was 20% compared to a general industry 
average of 46% - investment in advanced manufacturing 
equipment, like open end spinning and air jet looms is 
intended to enable the company to compete with low cost 
imports from Portugal, Turkey and the Par East.
The Lancashire Howe Bridge spinning plant, which produces 
polyester/cotton yarn for home furnishings sold under the 
Doraa brand, was completely refurbished in 1987 at a cost of 
£6 million. Government financial assistance, in the form of 
a £1.5 million regional grant, contributed towards the cost 
of the re-equipment (Textile Month May 1988). Modern 
machinery has been installed at every stage of the 
production process. New carding machines are 80% faster than 
the machines they replaced and new drawframes are twice as 
fast. The open end spinning equipment is 4.5 times more 
productive than the old ring spinning machines.
Consequently, there has been an 80% increase in productivity 
and a 33% rise in the volume of output produced at the 
plant. This has had dramatic consequences for the workforce 
at the plant. Before the re-equipment programme in 1987, a 
workforce of 437 people produced 88,000 kg of yarn a week 
whereas in 1988 274 employees produce 108,000 kg. a week.
The high capital cost of the equipment has led to the 
extension of shift «forking at the plant to increase the rate 
of capacity utilisation. The mill now operates 168 hours a 
week for 50 weeks in the year compared to 120 hours a week 
for 46 weeks a year. According to the union involved in the
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negotiations at the plant - the GMB Textile Division - the 
resaining workers received a 25% to 30% increase in pay in 
return for their acceptance of aulti shift work patterns, 
including weekends, and the introduction of functional 
flexibility or 'aulti-skilling'.
In 1988 the Dorsa weaving plant was re-equipped with new air 
jet loons costing f6.5 Billion. The conpany invested £2 
sillion in a colour printing systea and £2.3 Billion in a 
heaaing and stitching plant including a new naterials 
handling systea and distribution centre at its Vantona 
division. Investaent in new technology has raised 
productivity and reduced unit production costs. The 
exception to this trend is the expansion of the heaaing 
operation, where the deaand for decorative detail in 
household furnishings has increased labour intensity. The 
heaaing workforce has thus expanded by Bore than 700 to 
1,320 over the past four years. So although the Hose 
Furnishings Division has lost jobs in spinning and weaving, 
the total workforce has increased froa 3,000 to 3,500. This 
is priaarily because of the growth of the heaaing operation 
and the creation of jobs in 'service' areas like design, 
distribution and aarketing although these too are becoaing 
increasingly coaputerised.
Most of the investaent in spinning and weaving is directed 
at household textiles but the coapany is also considering 
re-equipping its apparel fabric capacity in both filaaent 
and staple y a m  weaving as part of its overall strategy to 
engage in isport substitution in basic fabrics through
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investment in advanced technology. Northern Ireland appears 
to be a particularly favourable site for investment and 
expansion, which is probably connected to the financial 
assistance made available by the Industrial Development 
Board.
In 1987 a Coats Viyella subsidiary. Ambler, which 
manufactures acrylic yarn, invested £5 an. in new production 
machinery and warehousing at its Northern Ireland plant. The 
existing workforce of 200 was increased by 100 and the plant 
now operates on a seven day rather than a five day shift 
pattern. Output has risen from 80 to 126 tonnes a week to 
meet increased demand. The investment was partially funded 
by the Northern Ireland Industrial Development Board. The 
company is also planning to spend £13.5 million on 
re-equipping and expanding its carpet plant at Donaghadee, 
Northern Ireland. Senior management predict that over 1988 
to 1991 employment at the factory will be increased from the 
present level of 430 to around 550. The investment in new 
machinery is not though in this instance related to 
maximising production scale economies. The Managing Director 
of the Carpets Division stated that:
'the new equipment will provide the versatility 
we need, for example, to rapidly alter patterns 
or colours and to cope with short runs without 
adversely affecting the economy.'
(Textile Month June 1988b:4).
The company has introduced automated systems and 
computerised planning in knitwear, hosiery and garments, 
with investment in electronic patterned equipment to 
facilitate the production of shorter runs and to reduce the 
time taken to supply customer orders. Capital investment has
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also been directed overseas, particularly at the company's 
thread division. The investment is intended to raise 
productivity and to upgrade product quality. Mills in Spain 
and Portugal are to be eodernised and expanded to serve a 
growing domestic and export market.
Investment in new technology in these instances is directed 
to reducing production costs by raising productivity and to 
introducing a degree of versatility and flexibility into the 
manufacturing process. But the company's capital investment 
programme is also directed at reducing production costs 
through the application of 'Just-In-Time' production 
systems, known as 'Quick Response' in the industry. This 
involves the application of technology to increasing the 
overall throughput of products, the reduction of stock 
levels and inventories in an attempt to match supply more 
closely to demand. The chief executive (Textile Horizons 
January 1988:5) has argued:
'...Many will recognise the fashionable jargon 
of Quick Response..Not only in fabrics and garments, 
but also in thread and in many other parts of our 
group, this is the key priority. Coats Viyella is 
investing as much on computers or systems as on 
loons and spinning frames.'
The company has invested in new technology in the UK to 
counter the cost advantage of overseas competitors. Quick 
Response or the ability to supply retailers more speedily 
than overseas manufacturers has introduced time economies 
into many production processes. For example, over the past 
three years. Coats Viyella has halved the time taken to make 
a shirt at its Northern Ireland factories. The company 
intends to expand its branded shirt manufacturing in
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Northern Ireland - in part subeidlaed by the Industrial 
Development Board - and is spending £1.8 an. on a new 
production unit which will create 100 jobs (FT 14.2.89).
A new computerised distribution system is currently being 
developed by the company, called 'Interactive Sales 
Environment Systems'. This is intended to dramatically 
reduce the stock levels and warehousing presently used by 
both the manufacturer and its retailer-customers. Computer 
terminals will be placed in retail stores, linked to a 
central computer at Coats Viyella. Customers will be able to 
create a three dimensional image of the interiors they wish 
to furnish, carpet or redecorate from their own snapshots. A 
list of selected items will be sized and costed and ordered 
directly from the company through the retailer which uses 
the system. A number of retailers, such as Habitat and Narks 
and Spencer, have reacted favourably to the company's 
initiative which is part of an attempt:
'to leapfrog to emerging new technologies that will 
give us an edge and position us to continue to 
provide high quality goods and services competitively 
in a global market.' (Observer 22.11.87)
The company spent £25 an. on research and development in 
1987 and a similar amount in 1988. Expenditure on new 
machinery alone amounted to £100 in. a year over the period 
1986-88. The company believes that capital investment in its 
UK plants can transform the sector from a declining sunset 
industry besieged by low cost imports to a high technology, 
'sunrise' industry. According to David Alliance, the 
company's chief executive:
'We as manufacturers have worked closely with a 
number of major retailers to develop systems which
214
reduce lead times and iaprove final customer service. 
This has enabled us to gain market share particularly 
against imported competition. The challenge is to 
maintain our advantage and this involves constant 
upgrading of plants and systems as well as the 
training and retraining of our workforce.'
(Annual Report 1987)
8.1.3 High value added production.
Another plank of the company's corporate strategy is to 
increase market share by emphasising brands through 
extensive marketing and advertising. As a result, in 1987, 
Coats Viyella increased its share of the branded hand 
knitting market at a time of depressed demand. Brands have 
also been strengthened in household textiles/home 
furnishings and carpets (Dorma, Vantona). In garments, the 
company has expanded its range of branded shirts and has 
become involved in the international licensing of the 
Viyella, Van Heusen and Allen Solly brands. In October 1988 
the Van Heusen brand, which is the UK's largest branded 
shirt company, was extensively advertised in a television 
campaign costing £3 million. The company aims to treble its 
share of the retail shirt market (from 3% to 9%), currently 
growing at 20t a year, by emphasising the product's quality 
and exclusivity. This was the first television advertising 
campaign by a UK branded shirt manufacturer since the 1960s 
Mew shirt brands have also been introduced and heavily 
marketed (43). The emphasis by manufacturers on branding, 
advertising, marketing, product design/quality are 
characteristic of a shift to high value added production. 
This has occurred in household textiles and carpets. 
According to a Barclays de Zoete Wedd report (1988:10), 
Coats Viyella:
'is all about the conversion of relatively low
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added value sourced products into high added value, 
high technology, consumer goods.'
8.1.4 Coats Viyella: a fully vertically integrated 
manufacturer-retailer?
Coats Viyella is unique asongst UK textile and clothing 
companies in that it has a number of retail outlets, namely, 
the Jaeger, Country Casuals, and Viyella shops. Over 90% of 
the Jaeger womenswear range is UK sourced and produced in 
Coats Viyella's own plants. The company is currently 
investing in electronic point of sale equipment in some of 
its retail outlets as part of a general strategy of 
refurbishment. It aims in particular to expand the Jaeger 
outlets overseas and to double their number in the USA 
(currently 66). Jaeger contributes roughly £100 mn. in sales 
turnover and Country Casuals, £25 mn. Paradoxically, given 
the company's international orientation, Jaeger has 
withdrawn from the European market, namely Germany in 1986, 
and the shops have been sold to the British 
manufacturer-retailer, Laura Ashley. It appears that the 
company has no intention to move into retailing as 
extensively as some clothing manufacturers, like Benetton or 
Laura Ashley. The chief executive recently announced that 
the company was '...a manufacturer, not a retailer'
(Knitting International February 1988a). Moreover, in March 
1989, the company announced the sale of its Country Casual 
outlets as part of a general rationalisation and 
restructuring of the group's activities following a 36% fall 
in pre-tax profits (FT 11.3.89).
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8.2. Coat« Viyella's locational itrattqy
8 . 2 . 1  F o r e ig n  d i r e c t  In v e s tm e n t
The coapany is currently establishing a aanufacturing base 
in Japan, in the fora of a joint venture, to develop its 
sales of textiles in the country and to gain access to the 
Par Eastern market. A Doran subsidiary was established in 
1987 to co-ordinate the Marketing, design and distribution 
of its products in Prance, as part of a process of 
introducing the coapany's brand naaes to an international 
market. It has also sought to expand overseas through the 
acguisition of a nuaber of companies. it has recently 
acquired control of Youghal Carpets, Eire and increased its 
holding in Consoltex Canada (a fabric/clothing company). The 
1987 Annual Report announced plans for expansion of textile 
production in the USA, Europe, and the Par East.
8.2.2 Overseas sourcing and rationalisation of production 
The combination of a particularly unfavourable set of macro 
economic factors in 1987 and 1988, namely, the strengthening 
of the value of sterling against the US dollar and Par 
Eastern currencies, a surge in imports, and the impact of 
rising interest rates on consumer spending in the UK, has 
generated a deterioration in the competitiveness of UK 
textiles and has affected the strategy of Coats Viyella in 
particular. Coats Viyella is very vulnerable to currency 
fluctuations because of its international presence, notably, 
its international thread and handknitting interests. The 
effect of adverse exchange rates on the conversion of 
profits was estimated at £5 an. in the half year to
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September 1988. In response to declining profitability (it 
announced in March 1989 that pre-tax profits had fallen by 
36% fros £212.8 sillion to £135.2 Billion) the coapany has 
restructured and rationalised its activities.
It has rationalised a number of its UK and European textile 
plants. In 1988, it closed one of its largest UK knitwear 
factories, which produced low cost knitwear under contract 
to retailers, leading to the loss of 800 jobs. The poor 
perforaance of the factory was one of the chief contributors 
to the fall in interia pre-tax profits in Septeaber 1988. 
Since the beginning of 1988, the coapany's combined knitwear 
workforce of 5,500 has been cut by 1,500.
The company has sought to rationalise its handknitting 
interests, which has witnessed declining deaand over the 
past two years. It has closed one American plant, shed 
labour in Australia and withdrawn froa production in Nest 
Germany leading in total to 800 job losses. Production 
capacity in carpets has also been cut. Its four carpet 
plants have been reduced to two and a factory in Yorkshire 
may be closed to concentrate production at the newly 
re-equipped Northern Ireland plant. There is a possibility 
of further rationalisation in carpets and childrenswear. The 
restructuring is estimated to have cost £35.2 million and 
the company ' s total worldwide workforce has been reduced by 
4,000 or 5% during the 1988 trading year, with 2,500 job 
losses in the UK.
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It is no coincidence that the coapany has recently announced 
ita intention to increase overseas sourcing of textiles and 
clothing. In 1988, it expanded its sourcing of clothing in 
Hong Kong by purchasing an export house and the coapany 
intends to establish siailar operations in other countries. 
The Group is considering shipping knitting aachinery to 
Turkey to sake use of lover labour costs. This particular 
country say also be used as a future location for acrylic 
yarn spinning. Overseas sourcing froa contractors in Hong 
Kong, Turkey, Portugal, Brasil and Malaysia, alaost doubled 
in the first half of 1988 but it still aaounted to only 10% 
of the value of UK sales, although it is predicted that the 
figure will eventually rise to 20% a year (FT 23.10.88). But 
this represents a sodest involvesent cospared to Tootal 
which sources 55% of all its textile saterials fros 
international subcontractors. The extension of overseas 
sourcing indicates that strategies of high value added 
production do not completely outweigh the importance of 
price competitiveness which, in the short term, is crucially 
affected by currency movements.
The recent decline in Coats Viyella's profitability has not 
discouraged further expansion through acquisition and in May 
1989, the coapany made a £395 an. bid for Tootal. It looks 
likely that Tootal's shareholders will agree to the takeover 
bid in an attempt to prevent the Australian textile 
industrialist, Mr. Abraham Goldberg - who owns the Linter 
Group - froa taking control of the coapany (FT 10.5.89). If 
the merger between Coats Viyella and Tootal goes ahead, the 
new coapany will possess an estimated 33% of the £1.5 bn.
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international thread market and will becoee one of the 
world's largest multinational companies with a coebined 
workforce of 85,000 people and sales turnover of £2.3 bn.
The company is, in effect, the result of a merger between 
two radically different firms. Coats Paton had extensive 
overseas manufacturing and distribution operations, and was 
highly dependent on its thread business. Prior to the 
merger, nearly two thirds of employees were located 
overseas. In contrast, Vantona Viyella sold the majority of 
its products in the UK - one of its major customers being 
Narks and Spencer - and manufactured most of them 
domestically. Hence, the Group now has a presence in almost 
every area of textiles and clothing production in the UK, 
complemented by specialised textile activities overseas 
(thread).
The company's initial objective was to implement an 
aggressive import substitution strategy in the UK based on 
investment in computerised production and distribution 
systems. The aim is to reduce unit production costs by 
raising productivity and increasing the overall throughput 
of products, whilst introducing a degree of productive 
flexibility and speed of response to retailer's 
reguirements. High value added products, particularly 
branded textiles and clothing, are emphasised. This has 
involved several advertising and marketing initiatives in 
the UK designed to increase its share of growth markets (eg. 
household textiles) and branded garments, such as men's
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shirts. Thus, the attempt is to maximise the price and non­
price competitiveness of textiles and clothing products 
Manufactured in the UK. Mhile new technology has led to job 
losses, they have been balanced by the expansion of 
employment in 'service' areas, such as design, distribution, 
marketing and at manufacturing plants in product areas 
characterised by buoyant demand or low import penetration.
The company has been affected by unfavourable macro-economic 
factors, notably, a series of exchange rate fluctuations 
leading to an influx of low cost imports and a rise in UK 
interest rates which has depressed retail demand. 
Consequently, the profitability of the group has suffered, 
with pre-tax profits falling by 36% over the last trading 
year (1988-89). The response has been to rationalise 
employment and scrap plant in both the UK and overseas. The 
company has attempted to compete by increasing its sourcing 
of textiles and clothing from overseas. It also intends to 
use its overseas subsidiaries as a low cost distribution 
network for UK manufactured products. The company is setting 
up a global data base to facilitate the selection of the 
lowest cost commercial subcontractors and to open up new 
markets for its products. In response to falling 
profitability, the company has enhanced the
internationalisation of its activities, notably, its circuit 
of commodity capital by sourcing some of the goods it sells 
from cheaper sites through the utilisation of commercial 
subcontracting. Unlike other companies (eg. Tootal) this 
does not, as yet, represent a move to withdraw in a major 
way from its primary textile interests in the UK or
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overseas, or fron Manufacturing per se. It is open to 
speculation as to whether the increase in overseas sourcing 
represents a short ters response to the exigencies of 
currency eovesents, or whether it is, in fact, a long tern 
strategy.
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8.3 Tootal
'Tootal doesn't actually sake much of anything except 
profit any more, especially in this country.'
(Guardian 4.10.88)
Tootal is the UK's third largest textile company in tens of 
the value of sales, and the world's second largest thread 
producer. It esploys over 13,000 people, of vhon 8,000 are 
based in the UK, 2,000 in North America and 2,000 in Asia. 
Tootal was created from the merger in 1968 of English Sewing 
Cotton (ESC) and the Calico Printers' Association. The ESC 
was itself an amalgamation of cotton spinning and sewing 
thread companies, the bulk of whose profits were derived 
from thread production in the US (American Thread). Calico 
Printers had a major share of UK fabric printing capacity, 
with garment, retailing and overseas textile interests. 
Tootal became a vertically integrated textile group with 
extensive intra group trading, although unlike Courtaulds it 
did not have fibre interests.
By the mid 1970s, Tootal had established factories in 
Australia, Canada, West Germany, Hong Kong, Philippines, 
India, Indonesia, South Africa, the USA, and Zaire. These 
were either wholly owned subsidiaries or, as in India and 
Indonesia, associated firms which were under the overall 
control of Tootal, though the company did not own a majority 
of the shares. Overseas factories were concentrated in 
thread production and geared to supplying local markets, not 
to exports. Production in the UK was geared to both domestic 
customers and export markets but as Elson (1986a, 1988a:20) 
makes clear in a detailed analysis of Tootal's corporate
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strategy there was, at this stage, no 'global sourcing' of 
thread.
In 1973, the Majority of Tootal's employees were in the UK, 
but only 48% of the profits for the financial year 1973/74 
case froe the UK; 52% case fro* overseas, with the bulk fron 
the US and Australia, although a growing share was from 
South Bast Asia. Up to 1979, there was no dramatic 
rationalisation of UK employment but investment was 
concentrated abroad. According to Bison (1986a) factories in 
Asia «rare modernised and a new subsidiary opened in 1975 in 
Malaysia to make thread for the local market. This 
investment was not motivated by the search for cheap labour 
but was related to the rapid expansion of the market for 
thread in South East Asia due to the growth of the garment 
industry. This coincided with the desire of governments in 
South East Asia to promote indigenous production as part of 
an import substitution strategy.
During the period of the aid to late 1970s, there was a 
dramatic increase in overseas jobs controlled by Tootal 
(Bison 1986a). In 1978, Tootal acquired a 40% controlling 
interest in Bradmill Industries in Australia, which led to 
an increase in the number of overseas employees, including 
those of associates, between 1975/76 and 1979/80. The 
acquisition in 1980 of a 50% controlling interest in Da 
Gama, the largest domestic textile group in South Africa 
also took overseas employment, including associates up to 
over 29,000 in 1980/81.
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Table 33: Tootal*s •■ploy— nt, 1973-87
Year UK Overseas
Incl. associates
Overseas
•xcl. associates
1973/74 20,001 
1975/76 19,507 
1977/78 20,397 
1978/79 20,213 
1979/80 17,578 
1980/81 14,580 
1981/82 10,995 
1982/83 8,878 
1983/84 8,595 
1984/85 7.966 
1985/86 7,700 
1986/87 7,907 
1987/88 8,647
21,822
29,374
30,460
25,580
13,721
n.a.
14,600
9,243
8,795
9,224
9,239
9,162
8,804
6,874
6,887
6,334
5,935
5,602
5,444
5,980
1. The textile year ends at the end of April.
2. Associates are companies where Tootal has a controlling 
interest but owns no sore than 50% of shares.
3. The figure is an average for 1975 based on the Annual 
Report for 1980/81.
Source; Bison (1986a) and Annual Reports 1986 to 1988.
During the early 1980s recession, Tootal, like other UK 
textile companies, savagely rationalised its textile 
operations. The Group eliminated the vast majority of its 
commodity spinning, weaving and knitting interests in the 
UK. Host of the redundancies were at mills which 
manufactured industrial sewing thread but the company also 
withdrew from traditional grey cloth weaving and ceased 
cotton spinning in Lancashire. The UK spinning interests 
were concentrated at two modern mills located in Belper, 
Derbyshire and Lisnaskea, Northern Ireland. The intention 
was to supply yams on a global basis with marketing 
co-ordinated from the UK (FT 30.9.80). During this period, 
the company began to source low cost undyed cloth from 
overseas subcontractors, to be printed and dyed by the 
company for customers based in Europe. The company also
225
withdrew completely from UK retailing. In 1979, the Van 
Allen woaenswear retail chain was aold although the company 
subsequently acquired an American womenswear retail chain 
(which has since been aold). Currently, Tootal has only a 
small amount of production capacity in yarn spinning and 
some weaving capacity in household textiles.
During the early 1980s, the management structure of the 
company was reorganised into four divisions (cf. Elson 
1988a:24): Thread, Textiles, Clothing and Non-Movens, which 
were organised around product lines and spanned national 
boundaries. Redundancies and rationalisation, however, were 
not confined solely to the UK. Following a major contraction 
in the UK workforce (a reduction of over 9,000 between 
1976/79 and 1981/82) cane a contraction in the total 
overseas workforce (a reduction of nearly 5,000 between 
1981/82 and 1982/83). The American subsidiary, the American 
Thread company, was re-equipped and the workforce reduced 
from 3,500 to 2,800. The Australian Bradnill and South 
African Da Gama operations were rationalised, with the 
workforce at Da Gama cut by 40% in two years. Eventually, 
Tootal sold its share in Bradmill to an Australian firm. By 
1983/84, total overseas employment had in absolute terms 
been reduced to below its 1975 level. The aim was to release 
Tootal from exposure to highly import sensitive products 
(Banyard (1987:21).
After Tootal narrowly fought off a bid from the Australian 
textile group, Entrad, in 1985, a new managing director and 
chief executive, Geoffrey Kadrell, was appointed in January
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1986, which in u n y  ways narked a strategic watershed in the 
company's development. The company is now pursuing a 
strategy based on global marketing, sourcing and 
distribution. This has involved a radical 
internationalisation of the group's activities, together 
with investment in new technology in a number of the 
company's UK operations, and a diversification into 
non-textile products.
8.4 The strategy of the company since 1986
8.4.1 The restructuring of managerial control
Chart 1: Toota1's Management Structure/Product Divisions.
Tootal Board Tootal Croap Board
(■ uaqeuat) (policy)
I
Da Gau Specialised
lateriala
i
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Sooth
A frica
Europe/Asia DI DI Europe
Asia
1 . A u rica  
Europe
Asia/Pacific
Africa
(1) Clothing/homewares
(2) International Fabric, Sourcing & Distribution
(3) Industrial and Consumer Thread
The current corporate strategy is to make Tootal a worldwide 
marketing organisation based on design, service and 
distribution skills (FT 28.8.87). This has involved a degree 
of managerial restructuring. Hitherto, the group had been 
divided into 50 operating companies but in September 1986, 
these were streamlined into ten 'strategic business units' 
all defined by activity. The board now has two tiers - a
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group and a management board. The fonar includes executive 
directors who formiate strategy, budgets, management and 
financial systems. The management board is composed of the 
operational heads of the divisions. According to Madrell 
(Financial Meekly 30.10.86):
'For an international group, it is appropriate to 
pursue a decentralised system of management based on 
strategic business units, each basically self-sufficient. 
At the top level, you need the experience not just of 
developing strategy, but of putting it into effect...'
Tootal has also begun to diversify into the production of
specialised materials, particularly nonvoven textiles. It
has also branched out into non-textile products, such as
kitchenware and homewares, with the acguisition of
Cloverleaf in 1986 - a market leader and a major supplier to
Marks and Spencer - and the distribution of office equipment
and stationery in the UK with the recent acquisition of
Sandhurst Marketing.
8.4.2 The reorganisation of thread production 
The production of sewing thread still dominates Tootal's 
activities although its contribution to overall profits fell 
during the period 1986-87 (from 57% to 42%). But in the 
financial year 1987-88, thread contributed 39% of the value 
of total group sales and was Tootal's most profitable 
activity contributing 46% of the company's profits.
Thread production is now orientated largely to industrial 
customers, notably garment manufacturers.
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Tabi« 34: Tootar» m Im  and profit» 1983-88.
1914 1415 1984 1487 1988
S iit i f  an. I f  m. t f  an. I f  an. t t m. 1
Thraad
Fabric*/
191.1 SI 224.7 52 147.) 4) 144.4 40 194.0 39
Clothmq 157.9 41 173.0 40 181.9 47 144.5 48 223.4 44
S r i * M.4 8 37.1 8 38.8 10 44.2 11 50.8 10
Stationery
D ilt. 5.) 1 34.) 7
Others 0.9 - 0.5 * - * • * 1 .) *
Total 317.) 453.3 300.0 408.4 503.0
1914 1905 1984 1487 1988
Profit« t  a*. 1 r ■*. t f  an. t t  an. t t  M. 1
Thrud
Fabric«/
17.1 75 20.4 72 17.1 57 14.7 42 19.1 44
Clothinq (.6 29 4.1 22 12.2 39 14.8 42 15.5 37
l a t e r i i l i 1.9 1 3.4 12 3.9 12 3.4 10 4.9 17
Stationery
D ilt. 0.) , 2.0 5
Otberi -2.9 -1) •1.4 -4 -2.4 -0 1.4 « -2.0 -5
Total 22.7 2 1.) 31.5 35.0 41.5
Sourca; Annual Raport« 1983-88
The current eaphasis of the company on aarketing and 
distribution activities is connected to the doainance of its 
thread interests. The majority (70%) of the value added in 
industrial thread production is derived from dyeing, 
winding, packaging and distribution, rather than 
manufacture. Many garment manufacturers are prepared to pay 
a premium for quick delivery and the facility to obtain 
small quantities of fashion colours. The company is 
attempting to gain greater control over its thread 
distribution business especially in the USA, where 40% of 
output is distributed by wholesalers compared to an industry 
average of 20%. The aim is to increase the amount of thread 
sold directly by the company rather than through
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distributors or wholesalers. According to G. Madrell:
'The sore control you have over your market, the 
Im i  risk you have. The textile industry has always 
concentrated on capacity and voluse, rather than on 
controlling its market.' (Financial Weekly 30.10.86)
Tootal has extended its overseas presence in this area 
through two important acquisitions in developed economies.
In December 1986, it purchased the thread interests of 
Standard-Coosa-Thatcher (SCT), a major American competitor. 
The company acquired SCT's warehouses, stocks, sales force 
and customer base but apart from one finishing plant, none 
of its production capacity. The acquisition raised Tootal's 
share of the American industrial thread market from 13« to 
23%. The American Thread division intends to increase the 
overseas sourcing of low cost 'grey' yarn from Par Eastern 
suppliers to be dyed, finished and distributed in the USA. 
Tootal also acquired a Swedish company, Molnlycke, as a 
major addition to its European thread business. This company 
sources dyed thread from Tootal's UK plants for finishing in 
Sweden.
This emphasis on the finishing and distribution of thread 
has involved a major expansion of the overseas sourcing of 
textile products and raw materials from the Far East, 
particularly China. The company has purchased cotton fabric 
from China for over forty years but has now extended its 
sourcing arrangements to include low cost polyester yarn. 
Since 1982, the yarn has been transported to Tootal Thread 
in Hong Kong and South East Asia where it is dyed and 
finished. This has reduced Tootal's production costs and 
increased its share of the thread market. Moreover, in 1985,
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the company set up a joint venture in the fora of a new yarn 
plant at Canton, China with a production capacity of 2,000 
tons per annua. The plant at present generates 10% of the 
group's yarn reguireaents. Again, the yarn is taken to Hong 
Kong where it is dyed and finished and the thread is then 
distributed to the following locations.
Table 35: distribution of thread on a global basis.
North America 40«
Hong Kong 30%
Australia 20%
Malaysia 10«
Banyard 1987:26
Currently, Tootal is expanding its dyeing capacity in Hong 
Kong to process aore yarn froa the Chinese spinning plant.
It is also considering the establishment of dyeing 
facilities in China and possibly a second joint venture. 
Eventually, the company intends to supply the large Chinese 
market with thread.
As part of the move to the higher value added components of 
the thread business, Tootal has established 'mini-mills'. 
These are small dyeing and finishing units situated close to 
thread customers. Stocks of low cost undyed thread are 
sourced from China to be dyed and finished at the mills, 
which also act as warehouses and distribution channels. The 
mini-mills involve around one fifth of the capital 
commitment of a normal mill and can be established very 
quickly. So far, Tootal has built or is converting existing 
plant to mini-mills in Costa Rica, Most Germany, Australia 
and Sweden. The company is also interested in expanding its 
thread interests in the Mediterranean by setting up mills in
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Turkey and Portugal.
Despite the expansion of the company's international 
interests in thread production involving strategic 
acquisitions and overseas sourcing, it has also established 
and equipped one of its UK plants with the latest 
technology. In late 1986, the company opened a f7 an. 
computer controlled dye house outside Glasgow of which 
approximately £3 mn. to £3.5 mn. was provided by the 
government in the form of a regional development grant. This 
plant will be part of English Sewing (a manufacturer and 
distributor of sewing threads) which now has four 
manufacturing locations in the UK, consisting of two 
spinning mills (Northern Ireland and Derbyshire), one 
finishing mill and the Glasgow dyehouse.
8.4.3 Fabrics
The International Fabric Sourcing and Distribution Division 
imports cloth from low cost sources, typically the Far East, 
to be sold in both developed and developing countries. 
Tootal's three existing subsidiaries in IFSD are in Hong 
Kong, Holland and the UK. In Hong Kong, Tootal Label 
supplies both local garment makers and export markets, with 
quality fabrics sourced from Hong Kong, China and Taiwan.
The Dutch subsidiary supplies shirt and sheeting fabric. It 
imports grey and finished cloth, which is finally 
distributed to manufacturers in Northern Europe. The 
manufacture of wax batiks, a high quality fabric used in 
African traditional costumes, is also extensively 
internationalised. The grey cloth is sourced from China and
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shipped to the UK for wax printing and then distributed to 
customers in West Africa. This coaplex sourcing and 
distribution chain has been a lucrative source of profits.
In 1982/83, the batik business generated pre-tax profits of 
£5.5 an, over one third of the group total.
Tootal has recently signed an agreement with Mafatlal, the 
largest vertically integrated textile coapany in India. 
Mafatlal is investing soae £40 an. in new plant to produce 
high quality fabrics for export. The agreeaent gives Tootal 
the export rights to the aajority of the output which will 
be sold in Europe and Asia. The coapany is also interested 
in establishing a UK joint venture with Chinese 
aanufacturers for the production of cotton drill fabric 
which will be sold in Western Europe.
Currently, 55% of all textile aaterials are purchased by 
Tootal outside the UK. Tootal is withdrawing froa primary 
textile production and has shifted to a strategy of 
international sourcing and distribution where added value is 
generated froa dyeing, finishing, packaging and 
distribution. According to Madrell:
'Por soae products, we ship in cloth froa India, 
send it to Germany for finishing, Mauritius for 
stitching, then back to sale in the UK'.
(Sunday Tiaes 9.10.88)
2 3 3
8.4.4 Clothing
Tootal has three aajor UK clothing subsidiaries. Slina ia a 
major supplier of clothing to Narks and Spencer with a small 
branded operation. Tootal Mensvear manufactures branded 
shirts, knitwear, and ties and Trutex produces branded 
schoolwear. Slimma is the most profitable of Tootal's 
clothing operations. By 1984, it accounted for one third of 
sales turnover in clothing and employed over 2,000. In line 
with other Marks and Spencer's suppliers, the company has 
made substantial investments in new technology in production 
planning, design, pattern making and cutting.
Tootal has not relocated clothing production overseas (Bison 
1988a) or introduced offshore processing arrangements. The 
company has, however, engaged in domestic subcontracting 
through its subsidiary, Raysil Gowns, which is one of the 
major 'middlemen' in the London clothing industry. This 
company supplies fashion dresses and separates under its own 
brand name or retail brand names, principally for the 
cheaper end of the clothing market to outlets such as C & A, 
British Home Stores, Tesco, Woolworths and mail order 
stores. Chisholm et al. (1986) estimated that the Raysil 
subsidiary subcontracts production to about 20 clothing 
manufacturers. This enables the company to tap sources of 
cheap female, ethnic minority labour in Britain without 
setting up factories overseas or developing offshore 
processing arrangements. According to the 1988 Annual 
Report, Tootal intends to develop the sourcing of fabrics 
and finished garments from Europe, the Mediterranean and the 
Far East to meet increased demand in the UK. Tootal Lebel
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based in Hong Kong has sourced garaents for the UK, 
Australia and New Zealand from locally-owned Par Eastern 
firas (Bison 1988a:26). The recent participation by Narks 
and Spencer in such arrangeaents B a y  encourage Tootal to 
develop overseas sourcing of clothing sore extensively than 
in the past. Its global thread business aeans that Tootal 
already has an advanced knowledge of the cheapest locations 
for garaent aanufacturing.
8.4.5 Suaaary
During the 1970s, Tootal had set up either wholly owned 
foreign subsidiaries or associated firas overseas, but these 
were concentrated in thread production and geared to 
supplying local aarkets, not to export. Moreover, up to 
1979, there was no draaatic rationalisation of UK 
eaployaent, although there was an expansion of investaent 
and jobs overseas (cf. Bison 1986a, 1988a). The coapany 
responded to the recession by savage rationalisation, 
involving redundancies and scrapping of plant. The Group 
eliainated the vast aajority of its priaary textile 
interests in the UK. Over the period 1978-88, its UK 
workforce has been reduced by 58*, although job losses 
stabilised in 1985 and the workforce has since aarginally 
increased. This is likely to be related to its policy of 
expanding its non-textile interests (stationery distribution 
etc.). The overseas workforce was also reduced, but by 
proportionately less than in the UK (ie. by 35%, excluding 
associates).
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Tootal has indulged in a radical internationalisation of its 
operations in the 1980s, through a eajor enhancement of its 
overseas sourcing activities. The Group now does very little 
weaving or knitting and spins y a m  mainly for its own thread 
operations. One quarter of all its y a m  requirements is 
sourced from the joint venture in China. The company has 
sought to withdraw from the production of import sensitive 
goods, by shifting to the sourcing of low cost, often undyed 
yarn and fabrics from overseas, mainly LDCs. These are 
subsequently finished and distributed by the company. The 
aim is to become a global marketing and distribution 
organisation. In the main, the process of 
internationalisation has not occurred through the 
establishment of overseas manufacturing facilities, but 
rather as a result of the subcontracting of production to 
independently owned firms and the acquisition of firms 
operating in lower cost locations. The circuits of commodity 
and money rather than productive capital have been 
internationalised (Bison 1986a). This has been combined with 
the modernisation of a number of plants, although in the UK, 
the complete re-equipment of a dyeing plant was 
substantially subsidised by the state.
The company's strategy in garment manufacturing has involved 
both domestic and international subcontracting. But 
investment in new technology and the establishment of close 
connections with retailers, especially Marks and Spencer, 
are also crucial objectives. As yet, Tootal has not engaged 
in the fragmentation and relocation of garment manufacturing 
to LDCs. In short, the company's overall strategy -
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representing a partial withdrawal from textile Manufacturing 
and a shift to international sourcing. Marketing and 
distribution - has involved substantial job losses, the 
Majority of which have been in the UK but it has revitalised 
the coapany's profitability, with pre-tax profits having 
alaost trebled since 1982 (cf. tables 36 and 37). Since 
Septeaber 1988, the coapany has been subject to intense 
takeover speculation. The Australian textile industrialist. 
Nr. Abrahaa Goldberg, has atteapted to stage a merger 
between the Linter Group and Tootal by acquiring a 25% stake 
in the coapany. But in May 1989 this was countered by a bid 
froa Coats Viyella which the Tootal Board recommended to its 
shareholders. If the intended merger is not prevented by a 
monopolies investigation, the combined companies will 
represent a major international force in the industry 
through its dominance of the global thread market. The new 
company will thus become a profoundly influential firm both 
globally and within the UK.
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Table 36: Pre-tax Profits, £ an, 1982-89.
1982 14.8
1983 14.9
1984 17.2
1985 22.9
1986 27.4
1987 30.2
1988 40.3
1989 42.3
Table 37: Profit Margins. 1984 and 1988
« 1983/84 1987/88
Thread:
US Thread 6.9 11.2UK and Europe 16.3 4.4South East Asia 6.5
Af r ica/Aus t r a 1 i a 6.4 6.5
International Fabric Sourcinq and Distribution:
UK and Europe 9.3 13.3Asia/Australia 6.9 9.0
Consumer Goods:
Clothing (UK only) 1.9 3.3Hoeewares 6.3
Specialised Materials 5.6 10.6
Stationery Dist. _ 5.7
Da Gaea 3.7 22.1
Source: Buck, Adams and Ferqusson 1988
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8.5 Courtaulds
Courtaulds has been the subject of considerable research and
media attention, with widely differing v i e w  being expressed
about the nature of the company's restructuring since the
■id 1970s. The following three references are typical of the
diversity of opinions held about the company's strategy.
'The split within aanufacturing capital can be seen 
clearly in industries such as textiles. On the one 
hand internationalised firms such as Courtaulds, with 
the world as their oyster, their degree of international 
mobility astonishingly high; on the other hand a host 
of Mdiui and snail domestic producers with backward 
technologies and somnolent managements.'
(Massey 1986:46)
'Courtaulds is very much a British company., it is not 
a multinational.' Lord P. Rearton. Chairman of 
Courtaulds 1962-1975 (Financial Times 16.11.73)
'It is difficult to describe the extent to which textiles 
is a world industry rather than a national one. There is 
no way in which any textile unit anywhere - however 
small, in any country in the world - can be really 
insulated from what is happening in the rest of the 
world.' Sir C. Hogg. Chairman of Courtaulds. 1980-. 
(Financial Weekly 16.5.80)
These statements raise a number of guestions concerning 
Courtaulds' strategic behaviour which the following analysis 
seeks to address. To what extent does Courtaulds operate as 
a 'footloose', thoroughly globalised multinational? Is it 
principally a UK based textile manufacturing company with a 
number of overseas interests? Or has its integration into an 
internationalised industry determined, in part, its present 
predicament and corporate strategy?
8.5.1 The recessionary conditions of the mid 1970s.
The historical background to Courtaulds' evolution into one 
of the world's largest integrated fibre and textile 
companies was elaborated in chapter six. During the 1960s 
and early 1970s Courtaulds adopted a strategy of vertical
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integration entailing acquisition of a large amount of 
capacity in textiles as well as expansion of fibre 
production. A high proportion of Courtaulds' synthetic 
fibres was used by its subsidiaries in spinning, weaving, 
knitting and hosiery.
This interdependent corporate structure based on a high 
degree of centralised aanagerial control had to contend with 
the increasingly volatile macro econoaic conditions of the 
1970s. The post oil crisis recession led to a slackening of 
both world and doaestic demand for textile products and the 
low dollar value rendered European textile and clothing 
goods uncompetitive against American and Far Eastern 
imports. Courtaulds was particularly vulnerable because of 
its heavy presence in fibres and primary textile production. 
In a recession, the first firms to destock or cancel orders 
are those nearest the point of end use (retailers/garment 
manufacturers). As the destocking process works its way 
upstream, it manifests itself most strongly at the beginning 
of the production chain, notably fibre, y a m  and fabric 
production. Thus, Courtaulds experienced rapid fluctuations 
in activity in these areas during 1974-76 and 1979-80. The 
company was vociferous in its support for stricter import 
controls. The Chairman, Sir A. Knight, argued that 
governments must recognise that the 'UK textile case needs 
special treatment' and that this 'must become an article of 
national industrial policy.' (FT 17.5.77).
Courtaulds policy of investing heavily in modem equipment 
to reduce unit production costs left it with much
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underutilised plant in the aid 1970s recessionary period and 
a number of its new weaving plants never reached full 
capacity (44). Return on capital dwindled froa 15.3% in 1974 
to an average of 6.9% between 1975 and 1980, and profit 
aargins shrank to an average 4.2% over the saae period. Pre­
tax profits were cut froa £118 an. to £46 an. in 1975-76, 
and froa £81 an. to £54 an. in 1977-78. In 1975, the paint 
subsidiary contributed nearly one half of the group's profit 
with 73% of its business overseas.
Table 38; Sales, capital expenditure and profits 1975-79.
fan 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
Sales 1134 1166 1510 1576 1662Capital exp. 115 103 96 56 50
Pre-tax Profits 118 46 81 54 64
Source; Annual Reports 1976- 80
The non textile businesses (paints, plastics etc.) were 
becoaing more profitable than textiles which constituted 70% 
of total assets. By 1979, paint, cellophane and plastics 
gave a much higher return on investment than fibre, yams 
and fabrics.
Table 39: Return on Capital
Year end 31.3.79
Pibres and Yams 
Pabrics
Consumer Products
International Paint 
British Cellophane 
National Plastics
Mise.
iployed, 1979.
Return on Capital Employed %
8
6
15
27
13
37
Source; Annual Report 1980
10
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In the context of excess fibre capacity in Europe and 
increasing iaport penetration in textiles in Britain, 
Courtaulds introduced short ties working into many of its 
textile operations and initiated a program® of closures and 
capacity cuts for which it became infaaous. Model «reaving 
plants in the assisted areas, like the plant at Skeleersdale 
were unable to coepete successfully against imports of basic 
commodity fabrics from the Far Bast, and the USA, and most 
of them were eventually closed (45).
The company's strategy of investment and re-equipment was 
also suspended. Knight argued 'We do not feel able in 
today's conditions to commit further large sums to new fixed 
investment and the level of our capital expenditure is being 
reduced.' (FT 17.5.77). Capital expenditure in the financial 
year 1978-79 amounted to £50.5 mn. which represented a 
halving of capital spending from its levels in 1975 and was 
in fact a low point in Courtaulds' capital expenditure 
programme. Moreover, at the end of 1978, Courtaulds faced 
the loss of the Temporary Employment Subsidy «ihich had 
amounted to around £12 mn. in 1977. The company argued in 
the 1977-78 Annual Report that lo«rer levels of capital 
expenditure reflected a cutback in investment in fibre and 
textiles in the expectation that existing plants must become 
profitable rather than be further enlarged.
The policy of vertical integration and centralised 
managerial control was substantially modified by the late 
1970s. The company's fabric producers were able to buy a 
proportion of fibre supplies from outside sources and the
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closure of the Spennymoor acrylic spinning plant brought 
internal group usage of synthetic fibres down to less than 
30« (PT 28.0.79) (46). By the late 1970s, UK plants and 
products had to be financially self-sufficient (Investors 
Chronicle 2.6.78).
8.5.2. The 1980s
The recession of the early 1980s, the strengthening of 
sterling and high interest rates, coincided with the arrival 
of a new Chairman, (Sir) Christopher Hogg. His first 
statesent to shareholders in Hay 1980 articulated a 
strategy:
'to concentrate resources on the best businesses and 
not squander thes in areas of long tera weakness; to 
achieve better returns on the textile side; and to 
expand the rest of the group'.
It was recognised that textiles was an industry particularly 
prone to low labour cost competition and excess capacity and 
a gradual diversification out of textiles was implied:
'Courtaulds has been developing its business outside 
the textile industry for many years. In 1960, the 
non-textile activities accounted for less than a 
fifth of the Group's profits...in 1979/80 they 
contributed two fifths of our profits, although 
they account for less than a quarter of the Group's 
sales and capital employed...we certainly see full 
priority continuing to be given to the development 
of our non-textile interests.'
(Annual Report 1979-80:3)
The company's 1981 financial results illustrate the full 
impact of this adverse economic environment, with pre-tax 
profits having fallen from £68 mn. in 1980 to £5 an. in 
1981. De-stocking, equivalent to nearly 20% of final demand, 
caused a fall in home orders for the domestic textile 
industry and a rise of about 15% in the real exchange rate
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for sterling encouraged isports. During 1980-81, Courtaulds' 
sales in the UK fell by 11% in value and 17% in voluse and 
production fell by 22% to allow stocks to be reduced. 
Courtaulds, at this stage, was profoundly disenchanted by 
both the UK Government's economic policies and the UFA. On 
the former, it complained of Government inactivity whilst 
the industry shrank at an alarming rate and on the latter, 
it wanted a much tougher renewal, arguing:
'In its effectiveness as an insulator against the 
cold the present UFA is more of a thin blanket than 
a feather bed, as the continuing increase in import 
penetration and the low levels of wholesale price 
increases in mass market clothing testify.'
(Annual Report 1981:2)
During the 1980s there have been profound changes in the 
character of the company. Since 1979, Courtaulds has reduced 
its UK workforce by more than a half. The largest 
proportionate fall occurred between 1980-81 when the company 
shed approximately 20,000 UK employees. The 1980-82 figure 
was 34,637. The trend since 1983 has been steadily 
downwards. Every year since 1983, an average 4% to 5% of its 
UK employees (2,000 to 3,000) have been shed, although there 
were no job losses recorded in the UK during the last 
financial year (1987-88) thus indicating temporary 
stabilisation (table 40, pg. 247). In 1988 and 1989, 
Courtaulds resumed rationalisation of its UK textile 
workforce in the light of an influx of imports due to the 
rise in the value of sterling and the depreciation of the 
dollar. Plant closures have occurred in spinning, knitwear, 
fabric, and clothing. It is estimated that since the start 
of the financial year in April 1988, 3,000 to 4,000 textile 
jobs have been shed in the UK, which represents the largest
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annual reduction since 1983 (FT 4/25.3.89).
There has not been a dramatic build up of overseas 
employment, however, despite reductions in UK employment. As 
we see from table 41, employment overseas in 1983 was at 
almost one half its 1975 level. Although the figure has 
since risen to 22,500, this is still 8,500 less than 1975. 
Overseas employment has increased as a proportion of the 
total number of Courtaulds' employees because reductions in 
overseas employment have been proportionately less than 
reductions in UK employment (78,000 over the 1975-88 
period). Nevertheless, in 1988 approximately two thirds of 
Courtaulds employees were still located in the UK.
There has been a shift in the balance of capital employed 
between the UK and overseas (cf. table 42). In 1979, 70% of 
capital was employed in the UK and 29% overseas (the 
majority in developed countries, particularly North America 
and Europe) but in 1988, 57% was employed in the UK and 43% 
overseas (the largest increase being in North America). In 
one year alone, (1980) the balance of capital employed as 
between the UK and overseas shifted from just under 2.5:1 to 
less than 2:1. This indicates that Courtaulds' activities 
have become increasingly internationalised during the 1980s 
at the same time that plant has been scrapped in the UK.
Although the company's textile activities are still large by 
international standards - the second largest European 
textile company in terms of the value of textile sales (£1.4 
bn.) - the balance of Courtaulds' activities has moved away
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from textiles towards its non-textile interests (of. table 
43). It was stated in the 1983-84 Annual Report that its 
non-textile businesses presented:
'the best prospects and opportunities for longer ters 
growth..We are seeking..to build on these assets, 
whether by acquisition or internal development...
Our interest in expanding in the USA continues....'
(pg. 7).
In 1980, Courtaulda was still very such a textile cospany 
with 80% of capital employed in textiles. By 1988, this had 
been reduced to 49% of capital employed. This shift was not 
merely a short term response to the recession. The increase 
in the percentage of capital employed in non textile 
activities was greater between 1984-88 (19%) than 1980-84 
(12%). This change in the emphasis of Courtaulda' interests 
is illustrated in the distribution of operating profit, 
sales turnover and employment between textiles and non 
textiles. For example, over the 1980s, employment in 
textiles fell from 8 2% of the total to 6 0%, due to a massive 
reduction in the former of 47,800 compared to an increase of 
8,800 in its non-textile workforce. Capital employed and 
operating profit are roughly equally distributed between 
textiles and non-textiles and this is beginning to occur in 
sales turnover (textiles 57% and non textiles 43%).
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Table 40: Courtaulds UK Labour Force 1979-88
Year UK Employees % annual change
1979 103,000 _
1980 97,000 (5.8)
1981 77,408 (20)
1982 62,363 (19)
1983 56,000 (10)
1984 53,000 (5.3)
1985 50,000 (5.6)
1986 48,000 (4)
1987 46,000 (4.2)
1988 46,000
Source : Annual Reports
Tabla 41: Employant overseas. UK, and worldwide.
1975 1980 1983 1986 1988
Overseas
employment 31,000 27,000 16,700 20,000 22,500
UK
employment 124,000 97,000 56,300 48,000 46,000
Worldwide
employment 155,000 124,000 73,000 68,000 68,500
Overseas 
employment 
as « of total 
employment 21% 22« 23« 29« 32«
Source ; Annual Report:»
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Tabi« 42; Geographical Location of Capital Employed 1979 and 
1988
Year End 31 March
£ an. « C «n. « £ an.
UK 552 70 489 57 - 63
Rest of Europe 89 11 114 13 ♦ 25
North America 51 6 121 14 ♦ 70Africa 54 7 82 10 + 28
Rest of World 38 5 47 6 ♦ 9
Miscellaneous (a) 8 1 (1) 0
Total (b) 792 100 852 100 ♦ 60
(a) elimination of inter-territorial sales
(b) coeprises land, buildings, plant and equipment, stocks, 
debtors less creditors.
Source: Annual Reports 1979 and 1988
Table 43: Distribution of turnover, profit and capital
eaployed between textiles and non textiles.
1974 1980 1984 1987 1988
Turnover % of total
Fibres and Textiles 80 79 71 60 57
Non Textiles 20 21 29 40 43
Operating Profit % of total
Fibres and Textiles 61 74 59 51
Non Textiles 39 26 41 49
Capital Eaployed t of total
Fibres and Textiles 80 68 50 49
Non Textiles 20 32 50 51
Eaployees '000
Fibres and Textiles 89 41.2
Non Textiles 17 25.8
Other 3 1.5
Total 109 68.5
Source: Annual Reports
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The increasing prominence of the company's non textile 
activities is intiaately connected to Courtaulds' heightened 
international presence (47). The reclassification of its 
product divisions in 1984 into two main areas, a textiles 
group and a chenical and industrial products division was 
underpinned by the recognition that its textiles business 
was eainly UK based and oriented towards supplying the UK 
market although 'its international operations are growing.' 
In contrast, cheeical and industrial products were sold to 
industrial custoeers and were 'international in scope' 
(Annual Report 1984-85). Moreover, the internationalisation 
of Courtaulds' activities over the 1980s is inextricably 
linked to the global expansion of its paint subsidiary.
Table 44: geographical location of overseas subsidiaries 
Developed Countries Developing Countries
Europe 20 Africa 8
North America 9 South and Central America 3
Australasia 6 India/Far East 3
Middle East 3
Total 35 17
Textiles & 
Fibres
13 2
Non Textiles 22 15
(12 in Paints) ( 1 0  in Paints)
Source: Annua1 Report 1986-87
Of Courtaulds 52 overseas subsidiaries. 37 were in non
textiles and 15 in textiles. But well over a third (22) of 
all foreign subsidiaries and significantly, a sajority of 
those located in LDCs, belonged to just one of Courtaulds 
divisions ie. International Paint. The geographical location
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of the capital employ ad in thia one buainesa shifted 
considerably over 1979-82. The proportion of the group's 
assets outside Western Europe rose frow 40% to over 50% and 
in the Americas alone from less than a quarter to one third. 
Overall, the capital employed in paints has more than 
doubled whereas it has been reduced by about one third in 
fibres and textiles.
More recently, Courtaulda has engaged in a number of 
strategic investments, notably the acquisition of paint 
companies in the USA, Sweden, Italy and Spain. In LDCs, a 
new company was formed in Malaysia, and two new plants built 
in Taiwan and Thailand. The company also plans to extend its 
paint interests in the Pacific Basin. This spate of foreign 
direct investment which spans both LDCs and developed 
countries is primarily motivated by the intention to gain 
access to growth markets. This has been combined with the 
rationalisation of some of International Paint's European 
capacity during 1986-87 which was related to the company's 
general strategy of withdrawing from cyclical or declining 
product areas (eg. marine paint). The coatings division is 
being developed as a global business involving considerable 
foreign direct investment and capital expenditure.
The company has also expanded its Pilms and Packaging 
Division during 1987-89 by three American acquisitions in an 
attempt to reduce its reliance on commodity products prone 
to cyclical swings in demand (48), and to increase its 
access to markets, particularly America, through a programme 
of foreign direct investment. In April 1989, the Coatings
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Division acquired a 10.5% staka in an American high 
technology polymer manufacturing company. This, again, was 
motivated by an attempt to enter a high technology, niche 
area. It appears likely that the recent spate of foreign 
direct investment will continue. It haa been argued that:
'Tomorrow's Courtaulds will look more to the US and 
Europe and will probably have more of an emphasis on 
niche businesses*. (Financial Weekly 25.6.87)
The strategy of expansion through foreign acquisitions is
not an attempt by the company to become a conglomerate. The
aim is to strengthen Courtaulds' existing range of
businesses. According to the Chairman, C. Hogg:
'We have deliberately avoided becoming a conglomerate.
Each of our businesses is related to one or more of 
the others--' (Annual Report 1986-87:6)
The structure of managerial control has also changed in 
response to shifts in corporate strategy. In contrast to the 
1960s, there is now a much greater deverticalisation and 
decentralisation of the company's operations. As Chandler 
demonstrates (1977) in his analysis of the multi-divisional 
corporation, a decentralised corporate structure enables 
senior executives to formulate overall corporate strategy 
without involvement in day to day, operational natters. 
During the 1960s and early 1970s, the vertical integration 
of the company was underpinned by centrally determined 
transfer prices for intergroup purchases (Financial Weekly 
25.6.87) but this has been replaced by autonomous decision 
making by subsidiaries on purchases, sales and pricing. If a 
company wishes to use group resources they are charged at 
the market rate but in product groups which overlap (is. 
textiles) strategies towards key customers, such as Narks
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and Spencer, are co-ordinated.
But financial control is still regulated froe the centre. 
During the early 1980s, Courtaulds instituted tight internal 
cash generation targets of 12% for each business which were 
supplemented by targets for return on capital and 
profitability. The Group is currently divided into 300 
profit centres which report to 25 full reporting businesses 
which are in turn divided between the six product sectors. 
Each unit has its own chief executive and is responsible for 
its own balance sheet. If the unit consistently fails to 
meet its own financial targets, it then has to meet 
centrally doterained targets. If a profit centre continues 
to sake inadequate returns it is eventually closed. The 
'autonomy' of individual businesses is thus constrained by 
centrally regulated financial targets. The aim is to 
maximise the benefits from internalization of vertically 
linked production processes, but not to subsidise loss 
making parts of the business.
The company had succeeded in revitalising its profitability 
up until the 1988-89 trading year. Over 1979-88, the value 
of sales rose by £759 an., pre-tax profits by £157 an. and 
capital expenditure by £110.5 mn. (cf. table 45). The 
reorganisation of fibres and textiles has contributed to the 
overall increase in Courtaulds' profitability. Since the 
recession of the early 1980s, Courtaulds has improved its 
return on capital employed overall and in textiles (cf. 
table 46 and 47). In 1987, fibres had the highest return on 
capital employed of all sectors and the return on textiles
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exceeded that of ita paints, packaging and cheaicals 
divisions, which reversed the trends of the early 1980s. The 
next section will therefore investigate in detail the 
reorganisation of Courtaulds' fibre and textile businesses 
so that shifts in the company's strategy in this sector can 
be revealed.
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Table 45: Sales,, profitability. etc. over 1975-88
Sales Pre-tax Profits Profit Marqin capital
fmn. fmn. «
Ex*,
fmn.
1975 1134 118.2 114.71979 1662 64.0 5.2 50.5
1980 1819 68.1 4.9 73.61981 1710 5.1 1.7 67.5
1982 1789 51.1 3.9 70.1
1983 1905 63.6 4.3 67.21984 2038 118.0 6.3 83.81985 2152 128.0 6.2 126.31986 2173 143.0 6.9 117.71987 2262 201.0 9.1 150.7
1988 2421 221.0 8.9 161.0
Source; Annual Reporta
ROCK % 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
Pibres and Yarns 8 10 _ 11 15 31Pabrics 6 6 - 4 5 14
Consumer Products 15 13 15 15 18 20
Paint 27 24 28 25 19 17
Cellophane 13 20 5 10 15 23
Plastics 37 39 20 10 24 21
Total 10 11 5 13 15 24
Source: Annual Reports 1979-84
Table 47: Return on Capital Employed 1984-88
ROCK « 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Fibres 29 22 31 53 41
Spinning 24 22 30 29
Pabrics 14 17 18 18
Clothing 21 23 23 25
Textiles (total) 18 20 22 23 21
Woodpulp 40 28 19 42 42
Paint 17 17 18 16 21
Cellophane 23 17 10 packaging 19 23
Plastics 21 16 10 chemical 20 18
& Materials
A. In 1987 there was a Major reorganisation of the product 
divisions. The CheMical and Materials division includes part 
of the old fibres business, cellophane and plastics. 
Packaging includes Much of the cellophane business but also 
part of the plastics division. Hence, comparisons of 
performance over the 1980s are now very difficult.
Source: Annual Reports 1984-88
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8.5.3 Fibres
Courtaulds began manufacturing fibres in 1904 with the 
production of rayon, a voodpulp based cellulosic fibre. Over 
the post war period, the coapany expanded into oil based 
synthetic fibres, notably acrylic manufactured under the 
brand naae Courtelle in 1957, nylon (Celon) in 1964 and 
polyester (Lirelle) in 1971. Currently, Courtaulds is one of 
the world's ten largest synthetic fibre producers. These ten 
producers control about 6 an. tons of synthetic fibre 
capacity, roughly 40 per cent of the world total, although 
their share has declined since the late 1970s with the 
development of capacity outside Western Europe, USA and 
Japan.
Table 48: World ranking of major synthetic fibre producers
Fibre sales Fibre capacity
Share of total Volume Share < 
world
(%) 'ooo tons totali
1979 1986/87 1986 1986
Du Pont (USA) 33 18 1,700 10.5
Celanese (USA) 58 48 820 5.1
Toray (Japan) 80 55 620 3.8
Hoechst (W.Germany) 7 10 540 3.3
Akzo (Netherlands) 33 22 470 2.9
Rhone Poulenc (France) 19 18 420 2.6
Formosa Plastics(Taiwan).. . . 400 2.5
ICI (UK)
Teijin (Japan)
9 7 380 2.4
73 68 355 2.2
Monsanto (USA) 17 12 350 2.2
Courtaulds (UK) 36 23 250 1.6
1. Hoechst acquired Celanese in 1987 
Source: Anson and Simpson 1988:39
But Courtaulds present strategy in fibre production can only 
be understood in relation to the general restructuring of 
this particular sector. The oil price rises of the 1970s
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brought a phase of long tera capacity expansion In fibre 
production to an abrupt end. High raw material costs raised 
production costs and depressed fibre demand. Capacity 
utilisation of fibre plants fall fros 92« in 1973 to 61% in 
1975 (breakeven level is around 80%) and led to sajor losses 
for all producers, estinated at $732 sn. in 1975. Massive 
overcapacity and falling prices encouraged the EC to launch 
the 'Davignon initiative' in 1977, with the aie of an 
'orderly reduction' (12%) of synthetic fibre capacity. Most 
manufacturers responded by concentrating on specific fibre 
types. A second agreement signed in 1982 aimed to achieve 
capacity reductions of an additional 500,000 tons.
The location of fibre production has shifted away from 
Western Europe and the USA to the LDCs and Eastern Europe.
In 1970, 76% of world fibre production was concentrated in 
Mestem Europe, the USA, and Japan whereas in 1985 about 49% 
of production was located outside of the three main Western 
trading blocks. Whilst developed country production of 
fibres rose eleven fold over the period 1960-85, LDC output 
rose by a factor of 340. According to Textile Outlook 
International (November 1986a:46):
'The problem for Courtaulds and other producers in 
the industrialised countries, is that fibre production 
will increasingly be located nearer to the low cost, 
bulk textile producers in the developing countries as 
the latter's output of standard low cost fabrics 
increases.'
Cutbacks in West European capacity have been achieved 
although they have been unevenly distributed. The UK's 
synthetic fibre capacity fell by 51% (316,000 tons) over 
1977-86 and West Germany lost 269,000 tons (26% of its 
capacity). But Italian producers cut their fibre capacity by
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only 11% (66,000 tons) and Spain's rose by 48%. Western 
European capacity in most fibres is still too high which 
holds down utilisation rates and tends to keep prices low. 
Additionally, intense isport competition in price sensitive 
commodity fibres has encouraged European fibre manufacturers 
to shift to the production of high value added specialty 
fibres (Davies 1987).
These developments have profoundly affected Courtaulds' 
corporate strategy. According to Management Today (May 
1986:61):
'The logic underpinning the vast Courtaulds production 
machine of the optimistic 1960s was that scale would 
bring economies and that the surplus could be exported 
to a tame Third World...'.
Courtaulds, like other European producers, now concentrates 
on particular fibre types where it has a high market share. 
During the 1980s, the company abandoned UK production of 
nylon (although it is still being produced in its American 
plant) and polyester. It now specialises in acrylic fibres, 
and cellulosic products such as viscose rayon and acetate 
yams. Its fibre plants are based solely in the UK and other 
developed countries.
Table 49: Courtaulds Pibres: geographical location of 
production and sources of supply.
Market Acrylic Viscose Acetate
Western UK UK UK
Europe Prance Prance
Spain
Rest of Exports from USA
World Europe Canada
Exports from 
UK
Source: Textile Outlook International November 1986a:51
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In acrylic fibres, Courtnulds emerged in the 1980s as the 
market leader in Western Europe. The acquisition of Cyanenka 
in 1984 boosted its market share (fros under 20% to 27%). 
Currently, this subsidiary supplies 41% of the Spanish 
■arket for acrylic fibre (49) (Knitting International June 
1987).
The company has promoted its acrylic fibre under the brand 
nase 'Courtelle' as a high fashion, high value added 
product. This has involved the development of a dyeing 
service called Neochroae, which enables small batches (two 
to ten tons) to be processed at a cost normally associated 
with long runs (cf. Textile Outlook International November 
1986a: 53). Special orders can be offered with a lead time of 
three weeks. The 'Courtelle' brand name has been 
aggressively marketed through design awards and fashion 
shows (50).
Courtaulds also produces cellulosic fibres, such as viscose 
rayon and acetate. In contrast to synthetic fibres, there 
has been no state intervention to reduce capacity so 
rationalisation occurred much later, namely during the mid 
1980s. Out of twelve producers in 1982, only six remained 
four years later and capacity had been reduced to 391,000 
tons (ie. 63% of its 1982 level). Courtaulds, one of the two 
largest producers of viscose rayon, virtually halved its 
existing capacity by closing its plant at Greenfield, North
Mai.
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Table 50: West European viscose staple production. 1983 and
1986 '000 tons per anni 
Company Country 1983 1986
COURTAULDS UK/FRANCE 130 70
Borregaard Norway 32 -
Ence Spain 33 —
Fabelta Belgium 30 —
Hoechst West Germany 60 60
Lenzing Austria 110 114
Rhone Poulenc France 45 —
Sateri Finland 65 _
Safa Spain 16 -
Snia Fibre Italy 35 —
Sniace Spain 16 30
Svenska Sweden 47 47
Total 619 319
Source: Davies 1987:10
Courtaulds has two viscose plants in Western Europe and two 
in North America. The company has dealt with the decline of 
demand for viscose fibre by developing its non textile end 
uses, particularly nonwovens, which now represent over half 
of Courtaulds' European viscose sales. It has withdrawn from 
low margin, commodity exports in competition from Eastern 
Europe and LDCs. A new wood pulp based fibre, termed 
'Genesis' is also being developed. In the production of 
acetate fibre, which is primarily located in the UK, the 
company has attempted to reduce manufacturing costs, and 
improve product quality whilst emphasising colour variety 
and fast customer deliveries. There has also been a 
diversification into non textile end uses, such as cigarette 
tow and acetate flake.
Courtaulds has thus attempted to adapt its production 
capacity to a situation of low or zero growth in the fibre 
market by limiting its range of fibres to those where it has
259
a substantial market share. It now concentrates on 
specialty, branded fibres with a high value added content 
emphasising colour variety, and swift response to customer 
requirements (51). A key part of the strategy in cellulosic 
fibres has been to increase non textile end uses (eg. non 
wovens, cigarette tow, acetate flake). Overall, Courtaulds 
has substantially rationalised its production capacity, 
whilst consolidating its facilities in the UK, Western 
Europe and North America with no relocation of production 
abroad or overseas sourcing.
Table 51: Courtaulds fibres and !•H•*«Î profits profile.
fan. 1983/84 1984/85 1985/86 1986/87 1987/88
Fibres 39 37 51 61 48
Textiles,incl. 37 47 55 63 66
Spinning 8 9 13 14 16
Fabrics 13 18 19 21 19
Clothing 16 20 23 28 31
Source; Annual Reports 1984-88
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During the 1980s, CourtouIds aussively rationalised its 
textile and clothing production capacity. The Chairman, C. 
Hogg, argued that the company:
'.........underestimated the problem of working
our way into markets from the production end 
- we did not buy market share and back it up with 
production...Me also underestimated the tremendous 
development in textile machinery which made it 
possible for less developed nations to use 
sophisticated machinery with widespread help from 
international banks and others lending huge sums 
throughout the 1970s.' (FT 28.11.80)
8.5.4 Textile»
Despite such rationalisation, the company currently controls 
25% of UK cotton spinning, 10% of UK apparel fabrics, 10% of 
the hone furnishings market and it is the UK's largest 
clothing manufacturer with 5% of total production. According 
to Buck and Adams (1985) 45% of garments, 47% of fabrics and 
8% of yarns are exported, mainly to the European Community 
but also to the USA and Japan. The company attempted to 
develop its branded products with over 30% of its branded 
sales in clothing. Production is no longer vertically 
integrated and intra group sales now amount to only 5% of 
the Group's turnover (Annual Report 1984-85). The overall 
strategy is:
'to build stronger positions in its key markets 
through constant improvement in product guality 
and specialisation, in perception of market trends 
and in service to the customer.'(pg. 14)
Long term strategy in textiles has three prongs (Annual 
Report 1986-87 and 1987-88). The Group intends to 
internationalise (including overseas sourcing) all aspects 
of its textiles business and to increase its presence in
global markets whilst maintaining its position in the UK. It
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alas to iaprove its portfolio of businesses by divestments 
and acquisitions, particularly in growth areas. It also 
intends to concentrate on aarket seqaents sensitive to 
on-time delivery, developing a quick and flexible response 
to fashion changes and high quality. The objective is to 
cater for saall orders, short delivery tiaes and tight 
inventories in a price coapetitive way.
The coapany has sought to withdraw froa the production of 
textile and clothing products which coapete with low cost 
isports and has shifted to higher value added products with 
an eaphasis on colour coordination and fast custoaer 
service. During the aid 1980s, the coapany embarked on a 
prograaae of investment in new automated technology costing 
£120 Billion (52). According to the last company report, the 
objective of the investment was to achieve growth, raise 
productivity, and quality standards and thereby reduce unit 
costs (1987-88). The company has also introduced 
productivity auditing by a centrally based teaa which 
assists individual textile companies in raising productivity 
to comparable group and industry standards. According to 
one Courtaulds aanager:
'The massive tide of pessimism at the turn of the
decade has gone'--'The anti-industrial culture
(recommending merchandizing rather than manufacture 
as the way forward for British textiles) has 
disappeared.' (Management Today May 1986:60)
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8.5.5 Spinning
Courtaulds Spinning accounts for 55% of the UK spinning 
industry and 26% of all yarn consumed in the UK (54% is 
imported and 20% is produced by UK competitors). About 8% of 
total sales are exported. Production is located mainly in 
the UK, although there are three spinning plants in Prance, 
operating under the Delebart-Mallet Fils name. These plants 
manufacture acrylic yarn (is. Courtelle) for the French 
knitwear industry and account for about 24% of yarn 
production (Buck and Adams 1985:72).
The Division was heavily rationalised during the early 
1980s. In 1979, it produced 1,800 tonnes of y a m  a week and 
employed 11,000 people at 42 factories, whereas in 1986, 
output was running at 1,100 tonnes, having fallen to a low 
point of 860 tonnes in the recession with just 4,000 workers 
at 28 sites. In one year alone (1980), 14 spinning mills 
were shut down due to a decline in orders from UK % savers, 
and growth in imports. Rationalisation and retrenchment 
appeared to stabilise by 1983, but a number of plant 
closures were announced in 1988 and 1989, including two 
acrylic y a m  mills and five Lancashire cotton spinning 
mills, leading to the loss of 1350 jobs. Closures have been 
motivated by the depressed state of the Bast Midlands 
knitwear industry and a surge in imports of low cost yams 
from Turkey, Mexico and the Far Bast (FT 4.5.88; 4/5.3.89). 
Courtaulds' spinning workforce will be reduced by around one 
third (to around 2650); the number of mills has fallen to 19 
in the UK and 3 in France and overall spinning capacity will 
return to its recessionary level. Courtaulds' interim
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results for the first half of the 1988-89 financial year 
indicates that spinning had been barely profitable. 
Courtaulds announced a 4% fall in pre-tax profits but this 
appears largely due to fluctuations in the exchange rate.
The rationalisation of spinning capacity reflects the 
withdrawal froe price sensitive coeeodity yarns and a shift 
towards y a m s  embodying a higher value added content. The 
formation of a Specialty Y a m s  Group is intended to 
strengthen the company's position in the high value added 
fashion market by the production of a range of fancy yams, 
including cashmere and lambs wool knitwear yams. According 
to the managing director, N. Parker:
'One of our major strengths is that we are active 
in markets that have a close proximity to our 
spinning operations...Customers want ever shorter 
lead times which places enormous demands on the 
spinner for a quick response. The area we 
particularly want to service is that where a 
manufacturer may use three or four different y a m s  
in a single garment, all from different sources.
We in Courtaulds Spinning are now in a position to 
supply all those y a m  requirements from a single 
source.' (Knitting International March 1987a:96)
The emphasis is on close cooperation with customers to meet 
their changing y a m  specifications so that production can be 
matched more accurately to demand. A number of mills are 
product dedicated and cater for well established, popular 
yams, (eg. the company is the principal UK supplier of y a m  
used in cotton knit sweaters) whilst several plants switch 
between different yams. The company has also shifted its 
y a m s  towards knitwear manufacturers rather than weavers.
The link from y a m  to knitted garment is direct whereas warp 
weaving takes a number of weeks to set up, and then needs to
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be sold to a garment aanufacturer or other end user.
During the aid 1980s, Courtaulds began a prograne of 
investment in the latest open end spinning systeas. These 
aachines raise productivity and draaatically reduce unit 
costs of production but equally iaportantly, they iaprove 
yarn quality. Retailers like Marks and Spencer which 
purchase 20% of the Textile Group's sales are deaanding 
better quality fabrics. Fabric aanufacturers have responded 
by installing aachines which require larger packages (or 
reels) of knot free yarn which only autoaatic control and 
splicing aachinery can deliver. Capital expenditure, though, 
is not related to any increase in capacity and is therefore 
labour displacing. Two ai 11s have been re-equipped with the 
latest open end spinning equipment, namely. Maple Mill in 
Oldhaa (1986) and Swan Lane Mill in Bolton (1988), costing 
respectively £4.5 an. and £5 an. The intention is to produce 
fashionable, high quality yarns which are price competitive.
8.5.6 Fabrics
The Fabrics sector has been the hardest hit by the recession 
of the 1980s. The return on capital employed dropped froa 6% 
in 1980 to zero in 1981 when it made an £8an. loss in 
operating profits. Overall, capital employed has fallen froa 
£234 an. in 1979 to £96 an. in 1984 although since then it 
has risen to £119 an. in 1987. The number of employees fell 
froa 22,000 in 1980 to 9,000 in 1985, with 6,000 people 
being displaced in 1980-81 alone.
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This division has sore sanufacturinq units overseas than 
spinning but these are based mainly in developed countries. 
They include a Prench weaving operation and the subsidiary 
of Clutaos Penn International with plants in the USA,
Canada, Germany, Spain and New Zealand, which manufacture 
various products, such as stretch fabrics used in corsetry 
and swimwear. Another subsidiary produces knitted fabrics in 
South Africa and an Irish operation produces towelling. 
Around 62% of fabrics are produced overseas compared with 
14% of garments and 24% of yarns. Courtaulds also engages in 
international subcontracting (Hamill 1987:16) involving the 
sourcing of fabric from overseas manufacturers based in 
India, Indonesia and China. The rationalisation of weaving 
capacity in the UK (from 250 million to 85 million metres in 
the early part of the 1980s) is connected to the withdrawal 
by Courtaulds from the production of low cost, undyed fabric 
which is now sourced internationally and finished and dyed 
by the company. New techniques of dyeing enable customer 
requests for fabric designs in alternative colour schemes to 
be produced and delivered within one week, five to six times 
faster than previously (Management Today May 1986). 
Consequently, the Division's main competitors are now 
developed countries, particularly European manufacturers, 
who dominate the supply of printed and coloured fabrics.
The strategy of the fabric division was formulated in the 
1980-81 annual report:
'...it has proved extremely difficult to compete in 
internationally traded commodity businesses where 
cost is the sole basis of competitive advantage and 
the volatility of sterling exchange rates exacerbates 
the problem. The UK fabric businesses are therefore 
concentrating on those areas where they have advantages 
in customer service, better designs, improved product
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ranges, faster response to market changes and fabrics 
of higher specification and eore consistent guality 
than their competitors.' (pg. 10).
Specialisation, and the shift to high value added fabrics 
emphasising design and colour have involved some 
re-equipment of strategically located 'niche' businesses. 
According to J. Nightingale, a director of the Group:
'Investment can only really be considered where the 
area of the market has some kind of protection such 
as unigue guality, high technology, service to the
customers, brand name--The apparel fabrics with the
greatest degree of natural protection are the warp 
knits, weft knits and specialty fabrics, sometimes 
linked to brand names. Here closeness to the customer, 
speed of service, design and innovation really come 
into their own so that the foreign competitor finds 
it more difficult to compete...'
(Textile Month January 1981:19)
Capital expenditure is aimed at improving productivity and
adding value to products. A number of plants have been
equipped with modern, shuttleless loons. The latest piece of
investment has been at one of Ashton Brothers' factories,
part of the Hone Furnishings division. The Hyde plant, near
Manchester, manufactures towelling arid under brand names
and will be re-equipped with air jet looms at a cost of £3.5
sn. Production capacity will increase by over 30%. A new
continuous dyeing and finishing plant was commissioned
during 1987 and computer aided design machinery has been
more extensively deployed (Textile Month July 1987).
Courtaulds Prints purchased a US software design system
which enables the process to be accomplished in a few hours
and with the participation of the retail buyer who can
change specifications immediately (Guardian 30.11.87). The
Division is trying to collaborate and cooperate with
retailers in an attempt to target fabrics specifically for
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the*. This is intended to eliainate inventories and shorten 
production and delivery tiaes to about two to four weeks. A 
Director of Courtaulds Fabrics stated:
'We want the 1990s to be the decade of equal partnership 
between aanufacturer and retailer. But a partnership 
where the textile industry through its innovation and 
aarket awareness seeks to retain aore value added than 
it has done in the past.' (Textile Month July 1987:19)
A number of overseas coapanies have also been acquired. In 
1986, United Elastic was acquired in the USA which 
aanufactures high quality knitted fabrics. In 1987, 
Courtaulds acquired three lace nanufacturers. It has a 
controlling interest in DLR Textiles (83.8% holding), one of 
the largest aanufacturers of lace in France, which has joint 
ventures in Japan, Spain and the USA. In 1988, Courtaulds 
acquired Liberty Fabrics, one of the largest lace makers in 
the USA for £28 an. According to M. Taylor, chairman of 
Courtaulds Textiles, the company intends to become a 'global 
force' in this area of fabric production. Moreover, in the 
UK, it has gained full control of Long Eaton Fabric, a 
knitting and lace business in which it already holds a 
controlling interest and acquired. Lace and Textiles, the 
second largest manufacturer of apparel lace in the country. 
This means Courtaulds will have about 20% of UK apparel lace 
production. The company has also continued to divest itself 
of 'peripheral' interests, notably the UK based, Samuel 
Courtauld polyester fabric business which was sold in 
February 1989 to Toray Industries of Japan (FT 21.2.89).
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8.5.7 Clothing
Courtnu Ids is the UK's largest clothing manufacturer with 5t 
of total production and Marks and Spencer's leading supplier 
with about a 15% share. The division has two branches, 
contract clothing which carries retail brand nases and is 
sold to department stores, sail order companies and 
Courtaulds branded clothing. Contract clothing produced f281 
nn. value of sales during 1987-88 and branded clothing 
produced £126 an.
The clothing group was less severely hit by the early 1980s 
recession than spinning and «reaving. In 1980-81, fibres, 
y a m s  and fabrics all slumped into a loss or very low 
profit, whereas clothing maintained its profitability and 
was in fact the second most profitable sector of the whole 
of Courtaulds business after International Paint. One of the 
main factors in cushioning the clothing business from the 
impact of the recession was its relationship with the UK's 
major retailer, Marks and Spencer and its UK sourcing policy 
(53). Nevertheless, Courtaulds Clothing has rationalised its 
unprofitable operations, particularly in nenswear and low 
priced, commodity knitwrear.
Rationalisation continued from 1983 to 1986, with closures 
of factories in the Meridian Group (contract knitwear), 
Gossard group (branded underwear), and a cutback in capacity 
in childrenswear. This was accelerated in 1988 with the 
closure of two children's clothing factories on Merseyside 
leading to the loss of 540 jobs. Part of the production will 
be transferred to factories in the Bast Midlands with
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remaining requiresents sourced from the Par East (FT 
12.11.88). Rationalisation resumed in 1989, with 384 job 
losses at three East Midlands clothing factories involved in 
the production of sportswear, underwear and lingerie. A 
branded knitwear factory in Scotland has also shed 80 jobs. 
The reduction in employment has been attributed by the 
company to intensified import competition fuelled by the 
rise in the value of the pound and depressed demand.
Overall, the number of employees in the clothing division 
has fallen from 32,000 in 1980 to 23,400 in 1986, with 
around 1,000 jobs shed in 1988-89.
During the early 1980s, there were discernible trends 
towards greater internationalisation. According to the 1981 
Annual Report (pg. 14)x
'The Group continued to develop its international 
connections in purchasing, manufacturing and selling 
and these will be improved and extended in the coming 
years.•
Two clothing subsidiaries operate in South Africa under the 
Gossard brand name producing knitted fabrics but Courtaulds 
also initiated offshore processing arrangements in a number 
of countries when sterling was strong (late 1979 to early 
1981). In 1981, a joint manufacturing operation was 
established in Portugal to produce underwear, leisurewear 
and knitwear for the lower priced end of the European 
market. A stitching unit was also established in Morocco.
The Meridian contract knitwear and underwear factories in 
Nottingham produce knitted fabric for these plants which 
make it up and ship it back to the UK for finishing, packing 
and distribution. In the same year, a Gossard plant was 
established in Tunisia to supply the German market and an
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underwear factory has also been built in Morocco.
According to Hogg, the Chairman (Knitting International 
September 1984:69):
'overseas investment will be a crucial part of the 
portfolio of a well balanced international 
manufacturing company...as far as our particular 
operations are concerned, first of all, I would 
like to say it's dm minimis. Something like 2t of 
our garment production capacity is overseas and we 
are just not able to switch more overseas at short 
notice even if we wanted to...But...if you're 
uncompetitive in, say, garment manufacture because 
you can't cope with imports, then you have a number 
of things open to you one of which...is manufacturing 
those garments overseas.'
'That is much better,...than just closing the 
garment company in the UK —  because if you 
manufacture overseas and you retain a marketing 
and design service organisation here you provide 
jobs in at least that part of the company instead 
of not providing jobs at all.'
Some products are now sourced from overseas subcontractors, 
although not necessarily from LDCs. Courtaulds Hosiery began 
sourcing tights from independent subcontractors in Italy in 
the early 1980s to supply the cheap end of the market. 
Childrens' clothing is also sourced from overseas suppliers, 
mainly in the Par Bast. But Courtaulds has not developed 
international sourcing as aggressively or as extensively as 
Tootal, neither has it embarked on a major relocation of 
clothing production overseas either by foreign direct 
investment or offshore assembly. Clearly, the joint ventures 
in Portugal, Morocco, and Tunisia enable Courtaulds to tap 
cheaper supplies of labour in the Southern European and 
North African periphery but contrary to Gilhepsy (1986:209), 
such arrangements do not (as yet) constitute a major part of 
Courtaulds' corporate strategy in this sector and UK job
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losses over the 1980s cannot be directly attributed to any 
shift in production overseas. The only broadly based 
overseas textile grouping, Courtaulds Hilton based in 
Australia was sold (to Entrad) in 1984. In the 1981-82 
Company Report it was stated that investigations into 
overseas manufacturing operations confirmed that 
productivity in the group's UK plants was generally well 
above the level in LDCs (pg. 15). The return on capital 
employed in its overseas clothing operations was 
dramatically lower than UK plants over the period 1982-84 
(table 52). Moreover, as already indicated, the Portuguese 
and Moroccan joint ventures have not been judged 
particularly profitable by Courtaulds' standards (Annual 
Reports 1983-84:18; 1984-85:17).
Table 52: Return on Capital Employed », Consumer Products
UK
1981 1982
T i ­
1983 1984
22
Overseas 22 lo 8 0
Total 14 IS 18 20
Source: Annual Report 1983-84:19
The modest expansion of its clothing interests in the mid 
1980s has primarily occurred in the UK through acguisition 
of businesses in branded clothing or those operating in 
'growth' markets. In 1986, the company acquired the 
underwear manufacturer 'Berle!'. It also bought the rights 
to the Dunlop, Slazenger and Carlton brands to extend its 
presence in the sportswear market. Colledge Hosiery was 
acquired in 1985 to strengthen its Moisey brand and the sock 
division of the UK based company. Corah was purchased in
272
1988 to double the else of the company's sock business (FT 
31.8.88).
Courtaulds' strategy to enhance its profitability in this 
sector is multi-dimensional. A central concern of the 
coepany is the expansion of its branded clothing, which in 
1985 only accounted for 12% of sales (Buck and Adaes 
1985:52). Existing brands have been eore aggressively 
marketed and advertised during the mid 1980s. In 1987, the 
Gossard brand was advertised in a £150,000 an. campaign in 
women's magazines and Lyle and Scott knitwear was advertised 
for the first time on television.
In terms of the company's manufacturing strategy, investment 
in information and production technology has been an 
important aspect of its operations in the UK. Collaboration 
began in 1984 with G EC and Pfaff (a German sewing machine 
manufacturer) to automate garment assembly which was funded 
under the EC BRITE programme. More generally, Courtaulds has 
invested in CAD/CAM, electronic knitting and dyeing 
machinery, and automated handling systems. The objectives of 
investment in production and information technology are 
various, including the shortening of lead times, improving 
the flexibility and speed of response to customer 
requirements, raising productivity and quality standards, 
and minimising inventories. The common thread is the 
reduction of production costs through mechanisms which 
resemble 'Just In Time' production and quality control 
systems.
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As clothing companies generally cannot utilise technology to 
maximise scale economies on long production runs, 
information technology can be used to reduce costs by 
raising throughput. A number of Courtaulds clothing 
subsidiaries have invested in an information technology 
system entitled 'Production Planning Control System' (PPCS) 
to improve stock control and minimise inventories. It has 
been deployed in about fifteen contract clothing companies 
which tend to operate in product markets characterised by 
intense import competition. The system keeps track of 
individual orders by identifying style, colour, size of 
garment required and monitors the progress of orders through 
the production process. It also tracks the flow of raw 
materials checking whether supplies have arrived on schedule 
and whether the quantity and quality of supplies match the 
original specification.
The system was initially installed in 1986 at Stuart 
Broughton, a contract nightwar company and has since been 
extended to other contract clothing companies in a £1.5 mn. 
investment programme. At Broughton's the system was 
particularly successful in identifying late suppliers. It 
was discovered that only about a tenth of its deliveries 
arrived on schedule and only one third cane within five days 
of the agreed delivery date. This engendered production 
bottlenecks which raised costs because many employees had to 
work overtime. Now, one third of supplies arrive on time and 
three quarters are delivered within five days of the 
delivery date. Moreover, although the number of styles in 
Broughton's range has quadrupled since 1985, the company's
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sales have risen by 50%, the level of substandard 
merchandise has been cut to 1% and raw material stocks by 
30%. Courtaulds intends that such technology will fore part 
of an integrated manufacturing systea beginning with a 
designer creating a style on CAD technology, which will 
enable thee to respond to a situation where:
'...our customers will want to know exactly when 
we put fabric on the cutting table so that they 
can change the size or style of the garaent.'
(FT 18.11.88)
Another Courtaulds subsidiary (a branded underwear 
manufacturer) has attempted to reduce costs through the 
computerisation of handling systems and a new guality 
control system (FT 28.4.88). Productivity rose by 15% with 
the introduction of computer tagged trolleys which move 
garment pieces between machines. A statistical quality 
control system has been phased in «Thereby a controlled 
sample of the work of each machinist is taken every two 
hours. If the sample fails the quality examination the whole 
batch is returned to the worker who has to recheck every 
item. During the rechecking period, the machinist loses 
production money. The progress of each individual machinist 
and each line of machinists is now closely monitored and 
notices proclaiming 'Get it right first time' are posted 
around the factory and on the trolleys of machinists who 
fail quality targets. The company estimates that reject 
rates have been reduced from 3.9% to 2% with fewer customer 
returns. Moreover, the product price has not risen since 
1985 trhen costs were 30% higher than the company's 
Portuguese competitors.
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Other companies have introduced mechanisms which reseeble 
quality circles and briefing groups. Courtaulds Jersey, 
which produces mainly cotton jersey for leisurewear, has set 
up 'corrective action teass' to raise quality standards and 
customer service, particularly as Marks and Spencer takes 
nearly 50% of its output. Courtaulds Jersey now expects no 
■ore than one fault in 25 aetres of cloth co«pared to a 
Marks and Spencer's quality standard of one fault in 10 
■etres (FT 28.4.88).
8.5.8 Su— ary
Until the early 1980s, Courtaulds was primarily a UK based 
fibres and textile Manufacturing company with a number of 
overseas interests. Although the company had engaged in 
rationalisation of its textile activities, the scrapping of 
plant, and cutl>acka in investment in this area, the majority 
of jobs and capital employed were based in the UK, and in 
fibres and textiles. The character of the company has 
changed during the 1980s, particularly since it suffered 
unprecedented reductions in profitability and output in the 
early 1980s. Although the company's textile activities are 
still large by international standards, Courtaulds has 
reoriented the balance of its activities away from UK based 
textile production, and towards the overseas expansion of 
its non textile interests, notably its paint subsidiary.
This has occurred through foreign direct investment in both 
developed and developing countries, and is motivated by the 
need to gain access to foreign markets.
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In fibres and textiles, Courtaulds has attempted to respond 
to a situation of slow or zero growth in a number of ways. 
The company has narrowed its range of fibres to those where 
it has a substantial market share. It now concentrates on 
specialty, branded fibres with a high value added, 
emphasising non-price factors, such as high guality, colour 
variety, and a swift response to customer reguirements. 
Overall, in the absence of any form of protectionism, 
production capacity has been massively rationalised, with 
the consolidation of its facilities in the UK, Mestem 
Europe and North America. There has been no evidence of any 
form of enhanced internationalisation of its activities, 
with no relocation of production abroad or participation in 
overseas sourcing.
Production capacity in textiles has also been rationalised, 
particularly in spinning and fabrics, involving the 
scrapping of plant in the UK, and massive job losses. 
Nevertheless, the company still has an extensive presence in 
most areas of UK textiles and clothing, and has implemented 
strategies to enhance its profitability in the UK. Common 
themes characterise its strategy in spinning, weaving and 
garment manufacture. Firstly, the company has attempted to 
withdraw from import sensitive products, such as the 
production of grey, undyed fabric, commodity yarns, low cost 
knitwear and childrenswear, and has sought to shift 
production to high value added areas, and products sensitive 
to non-price competition (ie. service, delivery to customer, 
high quality, flexibility to fashion changes). Thus, it has 
strengthened its production of specialty yarns, the design.
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dyeing and finishing of fabrics, the quality and design of 
garsents, and extended its range of branded clothing. This 
has been underpinned by an investment programme in new 
technology for the period 1986-89. The general emphasis is 
on raising productivity, reducing unit production costs, and 
enhancing quality standards. Investment in information and 
production technology has also been orientated to shortening 
lead times, increasing the speed of response to major 
customers, improving stock control and minimising 
inventories. The common thread, here, is the reduction of 
production costs and the shortening of the time taken by the 
whole cycle of production and distribution through 
mechanisms which resemble 'just-in-time' production and 
quality control systems. The objective is to match supply 
more closely with demand, and to improve the overall 
coordination of production and sales.
In contrast to Tootal, CourtauIds has not radically 
internationalised its textile and clothing activities. 
Moreover, the majority of the company's overseas 
subsidiaries in spinning, fabrics, and clothing tend to be 
located in developed rather than developing countries, with 
the clear intention of gaining access to markets. Its most 
recent acquisitions (in apparel lace and branded clothing) 
have been in the UK and other developed countries. The 
company has engaged in some overseas sourcing of both 
fabrics and clothing, mainly of low cost, undyed fabric from 
India and China to be finished and dyed by the company; 
children's clothing from the Par East and hosiery from 
Italy, but as yet these constitute only a small part of its
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textile and clothing requirements. A number of joint 
ventures were set up in Southern Europe and North Africa in 
the early 1980s but the Portuguese and Moroccan operations 
have not been judged particularly profitable by Courtaulds' 
standards (Annual Reports 1983-84:18; 1984-85:17). Moreover, 
the return on capital employed in its overseas clothing 
operations was dramatically lower than UK plants over the 
period 1982-84. The strategy pursued in textiles and 
clothing therefore does not appear to be synonymous with a 
massive retreat or withdrawal from textile/garment 
manufacturing and its replacement by the activities of 
'sourcing' and 'distribution' on a global basis. 
Nevertheless, there has been a clear shift in emphasis away 
from UK textiles and clothing production over the 1980s 
towards the international expansion of the company's non­
textile interests.
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8.6 TMCtll« Multinational«: in rrtrwt fro» tht UK?
The injor response of UK textile MNCs to a combination of 
heightened competitive pressures and deteriorating 
profitability has been a Massive rationalisation of their UK 
textile activities, involving the scrapping of plant and 
jobs on an unprecedented scale. The M»st recent evidence 
indicates that this process of rationalisation and scrapping 
has not been halted. Has this been accompanied by a radical 
internationalisation of textile production?
It appears that there has not been a dramatic or sustained 
build up of overseas employment during the 1980s for any of 
these MNCB. Massey's (1986) characterisation of UK textile 
MNCs as 'footloose' with the world economy as the passive 
object of their extended geographical ambitions is therefore 
a crude estimation of the respective strategies of these 
companies. Toota1 and Courtaulds have both rationalised 
overseas employment, although by proportionately less than 
in the UK. The analysis points up important differences 
between MNCs, and the emphasis placed by individual 
corporations on the balance between their UK and overseas 
activities, and particular forms of internationalisation. 
Tootal has been most active in internationalising its 
textile and clothing operations in the 1980s, through a 
major enhancement of its overseas sourcing activities. The 
establishment of overseas manufacturing facilities has been 
eschewed in favour of the subcontracting of production to 
independently owned firms and the acquisition of firms 
operating in lower cost locations. The company's overall 
strategy represents a partial withdrawal from textile
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manufacturing, particularly in the UK, and a shift to 
international sourcing, sarketing and distribution.
Coats Viyella's strategy indicated a conitient to textile 
and clothing production, and the aodemisation of its UK 
facilities through investment in computerised production and 
distribution systems. But profitability decline due to 
currency fluctuations and depressed demand has led to 
employment loss and plant scrapping in both the UK and 
overseas. More importantly, the company has augmented its 
sourcing of textiles and clothing from foreign firms. But it 
is open to speculation as to whether the increase in 
international subcontracting represents a short term 
response to the exigencies of currency movements, or a 
relatively permanent strategy. Courtaulds has an overseas 
presence in textile and clothing production but the majority 
of foreign subsidiaries tend to be located in developed 
rather than developing countries.
Courtaulds has not sought to augment its textile and 
clothing activities through extensive participation in 
overseas sourcing arrangements. The company has set up 
offshore processing arrangements in a number of lower cost 
locations but these operations constitute only a small part 
of Courtaulds' textile and clothing requirements. But there 
has been a clear shift in emphasis away from UK textiles and 
clothing production over the 1980s towards the international 
expansion of the company's non-textile interests.
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Despite the rationalisation of their domestic productive 
base, both Coats Viyella and Courtaulds still have an 
extensive presence in textiles and clothing in the UK. Since 
the recession of the early 1980s, both companies have 
attempted to Modernise production through new systems of 
work organisation, and the deployment of computerised 
technologies. They have sought to maxisise their competitive 
advantage with UK clothing retailers through the 
implementation of 'just-in-time' inventory and stock control 
systems. This has involved the application of technology to 
increasing the overall throughput of products in an attempt 
to match supply more closely to demand. Competition based on 
non-price factors has been emphasised, particularly the 
quality and design of products, and the advertising and 
marketing of branded textile and clothing goods. In short, 
Courtaulds, Coats Viyella, and - on a much smaller scale - 
Tootal, have attempted to transform the circuit of 
industrial capital within the UK, through strengthening 
their ties with dominant and powerful retailers.
The nature of the relationship between the three large 
textile groupings and clothing retailers is significant 
because manufacturing MNCs in the UK context have little 
control over the distribution of their products. This fact 
would not be so important if the structure of retailing was 
more fragmented, but large UK retailers possess sufficient 
scale to participate extensively in the international 
sourcing and purchasing of products. Thus, competitive 
strategies which aim to emphasise geographical proximity to 
UK distribution outlets are at best dependent on the UK
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sourcing decisions of Narks and Spencer, and recent evidence 
indicates that this coepany is substantially reorientating 
its purchasing policy towards international producers. The 
shift by textile eultinationals to high value added 
production and the Modernisation of their UK productive base 
has occurred too unevenly and partially to stes the 
industry's decline at the aggregate level.
The analysis has concentrated on the strategies of the 
leading producers, the structure of inter-industry 
competition, and the responses of the state to the 
industry's problems. Whilst these forces have shaped the 
development of British textiles in crucial and complex ways, 
industrial change also occurs at a more disaggregated 
level - notably, at the level of the individual workplace - 
and is thus mediated by the collective responses and 
strategies of workers, and their trade unions. The next 
chapter focuses on these key issues through an analysis of 
the reorganisation of the production process at two plants. 
The aim is to examine the concrete problems posed by the 
industry's decline and its present restructuring for 
workers, and their trade unions.
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Chapter Hln«; The Recomposition of Capital-Labour Relations 
Courtaulds has eliminated and scrapped vast amounts of 
textile plant located in the UK during the 1980s. The 
company's attempt to maintain the profitability of its 
remaining textile activities has involved radical technical 
and organisational change at particular plants. This chapter 
examines the reorganisation process at two plants concerned 
with the production of hosiery, and the spinning of cotton 
yarn. It shows that the reorganisation took different forms, 
but common elements can be discerned.
The modernisation of both plants has involved the scrapping 
of existing technology and gradual or complete re-equipment 
through the introduction of computerised production 
machinery. In cotton spinning, the principal function of the 
technology is not to displace high waged labour, as wages 
are low at the mill, but to maximise scale economies from 
long run production whilst enhancing product quality. In 
hosiery, management are attempting to raise productivity and 
reduce unit production costs whilst integrating formerly 
separate work processes, but the introduction of new 
machinery also facilitates other objectives, such as greater 
productive flexibility. Attempts have been made to raise 
throughput, which has involved the reorganisation of systems 
of inventory and stock control.
The dynamic process of industrial change is mediated in 
various ways by the responses of workers and trade unions. 
The analysis of the industry's long term decline indicates 
that fragmented and weak trade unions have been part of a
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set of crucial impediments operating against the 
transformation of the sector to a modernised, highly 
productive industry.
Trade unions and workers have facilitated the modernisation 
of the production process at both plants. The restructuring 
of pay and performance levels, and measures to raise 
throughput have involved an intensification of labour which, 
combined with the deployment of more automated technology, 
will boost productivity levels and displace labour. The 
discussion therefore highlights the manner in which trade 
unions as a social agency mediate the process of industrial 
change. A number of important questions are raised 
concerning the organisation of trade unions in the industry, 
and their ability to confront multinational corporations who 
are actively reshaping the structure of production and 
employment within a national and international context.
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9.1 Courtaulda Hosiery
The hosiery industry is dominated by fifteen large 
companies. The aost important are Pretty Polly, which had 
25% of total production capacity in 1986, followed by 
Courtaulds with 15%, Charnos with 7.5% and Nottingham 
manufacturing, now part of Coats Viyella with 7%. The 
industry is characterised by a relatively low level of 
import penetration. Companies which have been aost 
successful in retaining market share are the larger 
manufacturers who have established strong links with 
retailers. In 1985, total imports of tights by volume 
represented 32% of UK sales but approximately one third of 
these came from the Pretty Polly plant in Eire. Excluding 
these, imports represented around 20% of UK sales by volume.
Hosiery has previously been a price sensitive, commodity 
product and manufacturers added very little value in the 
fora of design, pattern variation, colour, advertising or 
marketing. Pretty Polly is the only hosiery company to have 
advertised consistently since the early 1970s. Manufacturers 
tended to maximise scale economies from long runs of an 
essentially standardised product. This is still the 
objective of much of the capital investment in the sector. 
Por example, over the period 1983-89, the number of 
operations involved in the production of commodity tights at 
Pretty Polly's plant in Eire has been reduced from eight to 
five and will eventually number three. The time taken to 
knit the leg of a tight has been reduced from 60 to 45 
seconds during the same period. Most manufacturers have 
developed their own brand names as a means of
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differentiating an essentially standardised product. The use 
of brand naees also generates a higher profit Margin than 
hosiery sold under the brand naees of retailers. 
Nevertheless, a considerable proportion of unbranded hosiery 
is still sold under contract to retailers.
Ieportant changes have occurred in the pattern of hosiery 
sales which directly inpinge on eanufacturer#s competitive 
strategies. Since 1983, the share of department stores in 
hosiery sales has fallen compared to a 15% increase in the 
share of the supermarket/grocery sector. Grocery stores (eg. 
Asda, Tesco, Sainsbury) are now the main outlet for hosiery 
sales with 37.5% of all tights sold whilst mixed retail 
stores account for 25.5%. In the grocery sector. Pretty 
Polly is the leading branded producer with a 37% market 
share. Courtaulds 'Kayser' brand is third with a 13% share 
after retail brands (Marketing 22.9.88). Tights sold in 
supermarket stores have a minimal amount of style 
differentiation. Pretty Polly manufactures a range of five 
styles made from the same yarn which only differ in terms of 
stitch changes.
Despite the growth in the share of supermarkets in the 
volume of hosiery sales, the emergence of the niche retail 
outlet Sock Shop in 1983 galvanised multiple stores like 
Marks and Spencer and British Home Stores into improving the 
range and the design of hosiery. There has been a strong 
trend towards single coloured or multi-coloured tights and 
stockings and hosiery bearing a variety of patterned motifs 
and different textured yarns. Hence, although department
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stores account for only 16% of the hosiery aarket in sales 
volume, the shift to higher value added hosiery leans that 
they account for a such higher percentage of the value of 
sales (ie. 29%).
During the 1980s, the coapetitive struggle between retailers 
has transforaed hosiery into a fashionable, high value added 
product. According to a foraer sales director of Courtaulds 
Hosiery (Knitting International May 1987b:55):
'No longer is hosiery just a leg covering: it is a very 
iaportant fashion accessory. Colour, pattern, new yarns, 
sophisticated aachinery, both for knitting and finishing 
all play their part, but above all the research and 
developaent of new styles, plus the aarketing of thea 
sake for an exciting package which has breathed new life 
into our industry.'
This has aeshed with technological developaents, such as the 
introduction of coaputerised knitting and dyeing aachinery 
which facilitates greater variety in patterns and colour. 
Nevertheless, hosiery aanufacturers are not passive agents 
in their relationship with retailers. During the 1980s, they 
have sought to shift production away froa non brand hosiery 
towards brand naae sales which have a higher profit per unit 
of output. This has been coabined with an eaphasis on the 
value added aspects of hosiery production, such as design, 
style differentiation and aarketing. In 1988, Pretty Polly 
increased its expenditure on aarketing by 50% to £1.8 an.
Significantly, over the past five years growth in the value 
of hosiery sales has outstripped that of voluae. voluae 
sales of tights have been static since 1980 at about 550 an. 
pairs a year but value is growing in real teras. Over 
1983-87, the value of sales grew froa £280 an. to £400 an.
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Table 53: value and distribution of hoalwy 1987
Value of hosiery sales 1987 Distribution by value 1987
1983 £280 mn. Grocery 23%
1984 £300 nn. Variety Chains 23.5%
1985 £340 an. Department Stores 14%
1986 £390 mn. Chemists 8%
1987 £400 mn. Multiples 7%
Independents 6%
Others 13.5%
(Source: FT 22.9.88)
9.1.1 Corporate Strategy
CourtauIds Hosiery, now called 'Aristoc', is part of the 
Courtaulds Clothing 'Brands' Group and was originally a 
collection of 22 companies acquired by the coepany in the 
1960s and 1970s. It produces tights under the Aristoc and 
Kayser brand labels, and under contract for supermarkets, 
the multiples and department stores. 'Aristoc' is generally 
a higher added value product aimed at the leading department 
stores, whereas the 'Kayser' brand is sold to grocery stores 
like Asda, Fine Fare, Tesco, and Gateway. In terns of 
contract hosiery, the company's largest customer is Marks 
and Spencer and the acquisition of Colledge Hosiery in 1984 
raised its supply to this one store to over 15% of all 
hosiery sales (54).
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Tablt 54: Court.auIda HoaUry. output and •■ploy— nt, 1987 
Court.auIda Ho»i<ry Limited
I
1 ILangley Mill Output 130,000 to 135,000 Belper
700 eaployaas dozen tiqhts/stockinqs a 700
40 to 45,000 week employees
dozen a week 90,000
dozen a 
week
Distribution of Output
Brands (64% of output)
Aristoc - Department Stores
Kayser - Grocery Stores eq. Asda, Fine Pare, Tesco.
Contract (36% of output)
Marks and Spencer (12% of output),
British Home Stores, C 6 A, Littlewoods, and Grocery 
Stores.
Export - 15% of output. France (12%), Germany under 
contract.
64% to the EEC, 30% to Efta.
Production now occurs at two factories in Nottinghamshire. 
The Langley Mill plant produces 40 to 45,000 dozen tights a 
week of patterned, atyled hosiery which are produced in 
shorter runs on slower but more flexible machines. The bulk 
of manufacturing capacity ia located at the Belper plant 
which produces 90,000 dozen tights a week in longer runs. 
All hosiery assembly is being transferred in stages to the 
Belper plant and Langley Mill will eventually be a packing 
and warehousing centre. In the future, management plan to 
relocate production to a greenfield site. Such developments 
are intended to reduce production costs and overheads.
The Kayser plant at Baldock was closed during the aid 1980s. 
According to management, this was part of a shift away from 
the production of high volume commodity tights. It was also 
an attempt to produce an average level of tights throughout
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the year rather than allowing production to fluctuate 
according to seasonal trends in hosiery demand which tends 
to peak in the winter and slump in the summer. Previously, 
there had been lay offs during the summer months when demand 
slackened. Any excess demand is now catered for by overseas 
sourcing or by destocking.
Courtaulds Hosiery began overseas sourcing of tights from 
Italian subcontractors in the early 1980s. The tights were 
sourced from Italy because of their lower cost. According to 
a Courtaulds manager:
'The Italians had the edge on us with the speed they 
adapted to changes in working practice. For instance 
since they went onto larger y a m  packages they had 
increased the machine load ...at no higher wages.
Other factors were (lower) overheads and interest 
rate charges. The Italian cottage industry didn't 
observe shift premiums, health and safety regulations 
and rates.' (National Union of Hosiery and Knitwear 
Workers, (MUHKW) 1982:3)
In volume terms the supply of Italian tights peaked in 1983. 
Overseas sourced tights accounted for 7% of sales turnover 
in 1987 and management intend that they should account for 
no sore than 10% of output reguirements. Technological 
developments during the 1980s have generated reductions in 
unit production costs which means that Courtaulds' hosiery 
is now as competitively priced as Italian tights even at the 
cheaper end of the market.
Although Courtaulds has attempted to be price competitive in 
the production of standard tights for the cheaper end of the 
market through investment in automated technology, a central 
plank of its strategy is to transform the product into a 
high value added fashion accessory. In both contract and
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branded hosiery, tights are becosing increasingly 
differentiated with more variation in styles, patterns and 
colours which necessitate shorter runs. But the cospany is 
also engaged in a competitive struggle with retailers. It 
hopes to counter the trend towards retail brands by a 
renewed esphasis on the 'Aristoc' label, which it is hoped 
will redistribute value added away from retailers. 
Courtaulds Hosiery, according to a NUHKW district official 
is a particularly proactive firm:
'the consumer doesn't determine what the patterns are. 
...all the time the manufacturers, especially 
Courtaulds are testing the market with design ideas 
...In fact I would think that probably Courtaulds
Hosiery...turns out more designs than anybody--they
test the market more than anybody.'
(Interview with Peter Hutton, NUHKtV district secretary 
August 1987).
During the aid 1980s, the company reorganised both its 
brands. In 1986 it rationalised the Aristoc range to focus 
on more fashionable designs. This has involved the 
introduction of tights with fine and fancy yarns and the 
refurbishment of its packaging, with different logos and 
colours denoting different ranges within the brand. The 
strategy succeeded in stemming the brand's decline but has 
not yet increased sales (Knitting International April 1988). 
The company has withdrawn the 'Kayser' brand from the 
supermarket sector where it was losing market share to 
retail labels, and is introducing a new range under the 
'Aristoc' name. Aristoc's annual count of styles, shades and 
sizes now exceeds 4,500 different stock keeping items. 
Nevertheless, a NUHKW district official argued that all this 
amounted to was minute and minor style differentiation:
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'I know Aristoc nnko...a lot of different styles and 
...different colours...but...a pair of tights to the 
customer hasn't altered such in the last 20 years. They 
look almost the ease; they are almost the saae; they are 
just knitted on slightly different sachines. What does 
change, ...is the way they are presented to the customer, 
...all the tise the big (retailers) are trying to 
present them in the sost fashionable way in order to sell 
a few sore.'...'they've tried all sorts of different ways 
of presenting tights either on pricing, or presentation 
to sell then. That's happening all the tise.'
(Peter Hutton, NUHKW district official, interview August 
1987)
The esphasis on the Aristoc brand has been backed up by an 
extensive marketing and advertisement campaign. A £1 sn. 
advertising campaign was launched in September 1988 which 
was the company's first marketing initiative for four years. 
The emphasis on marketing reflects a reorganisation of the 
company's management during the mid 1980s when several 
marketing specialists were recruited from other hosiery 
companies as well as from outside the industry (Knitting 
International March 1987b:78). A design and development 
group has been created which makes samples and then liaises 
with the marketing department who tests them out with the 
buyers of retail firms. This is all part of Courtaulds 
strategy to foster strong brand identification and to 
wrestle market share away from its major competitor. Pretty 
Polly and retail brand names.
9.1.2 The reorganisation of the production process 
The production process, pay levels and the gender 
composition of the work force are outlined below. Initially, 
the yarn is stretched and knitted to produce a tubular piece 
of hose. The toes are closed after the y a m  is shrunk and 
the legs are joined together. The garment is then dyed.
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examined, packaged and distributed to retailers. A snail 
group of Machinists at the Langley Mill plant Manufacture 
sasples for retailers and sew specialty Materials, (eg. 
lace) onto the tights. The highest paid tasks tend to be 
knitting and dyeing which are Male doMinated and involve 
night work.
Table 55: Courtaulds Hosiery; The Production Process. 1987
■ ork Proem Location *•1 Shift Syatan Bale P eu le
m 0 ) 0 )
far* Stretch n i l 1 Shift/
veekend vorkinq at
Inittinq l*l/l t i n Belper 1)1 11
S ta llin '/
T a b lin '
Li/I t u t 2 Shift
Ton Closiag 1 t u t 2 Shift and daya IS 91
Laq Joinin'/ 1 t i  oo 2 ahift 11 212
■ annal Savin' LI
Draia' 1 tut I sh ifts Id 1
S m i l in ' U / l tut 2 s h ift  and daya 1 226
landfold and LI noo a 25 IIS
Packin'/riniahin'
•arehoaae LI M S Daya 4« 1«
1. LM refers to Langley Mill and B to Belper.
2. Average weekly pay.
3. The three shift systea is organised froa 6 a.a. - 2.00 
p.a.; 2.00 p.a. to 10.00 p.a. and 10.00 p.a. to 6.00 a.a. 
The two shift systea works siailar hours but not the night 
shift (is. 10.00 p.a. to 6.00 a.a.). The weekend shifts 
operate froa 6.00 p.a. to 6.00 a.a. on Saturdays and 
Sundays.
New coapetitive strategies will have enoraous iaplications 
for the organisation of the production process. According to 
the Chief Executive of Courtaulds Hosiery (now renaaed 
Ariatoe):
'...we still need...productivity and efficiency levels 
raised to world standards. Better controls and systeas
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required to improve customer service and reduce 
stockholdings. We've got to have more control over 
overhead costs, which means people and space. Me 
have already massively reduced space requirements 
without any reduction in capacity, in terms of both 
factories and offices.'
(Knitting International March 1987b:78)
In the aid 1980s the company embarked on a capital 
expenditure programme costing 13 an. This has involved 
investment in additional knitting plant including the 
purchase of two electronic Nagata machines in March 1987. 
These computerised machines are more versatile and flexible 
than previous technology because they have unlimited 
patterning scope. By inserting a cassette, a hosiery pattern 
can be changed in 1.5 mins, and a new style is produced by 
feeding a new code into a computer. New electronic dyeing 
machinery has also been introduced and the packing operation 
is now highly automated. In terms of future investment, the 
company intends to automate tights assembly with robotic 
links between production operations. Automatic electronic 
devices will link together separate production processes, 
notably the toe closing, seaming and leg joining processes. 
The company also intends to invest in new CAD/CAM machinery. 
Although the capital intensive nature of the production 
process reflects the need to raise productivity and reduce 
unit costs of production, computerised machinery enables 
these objectives to mesh with greater productive 
flexibility, particularly pattern and colour 
differentiation.
The company's central aim is to increase throughput and 
reduce inventories. The production director of Courtaulds
295
Hosiery wants to achieve the productive flexibility of 
Japanese car companies, associated with 'just-in-tise' 
production and quality control systess.
'It (productive flexibility) is now all about people and 
systess. We have all becose too obsessed with 
technology.' (Knitting International April 1988:40).
The cospany is attempting to achieve 'flexibility' not just
by investment in flexible automation technology, such as
programmable knitting machines, but also by reorganising
their system of inventory and stock control. Production
lines are fed with a small amount of every order, termed
'mixed model master scheduling', which means that top-up
stocks are available for all customers. A system of
statistical quality control has been introduced whereby
quality checks are undertaken on a random basis in each
department instead of examining all hosiery before it is
delivered to customers. The union district officials
responsible for negotiations at the two hosiery plants
(William Hage and Peter Hutton) argued that the pattern of
change is particularly rapid:
'it's fair to say that things are changing from one week 
to the next and have been for the past three years now 
and that change doesn't appear to be slowing 
d o w n . ' p a r t  of it is due to customer demand..I say 
customer demand but really it's what the retailers 
inflict upon the customer...they would tell us it's 
customer demand but it's what they say we will have..' 
(WH)..'with a bit of help from advertising.' (PH)
The increasingly capital intensive nature of the production 
process has had a major impact on hours of work, skill 
levels and the pay structure. Investment in new machinery 
has led, as in other sectors of textiles, to an extension of 
shift working which has reinforced the sexual division of 
labour at the Courtaulds' plants. Hale dominance of the
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knitting and dyeing work processes has been reinforced with 
the introduction of three shift working, including nights, 
and weekend working. Wosen have tended to occupy sore labour 
intensive parts of the production process (handfold, 
examining) and seal automatic jobs (toe closing, seasing, 
leg joining) which did not involve working night shifts. The 
senior shop steward at Langley Mill argued that sale 
knitters had traditionally been perceived as an elite, 
privileged group despite the fact that the job was now one 
of machine minding. Although women were quite capable of 
doing the jobs they were deterred by the shift system which 
involves nights. Although some women do work shifts, they 
were usually single parents 'desperate for the money' 
(Interview with Margaret Bradley, senior shop steward at 
Langley Mill, August 1987).
The increasing automation of these processes has led 
management to extend shift working to female workers. Two 
shift working (6 an to 2 pm: 2 pm to 10 pm) has been 
introduced for female workers at both plants but is 
currently restricted to volunteers and new recruits (ie. 18% 
of the female workforce). Because the company had extended 
shift working to women on a restricted basis, management 
felt that it had received a more favourable response from 
workers than expected ('resigned apathy'), but the official 
union response was hostile. The extension of weekend working 
to the knitting section has also been opposed partly because 
it is against NUKHW policy for production operatives to work 
Sundays. More importantly, the company employs a separate 
workforce to work the weekend shifts but on lower pay rates
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(basic rate is £134 cospared to £152 during the week and 
shift allowances are also lower at £6.00 cospared to 
£13.00). These terms were eventually imposed after the 
management and union had 'failed to agree'.
Management and the union representatives argued that new 
technology had deskilled and routinised work processes. The 
union district secretaries argued that workers were becoming 
machine minders even in the most skilled jobs. In the 
assembly jobs in hosiery production which used to utilise 
skilled machinists, most of the workers were now 'just 
simply putting hose on a tube. They feed the stuff in and 
take it off at the other end.' In knitting there had been 
some deskilling but workers were now responsible for more 
machines than previously. Training times had been reduced 
from two to three years to two months.
Dramatic changes had occurred in the skills of dyers.
According to Peter Hutton:
'At one time they would have to very carefully mix 
all the dye..be totally responsible for making sure 
everything was done correctly at the right 
temperature.'
whereas now,
'They give then formulas and they just mix the dye 
according to the formulas....They (the dyers) will 
tell you differently but all they have to do is be 
careful they don't get the nix wrong as laid down
by computer--when you've logically examined
everything, you find out the skills gone out of it, 
everything that is hard is done for them.' (William Hage)
The union officials did not envisage any dramatic 
transformation in the sexual division of labour in hosiery 
production because of new technology. The extension of shift
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work was deemed to bo problematic for female workers
'most women don't want those sort of working hours...I 
haven't met one lady yet that wants to work those 
shifts. I've met quite a number that, for want of a 
job, will put up with it but I haven't met one that 
wants to work it.• (Peter Hutton)
If any change did occur in the gendered division of tasks,
it would probably be in the direction of the substitution of
female by male labour. Although the union recognises that
male workers have maintained their privileged niche within
the labour process in both the hosiery and the knitwear
industry because of the shift system and not the possession
of intrinsic skills, hierarchical pay structures are still
perpetuated by the union. This is despite the following
perception by the General Secretary of the NUHKW, Mr. T.
Kirk, that:
'most knitters are on piece rates,...it's the machine 
that does the work and the men get the money, the 
female doesn't have the help from the machine, every 
penny she gets she's had to do the work.' (55)
The management at Courtaulds Hosiery intended to rationalise 
existing pay grades because they were based on antiquated 
notions of skill. The proposed revision of pay grades was 
being negotiated with the NUHKW during the summer of 1987 
and is as followsî-
1. Basic Manual £95
2. Manual £100
(handfold; manual assembly; examining;pre-stretching)
3. Semi automatic £105
manual (toe closing and seaming; leg joining; packing
and examining)
4. Robotic £110
(autolink packaging; all robotically linked machines)
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The aain iapact will be the rationalisation and 
sisplification of grades other than knitting and dyeing. The 
higher wage differentials of knitters and dyers will be 
consolidated under this systes. Although the iapact of 
technology was in the sain to erode craft and skill 
boundaries, sanageeent was in the process of consolidating a 
wage structure which disproportionately rewarded workers for 
performing essentially deskilled tasks. Manual workers, even 
those doing skilled sewing jobs, will be lower paid than 
workers operating seal automatic or robotic machinery. New 
technology in this instance has had a major iapact on work 
content but not on pay differentials which are maintained on 
the basis of custom and anachronistic notions of skill.
9.1.3 Pay and Performance Levels
During the summer of 1987, a work measurement programme was 
being introduced to reorganise pay and performance levels. 
The aims of the exercise, management argued, were to 'allow 
greater incentive earnings potential' and more accurate 
piece rates, 'to ensure that each job has the right number 
of people doing it' and that 'each job is done the best 
way.' (Company Document 1987). Piece rates were regarded as 
slack and therefore needed to be tightened up to rectify 
overpayment. A work study activity sample was carried out 
with information collected on the performance levels of all 
workers. The analysts advised on new pay rates, the method 
and layout of work and appropriate employment levels. At the 
time of the interviews in summer 1987 with management and 
shop stewards at the plant, the programme had covered the 
knitting and handfold section.
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In the knitting section, at Langley Mill, workers are now 
responsible for a greater nuaber of sachines. Previously, 
one operative had responsibility for 35 Machines cospared to 
64 at Belper. This was related to the greater style and 
pattern variation of output at the Langley Mill plant. Since 
the work study exercise the ratio is one worker to 57 
nachines. This resulted in three job losses which were 
absorbed by natural wastage and voluntary redundancies. The 
resaining workers will receive higher pay. Poraerly, 
knitters at Belper received basic rates of £152 per week and 
£134 at Langley Mill. Pay rates will now be egualised to 
£152.
New pay rates have also been introduced in the handfold and 
packing section. Pay has increased overall by 23% with 
conparable increases in productivity. Manageaent stated that 
eaployaent at both factories had been reduced by 100 over 
1986-87 which had been partly due to the restructuring of 
pay and perforaance levels but there had been no coapulsory 
redundancies because displaced workers have been redeployed.
Tiae recording procedures were to be standardised, so that 
workers would all clock in and out for each work period. In 
the future, it is hoped that job losses will be absorbed by 
natural wastage (14% labour turnover) so when workers leave 
the jobs will not be filled. The possibility of coapulsory 
redundancies, though, was not coapletely ruled out by 
aanageaent.
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Investment in new technology, the reorganisation of pay and 
performance levels, and measures to increase throughput will 
collectively boost productivity and reduce unit production 
costs. According to management, productivity has increased 
since 1984 by 50% and it is estimated that over the next 
five years, the workforce will be reduced by 2 0% (loss of 
2 8 0 jobs) with the work study exercise alone leading to a 
fall of 10% in the number of workers employed. Such 
developments involve an intensification of labour which, 
combined with the deployment of more automated technology 
will boost productivity levels and displace labour.
Overall, management felt that the union and workers were in 
favour of changes in «fork organisation and investment in new 
machinery, although workers at the Belper factory had been 
more equivocal. Some workers were suspicious of the «fork 
study programme because of long standing antipathy to the 
piece rate system and the suspicion that management want to 
extract more work without corresponding pay increases.
The impact of such changes on the gender division of labour 
is less clear cut. Presently, male workers comprise 28% of 
the workforce and women 72%, but this gender composition may 
be restructured in the future in the light of several 
competing processes. The extension of shift working to the 
majority of production processes may lead to the gradual 
substitution of male for female labour, unless it is made 
materially easier for women with childcare responsibilities 
to work a two shift system. Female labour will be 
disproportionately displaced from employment at the company 
because of the increasing automation of manual processes.
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such as handfold and packing, and the introduction of a 
statistical quality control system in the examining area.
Job losses then will disproportionately hit the female 
dominated, labour intensive areas of the production process. 
It is probable that the 20% reduction in the workforce over 
the next five years will cose in the sain from female 
workers. This though say be countered to a si nor degree by 
the recruitsent of female workers into sale dominated areas 
like the knitting room and the warehouse because they were 
perceived by unageaent as less troublesome and sore 
adaptable to change than male workers (Interview with 
Personnel Manager, Stephen Spencer, August 1987).
9.1.4 The creation of a new employee culture?
'Perhaps the most difficult hurdle to overcome has 
been people and their enthusiastic acceptance of 
different practices, the importation of new skills 
in systems and computerisation - in fact the 
superimposing of a whole new employee culture.'
(The Production Director of Courtaulds Hosiery:
Knitting International April 1988:40-41)
Courtaulds has sought to create a 'new' employee culture at
the company in the hope of sustaining some sort of consensus
and acceptance of the restructuring of the production
process. In terms of relationships with workers, the
management emphasise the use they have made of various forms
of consultation and communication with the workforce. A
number of mechanisms have been used, such as work
committees, quality circles, suggestion schemes, team
briefings and company newsletters. Although all of these
mechanisms are non-union based forms of 'employee
involvement' they have been used to supplement consultation
with the union (the NUKHW) rather than to bypass it. On a
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number or occasions management isposed changes in tens and 
conditions of employment (eg. weekend working). But it did 
consult and negotiate with the trade union on the sajor 
aspects of the restructuring, such as the work study 
programme and the reorganisation of pay and performance 
levels at the plants. The senior shop steward at the plant 
felt that management were generally trying harder to 
communicate with the workforce and that the shop stewards 
had constructive relations with management.
The shop stewards regarded technological change and the 
introduction of new automated machinery as 'inevitable', and 
as 'progress' but they also felt that they were 'hanging 
onto (their) jobs by the skin of our teeth'. These 
sentiments «rare partly conditioned by the recession of the 
early 1980s and the perception that the company may not 
survive. The senior shop stewards argued that new technology 
had benefited workers by preserving their jobs, although the 
radical changes introduced by the company had engendered 
both fear and confusion. They were in particular concerned 
about the work study programme involving the tightening up 
of piece rates, which was regarded as penalising older 
workers who tend to dominate the Langley Mill workforce. 
These workers cannot easily adapt to change or pick up other 
jobs. In addition, the attempt by management to reduce 
inventories and rationalise stocks means that workers tend 
to have an inadequate or sporadic flow of work which 
depresses average wages. Thus, individualised forms of 
payment may not mesh easily with strategies of productive 
flexibility.
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Nevertheless, apart fro» hostility to the closure of the 
Kayser plant in 1984, the union district secretaries argued 
that there had been little opposition by workers to the 
recent changes at the plants. The reason for such 
acquiescence, argued the officials, was 'that there's been 
so such change they are used to it.' According to Milliaa 
Hage, at Courtaulds Hosiery:
'...things are changing fro» one week to the next and 
have been for the past three years...that change 
appears to be accelerating.'
9.1.5 The National Union of Hosiery and Knitwear Workers and 
Courtaulds; a case of '»acho aanaqeaent'.
Courtaulds, in the opinion of the NUHKW district
secretaries, had becoae less willing to consult and
negotiate with the union on issues as »ajor as proposed
redundancies, rationalisation or the introduction of new
technology. According to Peter Hutton:
'They sake the decision then they notify us. It's a 
tail end job all the ti»e...they change the unageaent 
structure (frequently)...and fro» ti»e to ti»e, we 
don't know who we are dealing with.'
'Courtaulds —  don't com in and negotiate. Now they tell 
us what they are going to do and then we have to try 
and get out of that situation.' (Millia» Hage)
The coapany cospared unfavourably with other firas (eg. 
Charnos) which tend to contact union officials for 
exploratory talks to 'work soaething out' on a autual basis. 
The perception of Courtaulds as a particularly ruthless 
employer was vividly expressed by the Vice President of the 
union at the 1984 Annual Conference:
'Courtaulds —  have spent a lot of »oney in the last 
couple of years, but,...they want a return for it...
If that is not produced, then heads roll. ...we are 
constantly pressurised for reductions in piece rates, 
changes in systeas and the pressure is never off...
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So m  of the proposals cosing through are alsost 
indescribable in their viciousness...You would 
screw up inside at the thought of how a British 
sultinational conpany could be so concerned with profits 
that...the workforce appear to be nothing sore than a 
unit of production, yet another product of the company.'
(NUHKW 1984:261)
As far as Courtaulds Hosiery is concerned, the district 
secretaries stated that levels of consultation had improved 
over the last few years although on sose issues it is still 
far froa ideal. Por example, management still purchase and 
introduce new technology without consulting the union. The 
district secretaries tend to be informed when the workers 
refuse to operate the new machinery without an increase in 
pay:
'When they can't reach an agreement then we get a phone 
call. "Your members won't work our new machine. Arm you 
going to come down and tell them to work it." The answer 
is normally no. I'll....talk to then about whether it 
should work and who it is going to affect and how much 
they should get paid for it.' (Peter Hutton)
Moreover, during 1987, the unilateral decision by the 
company to depart from established industrial relations 
procedures in the industry had increased the suspicion and 
hostility of the NUHKW. Formerly, management and the NUHKW 
had negotiated on the basis of the 'Green Book' which was an 
agreement between the union and certain companies within 
Courtaulds Clothing. In essence, it was an offshoot of the 
Knitting Industries Federation (KIF) agreement (the 
employers' federation). Although Courtaulds is a member of 
the KIF, it does not negotiate wages in the forum of the 
National Joint Industrial Council preferring to negotiate 
separately with the union. In practice, according to Peter 
Lowman (NUHKW Research Officer) Courtaulds have generally 
paid better wages than those established by the NJIC.
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In 1987 Courtaulds announced its intention to terminate this 
agreement so that negotiations were to be devolved to the 
level of the individual subsidiary. Management at Courtaulds 
Hosiery argued that the aim was to shorten the process of 
negotiation and decision making. The company felt it was 
hampered by the Green Book with its restrictive conditions 
on overtime and shift working. In certain circumstances, 
management may want to improve shift pay without the 
constraints of the Green Book. The NUHKW has reacted with 
anger to this decision because the agreement stipulated 
industry wide standards.
The fragmentation and decentralisation of industrial 
relations by the company poses severe problems for textile 
trade unions. The prevailing structure of trade union 
organisation means that the company is not confronted at any 
level by an inter-union forum or negotiating committee.
Apart from the TOC Textile and Clothing Industry Committee, 
the NUKHW research officer pointed out that the union does 
not meet with other Courtaulds• unions because the company 
is involved in multi and diverse industries which do not 
impinge on hosiery and knitting. However, sporadic and 
informal discussions do sometimes take place between the 
union and the National Union of Tailors and Garment Workers 
(NUTGW) and the Dyers and Bleachers section of the TGWU. The 
possibility of any amalgamation between the NUTGW and the 
NUKHW has been on the agenda since the 1970s but so far has 
been resisted by the NUKHW. According to Guraham (1986:180) 
NUHKW union officials and lay members feared that they would 
have little real power because the NUTGW is a much larger
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union and would therefore have a majority on the new 
executive conittee. Ironically, one of the NUHKW district 
officials interviewed still felt that the hosiery and 
knitting industry was primarily a 'craft industry' despite 
the deskilling tendencies of new technology.
'We know that they (the general unions) get sesbership 
in our industry and do not, in our opinion, give their
sesbers the sane sort of service that we give--if you
like we're a little bit proud.' (Million Hage)
9.1.6 Union Strategies; technology vs. inports 
The fragnentation of trade unions in the textile industry 
inpedes the fornulation of connon policies and strategies 
towards the problens posed by the rapid and profound 
restructuring of textile nultinationals. In the case of 
Courtaulds there exists no recognised central trade union 
forun for all unions. Moreover, the conpany's policy of 
devolved bargaining with little centralised control over 
industrial relations neans that negotiations occur locally 
despite the fact that strategies concerning rationalisation, 
and technological invest sent are constructed at a divisional 
or corporate level.
NUHKW officials positively supported conpany strategies that 
enhance the cospetitiveness of UK Manufacturing units in the 
hope that the jobs of union members will be preserved. This 
must be contextualised in terms of the rapid rate of decline 
in union membership during the early 1980s (from 1980-84 
union membership fell at the rate of 6.1% per year). 
Paradoxically, despite the labour displacement impact of new 
technology, union officials regard capital intensive 
production methods as a necessity to stave off imports.
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According to the Ilkeston district secretary, Peter Hutton:
'...if we don't go along with the new sachinery 
...which M a n s  job losses, then we aren't going 
to have a trade... because all our cospetitors 
overseas...will go along with it and ...will undercut 
us even sore...so we've got to keep everything hyper 
efficient in t ens of...new machinery. .The obvious 
effect is less people employed but....we might still 
have a business in this country.'
In terms of official pronouncements, the 1984 Annual
Conference proceedings records the reaction of NUKHW
officials to Courtaulds' investment package in the hosiery
and knitting industry. The feeling was that new technology
could still undermine levels of employment in certain areas
and therefore 'a great amount of consultation and
negotiation must take place.' (NUKHW 1984:46). Although the
NUKHW attempt to ensure that no redundancies are caused by
the introduction of new technology, in the case of job
losses, the officials aim to get a 'realistic' increase in
the wages of the remaining employees, or to get displaced
workers retrained. The district secretaries were generally
dissatisfied with prevailing levels of consultation over new
technology. The usual way of discovering that new technology
had been introduced was through circulars which are
regularly sent out from head office to shop stewards
reguesting information on this issue.
But union officials continually asserted the inevitability 
and desirability of technological change which they argued 
would enhance the competitiveness of UK companies. According 
to William Hage:
'You have to accept it or die. It's no good sticking 
your head in the sand because it's going to come in 
anyway.'
The reaction of shop floor workers in general to the
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introduction of new technology had also been one of 
acquiescence, albeit 'resigned' and 'reluctant'.
The alternative to new technology is likely to be ieport 
related job loss. At least with capital intensive production 
eethod8, the union will preserve soee jobs, and possibly at 
higher wage rates than previously. Moreover, acquiescence to 
new technology eust be placed in the context of the union's 
concern at the growth of unregulated, technologically 
backward, sweatshops in the hosiery and knitwear industry 
which tend to coepete on the basis of wage costs. Large 
companies like Courtaulda and Corah are perceived as the 
'advanced' and aodern sector of the industry offering better 
teres and conditions of enployeent than other coepanies.
The general support for productivity enhancing eeasures by 
the union is not necessarily new. During the 1970s, Michael 
Meacher, the then Under Secretary of State for Industry 
praised the union for,
'...accepting new machinery and new methods... 
to a degree which has sometimes surprised and evoked 
the admiration of other sections of British industry.' 
(Guraham 1976:169)
Prom the official history of the union, it appears that 
union leaders in particular have consistently sought to 
cooperate with management in raising the level of 
productivity in the industry and in the introduction of «fork 
measurement and method study.
The union is also positive about the trend towards shorter 
production runs and lead times in the industry. This was 
made explicit at the 1984 conference:
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'The ability to produce goods for a changing market in 
less tine than your coapetitor is a aajor factor in the 
current aarkets for our goods...The possibility of 
shorter lead tines, resulting froa the ability to adjust 
aachines to pattern changes. Bust be fully utilised by 
aanageaent in order that our industry can resist the 
inpact of i«ported products. However,...there sust be an 
inevitable iapact on eaployaent levels.' (NUHKtf 1984:183)
But the trend to shorter runs and lead tines poses real
probleas for workers paid on the basis of piece rates, when
highly productive workers aay fail to earn their average
wage because of the fast changing pace of work. A delegate
at the Annual Conference in 1986 articulated the very real
probleas that flexibility poses for workers in the industry.
'...we know, and accept, that in this world of ever- 
changing fashions we are now in an era of ever shorter 
runs, which have led to aore constant switching fron one 
job to another...we are no longer prepared to cone to 
work and accept a reduction of 12.5% in our wages under 
the guise of alternative enploynent...it is laid down in 
black and white under our National Agreeaent, whether it 
be the Green Book or the Brown.' (Mrs N Daniels: NUKHW 
1986:226)
The Temporary Interchange of Enployaent Clause allows 
eaployers to pay only 87.5% of a workers' potential 
earnings. Currently, the union is canpaigning for 100% 
average earnings or the piece rate if it happens to be 
higher, for any alternative work done. The union has also 
felt on a number of occasions that the technical 
reorganisation of the production process had been used by 
Courtaulds as an opportunity to introduce new work 
neasurenent/study systems with the precise intention of 
tightening up piece rates. For example, the introduction of 
new handling systems in knitwear factories which transport 
garment pieces to workers on rails had led to management 
trying to lower piece rates and standard minutes (NUKHW 
1986:20).
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Nevertheless, despite concern over the ispact of technical 
and organisational changes on employment levels and pay, the 
union had adopted a positive stance in relation to 
strategies which, it felt, would enhance the competitiveness 
of the company within the UK thus preserving the remaining 
jobs of hosiery and knitwear workers. This 'favourable' 
response, though, must be contextualised in terms of union 
concern at the multinational orientation of Courtaulds' 
activities, and its involvement in overseas sourcing, 
particularly of hosiery. The negative impact of Courtaulds' 
participation in international subcontracting on employment 
levels had preoccupied the union in the early 1980s. NUHKW 
officials argued that sourcing of tights from Italian 
subcontractors had been partly responsible for the closure 
of the Kayser plant at Baldock in 1984. The National 
Officer, Mr j Matlock, argued at the 1984 Annual Conference:
'The company (Courtaulds) decided that one factory 
would have to close, they would buy the merchandise, 
or source the— tights, from Italy. No matter what 
representations we made on behalf of those members, 
we could not get past the stone wall economic fact,
"We can buy then cheaper in Italy, we want then to 
support the bottom end of the market, and the idea 
is we'll close this down, buy all the cheap tuff in 
Italy, support the bottom end of the market and in our 
other two factories we will make up market goods, with 
the higher added value."'
The union also objected to Courtaulds selling machinery to 
competitors in Italy to 'make the hose which they were going 
to buy in and sell in the UK market.' Moreover, concern was 
registered at Courtaulds' involvement in offshore processing 
although it was continually stressed by the company that 
these arrangements represented only 2% of Courtaulds total 
textile and clothing operations and therefore would have
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minimal impact on UK employment. Some NUKHW district 
secretaries now consider overseas sourcing to be less of a 
problem than in the early 1980s. According to Pete Hutton 
companies like Courtaulds are now:
'more reliant on the price of the yarn and the cost of 
running hi-tech machinery rather than the wage bill, 
(therefore) the less advantage...any cheap imports 
...have over us.'
The strategic unity of textile unions tends to coalesce 
around the necessity of import controls. The NUHKtf Research 
officer, Peter Lowaan, argued that Courtaulds had not 
extensively internationalised its manufacturing activities 
during the 1980s. It had pursued a strategy of 
rationalisation rather than relocation of production 
overseas. Low cost imports were regarded by the union as the 
main threat to employment levels in the industry, 
particularly from EC countries like Spain and Portugal not 
covered by the MPA. As in other sectors of the textile 
industry, the main response of the union to the crisis of 
the industry in the 1980s has been to emphatically stress 
the job displacement impact of low cost imports and to 
campaign under the umbrella of the TUC Textiles and Clothing 
Industry Committee for stringent import controls. This 
renders them impotent to deal with a company, like 
Courtaulds, whose industrial relations policy is designed to 
exacerbate the fragmentation of union organisation, which 
tends to be sectorally or regionally based.
Contact with overseas trade unions with membership at 
Courtaulds' subsidiaries is at best sporadic. Textile unions 
do have an international trade union structure through which
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information and support are channelled. The body linking up 
textile trade unions in the industry is the International 
Textile, Garment, and Leather Workers' Federation (ITGLWF), 
an international trade secretariat, based in Brussels. It 
has very limited resources and does not organise company 
councils to link workers in specific multinationals, unlike 
some international bodies.
Criticisms of the ITGLWF (cf. Rollman 1984, Chisholm et al. 
1986, International Labour Reports 1986) centre around its 
lack of recognition of the complex constraints that shape 
union organisation in LDCs. Many workers may be organised at 
factory level but do not belong to national trade unions 
which are often sponsored by governments as compliant or 
'tame' unions. The trade unions which emerged, such as those 
at the Daewoo Company in South Korea, and at IGMC (owned by 
Bairds, a British clothing MNC) in the Philippines tend to 
exist outside of an international trade union structure. It 
also means that the International covers only a minority of 
workers in a number of European countries because textile 
unions in those countries are affiliated to a socialist or 
communist organisation. This complicates further the task of 
monitoring multinationals and coordinating union strategy 
even within developed countries (Rollman 1984).
Fragmentation of British textile unions at a national level 
therefore coexists with infrequent and perfunctory links 
between trade unions at an international level.
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9.2 Courtaulds Spinning; the re-equipment of Maple Mill 
9.2.1. Introduction
The company's spinning division covers 19 sills. Two of 
these sills - Maple Mill and Swan Lane - were thoroughly 
sodernised in 1986 and 1988 respectively. Maple Mill 
consists of two plants but the re-eguipsent prograsse was 
restricted to Maple Mill (2) which forserly had a ring 
spinning departsent and a ssall open end spinning section 
utilising first generation Czech BD sachines purchased in 
the late 1960s (56).
Chapter eight desonstrated that intensified cospetition in 
the British retail market led directly to the sodernisation 
prograsse. Marks and Spencer, which takes 20« of the Textile 
Group's sales, is constantly desanding better quality fros 
their garsent and fabric sanufacturers. They now insist 
their suppliers install sore sophisticated technology. This 
sachinery requires larger packages - or reels - of knot 
free, high quality yarn, which resulted in the decision by 
the cospany to spend £4.5 sn. to re-equip the plant at Maple 
Mill (2) with Schlafhorst Autocoro machines - the latest, 
fully autosated open end spinning sachines. These were 
gradually phased in over a two year period, fros 1986 to 
1987, and culminated in the full re-equipping of the plant 
with fourteen spinning machines, new pre-spinning machinery, 
robotic package resoval systems, air conditioning equipment 
and modernisation of the building.
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This development has had profound consequences for the 
workforce at the plant. The new machinery has the potential 
to more than double labour productivity and since there were 
no plans to increase the factory's output of 60 to 70 tonnes 
of yarn a week, employment levels have been dramatically 
reduced, from 265 employees in January 1986 to 90 in 1987. 
Senior management argued that the principal function of the 
technology was not to cut the wage bill, for the cost of 
labour at the mill was already low. Union officials 
estimated in 1986-87 that workers at the Spinning Division 
earned basic hourly rates of £2.15 for a 37.5 hour week.
With overtime, better paid workers grossed £125 to £150 a 
week (57). Before the re-equipment, management estimated 
that average pay at the mill was around £85 to £95 per week 
for a spinner «forking a discontinuous, three shift system.
Given the reconfiguration of the domestic retail and 
clothing markets and the intense competition from yarn 
manufacturers of other developed countries, management 
argued that they had to invest in the latest spinning 
technology. Any failure to introduce such technology would 
lead to erosion of market share and job losses. Senior 
management saw the choice as between 'fewer jobs and a 
future and no future at all'.
The following discussion investigates the impact of new 
technology on skill levels and the sexual division of 
labour. The analysis highlights the responses of workers and 
the strategy of the union to the technical reorganisation of 
the production process.
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9.2.2 Hew technology and the recomposition of til« workforce 
Pre-dating the introduction of the Machinery, the work 
process was divided into the pre-spinning, spinning and 
winding processes. Pre-spinning processes - opening and 
cleaning, carding, draw and speed fraee work - cumulatively 
clean and break up the dirty bales of raw cotton. The fibres 
are then straightened, separated and made to lie in a 
parallel direction and finally pulled and twisted to fora a 
very soft, thick string which is ready for spinning.
The mill had a section of ring spinning machines, which 
formed yarn by means of a spindle, and a small open end 
spinning section which produced yarn by centrifugal action. 
The winding process detects any faults in the yarn and 
finally, winds it onto packages ready for the customer. 
Generally, open end spinners are capable of higher 
productivity than ring spinners although before recent 
technical advances, they have been economic for coarse 
rather than fine fabrics. Many technical problems have been 
eradicated and Schlafhorst Autocoro machines - a third 
generation open end machine on the market since 1978 - have 
maximised the potential of open end spinning with full 
automation incorporating the winding process, and delivery 
of high quality yarn on large packages at speeds of up to 
80,000 revs, per minute. The production of yarn occurs in 
long runs, with output at the mill estimated at 60 tonnes of 
y a m  a week. Because most of the y a m  produced is continuous 
running, about 8 0% of the machines do not alter at all for 
at least six month periods. The result is that scale 
economies from long run production can be secured whilst
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Maintaining standards of high quality.
In terms of the impact of the machinery on skill levels, 
technological change is not a new phenomenon in the cotton 
textile industry and there are few work processes left which 
are intrinsically skilled. The union concerned felt there 
was less 'skill' involved in all work processes and this was 
inextricably linked to increasingly capital intensive 
methods of production. Turner argued in 1962 (p. 10-11) 
that:
'few occupations in the cotton industry are intrinsically 
skilled in the sense that their adequate performance 
necessarily requires any long preliminary training. Host 
of the work is simple machine tending - feeding the 
machine with its material, removing its product, 
keeping it clean and free from obstruction.'
Even these are now defunct manual operations. The last
bastion of an apprenticeship system at the mill centred
around Card Attendants, a group which achieved skilled
status by monopolisation of union office and exploited
technical change at the work place to extend their control
over machinery. In the cotton textile industry, workers in
the card room have customarily been paid higher pay rates
than spinners (a £5 to flO differential at the mill
predating the re-equipment). This historic relic of skill
will now finally be destroyed by new technology.
Mill management felt spinning processes had been deskilled 
over many years by new technology and workers will only get 
minimal training for the new spinning machines. Both Card 
Attendants and Draw Frame operators (pre-spinning 
operations) will have their skill marginally reduced 
although these jobs have been semi-skilled now for some
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tine. The only relatively skilled job that is craatad by the 
introduction of these aachinaa ia that of aaintananca 
technician, and this position will be filled by a group of 
existing aale supervisors. In short, new technology has not 
enhanced worker autonoay or increased task variety, but has 
further deskilled already routinised work processes.
Consequently, there have been no obstacles to the 
re-equipaent posed by craft workers or strategically 
powerful bargaining groups within the aill. Autocoro 
aachines not only raise productivity levels (they are six 
tiaes as productive as the 1960s generation of open end 
aachines which were three tiaes as productive as ring 
spinning aachines) but they also aliai nate certain work 
processes, notably the speed fraae and winding operations 
and in this instance, will eliainate less productive 
technology like the ring spinning and the saall open end 
spinning section.
Autocoro
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The application of new equipment has had important 
implications for the sexual division of labour at the mill. 
Hitherto, the opening/cleaning and carding functions «rare a 
male preserve, as was the open end spinning section. Draw, 
speed frame work and ring spinning «rare performed equally by 
men and women, with winding an exclusively female preserve. 
All production «rorkers, except winders, were employed on a 
shift system, with the open end spinning section on a 
slightly different pattern involving weekend wrork and 
slightly longer hours tthich resulted in higher average pay 
rates.
In terms of the relative position of men and women, it is 
clear that although male workers have been affected by the 
job displacement impact of technological change at the mill, 
they will be able to secure the majority of the remaining 
jobs. This is the result of complex long term shifts in the 
gender and ethnic composition of the workforce at the level 
of the industry. The proportion of men employed in spinning 
has been rising since the end of 1959 (cf. Miles 1968 and 
Malby 1986). This can be attributed to the growrth of shift 
«working, involving night «fork intended to increase the 
utilisation of machinery. Women were prohibited from night 
work unless exemption from legislation was obtained and this 
led to the gradual substitution of white female labour by 
Asian males. According to Singleton (1986:106) in 1965 
Asians comprised 7% of the labour force in the UK cotton 
industry and by 1968, 59% of operatives on night shifts in 
spinning and 36% on night shifts in weaving «rare immigrants.
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There has always been a higher proportion of sen at Maple 
Mill (2) because the open end section has worked a shift 
system which involves night and weekend work, considered by 
both management and the union to be unpopular with female 
workers and white males. This shift pattern will be 
generalised to all workers in future. In fact, shift working 
which gained ground in the 1960s was emphasised by 
management as the principal reason for the transformation of 
the industry from a female to a male dominated workforce. 
Permanent night shifts or weekend work were held to be 
inconvenient for women because of their "domestic 
responsibilities". Furthermore, in relation to negotiations 
over the introduction of this technology, union officials 
had not considered negotiating shift hours which would 
explicitly suit the needs of working women with children.
The continuous multi-shift system which revolves around a 
four week pattern (two weeks on days, two weeks on nights 
7.30 am - 7.30 pm, 2 days on, 3 days off; 2 days on, 2 days 
off; 3 days on, 3 days off - then onto nights) has been 
generalised to all workers. Mill management argued that the 
only other option would have been a rotating day and night 
shift, whereby people would be permanent day workers or 
night workers but this would have involved higher 
differentials for night work which ran counter to the 
company's policy of eradicating pay differentials. The shop 
steward at the plant favoured the extension of a 
discontinuous three shift system (6 am - 2 pm; 2 pm - 1 0 pm; 
10 pm - 6 am) and a separate weekend shift. This, he argued, 
would have preserved the jobs of a few more workers and led
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to the employment of people who could not work nights but 
again, this system involves higher pay differentials for 
workers on nights.
Currently, only 16 out of 79 production workers are now 
employed on day shifts.
Machine Minders 28
Ancillary Operatives 16 
Shift Overlookers 12
Beamers 16
Other 7
Total 79
Fourteen operatives work a typical shift, involving one 
shift overlooker, two technicians, seven machine minders and 
four ancillary operatives.
The people selected to be operatives on the new machinery 
were the open end spinners who management felt had the 
requisite 'skills' despite it being a semi/unski1led job. 
Length of service, insisted on by the union, was also taken 
into account. The shop steward at the mill argued thus:
'a lot of the (female) winders felt that they should 
have been given the opportunity to train on this type 
of machinery but...our initial argument was - and it
wasn't really a case of jobs for the boys--- it was
that if anybody's doing a job then they should be 
...given the first chance. The jobs were limited so 
obviously we couldn't say right well anybody can come 
in and train on them.' (Interview with Mick Malsh,
Summer 1987)
The Opening/Cleaning and Card Room section will remain 
predominantly male after the introduction of Autocoro 
machinery. In fact, all the operations to be phased out are 
ones which predominantly affect women - speed frames, ring 
spinning and winding. The single case of reskilling
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resulting fros the re-equipment (saintenance technicians), 
will benefit wale supervisors froa whose ranks recruitaent 
will coat.
Previously, the proportion of wo wen to sen was one third to 
two thirds and aost woaen worked either as winders on day 
shifts (90% woaen) or in the ring rooa as spinners and 
doffers on double day shifts (roughly 50% women). How, woaen 
account for only 10% of production operatives with two women 
working a multi-shift system (these were previously a draw 
fraae worker and an ancillary operative), and six woaen 
employed as beaaers on a day shift. The Personnel Officer 
(interview with Doreen Broadbent in the suiter of 1987) 
argued that aulti-shift work involving nights and weekends 
had had a massive impact on the numbers of women employed at 
the mill. An additional factor militating against the 
retention of female workers was the necessity for the 
remaining workers to possess the requisite 'skills', 
particularly carding and draw fraae work which had always 
been male dominated occupations. A number of young women 
applied for aulti-shift working but the Personnel Officer 
argued that they were not taken on because they did not 
possess the relevant 'skills' or fulfil the length of 
service requirement. According to the Personnel Officer, new 
technology in this instance had not benefited female workers 
at all.
The ethnic composition of the workforce had been 
consolidated by the introduction of new technology. Twenty 
four production and ancillary operatives are Asian,
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comprising 30% of the workforce. All the Autocoro 
operatives, half the packers and labourers and three out of 
the eight draw frame/card attendants are Asian males. The 
Personnel Officer stated that Asian females (like white 
feeales) were previously employed in the winding rooa on day 
shifts because they «fere 'nimble fingered*.
There has been consolidation of «rhite males in positions of 
authority at the plant, as shift overlookers, technicians 
and general managers although ««hits males also perform 
production and ancillary tasks. Female workers, both Asian 
and «rhite, have been displaced from employment largely 
because of the extension of the shift system to all 
production operatives but also because other highly 
discriminatory factors «rare taken into account in the 
allocation of workers to new tasks at the mill, notably, 
length of service and possession of requisite 'skills*.
These factors inevitably favoured the retention of both 
Asian and white male workers at the plant. White males 
account for the majority of managerial and supervisory 
positions in the mill «rhereas Asian males perform a sizeable 
proportion of the production and ancillary jobs, 
particularly on the Autocoro open end machines run on a 
continuous multi-shift basis. These patterns of change at 
the mill clearly form part of broader historical shifts in 
the composition of the workforce representing the complex 
intersection of gender, race and class factors.
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9.2.3 The response of the union and worker« to th« 
re-aqulp— nt of the »111: conflict: and coni>n»u».
The official union perspective on the re-equipment proqraue
was conditioned by the recent decimation of its aeabership
and individual worker's attitudes too were inevitably
affected by high levels of uneaployaent and the drastic
rationalisation of the Lancashire cotton spinning industry.
Between 1974 and 1985, the aeabership of the old Aaalgaaated
Textile Workers' Union (ATWU) fell froa 45,243 to 15,331.
The union's response to technological change also reflects 
historical factors. The ATWU, established in 1974, resulted 
froa a merger of five separate unions each of which had a 
predominance of aeabership in the cotton and allied textile 
spinning and weaving industries. Despite this aaalgaaation, 
the union kept a federal structure with two distinct levels 
of autonoay; the central organisation (the ATWU) and the ten 
districts which comprise the ATWU. Each district had its own 
set of rules and systea of internal government with aeabers' 
grievances and problems being processed initially at this 
level.
Turner (1962) in a study of the cotton unions, argued that 
despite some major disputes in the industry, the leaders of 
the cotton unions did not view industrial conflict as an 
instrument of broad social or political change, or strikes 
as anything aore than an occasional necessity. Another 
factor was the cotton unions' over-reliance on full tine 
officials. In comparison with engineering and dock workers, 
unofficial shopfloor based movements were rare in the cotton 
industry and the level of workshop disputes was negligible.
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Turner argues, (1962:28-29) Moreover, that union leaders and 
employers colluded to liiit the occasion for factory 
disputes by elaborating a general code of principles for 
their resolution. These historical antecedents - political 
conservatism, over reliance on full time officials, weak 
traditions of shopfloor resistance and the peculiar federal 
system of district autonomy - all shaped the character of 
the ATWU.
As a consequence of the ATWU's rapid decline in membership, 
which threatened the viability of the union itself, the 
union voted by a majority of four to one to merge with the 
General, Municipal and Boilermakers Union (GMB) in April 
1986. The shop steward at Maple Mill argued that under the 
ATMU:
'shopfloor organisation was —  neglected...because 
people would always go up to the (district) office 
to present the complaint...and the full time officials 
would come down and deal with it— the full time 
officials were far sore involved than an organiser is 
for the GMB and they tended to hold all the power and 
information and deal with a lot of issues that should 
be dealt with by shop stewards.'
The amalgamation of the ATMU with the GMB was regarded as a
positive development because of the general union's emphasis
on the role of shopfloor organisation. But textile workers
still expected the district officials of the Textile
Division to get involved in the first stage of disputes
rather than shop stewards.
Neither the union at an official level or at the plant 
opposed the introduction of new technology as such. It was, 
however, pledged to fight any compulsory redundancies. The 
chance of higher pay and better conditions for the remaining
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workers and the possibility of redundancy money which about 
one half the displaced workers wished to take despite the 
offer of redeployment, overcame any potential resistance to 
the re-equipment of the mill. Por workers who live in 
communities devastated by unemployment and who work in a 
drastically rationalised industry, the option of resisting 
new technology is not attractive. In the case of Maple Mill 
2, workers were aware that their mill was antiquated and 
full of obsolete equipment, and that workers in surrounding 
mills would probably be more than willing to accept the 
re-equipment. The shop steward at the plant argued that 
there was a lot of apathy over the reorganisation of 
production at the plant. He attributed this to,
'the general situation outside. The economic climate 
at that time. People were frightened to death. They 
still are now. They are frightened to death on the shop 
floor of doing anything, stepping out of line anywhere. 
They put on a bit of bravado but when you work with 
them, you can see— (how far) they are prepared to go 
and it's not actually very far.'
It was argued that the official union response had been 
motivated in part by 'new realism' and the fear that if the 
union did not accept technical change Courtaulds would 
respond by relocation or rationalisation. But on the 
shopfloor, according to Mick Malsh:
'there was no optimism - it was a case of well at 
least we are going to save x amount of jobs out 
of it.'
Shop floor attitudes to the new technology had been 
conditioned to a large extent by previous closures and 
rationalisation. In this context, opposition to the 
introduction of new technology would have jeopardised the
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competitiveness of the mill and the remaining jobs with few 
tangible gains. Nevertheless, other issues surrounding the 
introduction of the new machinery such as job reallocation, 
redundancy, pay levels and multi-skilling became the focus 
of discontent which eventually opened up significant 
ruptures and fissures between the old ATWU negotiators and 
the workers at the plant.
9.2.4 Redundancy; contradictions between the union and 
workers.
The introduction of new technology has massively reduced the 
numbers employed at the mill. In July 1987, 90 people were 
employed at the mill compared with 265 in January 1986. 
Senior management, though, wanted to absorb the displaced 
workers through redeployment, natural wastage and a limited 
number of voluntary redundancies. Consequently, a minimal 
redundancy pay deal was negotiated with the union (a maximum 
of six weeks pay on top of the statutory redundancy pay) to 
discourage those attracted to the option of redundancy. An 
upheaval allowance of £25 per year of service was agreed for 
workers redeployed to other mills (except those moving to 
Maple Mill One). Moreover, recruitment at other Oldham mills 
was temporarily frozen to ensure a guaranteed supply of jobs 
for redeployed workers.
According to the Personnel Officer, 90 people were made 
voluntarily redundant after being offered the opportunity to 
retrain, 53 were absorbed through 'natural wastage' and 44 
were redeployed to other mills (21 to Maple Mill One). The 
mill management felt that the redundancy issue had been the 
most divisive and troublesome mainly because many workers
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(in particular Aaian sales who it was argued wanted the 
aoney to start their own businesses) wanted the redundancy 
aoney rather than redeployment. According to the Management, 
they attempted to mobilise the shop stewards to press for 
redundancy money which was contrary to the objective of 
union officials to preserve as many jobs as possible.
The shop steward at the mill was aware of the contradictions 
that this posed for union strategy and policy:
'It is pretty hard for a union official to turn around 
and say you should be allowed redundancy and..fight 
for redundancies but the people themselves were asking 
for this. They wanted redundancy.'
He argued that workers felt the company was not preserving
their jobs but offering them alternative ones which were not
necessarily regarded as desirable. Moreover, it appeared
that many workers had formulated their own individualist
strategies to deal with the job losses. According to the
shop steward:
'a lot of people thought - they are pretty sharp - well 
if Courtaulds can find 150 jobs in 12 months (at other 
mills) then they must have a high turnover of labour 
and...if I get my redundancy and sit tight, then I'll 
just trot in, in a few months time which is happening 
in a lot of cases.'
High rates of labour turnover would allow additional workers 
to be taken on after receiving redundancy aoney. The shop 
steward argued thus:
'Courtaulds have got a shocking record on turnover.
They pay bad wages, no natter what they say, their 
record is absolutely disgraceful, compared to other 
industries. Textiles, in general, the turnover of 
labour is shocking.'
An additional factor that persuaded workers to opt for 
redundancy was the probability that the company would 
continue to rationalise production capacity throughout the 
1980s. The shop steward argued that Courtaulds:
'have got a definite programme of rationalisation.
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In Nuaber One Bill they are talking of 40 odd people 
being phased out in various jobs...'
and this was not because of new technology but cost savings.
9.2.5 The Significance of Pay
The discontent and bitterness, which the shop steward 
regarded as peraeating all aspects of the negotiations, 
crystallised around the issue of pay rather than the 
introduction of the new aachinery. Initially, the shop 
stewards at the plant aiaed to negotiate a substantial rise 
in the basic wage, with shift pay and overtiae as 
suppleaentary preaiuas. According to Nick Walsh, the coapany 
was arguing that:
'this was going to be the aost aodern plant in Europe 
...we turned round and said well if...we are going 
to lose two thirds of the people that are eaployed 
...then there are going to be substantial rewards for 
the people who are left because...this will be the 
precedent--' .
In contrast, the coapany's objective was to negotiate a 
relatively low increase in the basic wage but with high 
shift preaiuas. The shop steward argued:
'we did not think these were excessive wages...
We were asking for £200 initially, based on a £175 
basic wage...but we did not think those were excessive 
for the aost aodera sill in Europe.'
The coapany's original pay offer of £135 for ancillaries and 
£150 for production operatives was rejected by both the 
workers and the ATWU officials who atteapted to get this 
offer increased by £5. A final offer by the coapany was 
declared, however, and so the union aeabers at the plant 
voted on the issue of industrial action. According to the 
shop steward, the necessary two thirds aajority was
forthcoaing but:
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'behind the scenes, the stewards were finding out that 
people were not prepared to back it up, so there was 
a hell of a lot of bluff involved at that time.'
At one point during the negotiations, the company threatened
to write to each individual worker to info» thee that
unless they accepted the offer and attended work it would be
assuaed that they were in breach of contract. According to
the shop steward:
'We then had to call a meeting pretty rapidly of 
everybody that was going to be involved -...the 
apathy...there were people actually in working on 
overtime while that meeting was going on - shocking 
attendance.'
The bitterness over pay did not result in industrial action 
because of a complex mixture of fear and apathy. At the time 
of the negotiations, the shop steward felt that the 
management knew of the employees' resentment but were 
content to exploit their reluctance to take industrial 
action, particularly
'with people queuing up for these jobs..at the time, 
people from within this mill were queuing up for the 
jobs. There was a tendency to start wavering.'
Moreover, this was exacerbated by the knowledge that the
remaining workers would materially benefit from the
re-equipment. The shop steward described it as an
'...I'm alright Jack feeling, don't rock the boat... 
...it's not much when you add it up, £30 odd..but 
they are starting to make commitments with that £20 
or £30. The novelty has worn off now, that £20 or £30 
is committed to the car or to the house...you can see 
it, don't rock the boat..'
The ambivalence over industrial action was supplemented by 
divisions between workers. The packers, for example, were 
hostile over the pay deal because they were classified as 
ancillary operatives and on a lower basic pay rate than 
machine minders.
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Eventually, £167 was negotiated for machine ainders which, 
after the 1986-87 pay rise of 5.5%, culminated in an average 
wage of £175 per week. Currently, machine minders are paid 
an average of £185. More importantly, the pay negotiations 
narked a break with customary differentials, particularly 
the complex proliferation of pay grades in the industry. 
These have been completely rationalised and all production 
operatives are now classified as either machine minders or 
ancillary workers (packers/handlers etc.). The basic rate 
for machine minders is 14% higher than the rate for 
ancillary workers and the pay differential that had 
previously operated between spinners and carders has now 
been abolished. Nevertheless, the union members at the mill 
were still not satisfied by the pay deal because they wanted 
an average wage of £ 2 0 0 inclusive of a shift premium.
The GMB district official who now represents members at 
Maple Mill, (with the amalgamation, many of the old ATWU 
officials had retired) Pat Jenner, also argued that workers 
at the plant were still very unhappy about the pay deal and 
admitted there had been fundamental differences between 
union officials and shop stewards about the pay issue. 
According to Mick Malsh (shop steward), a former district 
official argued at the time that:
'you cannot have a quantum leap and suddenly appear 
well paid..and we (the shop stewards) said well if 
you don't do it now..based on their (Courtaulds) past 
record then you are not going to get it because...you 
will get your £30 and they will start whittling it
away. They will add extra duties on and--
rationalisation will appear in the future...'.
The former General Secretary of the ATWU (Jack Brown) who
negotiated the pay deal did not wish the plant to become
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established as an elite Bill in teres of pay. But Pat Jenner 
disagreed with this strategy, because the negotiations at 
Maple Mill and the pay rise had set a precedent for 
negotiations over the re-equipment of other sills. It 
appeared that soee union officials (including Mr Jenner) 
wanted to negotiate a larger pay increase for just the 
Autocoro operatives rather than for all machine and 
ancillary workers. In any case, it was felt that the union 
should have persisted in its claim for £ 2 0 0 but that it 
could have been phased in over a three year period. The 
dispute over pay opened up significant fissures over 
strategy between the union officials and the shop stewards 
at the plant. But the rationalisation of pay grades at the 
■ill was also connected to the realisation of a such wider 
managerial strategy, notably the attainaent of a 'su11 i— 
skilled (sic) workforce'.
9.2.6 Flexible working; an intensification of labour?
The introduction of new Machinery was clearly an opportunity 
for management to facilitate a degree of functional 
flexibility amongst the workforce. It was envisaged that 
flexibility would operate between workers classified as 
machine minders (ie. between draw frame/carders and 
spinners) and between ancillary workers. The old ATMU union 
officials appeared in 1986 to be in broad agreement with 
management over the desirability of flexibility. Jack Brown, 
the former General Secretary, argued in favour of unit teams 
responsible for a combination of machines and a pay 
structure whereby all direct labour would be on the same 
basic rate.
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But in the suiier of 1987, these negotiations appeared to be
as conflictual and as bitter as those over pay. The shop
steward at the plant pointed out that:
'...we still haven't com to any final agreement on 
work levels, loading ... This is the sort of thing 
that drags on and on. No doubt eanageeent will say 
they haven't got the plant fully operational yet. The 
ateosphere has changed completely...you don't see 
people selling anymore.'
The Head Overlooker at the mill pointed out that the aim was
to increase the workload of individual machine minders, and
that each person would be responsible for more machines.
Hence, it was envisaged that with the Autocoro machines, one
man (sic) would now look after twenty machines rather than
the previous ratio of seven machines. Plexible working had
been introduced by the end of 1988 but it appears from a
recent report that neither functional flexibility or the new
shift system were particularly popular (FT 5.12.88).
According to one worker (a draw frame tenter):
'It's hard enough what we're doing now. But what we're 
going to be doing will be even harder....The hours are 
unsocial; it's noisier; dust has improved but not a great 
deal...Doing nights is not good for anybody..If I had a 
choice I'd go back on days.'
He argued that multi-skilling involved more work and heavier 
loads (is. it was argued that the 30 kilo tubs of half 
finished yarn which are lifted off the production line are 
fuller and heavier than previously) but the quality and 
enjoyment of work had not improved. An Autocoro operative 
who was being retrained to operate the draw frames 
complained of deskilling and the fact he was working harder 
than previously:
'There's nothing much to enjoy in the cotton industry.
All you have to do is work for a living.'
(FT 5.12.88)
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Management had therefore used the introduction of new 
machinery to intensify the pace and scope of work at the 
mill. The shop steward pointed to other examples which 
reinforce the perception of labour intensification:
'over the past seven years,... they (the company) have 
started tightening up, cutting down on the workforce, 
and tightening up over petty things. Therm ia a move 
afoot to bring in time clocka which they have never 
had before, chasing people on particular jobe. The 
pressure is on them (workers) now and it is building 
up. People tend to look at Courtaulds as a very low 
paying firm that made vast profits and they look at 
the multinational aspect of it.'
The deterioration in relations between Courtaulds' 
management and workers at the mill does not appear to have 
been alleviated. The shop steward argued that the bitterness 
originated several years ago when it was rumoured that the 
sill was to be re-equipped and management failed to consult 
the workers or the union. The shop steward argued:
'...I don't think they'll ever get the atmosphere back 
(at the mill). I can't see it until there is a 
complete change of operatives...there is just an 
undercurrent you feel all the time. You couldn't 
channel it in any direction. Management can't channel 
it. They can't channel it into support...they had a 
film show for everybody and we were all given
Courtaulds' badges--No matter what is happening
people are not prepared to tip the scales.'
This contrasts with the personnel officer's perception that
only minor 'teething' problems with the new machinery had
affected workers' morale and low levels of labour turnover
and absenteeism demonstrated that workers were relatively
content at the mill.
The negotiations at Maple Mill established a precedent which 
is being extended to other mills currently undergoing 
similar re-equipment. At the Swan Lane plant the union and
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management negotiated a pay deal in November 1988 based on a 
single grade 'multi-skilled' workforce (FT 23.11.88). The 
traditional grading of direct and indirect textile 
operatives and the myriad of different payments associated 
with different grades has been replaced with an agreement 
whereby all employees earn the sase basic pay. All day 
workers earn a common shift premium, as do all night 
workers. Employees are organised in teaas and supervised by 
a teas leader. Management view such deals as a way to 
improve industrial relations and reduce the time involved in 
negotiations and openly state that they wish to extend such 
arrangements to cover the majority of plants. The present 
GMB regional organiser for the Textiles Division, Mr Bob 
Trotter, argued that the union had been forced to come to 
terms with the concept of a multi-skilled, single grade 
operative because of the introduction of new technology.
9.2.7 Pay: the emergence of industry wide militancy 
The introduction of new technology at the Maple Mill plant 
indicated that hostility centred primarily around the issue 
of pay rather than the machinery itself. Conflict over pay 
at the mill did not translate into industrial action. But 
bitterness with successive pay deals negotiated with the 
British Textile Employers' Association (covers 120 
employers, of whom Coats Viyella and Smith and Nephew are 
the largest) and Courtaulds (who has negotiated separately 
with the unions in spinning and weaving since 1981) led in 
May 1988 to the first large scale disruption in the cotton 
textile industry since the early 1940s.
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The textile and clothing industries are one of the lowest 
paying sectors within British Manufacturing, as table 56
Table 56: A Comparison of Average Hourly Earnings in
Textiles, Clothing and Manufacturing Industry. 1987.
All Full Ties Average Avqe. Earnings
as a % of full 
time workers in 
all manufacturing
Manual Workers:
Textiles 327.4p 77.5*
Clothing 279.3p 66.0*
Full Tine 
Men:
Textiles
Manual
366.3p 86.7*
Clothing 339.7p 80.5*
Full Time
Women:
Textiles
Manual
270.lp 63.9*
Clothing 259.8p 61.5*
All Full Tine
Workers - All:
Manufacturing 422.7p
Source: Department of Employment Gazette October 1987 survey
Moreover, over the period of the recession, earnings 
declined both in real terms and in relation to the earnings 
of other groups of workers. During 1979-85, earnings fell in 
relative terms compared to levels in manufacturing, as the 
figures below demonstrate.
Table 57: Average Hourly Earnings in Textiles as a 
percentage of average hourly earnings in manufacturing. 1979 
and 1985
1979 1985
Full time manual men 89* 81*
Full time manual women 94* 88*
Source: Mew Earnings Survey 1985
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The unions cooperated with low pay increases, which were 
effectively real wage cuts during the recession on the 
implicit understanding that workers would be materially 
compensated during any post-recession recovery. In the 
ATWU's last annual report before amalgamation with the GMB 
it was stated that:
'Por a number of years we, as a union have recognised 
that the employers, because of recession and poor 
profitability were genuinely unable to meet in full 
«That to us were legitimate claims. Me had nursed the 
hope, and belief, that if circumstances improved we 
would be able to make up lost ground and to narrow the 
gap that has g r o w  in pay differences between our 
members and those engaged in manufacturing industry 
in general.' (1985:5)
This 'moral' understanding disintegrated in 1985, a year of 
relatively buoyant activity in the industry, when employers 
pegged the annual pay increase below the increase in the 
cost of living. Eventually, discontent with pay levels 
culminated in the strike of May 1988, when 73% of GMB 
textile workers voted for industrial action with only 8 out 
of 81 sites voting against. The industrial action affected a 
total of 11,500 workers represented by five trade unions.
The union claim included an £11 a week increase which 
represented a rise of 10.4%. The BTEA were offering a 5.5% 
increase, and a £5 increase on minimum earnings of £78.50. 
The industrial action took the fora of 24 hour stoppages 
held every week until management returned to the negotiating 
table. The strike also spread to Courtaulds and by 1 June 
more than 3,000 workers at Courtaulds mills had stopped work 
indefinitely. At this company, the GMB were seeking a pay 
increase of 10.4% for shift workers and a £10 a week 
increase for low wage earners. Courtaulds made a 6.5% 'final 
offer'. The union claimed unanimous support with all of the
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21 Courtaulds ailla closed.
The diapute engendered diaunity within the BTRA. Saith and 
Nephew negotiated the firat breakaway aettleaent with the 
uniona and offered 6.5% or between £10 and £13 a week for 
lower paid eaployeea and an extra daya holiday a year. 
Eventually separate deals were negotiated with seven other 
coapanies, all of which iaproved on the BTEA offer ie. 6.5% 
to aost workers and aore (£6 to £10 a week) to staff on the 
lowest wage scales. By the end of the dispute, thirty of the 
120 plants had settled outside the auspices of the BTEA.
Courtaulds eventually offered workers an increase of 5.5% 
and a local productivity rise of 1.5%. The current ainiaua 
earnings level of £78.60 was to increase by £10 to £88.60. 
The coapany stated it would try to accelerate the process of 
productivity bargaining at its plants. A aajority of 58% 
voted in favour of the coapany's pay offer (1,991 to 839) 
and by 21 June, a ballot of the TGWU and GMB showed a 54% 
aajority in favour of the BTBA's offer which would raise 
aost workers' pay by 6.5% and provide a ainiaua earnings 
level increase of £6.50.
Courtaulds' workers rejected the suggestion that the strike 
was purely the result of the GMB's greater organisational 
ability. According to one worker at Pox Mill, Oldhaa: 'The 
union has done nothing to us. Courtaulds has aade us feel as 
we do.' The strike was aotivated by other issues in addition 
to pay, notably the coapany's savage retrenchaent prograaae 
and the deteriorating condition of workplace facilities such
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as canteen and rest areas (FT 4.6.88).
The dispute was characterised by several important features, 
notably the effective disintegration of multi-employer 
bargaining and the overt disunity of the BTEA. Although 
Smith and Nephew, one of the largest employers in the BTEA, 
had improved on the minimum earnings deal by £10, the unions 
indicated that they did not favour a transition from multi 
employer to company level pay bargaining which would 
effectively erode any notion of industry wide standards. But 
the reality is that Courtaulds has already introduced 
variations in basic rates and skilled rates according to 
local circumstances, and the terms of the 1988 pay deal - 
with its emphasis on local productivity bargaining - will 
exacerbate this trend.
The strike signified the emergence of the GMB as a 
considerable force in the industry and demonstrated that 
general unions can facilitate industrial action by virtue of 
their possession of superior material resources which 
overshadow the smaller, fragmented textile unions. 
Nevertheless, although the average wage rise over August 
1987 to June 1988 of 6.35% was slightly above the general 
level of settlements in the economy (6%) the industry is 
still way down the league table of pay rates. Nor are low 
basic wages made up by superstructure payments, such as 
overtime or shift premiums. Clothing and textiles remain two 
of the worst paid sectors of British manufacturing industry.
340
i l l - — n
Modernisation of the production process at both the hosiery 
and cotton spinning plants has been accompanied by the 
recomposition of capital-labour relations. In hosiery, pay 
and performance levels have been substantially reorganised, 
with the clear objective of tightening up the relationship 
between wage rates and labour productivity, and increasing 
the work levels of individual employees on particular jobs. 
Pay grades have also been rationalised and simplified. The 
restructuring of pay and performance levels, and measures to 
raise throughput involve an intensification of labour which, 
combined with the deployment of more automated technology, 
will boost productivity levels and displace labour. Female 
labour will be disproportionately displaced from employment 
at the company because of the increasing automation of the 
work process, and the rationalising impact of the «fork study 
exercise and guality control system.
In cotton spinning, the technical reorganisation of the 
production process has the potential to double labour 
productivity and since this was not linked to any increase 
in the factory's output, employment levels have been 
dramatically reduced. This has also been associated with the 
rationalisation and simplification of a series of multiple 
pay grades into two single grades, and the introduction of 
functional flexibility amongst the remaining workforce. The 
aim is to increase the «forkload of individual machine 
minders, and to raise the ratio of machines to «forkers. In 
terms of the relative position of particular «forkers, it is 
clear that although male «forkers have been affected by the
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job displacement impact of technology, they have secured the 
majority of the remaining jobs. This is the result of 
complex long term shifts in the gender and ethnic 
composition of the workforce at the level of the industry, 
which partly reflect changes in working hours due to the 
extension of shift working.
The dynamic process of change at both plants has been 
mediated in various ways by the responses of workers and 
trade unions to these developments. In cotton spinning, the 
chance of higher pay and better conditions for the remaining 
workers and the possibility of redundancy money which about 
one half the displaced workers wished to take despite the 
offer of redeployment, overcame any potential resistance to 
the re-equipment of the mill. Shop floor attitudes to the 
reorganisation of production have been inevitably affected 
by previous closures and rationalisation.
This was very much the case at the hosiery plant. 
Acquiescence to change had been partly conditioned by the 
recession of the early 1980s, and the perception that new 
technology was an inevitable development which would benefit 
workers by preserving jobs. Nevertheless, 'acquiescence' 
tends also to coexist with discontent and latent conflict.
In cotton spinning, oppositional strategies crystallised 
around the issue of pay rather than the introduction of the 
new machinery. Negotiations over pay opened up important 
cleavages between union officials and shop stewards at the 
plant, who wanted technological change to result in 
substantially higher basic pay rates. The dominant
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perception of workers was that Courtaulds was content to 
Modernise production, whilst perpetuating low pay. Moreover, 
aanageaent had used the introduction of new Machinery to 
intensify the pace and scope of work. Nevertheless, at the 
tise of the pay negotiations, workers were unable to exert 
the necessary collective pressure on nanagenent so that pay 
rates could be raised to an 'acceptably' high level.
The trade unions involved positively support conpany 
strategies that enhance the coepetitiveness of UK 
Manufacturing units in the hope that the jobs of union 
aesbers will be preserved. Both organisations had faced 
rapid rates of decline in union nenbership during the 
recession, although in cotton spinning, this had been 
occurring for Many years and had eventually threatened the 
viability of the union itself. Moreover, the Main response 
of both unions to the crisis of the industry in the 1980s 
had been to stress the job displaceaent inpact of low cost 
iaports and to canpaign under the unbrella of the TUC 
textiles and clothing industry conaittee for stricter inport 
controls.
The relocation of hosiery and knitting production overseas 
preoccupied the hosiery union nore extensively than the 
cotton spinning union. But the deploynent of capital 
intensive production Methods in the UK was favourably viewed 
as a process which could sten further relocation. Large 
coapanies like Courtaulds and Corah were perceived as the 
'advanced' sector of the industry offering better terns and 
conditions of enploynent than unregulated, unorganised.
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sweatshops - an increasing feature of the industry during 
the 1980s. But Courtaulds was also presented as an employer 
which had becoae increasingly 'macho', often dispensing with 
consultation and negotiation with the union on sajor issues 
such as redundancies, rationalisation or technological 
investment. The NUHKtf felt that the introduction of new 
machinery had been used by the company as an opportunity to 
introduce new work measurement systems with the precise 
intention of reducing piece rates. This impression of a 
company increasingly favouring the implementation of 
'unilateral' decisions was crystallised by its announcement 
in 1987 to terminate established industrial relations 
procedures contained in a document stipulating industry wide 
standards. Henceforth, negotiations were to be devolved to 
the level of the individual subsidiary.
The prevailing structure of trade unions in the textile 
industry means that a company, such as Courtaulds, is not 
confronted at any level by an inter-union forum or 
negotiating committee. The fragmentation of trade unions in 
the textile industry impedes the formulation of common 
policies and strategies towards the problems posed by the 
rapid and profound restructuring of companies like 
Courtaulds. The strategic unity of the unions tends to 
coalesce solely around the presumed necessity for import 
controls. Courtaulds' policy of devolved bargaining with 
little centralised control over industrial relations means 
that negotiations occur at a local level despite the fact 
that competitive strategies concerning rationalisation, and 
technological investment are formulated at a divisional or
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corporate level.
This indicates that the 'national' organisation of unions in 
the industry has been hopelessly fragmented at both a 
sectoral and regional level, with little cooperation 
occurring between these bodies except through the 
organisational structure of the TUC and its industry 
committee. But fragmentation at a national level also 
coexists with infrequent and perfunctory links between trade 
unions at an international level.
The international orientation of textile trade unions mostly 
rests on union support for social clauses within trading 
agreements such as the Multi Fibre Agreement. The TUC's 
social clause proposal has been received with some hostility 
in developing countries who regard it as another form of 
'backdoor' or 'discriminatory' protectionism (International 
Labour Reports 1986). Moreover, the TUC does not really 
address how social clauses should be monitored or enforced 
on an international basis. The emphasis on the reformulation 
of trading agreements though tends to neglect the 
formulation of international links between textile and 
clothing workers based in LDCs and developed economies. 
Unions do have an international trade union structure 
through which information and support are channelled but the 
International Textile, Garment, and Leather Workers' 
Federation has very limited resources and does not organise 
company councils to link workers in specific multinationals, 
unlike some international bodies. Its effectiveness has also 
been neutralised by long standing political divisions.
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The difficulties that Multinationals pose for trade union 
organisation and strategy should not be underestiBated.
Calls for international solidarity and organisation are 
often little Bore than eapty slogans accoapanied by few 
practical or workable proposals. International union 
cooperation is in any case vulnerable to national and local 
econoaistic concerns, particularly in industries facing long 
tern decline and rationalisation and during periods of 
recession. According to Haworth and Raasay:
'international solidarity is...generated largely 
between organisations with coapatible interests, 
not soaething welling up froa rank and fila daaands 
or initiatives. So far froa being given ground in 
which to flourish by the exigencies of the recession, 
it retreats, since local econoaic interests no longer 
appear so autual.' (1986:65)
The intensification of coapetitive pressures in the textile 
and clothing industries during the 1970s and 1980s has not 
been particularly conducive to the foraulation of 
international links or autual understanding between unions 
and workers in LDCs and the developed countries. As we have 
seen, even within the context of the UK, unions have been 
hopelessly fragaented, with large and international 
producers, like Courtaulds, able to foraulate strategy at a 
corporate level whilst confronting workers at the level of 
individual plants and subsidiaries. The thrust of the 
coapany's industrial relations policy is to enhance the 
isolation of workers and the disunity of the trade unions in 
the industry. In short, the stark reality is one of 
sectorally based trade unions operating within a national 
context, whilst confronting a set of increasingly 
internationally oriented producers. It is hardly surprising 
then that the chairaan of one British textile Multinational
£ 
ì 
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is positively sanguine about the relationship between the 
company and its trade unions.
'I have enjoyed good labour relations and I would not 
label the unions as being a serious problea for 
anything that we have been trying to do in ay tiae at 
Courtaulda. The textile industry has been declining 
overall since the Second World War...So aany years of 
struggle have induced realise on the part of aanageaents 
and the unions which have Bade for a auch greater 
acceptance of the need to tailor capacity to what can 
be sold than perhaps exists in other industries.* 
(Interview with the present chairman of Courtaulds, 
Knitting International September 1984)
The forces of inter-capitalist competition and the responses 
of workers and trade unions facilitated the technical 
reorganisation of the production process at two of 
Courtaulds' textile plants. But textiles and clothing at an 
aggregate level still constitute one of the lowest paying 
sectors of British manufacturing industry, and a relatively 
low waged, low productivity sector internationally. The 
analysis of the industry's long term decline indicates that 
fragmented and weak trade unions may have been an important 
part of a set of crucial impediments operating against the 
transformation of the sector to a modernised, highly 
productive industry. The utilisation of 'cheap labour' as a 
component of short term, cost cutting strategies, reduces 
pressure on firms to economise on costs by modernising 
industry's productive base. This has militated against 
deployment of advanced technologies and the adoption of 
production methods capable of sustaining long term, dynamic 
efficiency.
But capital-labour relations are not static and potentially 
important changes are occurring within the structure of
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textile trade union organisation. The severity of the 
industry's long ters decline has encouraged the ssaller 
textile unions to serge with general unions, such as the GMB 
and the TGWU. The dispute over pay in June 1988 in the 
cotton textile sector - the first bout of industry vide 
strike action since the 1940s - was characterised by 
several isportant features, notably the effective 
disintegration of sulti-esployer bargaining and the overt 
disunity of the esployers' association, but it also 
highlighted the esergence of the general union, the GMB, as 
a considerable force in the industry. Large general unions 
are able to sount and carry through effective industrial 
action previously beyond the saterial resources and 
organisational ability of the ssaller, fragsented textile 
unions.
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Chapter Ten: Conclusion
The aim of this chapter is to draw out the connections 
between the theoretical debates introduced in chapter one, 
and the substantive focus of the thesis, nasely, an account 
of the interplay between economic imperatives articulated at 
the level of the international industry and the long term, 
relative decline of British textiles. The analysis of the 
industry has raised several problems with the existing 
theoretical literature. These concern the lack of a 
developed, integrated perspective on international 
structural change and uneven development, and, in 
particular, the manner in which analytical categories are 
elaborated to mediate between these two distinct levels of 
analysis.
10.1 Internationalisation and 'new divisions of labour'
Two distinct perspectives on international structural 
change, ie. neo-Smithian and neo-Ricardian, were presented 
in chapter one. Both conceptualised the structural 
transformation of the world economy in terms of a new 
international division of labour, characterised by the 
integration of LDCs into the world capitalist economy as 
exporters of manufactured products and as sources of 'cheap' 
labour power. The neo-Smithian variant d r a m  upon a world- 
systems framework to argue that the world economy 
constitutes a single integrated global system with world 
markets for labour and production sites. The mechanism 
underpinning the new international division of labour is the 
Babbage principle which refers to the decomposition of the 
production process into a series of deskilled, fragmentary
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tasks, which are then allocated on a global basis to the 
cheapest labour force. The neo-Ricardian perspective 
presents the new International division of labour as a 
locational response by predominantly 'footloose' 
multinationals to rising costs, notably higher wages, and 
falling profitability in the developed economies. But both 
converge in highlighting the key role of multinational 
capital in 'relocating' production out of higher waged 
economies into countries where there is a plentiful supply 
of cheap labour.
These debates are directly relevant to any analysis of the 
industry. Probel, Heinrichs and Kreye (1980), in particular, 
draw upon the textile and clothing industry as a typical 
manifestation of the new international division of labour.
As we have seen, multinational corporations continue to play 
a pivotal role in the industry's development but their 
expansion cannot be exclusively related to an inexorable 
search for lower waged labour underpinned by the 
fragmentation and relocation of production. Such 
explanations underplay the contradictory nature of capital 
accumulation, and the imperfect and partial nature of 
competitive strategies.
The analysis of the industry indicates that the 
internationalisation of textile and clothing production has 
assumed a number of forms and has been driven by a 
multiplicity of factors. Foreign direct investment has been 
primarily motivated by access to foreign markets, and the 
bulk of overseas investment by OECD textile firms tends to
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be located In other developed countries rather than LDCs. 
International subcontracting, which sore closely 
approximates a strategy designed to reduce labour costs, 
tends to have been unevenly adopted by firms in the 
developed economies, and evidence indicates that it has 
resulted in problems for multinational corporations because 
of the arms length nature of the transactions involved. The 
economic costs of subcontracting arrangements are associated 
with the loss of managerial control over production which 
are typically accentuated when process specialisation and 
the fragmentation of production occurs on an international 
basis (cf. Marglin 1976, Williamson 1980). Investment in 
lower waged LDCs has also generated demands for rising 
wages, expansion of unionisation and industrial conflict. In 
short, competitive strategies based on 'cheap labour' often 
have contradictory effects.
Textile firms have embraced other forms of 
internationalisation such as cross-national licensing 
agreements, which do not necessarily involve investment in 
overseas markets or relocation of production. Again, other 
agencies - such as large retail firms and trading houses - 
have been important to the process of internationalisation 
through the global sourcing of textile and clothing 
products.
The process of internationalisation in the industry has 
therefore developed unevenly; its pace both facilitated and 
impeded by the cumulative actions of supranational and 
national economic and political agencies. The thesis
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highlighted the ambiguous character of state intervention in 
the industry in developed economies which has heightened the 
tensions and contradictions integral to the process of 
capital accumulation.
Protectionist agreements, like the Multi Fibre Agreement, 
have sought to close off or restrict the access of low cost 
producers to the markets of developed economies. Such 
strategies, though, have contradictory material effects 
which have intensified rather than stabilised international 
rivalries in the industry. In particular, 
protectionism has facilitated the establishment of Third 
World multinationals and foreign direct investment to 
developed economies and lower cost LDCs. This points against 
the conceptualisation of developing countries as a 
homogeneous bloc, or as extended workbenches for First World 
multinationals. The evidence suggests an increased 
interlinking between companies in the developed economies 
and the NICs, motivated by the need to transcend obstacles 
to their expansion by gaining access to markets denied to 
them by protectionist agreements or tariff barriers. The 
outcome is a process of uneven development, both between and 
within individual economies.
The complex nature of the industry's internationalisation 
highlights in a particularly acute way a number of flaws in 
the theoretical literature on multinationals and the new 
international division of labour. A unique emphasis on the 
Babbage Principle and the fragmentation/relocation of 
production designed to reduce labour costs ignores the
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significance of technological developments in raising y 
productivity and reducing unit production costs. As we have 
seen, there has been a long run trend in the textile 
industry towards eore capital intensive methods of 
production.
In an incisive critique, Jenkins (1984) argues that the neo- 
Ssithian and neo-Ricardian perspectives give a partial and 
■isleading interpretation of the internationalisation 
process because they focus exclusively on the sphere of 
circulation (ie. exchange and distribution) and neglect 
developments in the sphere of production. They tend to be 
overly preoccupied with mechanisms to increase the 
extraction of absolute surplus value, such as the 
intensification of labour and the reduction of wages with 
little comprehension of the role of technical innovation in 
the capital accumulation process. Yet, as Jenkins (1984:33) 
points out, reducing labour costs by the fragmentation and 
relocation of production processes is only one possible 
strategy available to capital and may not be dominant. Other 
writers (Pine and Harris 1979:37) link the dynamism of 
capitalism to the introduction of new techniques of 
production. Such processes, rather than the Babbage 
Principle, constitute the general imperative of capitalist 
development, in the sense that capitalism is characterised 
by the continuous transformation of the labour process. New 
technologies, in other words, may impose serious limitations 
on strategies of accumulation based on the fragmentation and 
decomposition of labour processes and their relocation to 
LDCs (Jenkins 1984, Kyoung Cho 1985, Lipietz 1987).
353
New international division of labour theories also tend to 
focus on only one aspect of the internationalisation of 
capital, nasely, the internationalisation of productive 
capital. As such, they ignore the internationalisation of 
money and commodity capital which, together with productive 
capital, collectively constitute the internationalisation 
process. Jenkins (1984) argues that the three circuits of 
■oney, conodity, and productive capital can be linked to 
different fores of internationalisation; the growth in world 
trade, growth in the export of leans of production, 
particularly fixed capital from developed to developing 
countries (conodity capital), the growth of international 
capital loveients, such as the expansion of currency exports 
and Eurodollar aarket, the increase in bank lending to NICs 
in the 1970s and their indebtedness (money capital) and the 
growth of multinationals and the international circulation 
of products within subsidiaries of multinationals 
(productive capital) (cf. Palloix 1975). At an international 
level, there has been a new integration of transnational 
banks and Multinational corporations with the 
diversification of banking capital into industrial 
activities, reinforced by the growth of interlocking 
directorates. Andreff (1984) has conceptualised this as an 
acceleration in the centralisation and concentration of 
capital at an international level through the emergence of 
transnational finance capital.
Bison (1986a) has used a 'circuits of capital' approach to 
analyse the coaplex amalgam of strategies multinationals may 
utilise to enhance their profitability. She argues that the
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international subdivision of the production process is but 
one fore of the internationalisation process. In response to 
declining domestic profits, fires say internationalise the 
circuit of eoney capital by buying up existing productive 
assets operating at cheaper sites or they eay 
internationalise the circuit of commodity capital by 
sourcing products from lower cost production locations. At 
the same time, or instead of internationalisation, a firm 
may transform the circuits of capital by introducing new 
technologies. The analysis of the three British 
multinationals presented in section C emphasises this 
option. In terms of the balance between UK and overseas 
activities, the discussion highlights important differences 
between Coats Viyella, Courtaulds and Toota1. This points 
against characterisations of British textile multinationals 
as inherently 'footloose' with the world economy as the 
passive object of their geographical ambitions (cf. Massey 
1986).
10.2 The transition to neo-Ford ism and flex-spec 
Regulationists view the historical development of capitalism 
as being punctuated by 'structural breaks' or 'organic 
crises' which are the product of multiple contradictions 
within production, and between production, exchange and 
distribution. The current structural transformation of the 
world economy is attributed to the disintegration of 
Pordism, and the transition to a new 'mode of regulation' 
described as neo/post Pordism.
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Although regulationist analysis is situated at a relatively 
abstract level of analysis, attespts have been sade to 
harness the conceptual categories of Fordism and neo-Fordiss 
to capture particular features of the reorganisation of 
individual industries and companies. Mhilst the theoretical 
tools of analysis differ, both regulationist and flex-spec 
perspectives converge in their descriptive account of the 
current period of industrial restructuring.
Combining both regulationist and flex-spec analysis, Murray 
(1985) (1987) has drawn upon the example of Benetton as a 
prime exemplar of a new form of industrial organisation, 
based on the utilisation of integrated information 
technologies, a putting out system of production, and the 
close coordination of manufacturing and retailing through 
just-in-time production techniques. Dominance of the circuit 
of industrial capital now tends to be achieved by the 
control of information flows which is facilitated by 
computerised systems of distribution and sales. This has 
enabled the development of subcontracting and franchising 
arrangements, or control by 'contract' rather than 
'ownership' (Murray 1987). In the context of textiles and 
clothing, Mitter (1986), Zeitlin and Totterdill (1989), and 
Zeitlin (1985) argue that firms in the developed economies 
are shifting to strategies of flexible specialisation 
underpinned by 'new' automation technologies. The 
implication is that LDCs are left to concentrate on the 
production of basic fabrics and mass merchandise clothing in 
line with their comparative labour cost advantage.
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Other writers, whilst not necessarily fully embracing either 
perspective, have also focused on trends highlighted by 
regulationist and flex-spec analysis. The significance of 
new technologies, particularly their systesic 
('systesofacture') or integrated characteristics have been 
eaphasised by both Kaplinsky (1985) and Elson (1988a). The 
novel feature of current technological developments is that 
they enable coordination between the spheres of design, 
manufacturing and information/coordination which have 
previously been spatially separated and differentiated 
within modern industrial enterprises. Such factors have 
collectively shifted production to a new pattern of 
systeaofacture (Kaplinsky 1985:133).
In an analysis of textile and clothing multinational 
corporations, Elson (1988a) draws upon aspects of Hurray's 
(1985, 1987) and Kaplinsky's (1985) account of industrial 
restructuring. It is argued that textile and clothing 
multinationals are increasingly defining their function not 
in terms of manufacturing but more in terms of the co­
ordination of decentralised production facilities with 
increasing emphasis on marketing, finance and licensing.
This has resulted in a shift from the ownership of 
production facilities to control of the co-ordination of the 
circuits of capital underpinned by integrated information 
technologies.
An important theme of the thesis is the extent to which new 
technologies, and non-price forms of competition have led to 
the sort of substantive changes highlighted by these
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writers. Two points have been ude. Firstly, the harnessing 
of conceptual categories - such as Fordism, neo-Fordisa, and 
flex-spec - to describe conteaporary developments either 
within specific industries or companies is unsatisfactory. 
Secondly, the abstraction of particular eapirical trends 
often occurs on a random and partial basis. Such trends are 
then subsumed within relatively stylised categories, which, 
it is alleged, mark significant 'structural' breaks in 
corporate behaviour, or new forms of industrial 
organisation.
The foregoing analysis of the industry indicates that 
international competition tends not to be characterised by 
clear cut shifts in comparative advantage or dichotomous 
relationships between the developed and developing 
countries. This is dramatically revealed by scrutinising the 
evidence on the diffusion of new technologies, and the 
application of allegedly 'novel' competitive strategies 
based on just-in-time techniques and the transition to 
'upmarket' products.
A focus on the (re)locational movements of production 
between developed and developing countries represents an 
inadequate way of analysing the dynamics of technological 
change. The application of highly productive textile 
machinery in the developed countries has contributed to 
their overall net surplus in international textile trade.
But it is difficult to substantiate the claim that 
technological developments have initiated a 'relocation' of 
production back to developed economies. It is more plausible
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to argue that it has helped maintain particular branches of 
textile production in the developed countries but this la 
not synonymous with a massive shift in comparative advantage 
against LDCs.
The clothing industry is a different matter, however, with 
the rate of diffusion of microelectronic technology in 
developed economies being very much slower, and the high 
capital outlays involved in such capital investment being 
beyond the financial scope of the majority of (small) firms 
in the sector. Although there have been cases where 
microelectronic technology has been important in maintaining 
a firm's or a sector's competitiveness, there has as yet 
been no quantifiable impact on international trade patterns 
with the developed economies maintaining at an aggregate 
level a net deficit in clothing trade.
Moreover, there may be time lags involved in technological 
development, leading to the uneven diffusion and deployment 
of new technologies in LDCs, but governments and firms, 
particularly in the NICs, are actively involved in the 
restructuring of their industries. A number of Third World 
governments have introduced rationalisation and 
modernisation programmes to upgrade the capital stock in 
textiles and clothing.
Does the evidence suggest that Third World firms are being 
relegated to the production of mass produced, low cost 
textile and clothing products? One clear implication of the 
analysis of structural change in the industry is that the
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production of high value added, high guality products, the 
adoption of non-price forms of competition and the 
utilisation of integrated, information technologies are not 
competitive panaceas for firms in the developed economies.
In the context of slow growth in the industry, a number of 
textile and clothing manufacturers in the developed 
economies - although by no means all - have sought to 
maintain their market share by segmenting the market into 
heterogeneous niches. Firms have differentiated their 
products from those of their low cost competitors by 
shifting to the production of high value added, high guality 
goods. It has also involved engaging in other forms of non­
price competition, such as the use of brand names to 
differentiate products both from unbranded imports and from 
retailer's brand names. Thus, rather than these developments 
reflecting the fragmentation of demand and disintegration of 
mass markets/production, it is argued that the segmentation 
of markets is very much an active strategy by firms to 
maintain or increase their market share.
The consequences for the international structure of 
competition in the industry are not necessarily as dramatic 
or as clear cut as writers have implied. The emphasis of 
flex-spec theory on the articulation of 'successful' 
corporate strategies, and their institutional preconditions 
in the developed economies underplays the different ways in 
which Third World countries are integrated into the world 
economy. As we have seen, a number of Third World firms, 
particularly in the Asian NICs, are also attempting to 
transcend and overcome constraints and obstacles in their
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competitive environment. Mot only has protectionism 
facilitated the establishment of Third World multinationals 
and foreign direct investment to developed countries and 
lower cost LDCs, but it has also encouraged LDCs to move 
upmarket, to increase the value of their exports because 
bilateral guotas limit export volume.
First World firms, therefore, cannot merely depend on 
maximising their geographical proximity to centres of demand 
or introducing time economies into the production and 
distribution of products. Far Eastern exporters are also 
implementing just-in-time production methods in an attempt 
to reduce delivery and lead times. This, in turn, will 
intensify the competitive pressures on firms in the 
developed countries who have shifted production upmarket. 
Thus, international competition in the industry constitutes 
a complex matrix of conflicting material interests mediated 
in various ways by national firms, governments, trade unions 
and transnational capital.
As the analysis of the decline of the industry in the UK 
makes clear, it is hard to identify with any degree of 
analytical precision, which sectors or firms of the textile 
and clothing industry are making the alleged transition from 
Fordism to flex-spec, or to substantiate the claim that
✓there has been a long tern shift in the dynamics of inter­
industry competition. In fact, claims of a shift in 
comparative advantage towards UK producers based on 
strategies of flex-spec tend to be hasty extrapolations from 
short tern trade trends. The evidence indicates that inter­
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industry competitive relationships are not changing in ways 
that intrinsically favour domestically based UK 
manufacturers. Whilst non-price product differentiation 
strategies may have become more salient in the 1980s, the 
price competitiveness of textile and clothing products still 
appears to be an important determinant of retail purchasing 
patterns and sourcing policies. This could explain the 
reported increase in homeworking and small production units 
which utilise immigrant female labour on very low rates of 
pay. Low cost garments from the informal sector of the 
industry are intended to be price competitive with those 
obtainable from subcontractors based in LDCs. There is 
little evidence, in short, to connect such developments with 
a shift by retailers/manufacturers to design orientated, 
high value added, high guality production, characteristic of 
flex-spec strategies.
But is the emphasis by textile and clothing firms on 
marketing, and methods to coordinate production and 
distribution a particularly novel development? Chandler's 
(1977) historical analysis of the evolution of large-scale 
American enterprises indicates that an emphasis on the 
coordination of production and sales, and the marketing of 
products has been a relatively enduring feature of the 
strategies and preoccupations of modern corporations 
throughout the twentieth century. The integration of mass 
production with mass distribution initially took the form of 
mergers, verticalisation and the establishment by 
manufacturers of national and global marketing 
networks/purchasing organisations. The processes of
362
production, Marketing and purchasing were therefore 
internalised within the structure of the firm. The forai of 
integration of production and distribution aay have 
changed - along with the evolution of 'new' technologies of 
coordination - but the emphasis by f ins on the Marketing of 
products and the Matching of supply with deaand does not 
constitute a new stage of industrial developnent or an 
intrinsically novel feature of corporate behaviour. It 
Merely represents the continuous preoccupation of fins with 
Methods to realise profits through the establishaent of 
Mechanises to ensure that products are not just Manufactured 
but also distributed and sold.
Multinationals then do not pursue 'honogeneous' strategic 
interests defined either in terns of an inexorable search 
for cheap sources of labour, or a concerted withdrawal fron 
Manufacturing production in favour of Marketing, sourcing 
and distributional activities. The Benetton nodel of 
donestic subcontracting and international franchising is 
Merely one way for a Multinational corporation to co­
ordinate production and distribution. It is not a universal 
tendency, nor necessarily the Most significant. Belussi 
(1987:75) points out. Moreover, that the evolution of 
Italian clothing firns, like Benetton, is very Much 
dependent on factors specific to the Italian region in which 
the company operates, notably the labour Market structure of 
Veneto and the proliferation of a set of comparatively poor 
work conditions which underpin the operation of the putting 
out system.
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Whilst the strategies of the three British textile 
multinationals in the 1980s illustrate som similarities, 
particularly the tendency to scrap massive amounts of 
textile plant in the UK, there are also clear differences in 
the degree and form of internationalisation; the balance 
between textile and non-textile interests, and between their 
domestic and international activities.
Tootal has gone furthest in its withdrawal from textile 
manufacturing and the shift to international sourcing, 
marketing and distribution. But it is not clear that 
Courtaulds or Coats Viyella have embraced this strategy to 
the same extent. Despite the rationalisation of their 
domestic productive base, both companies still have an 
extensive manufacturing presence in textiles and clothing in 
the UK, and have attempted to modernise production through 
new systems of work organisation, and the deployment of 
computerised technologies. The shift by textile 
multinationals to high value added production and the 
modernisation of their UK productive base nay have occurred 
too unevenly and partially to stem the industry's decline at 
the aggregate level, but it does constitute an attempt to 
revitalise profitability through a transformation of the 
circuit of industrial capital within the UK. This has of 
course involved an emphasis on product design and marketing. 
But the case studies of the two Courtaulds' plants suggest 
that the reorganisation of manufacturing production is also 
an important feature of current restructuring. A plethora of 
organisational forms and internal 'firm' structures are thus
discernible in the industry which are determined by
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historical circumstances, local and national specificities 
and international imperatives.
It is clear that multinationals in the industry are not the 
ossified, inflexible 'Pordist' dinosaurs that the flex-spec 
perspective implies, or the type of 'footloose' economic 
units suggested by new international division of labour 
theorists. The foregoing analysis indicates that there are 
problems in the way in which theoretical models of 
industrial restructuring selectively draw upon empirical 
trends. The application of analytical categories like 
Pordism, flex-spec/neo-Pordism and systemofacture involves 
the abstraction of partial trends which are then subsumed 
under simplistic ideal types or generalised in an ad hoc 
fashion to represent novel developments in industrial 
organisation or sharp 'breaks' with previous forms of 
corporate behaviour.
This, then, raises more fundamental questions over the way 
in which conceptual categories are elaborated to mediate 
between analysis of the international economy and the 
differentiated nature of national economies. The central 
argument of the thesis is that the fracturing of theoretical 
analysis around two separate axes of international 
structural change and national industrial performance has 
resulted in the absence of a synthetic treatment. Why has 
this been the case? And what problems stem from the 
elaboration of categories specified in new international 
division of labour, regulationist, flex-spec and the 
industrial decline literature?
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10.3 The Dialectic b e t w n  the International and th* 
N.it Iona l
10.3.1 Kaw International Division of Labour and 
Requlationiat Analysis
As we have seen, new international division of labour 
theories adopt an explicitly internationalist view of the 
phenomena of deindustrialisation and economic disorder. Some 
world-system theorists (tfallerstein 1974, Prank 1980, 1981 
and Amin 1977) take the extreme position that national 
economies are now fully subordinate to changes in the world 
economy.
It is clear that individual economies have been integrated 
into the world economy through the activities of 
multinational firms and banks. This means that nation states 
are no longer completely coherent or autonomous economic 
entities (Fine and Harris 1985, Radice 1984). But the key 
problem with an internationalist or new international 
division of labour perspective is that the connections 
between structural transformations occurring at the general 
and undifferentiated level of the world economy and the 
particular condition of national industries and economies is 
rarely problematised. The complex relationship between 
international and national economic forces is therefore 
blurred, with a supranational international economic system 
replacing the nation state as the basic unit of analysis.
Although the regulationist perspective presents a more 
nuanced consideration of the international and national 
dimensions of structural economic change, it does not as yet 
constitute a synthetic treatment. A key problem is that
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ragù1ationiats differ aa to the appropriate level of 
analyaia for an exploration of the current period of 
atructural change in the world economy.
Aglietto (1979) uneasily aituatea his analyaia of capitaliat 
development in the context of American hiatory during the 
twentieth century. It is, however, unclear whether this is 
because the USA is regarded as a prime mover or exemplar of 
generalisable trends or whether the analysis ia aimed purely 
at the successive modes of regulation/regimes of 
accumulation within a single nation state.
Such a formulation can be criticised on both points.
Firstly, if Aglietto (1979) ia positing that America 
exemplifies trends typical of global capitalist development, 
then the lack of consideration of the world economic system 
(the internationalisation of industrial and finance capital, 
the new international division of labour, development of the 
Eurodollar and the growth of multinationals) become very 
serious analytical omissions which cannot be displaced to 
other more concrete levels. In later writings. Aglietta 
(1982), asserts 'the primacy of the national dimension' with 
the world economy conceptualised 'as a system of interacting 
national social formations.' But it is the hegemony of one 
national economy (the USA) over the international economy 
which is central to his analysis in the sense that it 
determines the character of international and national 
economies. In the present crisis, the dissolution of the US 
hegemonic growth model is emphasised and connected to the 
emergence of destabilising international capitalist
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rivalries.
The focus on the development of the USA and the diffusion of 
this regime of accumulation to other developed economies 
obscures both national specificities and an account of the 
complex processes which have informed the present 
development of the international economy. Andreff (1984) 
argues that by ignoring the integration of the Third World 
into the world economy, the regulationists fail to see that 
the convergence of monopolistic regulatory processes between 
national economies is largely due to the development of 
transnational banks and multinational corporations in the 
developed economies and NICs, and the growing 
internationalisation and centralisation of transnational 
finance capital.
Lipiets (1987) has tried to overcome these problems by 
attempting to integrate analysis of Third World developments 
into his account of the global diffusion and crisis of 
Fordism. But, in his account, the specificities of 
particular nation states are omitted, in an attempt to 
comprehend the international dimensions of structural 
disorder. Both de Vroey (1984) and Lipiets (1987) focus 
their analysis on global economic developments, and point 
out that the connections between national and world regimes 
of accumulation are immensely problematic. To Lipietz (1987) 
an analysis of the international crisis of Fordism is 
necessary, but it should be supplemented by the study of the 
specific characteristics of each social formation, and its 
relationship with the world economic system. This is a
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project which, as yet, has not been undertaken.
This raises the question of whether a régulâtionist 
perspective can mediate between the general level of the 
world economy and the specific context of national 
economies? Is it helpful to periodise successive stages of 
capitalist developsent by seans of heuristic ideal types, 
like Pordiss and post-Pordiss? Can these categories shed 
light on the differentiated pattern of individual economies, 
and the particular configuration of social and economic 
institutions which shape their developsent?
The analysis presented here supports the view that such an 
approach tends to degenerate into a descriptive reading of 
historical developments, rather than a theorisation of the 
turning points and contradictions of changing material 
circumstances (cf. Nolan and O'Donnell 1987). This is 
related to the tendency of inscribing 'logics' into patterns 
of accumulation which have characterised post war capitalist 
development. Categories, such as Pordism and neo-Pordism, 
are imposed on complex, contradictory economic and social 
phenomena. Empirical trends are arbitrarily integrated into 
a formal model thus ignoring the wide diversity and 
specificity of national patterns of capitalist developsent 
(Bonefeld 1988).
Lipietz (1987) acknowledges the importance of a non­
functionalist approach to the new international division of 
labour which recognises the role of historical contingency 
and the (relatively) autonomous actions of economic agents
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(eg. Third World states), but this is obscured by an 
analytical eaphasis on the 'functionality' of Third World 
acciunilation strategies (export led industrialisation) for 
the crisis management of Fordism at the 'centre'. The 
attempt to discern 'logics' of accumulation, and modes of 
regulation, partial or otherwise, within the world economy 
tends to shift the focus of analysis away from the multiple 
processes and complex strategies of individual companies and 
nation states and away from any notion of the uneven 
development of the world economy. Furthermore, the 
activities and strategies of the 'actors' within the global 
economy, such as multinational capital and transnational 
banks, remain in the background, with regulationist analysis 
focusing on these agents as 'bearers' of forces and 
relationships determined by the needs of a particular mode 
of accumulation, primarily Fordism at the centre.
The approach, moreover, fails to provide the analytical 
tools necessary to theorise industrial development at a 
differentiated, micro level. A regulationist perspective on 
the uneven development of the British economy emphasises the 
obstacles and blocks to the consolidation of an intensive 
regime of accumulation over the post war period (Dunford and 
Perrons 1986:57). But such explanations tend to harness the 
UK's relative industrial decline to conceptual categories 
which were not originally formulated for the analysis of the 
differentiated nature of individual economies and the 
specific character of national social and economic 
institutions which shape their development. Hence, analysis 
of Britain's long term decline tends to degenerate into a
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descriptive and unordered account of Britain's industrial 
development and the factors which impeded the full 
application of a particular regime of accumulation (ie. 
Pordism).
10.4 Britain's Industrial Decline
Prom a very different standpoint, Britain's industrial
decline has been explained solely in terns of a particular
configuration of institutional relationships which emerged
in the last quarter of the nineteenth century (Elbaun and
Lazonick 1985). It has been argued that:
'Entrenched institutional structures - in industrial 
relations, enterprise and market organisation, 
education, finance, international trade, and 
state-enterprise relations - constrained the 
transformation of Britain's productive system.'
(1985:2)
The main emphasis is on how the structure of industrial 
relations and industrial organisation inherited from the era 
of Britain's international economic dominance impeded the 
structural transformation of British manufacturing industry. 
Thus, British firms failed to adopt modem technological and 
organizational innovations based on mass production methods 
and corporate forms of managerial co-ordination because of 
the institutional legacy associated with atomistic, 
nineteenth-century economic organization.
There are clearly many similarities between Elbaurn and 
Lazonick's account (1985) of Britain's long run relative 
economic decline and flex-spec analyses of the competitive 
failure of British manufacturing (Hirst and Zeitlin 1989a, 
1989b). Both tend to view the problems of the British 
economy in terms of nationally based, institutional
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rigidities. The major difference is that Elbaus and Lazonick 
(1985) view econoiic decline as a continuous process 
beginning in the late nineteenth century, whereas flex-spec 
writers point to a historical 'turning point' in British 
econoaic development in the late 1960s. Thus, Britain's 
failure to adapt to the changing nature of competition, the 
disintegration of Fordism and the fragmentation of demand 
are critical manifestations of a series of institutional 
impediments to the transition to flex-spec.
Despite Piore and Sabel's implication that the shift from 
Fordism to flex-spec is a generalised transition affecting 
all economies, the dependence of both mass production and 
flex-spec on variable forms of institutional regulation has 
been emphasised by recent writers (cf. Hirst and Zeitlin 
1989a). It is argued that:
'the technological dynamism of each model and its 
potentialities for future development cannot be 
evaluated outside of a definite institutional..context.' 
(Hirst and Zeitlin 1989a:2).
Thus, the categories of Fordism and flex-spec have been
harnessed to explain the success (Italy, Germany) or failure
(UK) of particular manufacturing industries. It is argued
that the competitive failure of British manufacturing
industry stems in large part from the destruction of
industrial districts through successive waves of mergers and
government-sponsored concentration (Hirst and Zeitlin
1989b). British management and government were dominated by
a 'misguided' belief in the competitive advantages of large
sized firms and the efficiency gains of scale economies.
This has inhibited the possibility of flex-spec strategies
in Britain by obstructing the formation of regional networks
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of firms prevalent in Italy and Japan.
These explanations of Britain's competitive failure draw on 
similar analytical categories defined as a set of 
institutional impediments to the transformation of 
production but flex-spec analysis also constitutes a curious 
inversion of the Blbaum and Lazonick thesis. An historical 
account of Britain's decline implies that British 
manufacturers failed to shift to Fordism because they were 
enmeshed in productive strategies that bear a striking 
resemblance to flex-spec. Lazonick (1979) argues that in the 
late nineteenth century, Lancashire cotton textile 
manufacturers moved upmarket to finer yarn counts and 
adopted strategies of horizontal specialisation and a high 
degree of vertical disintegration. This impeded the pursuit 
of a cost cutting strategy based on the adoption of modern, 
high throughput technologies. The implication is that a 
concentrated and vertically integrated industrial 
structure - like the one exhibited by the US industry - 
would have facilitated the adoption of high throughput 
technologies, and eradicated the sector's technological 
backwardness.
But it is these very industrial districts, supposedly 
consisting of a network of 'cooperative' firms, which are 
currently being promoted by flex-spec writers as the 
potential basis for the regeneration of British 
manufacturing industry. This stands in sharp contrast to 
historical evidence which indicates that Lancashire textile 
firms eschewed the modernisation of production in favour of
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short tern cost cutting strategies (ie. wage cuts) and the 
intensification of labour on outdated equipment. The flex- 
spec approach to competitive failure therefore meshes with 
conventional explanations of the textile industry's decline. 
Both highlight the misguided and flawed strategies adopted 
by the large vertically integrated groups which came to 
dominate the industry during the 1960s and 1970s. An 
association is postulated between high concentration levels, 
the prominence of large corporations and 'inflexibility'. 
The implication is that the British state was also 
'misguided' in its attempt to hasten the concentration and 
rationalisation of fragmented industrial sectors like 
textiles. Both draw upon ideal typical economic success 
stories, like Italy or West Germany, which are then used to 
make superficial connections between concentration levels, 
state intervention and economic performance.
The problem with these explanations is that they are 
inherently partial and one-sided. At the very least, they 
either ignore historical evidence or interpret it in a 
selective manner. As we have argued, large companies, like 
Courtaulds and ICI, intervened in an industry which was in a 
state of profound technological backwardness and was thus 
substantially uncompetitive. Such interventions also 
occurred against a backdrop of unsuccessful industrial 
reorganisation by successive British governments and their 
ambiguous stance towards the formation of a concentrated 
industry dominated by large companies. Moreover, other 
commentators (Miles 1968, Pishwick and Cornu 1975) have
asserted that the intervention of such fij had positive
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effects, particularly their initial iepact on capital 
expenditure and labour productivity. Such contrasting 
assesseents of the iepact of large fires on coepetitive 
perforeance point against explanations which centre on size 
alone.
There are sore general problees with both an historically
based 'institutionalist' account of industrial decline and
flex-spec analyses. A one-dieensional analytical focus on
nineteenth century institutional relationships tends towards
a unilinear and detereinistic view of historical
development, which downplays the potential for the change
and transformation of British industry during the twentieth
century. As Pine and Harris (1985:11) argue:
...'the weakness of the British economy was not laid 
down like an old wine in the seventeenth, eighteenth 
or nineteenth century with the following years 
witnessing this weakness being brought to maturity 
as if the vintage were a bad one and the wine soured.'
In particular, such an approach obscures the significance of
shifts in state intervention in the British economy, and
changes in the relationship between the state, industry and
organised labour over the post-war period.
Moreover, international economic developments, the 
integration of the British industry within a global system 
of production and the centrality of multinationals to the UK 
economy are displaced in favour of an analysis of 'internal' 
constraints which evolve within a purely national context.
As Harris (1988:20) points out, multinational corporations 
are peculiarly central to the UK economy. The UK's stock of 
overseas direct investments is second only to that of the
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US, whilst the UK is also a 'host country' to a large stock 
of assets owned by foreign sultinationals, ranking third 
behind Canada and the US itself. Evidence suggests that 
foreign sultinationals have orientated their investsent 
strategies to take advantage of Britain's low labour cost 
position by locating relatively low skilled, low value added 
assenbly work in the UK (Nolan 1989b).
Similar problems are present within flex-spec accounts of 
Britain's economic decline. The emphasis on the 
fragmentation of demand, small batch production, and the 
success of decentralised, regional economies composed of 
networks of small firms in Italy, Japan, etc. ignores any 
consideration of the trend to the concentration and 
centralisation of capital at the level of the world economy, 
the growth of manufacturing multinationals over the post war 
period and the increasing integration of industrial and 
finance capital in the form of transnational finance capital 
(Andreff 1984). There is therefore no convincing analysis of 
the role of international economic forces in the current 
period of structural change. This, as already mentioned, is 
a particularly serious omission in any analysis of the UK 
economy. The selective empirical evidence provided by flex- 
spec theorists does not demonstrate that scale economies in 
industrial production are no longer relevant. There is 
little evidence to suggest that widespread reskilling or the 
resurgence of cooperative industrial relations has occurred, 
although such phenomena are allegedly integral to the 
diffusion of flexible specialisation production methods.
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In short, the flex-spec perspective is not primarily 
concerned with revealing current aatorial and structural 
transformations in the world economy but is a prescriptive 
and speculative discourse concerned with the identification 
of successful coapetitive strategies and their (national) 
institutional preconditions. Rather than viewing industrial 
decline as the effect of a set of institutional 
'rigidities', a sore convincing account would seek to 
analyse the interactions between the key social and economic 
agencies - labour, multinationals, finance and the state - 
which have been crucial to the emergence of the UK as a 
relatively low wage, low productivity economy. Such an 
approach cautions against a partial emphasis on one set of 
factors - industrial relations, or large firms - in favour 
of an integrated and more historically secure perspective on 
decline. It is hoped that the analysis of textiles has shown 
that the complex dynamics of restructuring and sectoral 
decline can only be understood in terms of a matrix of 
international structural forces, and a national 
configuration of social and economic relationships.
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1. Vertical integration by textile companies is clearly an 
atteapt to link and control the complex nature of these 
production stages.
2. The most recent figures available for 1974-85 (Anson and 
Siapson 1988:54) indicate that the bulk of the increase in 
world spindle capacity has been in Asia. Spindle capacity in 
Western Europe, the USA and Japan has declined.
3. In Canada, the US and the UK, clothing expenditure rose 
as a percentage of total spending.
4. Probe1, Heinrichs and Kreye (1980) investigated 214 
textile and 195 clothing companies. Over the period 1966-74, 
overseas employment more than doubled whilst domestic 
employment fell by one quarter. Hence, by 1974/75, 100 West 
German textile companies (45% of the total) and 125 clothing 
companies (75% of the total) were engaged in overseas 
production in the form of offshore processing or foreign 
direct investment.
5. This is defined by the OECD (1983:38) 'as an arrangement 
through which individual production processes are 
transferred abroad on the initiative of the supplier of 
inputs who is also the buyer of the transformed product'. If 
the offshore processing is carried out by an independent 
unit, it takes the form of subcontracting which guarantees 
both the supply of the input and the disposal of the 
product, thus limiting the risks and the benefits of the
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subcontractor.
6. These figures underestisate the importance of 
international subcontracting for particular companies. 
Manhattan Industries, Phillips Van Heusen (two large shirt 
makers), Warnaco and Kellwood import approximately 30% of 
their total reguirements from offshore assembly and overseas 
subcontracting operations.
7. In 1987, imports processed offshore rose by almost one 
sixth in value terms and accounted for over 9t of all French 
clothing imports. They were mainly from Tunisia (27%), 
Portugal (20%), Morocco, Mauritius and Hungary.
8. Chisholm et al. (1986) argue that a number of small firms 
in the London clothing industry are attempting to reduce 
labour costs by subcontracting production to Cyprus and 
Turkey. The cloth is cut in London and sent to Cyprus to be 
made up into garments. These are subeeguently re-imported 
and finished in London.
9. It is estimated that Benetton directly employs about 
1,500 employees with 300 subcontractors employing an 
estimated 15,000 to 20,000 workers (Belussi 1987:28).
Workers employed by subcontractors tend not to be unionized. 
An agreement operates between local unions and Benetton, 
which stipulates that workers employed by subcontractors are 
covered by similar pay and conditions to those affecting 
Benetton employees.
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10. A *«jor cause of the export decline was competition 
posed by cheaper Par Eastern imports in West Germany's West 
European export markets rather than the effect of the higher 
dollar on direct trade with the USA.
11. Whereas in 1977 only 5% of a sample of leading textile 
companies had subsidiaries in LDCs, this had risen to 9* in 
1981. Worldwide, the foreign production of KNEs surveyed 
rose 16-18% and was generally accompanied by an increase in 
the employment shares of foreign operations (ILO 1984).
12. At $1.77 an hour in Spring 1987, South Korean hourly 
labour costs were in excess of Turkey ($1.28), Thailand 
($0.58) and China ($0.23).
13. According to Anson and Simpson (1988:58), the gap in 
wage costs between the developed countries and the LDCs has 
widened. In 1984, the ratio between the highest and the 
lowest paying countries was 43, whereas in 1980 it was 36.
14. In ring spinning and rotor spinning, machine speeds have 
more than doubled. Yarn preparatory machinery in 1987 had
2.5 tines the productive capacity of the available 
technology in 1967. A state of the art weaving mill has a 
net output per loom hour 3.35 times more than could be 
achieved twenty years ago.
15. Faster, shuttleless looms now account for 70% of new 
machines installed worldwide and well over 95% of new 
machines installed in the US, EC and Eastern Europe. Host
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new spinning machines are Microprocessor controlled and 
linked into integrated automatic systems.
16. The KEDC (1987) report suggests that the total 
production cycle could be reduced to 4 days - 1 day for 
spinning, 1 day for knitting, dyeing, finishing, 1 day for 
cutting/sewing and 1 day for distribution to the retailer.
17. It is estiaated (Belussi 1987:33) that the Benetton 
faaily owned 500 shops out of a total of 2300 in 1984.
18. State assistance to Aaerican textile firas has taken the 
fora of technical assistance, - Governaent funding of up to 
75% of the costs of re-equipaent - or financial assistance, 
such as loan guarantees or direct loans. The Trade Act of 
1974 directed loans to industries where increases in isports 
had contributed to reduced sales or production (OECD 
1983:115).
19. The 'Plan Textile' reduced social charges by up to 12% 
for textile firas in return for coaaitaents on investaent 
and the retention of existing eaployees. Two thirds of firas 
took advantage of this provision.
20. Kaneba branched out into cosaetics (now foraing 20% of 
its sales turnover) and Unitika has diversified into several 
fields including engineering, real estate, and food 
manufacturing.
21. The largest ten fires in these two countries esploy on 
average 2,000 to 3,000 cospared with the tens of thousands 
sore cosson in other developed countries (eg. US, UK,
Japan).
22. One schese of potential benefit to the textiles industry 
is the 'Advanced Materials Prograsse' worth £22 an. Other 
scheses are designed to encourage technology transfer fros 
one industrial sector to another.
23. £46 an. was earmarked in 1985-86, £42 sn over 1987-88 
and a further £350 sn. over 1987-91. The EC contributes 50% 
of the cost of approved projects. All projects sust involve 
industrial firms and partners fros sore than one EC country.
24. Employment decline in the developed countries has been 
rapid - EC esploysent in this sector was 4.5 sn. when the 
HFA was introduced in 1974. Ten years later esploysent had 
fallen by one third to 3 sn. In the USA, textile employment 
was 980,000 in 1973 and clothing esploysent 1.4 sn. By 1986, 
employment levels were 669,000 and 1.1 mn. respectively.
25. Other formal arrangements exist for controlling textile 
and clothing trade. These include global tariff quota 
systems operating in Australia and New Zealand; selective 
regional arrangements such as the '807' provisions for US 
offshore assembly and the EC's preferential arrangements 
with African, Caribbean and Pacific countries and a number 
of Mediterranean countries (eg. Cyprus, Malta, Morocco, 
Tunisia, Turkey and more recently, Egypt).
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26. 'Market disruption' is defined as a sharp increase or a 
potential increase of imports of particular products; the 
offering of these products at prices substantially below 
those prevailing for similar goods of comparable quality in 
the market of the importing country; or serious damage to 
domestic producers or the threat of damage.
27. Imports from UFA suppliers grew by more than 20% a year 
during 1983-84 although imports from other countries 
(especially Western Europe) grew even faster (Anson and 
Simpson 1988:126).
28. The change was most evident in the EC. Over 1976-79, the 
annual volume growth of imports of LDC origin was 4.0%. In 
the period 1973-76, the annual rate had been 25%.
29. Over 1973-81, the share of developed countries in EC 
textile imports rose at the expense of LDCs. In the US, the 
share of the Eastern trading area countries (including 
China) rose between 1973-81. Since 1981, the LDCs' share in 
all clothing imports into the EC and USA has declined. In 
1975, MFA suppliers accounted for 27.9% of UK imports of 
textiles and clothing, whilst EC suppliers accounted for 
35.3%. By 1985, EC countries increased their share to 5*' *»% 
while that of MFA suppliers had fallen to 23.4%.
30. Some writers have linked this phenomenon to shifts in 
employment from firms registered in the official statistics 
(eg. census of production surveys) to small firms in the
hidden, informal sector of the clothing industry (eg. Hitter
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1986). As Mitter (1986:44) indicates, there has been a 
growth in unregistered fires in the industry and a 
proliferation of 'sweatshop' conditions. Nevertheless, if 
these output and employment shifts are unrepresented in 
official statistics, it is doubtful whether they can be 
directly connected to fluctuations in the productivity of 
registered fires in the industry.
31. In teres of a more disaggregated picture, Silberston 
(1984:45-46) deeonstrates that in 1970 isports of cotton 
y ams were eainly froe MPA suppliers but were supplanted in 
1982 by the EEC, Portugal, Spain and Turkey with MPA 
suppliers and China having relatively seall import shares. 
MPA suppliers doeinated UK isports of woven cotton fabrics 
in 1982 although the EEC was of growing ieportance (import 
penetration here was 75%). In hosiery and knitwear, imports 
from MPA countries were important although total import 
penetration had only reached 32% by 1983. The clothing 
industry has been sore at risk from low cost suppliers than 
other sectors. In 1983 Hong Kong was the dominant supplier 
of trousers, woven shirts and dresses but other important 
suppliers were India (trousers, shirts) South Korea 
(trousers, blouses and shirts) and Portugal (trousers and 
shirts).
32. In 1912, 86% of the linear yards of cotton piece goods 
that the industry produced and 70% (by weight) of the raw 
cotton that the industry consumed were exported (Lazonick 
1985:18/19).
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33. From 1946-51, yarn production rose by 50% and cloth 
production by 56%.
34. The aultiple stores' share of retail textile sales rose 
from 30% to 37% between 1954-64 and by 1967, they accounted 
for 38% of clothing sales (Briscoe 1971:71). The increasing 
prominence of retail brand names encouraged textile and 
clothing manufacturers to introduce their own product 
brands. This development favoured large firms because they 
can achieve economies of scale in marketing/advertising and 
vertical integration facilitates consistent standards of 
product quality.
35. In 1968, the five firm concentration ratio in the 
spinning of cotton and manufactured fibres was 50%, up from 
37% in 1963 and 32% in 1958. The five firm concentration 
ratios for weaving also rose from 19.3% to 31.2% for cotton 
cloth and from 35.8% to 51.9% for synthetic fibre cloth. In 
hosiery and knitting the main increases in concentration 
occurred in the production of warp-knitted fabrics and in 
hosiery, for which the five firm concentration ratio rose 
from 20% to 43%. Synthetic fibre manufacturers were less 
involved in the woollen and worsted industries, which showed 
comparatively little increase in concentration between 1963 
and 1968 (cf. Fishwick and Cornu 1975:45-57).
36. Increases in concentration were confined to the largest 
firms in the industry. As a result of acquisition of other 
large groups. Coats Paton and Illingworth Norris increased 
their share of total turnover in the woollen and worsted
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industry fros about 19% to 30%. The combined share of the 
ten largest firms in the woollen/worsted industry remained 
at 60% in 1973 (the sane as in 1968). In hosiery and 
knitting, concentration changed negligibly between 1968-73. 
In 1968, four firms controlled 53% of turnover and 10 firms 
just over 72%; in 1973, the two proportions were unchanged. 
In the cotton industry concentration levels were much 
greater than in wool: 10 firms controlled 73% of turnover in 
1968 and 75% in 1973.
37. There has been financial support for textiles and 
clothing in one UK region, notably Northern Ireland. This is 
due to the region's Industrial Development Board, a 
government funded body formed in 1982. Over the period 1985- 
88, the Board ploughed £96 an. (over a third of its budget) 
into textiles. The Board, in some cases, provides 30% of the 
cost of new projects or 25% of the cost of reinvestment. 
Textiles and clothing firms in Northern Ireland employ about 
27,000 people, roughly 30% of the manufacturing workforce. 
The region has one of the highest concentrations of textile 
and clothing employment in Europe (FT 31.8.88). It is also a 
favourable location for multinational investment. Coats 
Viyella employs 4,000 people in 10 plants; Courtaulds has 9 
plants and Tootal also has production capacity in the 
region. Foreign owned companies include the American 
clothing firms, the Vanity Fair Corporation and Warners. The 
Board is presently encouraging Far Eastern clothing 
companies to site factories in Northern Ireland so that they 
can gain access to the EC market.
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38. The major unions in the British textile end clothing 
industry are the National Union of Tailors and Garment 
Workers (76,130), the Transport and General Workers Union, 
Dyers and Bleachers (51,000), the National Union of Hosiery 
and Knitwear Workers (51,357) and the Textile Division of 
the General, Nunicipal and Boilermakers Union (15,000).
These unions and a nunber of smaller textile unions are 
represented on the TUC Textile, Clothing and Pootvear 
Industries Committee which formulates unified responses to 
general industry issues, including imports, regulation of 
trade, sectoral measures, industrial policy etc. The GMB, 
TGWU, and NUHKW are members of the British Textile 
Confederation along with representatives of the main textile 
employers' associations (the BTEF etc.). The principal 
activity of the BTC 'is the promotion of policies for 
improving the prosperJcy of the British textile industry' 
and it co-operates with other organisations like the British 
Clothing Industry Association, the Knitting Industries 
Federation and the TUC Industry committee on issues of 
particular concern.
39. S.R. Gent, one of the larger Marks and Spencer 
suppliers, has established a Hong Kong office to source 
garments from sub-contractors in China, Hong Kong, Sri Lanka 
and the Philippines (FT 16.3.89).
40. Habitat and Mothercare merged with British Home Stores 
in 1985 to create Storehouse. This includes Habitat, Heal's, 
and Conran's in home furnishings; Mothercare, Now, and 
Richards in clothing and babywear, and BHS. Burton acquired
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Debenhams in 1985.
41. An average of five weeks between receiving an order and 
delivery of the product was reported in the fashion end of 
the woienswear earket.
42. All the unufacturers interviewed by Gibbs (1987) used 
computer systems for production planning and control. Only 
one firs, however, had introduced conputerised technology 
for design and manufacturing although a number of companies 
intended to invest in such machinery in the near future. The 
non-adoption of such systems was related to their high 
capital cost.
43. A new branded shirt has also been introduced, called 
'Varsity' and in June 1987, Peter England shirts were 
promoted through an advertising campaign, with the 
introduction of a new branded range called 'Signature'. 
Viyella Menswear, another of the company's branded shirt 
manufacturers, was also heavily advertised during the 1987 
trading year. The Viyella brand subsequently increased its 
share of UK shirt sales from 16% to 66%.
44. These were the Letterkenny polyester filament plant in 
Eire; the Caapsie sheet and workwear factory in Northern 
Ireland and the Belmont weaving plant in the UK.
45. After the company's failure to give the Labour 
Government an opening date for the company's new fabric 
factory at Belmont, Co. Dux-ham, the Government ordered the
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immediate repayment of the project's regional development 
grants. Government grants had accounted for about f6.8 mn. 
of the total investment of fl0.5 mn.
46. Previously, a high proportion of Courtaulds' output of 
nylon (60%) and polyester (80%) were purchased by 
Courtaulds' fabric businesses.
47. Comparisons are hindered because the company has 
reclassified its product divisions on tiro occasions during 
the 1980s. The present structure is thus:
Chemical and Industrial Products
Fibres - courtelle; viscose staple; acetate (Yarn) 
Chemical and Materials - chemicals; advanced materials; 
acetate products; non vovens 
Coatings - International Paint
Films and Packaging - cellophane; flexible packaging; 
plastic and specialty films; Betts and Amtico.
Textiles
Spinning; fabrics; clothing 
Wholesale and retailing
The definition of Courtaulds' textile activities used in 
this thesis is broader than Courtaulds own definition 
because it includes synthetic fibres.
48. The company's South African and Swazi woodpulp interests 
were sold in 1988. The company uses woodpulp in viscose 
fibres, cellophane and paper packaging.
49. Courtaulds used Pta 50 mn. of aid from the Spanish 
Government on a fully automated warehouse.
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50. In the financial year 1987-88, Courtaulds' three acrylic 
plants were operating below capacity and profits froe 
Courtelle fell by £35 an. (ie. froa £278 an. to £243 an.). 
This was due to a decline in deaand froa Western European 
textile firas attributable to a shift away froa knitwear 
towards aore tailored clothing; a sluap in the sale of brand 
knitting yarn, and currency aoveaents, particularly the rise 
in the value of sterling.
51. Courtaulds has taken a fira stand with its aajor 
customers in Prance by refusing to reduce the price of its 
acrylic fibre. This is part of a battle with its custoaers 
over the distribution of added value and profits.
52. Capital investaent expenditure over 1985-88 equalled 
£119 an.; 1985-86, £31 an.; 1986-87, £39 an. and 1987-88,
£49 an.
53. Its dependence on Narks and Spencer is revealed below:-
a) Underwear 77% Contract - 46% Marks and Spencer
23% Branded - Gossard, Kayser, Berlei. 
The Group has over 30% of Marks and Spencer's business in 
this area and is its aajor supplier.
b) Outerwear 97% contract - 43% to Marks and Spencer
3% branded - Brettles etc.
c) Knitwear 44% contract - 34% to Marks and Spencer
56% branded - Lyle and Scott, ffolsey
54. The case study of Courtaulds Hosiery was based on 
interviews during the suner of 1987 and were conducted with
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the following:
S. Spencer - Personnel Manager, Courtaulds Hosiery.
Margaret Bradley - Senior Shop Steward, Courtaulds Hosiery. 
P.J.S. Hutton - District Secretary, Ilkeston district of the 
National Union of Hosiery and Knitwear Workers (NUHKW)
W. Hage - Assistant District Secretary, Ilkeston district of 
the NUHKW
P. Lowaan - National Research Officer, NUHKW
55. Duffy (1985:72) argues that the NUHKW had shown a narked 
disinterest in equal value legislation, particularly in 
using it as a test case to re-evaluate feaale jobs in the 
industry.
56. The case study of the re-equipaent of Maple Mill (2), 
Courtaulds Spinning was based on interviews during the 
suner of 1986 and 1987 and were conducted with the 
following;
M. Parker - Managing Director, Courtaulds Spinning
B. Iveson - Personnel Director, Courtaulds Spinning
D. Dear - Personnel Manager, Courtaulds Spinning
D. Whitehead - General Manager, Maple Mill
Doreen Broadbent - Factory Personnel Manager, Maple Mill
J. Baines - General Manager, Cotton Yarns Group, Courtaulds
Spinning
R. Boase - Head Overlooker, Maple Mill (2)
M. Walsh - GMB Shop Steward, Maple Mill (2)
B. Trotter - General Secretary, GMB Textile Division 
P. Jenner - District Official, GMB Textile Division
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J. Brown - General Secretary, Amalgamated Textile Morkers' 
Union
J .  Martin - District Official, ATWU
57. In 1986, the average lowest basic rate stipulated by 
CourtauIds Spinning was 173.38 for a 37.5 hour week. By 
1988, this had generally risen to £88.60.
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